A MANUAL OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

REV. JOHN S. BANKS

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BY THE

REV. JOHN S. BANKS

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. *Christian Theology* may be briefly defined as the *Science of the Christian religion.* The word itself is a definition, meaning "discourse about God," a phrase enlarged in early days into "discourse about God and divine things."[1] There is a sense in which every doctrine refers to God.[2] Dr. Pope's definition is, "The science of God and divine things, based upon the revelation made to mankind in Jesus Christ, and variously systematised within the Christian Church."[3] Dr. Hodge's is substantially the same: "The exhibition of the facts of Scripture in their proper order and relation, with the principles or general truths involved in the facts themselves."[4] Here all turns upon the term "science." By scientific knowledge is meant systematic, reasoned knowledge, *i.e.* not merely the general knowledge which suffices for practical life, but such knowledge of the causes, relations, and laws of things as reason demands. In every other sphere man is not content with noting and registering facts as they are presented to observation,

[1] Λόγος περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν θείων.

[2] The term Theology is sometimes used, as by Hodge, to denote the doctrines relating specifically to the Divine existence, nature, and attributes. So Anthropology, Soteriology, Ecclesiology, Eschatology.

[3] *Comp. Theol.* i. 3.

[4] *Syst. Theol.* i. 19.

but seeks to reduce them to order and understand their inner connection. The result of this process is science. A process that is universally regarded as legitimate and indeed inevitable everywhere else, cannot be wrong in the religious life. Its legitimacy can only be contested on the supposition that theology does not deal with facts; in other words, that it is a mere collection of fancies and illusions, having no basis of reality. Is it so? The objects with which theology deals are the contents of the Christian consciousness, the belief in God, sin, redemption, immortality. This Christian consciousness or experience is too widespread to be explained away as mere fancy or illusion. Every fact with which theology deals is present explicitly or implicitly in the experience of every Christian. And but for the imperfection of Christians, and the difficulty of interpreting them, we might take their experience as the quarry from which to draw the materials of theology. But no such objections apply to Scripture, to which every Christian without exception appeals, and of which he is the product and reflection (1 Pet. 1^{23}). The perfect Christian experience, with all that it implies, the complete course of revelation of which each individual believer is the outcome, is found there. Scripture, then, is to theology what outward nature is to physical science; what the mind and its operations are to mental science. It supplies the materials, the facts or phenomena which theology uses.

The usefulness of theology is as little open to dispute as its legitimacy. It is necessary, not to ordinary Christians, but to Christian teachers and advocates. It is neither necessary nor possible that every one should be a lawyer, doctor, engineer; but every one who aspires to one of these professions must have more than the empirical knowledge which suffices for ordinary life. Times like ours are the last in which Christian teachers can afford to dispense with accurate and complete knowledge.

There is, then, as little or as much theology in Scripture as there is science in nature. The materials are there, nothing

more. Yet while it is true that all theology, like all science, is human and artificial, the order and laws which it formulates are all latent in the facts. It is only the form or expression that is human. We see a striking example of this in the technical terms which abound in theology. Such terms are a necessity in the framing of definitions. They save time, secure precision, and often exclude error. Objections to terms like Trinity, nature, person, homoousion, are at bottom objections to the doctrines which they bring to a point.[1]

A conventional but useful distinction, which we must ever bear in mind, is the one between doctrine and dogma. By the former we understand the systematised teaching of Scripture on any given subject; by the latter, the form which the doctrine has assumed as the result of development. In this way Biblical Theology and Dogmatic Theology arise. Every dogma is more or less a theory in the right sense, *i.e.* a statement embodying the implications and giving the *rationale* of the doctrine. Thus, there is both a doctrine and a dogma of every article of the Christian faith—the Trinity, Christ's Person, Atonement, Justification. It is in the field of dogma that the chief differences of the Christian world are found. Theological systems, creeds, and confessions express these differences. In the field of doctrine there is substantial unity.

The differences and antagonisms of theological systems are often used to disprove the scientific character of theology. "Contrast," it is said, "this Babel of opinions with the grand unity of scientific teaching." One reply is, that differences of Christian belief are grossly exaggerated, often by friends, always by foes. In times of controversy especially, like the Reformation, the points at issue inevitably throw the points held in common into the shade. We should be the last to minimise the differences between Romanism and Protestantism, or even between Calvinism and Arminianism, yet few realise the extent

[1] It is not only non-Christians who object to the technicalities of theology. Well-meaning but thoughtless Christians do the same. They might as well propose to abolish astronomy, geology, physical geography.

of the fundamental unity lying behind these differences. Again, a fairer comparison would be, not between theology and physical science, but between the former and mental science, where the subjects are in closer affinity. But where is the unity of mental and moral philosophy? The schools of Christian thought are certainly not more numerous than the schools of mental philosophy. Every great thinker is variously interpreted by different disciples. Nay, even in physical science, when we leave facts for theories (*i.e.* doctrine for dogma), we find as little unity as in the theological world. Note the different theories in geology and related sciences. Such differences are inevitable from the constitution of the human mind, from the wealth and many-sidedness of truth, and from the necessity of sometimes giving prominence to a particular truth or aspect of truth. And inevitable differences are innocent.

The scientific character of theology being admitted, the most important rule of procedure in it is, that the induction of facts which forms the basis of teaching should be complete. Every error in doctrine has arisen from the neglect of this rule. Every heresy, from the earliest to the latest, is the exaggeration or distortion of some one side of the truth to the neglect of other sides.

2. *Nature of Christian Evidence.*—The test of the sufficiency of evidence is, Is it the best of the kind appropriate to the subject? Physical truth must be established by experiment; historical, by testimony; spiritual, by the interrogation of consciousness, reason, and moral sense. To attempt to transpose any of these means of proof is folly. And yet some writers against Christianity appear to wish to do so. At least they demand better and stronger evidence than the best and strongest possible in the case. The disposition, observable in our days, to demand mathematical certainty for matters of religious belief is due to the prominence given to physical science. Exclusive dealing with subjects of physical science insensibly begets a craving for the same degree of certainty in other fields. Men overlook the important fields of conduct in which any such certainty is out of the question.

All truth may be classed as *intuitive, demonstrative, and probable.* The test of the first is that it is self-evident, it neither needs nor is capable of proof. Let any one try to give a reasoned demonstration of an axiom of Euclid. Truths coming under this head, though the foundation of all other truth, are comparatively few in number and abstract in nature. Demonstration, like intuition, gives absolute certainty, but does so by means of a course of reasoning. The conclusion of a geometrical theorem or problem is as certain as an axiom, but it is reached by way of proof. Demonstrated knowledge covers a wider area than the former kind; yet its extent is limited. It relates chiefly to the physical world. There is no doubt a wonderful charm in the certainties of mathematical processes. Their peril is that they beget impatience with every other kind of certainty. When we speak of the certainty attainable in every other field as amounting to probability, we use the term in a restricted sense. In popular usage the word probability suggests an element of doubt. But this is not a necessary element. I have no doubt that there is such a city as Rome, or that Julius Cæsar lived and fought, and yet my conviction only amounts to probability. Unlike the two other kinds of certainty, probability, as Butler points out, has endless diversity of degree, ranging from the lowest presumption to the highest moral certainty, according to the evidence. If the testimony by which facts of past history or present occurrence are made known to me fulfils every test applicable to testimony, my certainty of conviction as to the truth of the facts is as good for this sphere as that of intuition or demonstration is for other spheres. Testimony is the ground of faith and action in nine-tenths of the affairs of life. In matters of health, education, business, law, politics, morals, any other kind of certainty is impossible, and men never dream of asking for any other. The essential bases of Christianity consist of historical facts, verifiable by historical evidence, and by historical evidence only. The Christian case is that the evidence for Christianity is incomparably stronger than that for facts of

experience and history which no sane man ever dreams of doubting.

The feature of the Christian evidences which gives them this high degree of certainty is their cumulative character. Scarcely any article of the Christian creed, perhaps none, rests on a single line of argument; it is the goal of several converging lines. In legal cases, circumstantial is often more convincing than direct evidence. In the same way, Christian faith appeals to different witnesses—history, man's moral nature, living experience. The undesigned coincidence of such various and independent witnesses is conclusive to a fair mind. This feature also meets the case of different natures and generations. One is more impressed by the historical, another by the moral. In the last century the battle of faith and unbelief was fought on the ground of history and reason; the battle now turns more on the verdict of conscience.

Probably the reason why some demand higher than moral certainty for religious faith is the importance of the subject. It seems unbecoming for such great truths and such tremendous issues to rest on anything less than absolute certainty. Still we cannot go against facts and the nature of things. And the seeming disadvantage is not without compensation. Were religious certainty absolute, faith would be as compulsory in the religious as in the physical sphere. There would be as little room for the play of choice and the manifestation of character in one as in the other. In a word, faith would cease to be a moral act altogether. Whatever intellectual discipline may be found in the study of mathematical and physical truth, moral discipline is absent, moral emotion and enthusiasm are dormant, the wishes and inclinations of the inquirer form no factor in the case. On the other hand, where the conclusion depends on an overplus of probability, our attitude to the conclusion will insensibly influence our treatment of the evidence. Religious inquiry has always acted as a test of character. As men use or abuse their freedom, it becomes a stepping-stone or a stumbling-block to salvation (Luke 2^{34}).

The probable character of Christian evidence explains the fact of its rejection by many. It would be difficult to explain the rejection of self-evident or demonstrated truth. Moral wilfulness or perversity can scarcely be alleged in all cases. We grant that, even taking into account the point now under consideration, the vast amount of unbelief is staggering at first sight. Why should there be so much more scepticism in religion than in history, where the evidence is of the same kind, but far less in degree? The explanation is to be found in the difference of the interests at stake. Whether I believe in the facts of Roman and Greek history or not will make no difference in my life. But acceptance of Christianity involves the acceptance of a new law of life, a revolution of thought and practice of the most far-reaching kind. It is evident that where this consequence is disliked, some reason will be sought for avoiding it. If the practical issues were the same in the other case, historical infidels would be plentiful enough.

The mysteriousness of Christian doctrine is less objected to now than formerly. The material universe, history, human nature and life, natural religion, are seen to be no longer the simple things they were once thought to be in contrast with religion. Science does little more than arrange and connect facts; questions of nature and mode are as inscrutable as ever. The growth of trees, the mutual influence of mind and matter, to say nothing of the nature of either, are as mysterious as miracles. Yet ignorance in one class of questions does not invalidate knowledge in another. Knowledge is real and trustworthy as far as it goes. Our knowledge and ignorance relate to precisely the same class of questions in religious faith as in other spheres. In a word, we apprehend what we cannot comprehend (γνῶσις, ἐπίγνωσις).[1]

3. *Unity of Theology.*—This results from the unity of the

[1] See Dr. Mozley, *Lectures and Theological Papers*, essay on "Mysterious Truths," p. 108. "What we *deny* of God, we know in some measure—but what we *affirm* we know not; only we declare what we *believe* and adore."—Owen, *Works*, i. 66.

facts to which theology refers. Thus the unity is natural, not artificial,—the unity of a living organism, not of a machine. Christianity is a system, not a congeries, of doctrines, one or another of which may be removed without affecting the rest. The view taken of any leading doctrine determines the view taken of the rest. The views taken of the seriousness of sin and redemption react on each other. If sin be treated lightly, no need will exist for a costly remedy. Or, if we take low views of Christ's person and nature, we shall be driven to a reduced estimate of the evil of sin. Thus, Pelagianism and Socinianism always go together. Whichever of the two we begin with, we end with the other. Arianism involves the denial of the Trinity. Predestinarianism has far less serious consequences. Still it tells powerfully on the place given to personal repentance and faith. So again, in Romanist and Protestant systems of theology, there are certain central principles and doctrines which give character to the rest. Accept the Romanist theory of the Church, or the Protestant doctrine of the Sufficiency of Scripture, and the remainder of the system follows.

We here see the impossibility of separating theoretical from practical doctrines. All practice rests upon some theory, expressed or implied. They are two sides of the same thing. A one-sided object would be a curiosity. We cannot preach repentance and forgiveness without having some theory of their nature and their relations to other things. We can neither worship Christ nor refuse to worship him without holding some doctrine of his nature to justify our conduct. The Trinity is the most speculative doctrine of Christianity, and has raised more metaphysical issues than perhaps any other subject of inquiry. Yet its practical influence on Christian thought and life is enormous. Its presence or absence makes the difference between two Christianities.

The great body of truth held in common by all Christian Churches is often overlooked. In the confession of one God, of the Trinity, of a Divine Revelation in Scripture, of the Fall, of the Incarnation, the Atonement, Pardon and Regeneration, future

Eternal Awards, the Romanist and Protestant worlds are united. Without underrating the divergences which exist, we must not forget that those divergences often bear on the light in which certain blessings are to be viewed rather than on the fact whether such blessings exist. In both communions we must distinguish between the common Christian element and the distinctively Roman or Protestant element. The distinctive doctrines held by all sections of Protestantism are such as, the Sole Sufficiency of Scripture, Justification by Faith, etc. The common doctrines are neither Romanist nor Protestant, but Christian. Protestantism is often called a system of negations, but its negations are only of Romanist additions. The distinctively Romanist doctrines are the real negations, *i.e.* negations of the original Christian doctrines, to which the Reformation was a return. The divisions of Protestant Churches turn far more on questions of polity than of doctrine, and the doctrinal differences nowhere relate to essentials. The greatest controversy is that between Calvinist and Arminian, which bears only on a secondary point. The distinctive note of Lutheranism is its semi-Romanist doctrine of the Sacraments; of the Reformed bodies, their Predestinarian doctrine; of Anglicanism, its episcopal polity; of Independency, its congregational system; of Baptists, their views on two points relating to the sacrament of Baptism; of Methodism, its Arminianism and Experimental Theology. Presbyterian Churches are named after the form of church polity peculiar to them; in doctrine they belong to the Reformed side which follows Calvin. Independents and Baptists were originally one both in Predestinarian creed and congregational polity, differing only on the point of Baptism.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL FACTS

1. The Scripture parallel of different theologies is found in the difference between the teaching of the apostles Peter, Paul, and John. The influence of personal temperament on the form of teaching is as clearly seen in them as in modern systems. Peter has an eye for practical religion chiefly. Paul is the logical reasoner and systematiser. John is the Seer; he announces dogmatically what he has seen by intuition. Not only do they deal with different parts of the body of revealed truth, but even in expounding the same part they contemplate it on different sides and describe it by different terms. Here is incontestable proof that variety in form is quite consistent with substantive unity. In short, the inspired apostles are examples of that practice of giving prominence to one truth or aspect of truth which lies at the root of many modern differences.

In post-apostolic days we find marked divergence between the types of teaching followed at Antioch, Alexandria, and in North Africa respectively. The first led the way in the literal, grammatical exegesis of Scripture. Its sober, rational spirit savours more of the West than the East. Its chief representatives are Theodore of Mopsuestia, †428; Theodoret, †457; and Chrysostom, †407.[1] Alexandria was the home of eclectic, philosophical Christianity, the aim of which was to reconcile knowledge and faith. Its allegorising interpretation ran to great extremes. Its great names are Clement, †220; Origen, †254; Athanasius, †373. The North African Churches exhibit

[1] See Smith's *Dict. Christian Biogr.* for these and following names.

the practical spirit of the West. Cyprian, †258; Tertullian, †220; Augustine, †430, are its representatives. Here again we have differences without opposition.[1]

2. The substance of the faith of the Church in this its undivided period is preserved to us in the three "Œcumenical" Creeds[2]—the Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian. The Nicene is the only one that originated with a Church Council; the others grew up and passed into use spontaneously. The Nicene is the only one officially received in the Greek Church. The Apostles' is the oldest, its origin being lost in the obscurity of the first centuries. In a briefer form it can be shown to have been used and held in the highest esteem[3] in the Church at Rome from the middle of the third century to the end of the fifth. Harnack conjectures it may have arisen in the middle of the second century "on the basis of the baptismal confession and of Eastern formulas."[4] From the end of the sixth to the middle of the tenth century it was superseded in Rome by the Nicene, which was adopted as a defence against Arian doctrine brought to Rome by Odoacer and his Goths. When the use of the Apostles' Creed was resumed at Rome at the latter period, the present enlarged form, which arose in the churches of South Gaul at about the same time, was adopted. In the 2nd ed. of the *Realencyk.* Harnack held with other scholars that there was a contemporaneous creed-development in the East; but in the 3rd ed. he says that there is no proof of the existence of a fixed creed there before the beginning of the third century. Still at that time Clement Alex., Irenæus, and Tertullian speak of a Rule of Faith, Rule of Truth, Rule of the Church as already known, and specify contents which agree with our Creed.[5]

[1] On the schools of Alexandria and Antioch, see Blunt, *Dict. Theology.*

[2] Symbol also = creed; symbol literally = sign, compendium. The term is much used in Germany, where Symbolics = History of Creeds.

[3] Its composition was attributed to the apostles.

[4] *Realencyk.* i. 753, 3rd ed.

[5] As Harnack allows that even Ignatius and Justin have doctrinal statements like those in the Creed, the difference between him and other scholars is not great.

The first General Council was summoned at Nicæa (325) by the Emperor Constantine, in order to settle the questions raised by Arius. The Bishop of Rome was represented by two presbyters; but the West was really represented by Hosius of Cordova. The Arian doctrine had many powerful supporters, like Eusebius of Nicomedia. There was also a party of compromise led by Eusebius of Cæsarea. The orthodox doctrine was carried through by the Alexandrian party, under the influence of Athanasius, then only a deacon. Eusebius of Cæsarea proposed the adoption of the creed of his own Church. This was done eventually, but not until changes were made which removed its ambiguous character, such as the omission of "firstborn of all creation," replacing "Word of God" by "Son of God," and especially adding "begotten, not made," and "of one substance" (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father. The latter term was opposed by the Arians as unbiblical. The original Creed ended at the words "Holy Ghost," besides wanting clauses in the present earlier part. Formerly it was generally supposed that the Creed was completed at the Council of Constantinople, 381; hence often called Nicæno-Constantinopolitan. But the Council of 381 simply ratified the original Creed of Nicæa; and Hort and Harnack have shown that the basis of the present Nicene Creed was the Creed of Jerusalem, which was revised about 370 A.D. by Cyril of Jerusalem in a Nicene sense, clauses from the Nicene being added. The present Creed appears in a work of Epiphanius about 374, and gradually passed into general use as a Baptismal Creed.[1] The *Filioque* was added at the Synod of Toledo, 589, and sanctioned at Frankfort, 794. It thus appears that the original Nicene Creed and the present Creed are two distinct documents.

[1] Harnack holds that the Council of 381 was not Œcumenical, but received its Œcumenical character in the East about 450 A.D. through the influence of Constantinople, and a century later in the West, when Rome was under the influence of the East. The appearance of the Creed in the Acts of Chalcedon, 451, as the Creed of Constantinople, is regarded as an interpolation.

The origin of the Athanasian Creed is lost in obscurity. It was not the work of Athanasius. The Greek form of the Creed is plainly a translation from the Latin. The first part bears the stamp of Augustine. Some of the heresies referred to are subsequent to Athanasius. The Creed comes into the full light of day in its present form in the ninth century; and this led Swainson and Lumby in their Histories of the Creeds to date the composition then, of course referring to earlier forms which supplied the materials. The latest investigators, Dr. Loofs[1] and Mr. Burn,[2] take a different course. They refer to "Expositions of the Creed," statements in writers of the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, and decisions of Synods of the same date,[3] which, to a greater or less extent, resemble the clauses of the Creed without naming it. Four of the writers are connected with the Monastery of Lerins in Gaul in the fifth century, viz. Vincentius, author of the *Commonitorium;* Faustus of Rhegium, abbot from 433 to 462; Eucherius of Lyons, who was a monk there 416–434; other writers with such passages are, Cæsarius of Arles, sixth century; Vigilius of Thapsus, sixth; Isidore of Seville, seventh. It is certain that the Creed was ascribed to Athanasius at the end of the eighth or beginning of the ninth century; but Dr. Loofs thinks that it was so ascribed as early as 670, at the Synod of Autun. All the facts point to South Gaul as the place of origin; at that time South Gaul was the scene of remarkable theological activity. Dr. Loofs would make the Creed the "final outcome" of all these expositions and discussions. Mr. Burn would place the actual writing of the Creed from 420 to 430 (p. 145). But if Mr. Burn's views were correct, it is strange that the Creed is never quoted during the centuries immediately following that period, but that we have only statements more or less similar. Dr. Loofs says, "The *Quicunque* is no mediæval

[1] *Realencyk.* 3rd ed., *Athanasianum.*

[2] *Introduction to Creeds.*

[3] Such as Carthage, 484; and several Synods at Toledo, 447, 589, 633, 675 A.D.; Milan, 680.

product" (as Swainson and Lumby thought), "it is the final outcome (*Niederschlag*) of the ancient expositions of the Creed in the West." The Creed is sometimes called a "Psalm." In form it is less like a creed than one of the early "sermons" on the Creed, or "expositions" of the Creed. It was never sanctioned by any Council, but passed into general use of itself.[1]

These creeds are far from being complete summaries of Christian doctrine. The Nicene deals mainly with the Incarnation, the Athanasian with the Trinity and the Incarnation. These two Creeds were directed against current errors. The first General Councils did not profess to teach new doctrine, but only to define what the Church had always understood to be the mind of Scripture on particular points. Whether they defined correctly is for each Church to decide. To the Roman Church General Councils have a divine commission to define doctrine, not so in Protestantism. "The Three Creeds ought thoroughly to be received and believed, for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture" (Eng. Art. viii.). "General Councils may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God" (Art. xxi.).[2]

The Eastern and Western Churches have taken different parts in the definition of doctrine. To the East, with its fondness for metaphysical subtleties, we owe the dogma of the Trinity and the doctrines bearing on the nature of the Godhead. The more practical genius of the West has busied itself with the doctrines of Sin and Redemption.

3. The first great division in the Church was that between the East and West, resulting in the establishment of the Greek and Latin Churches. The sole doctrinal point involved was

[1] Dr. Swainson (*Nicene and Apostles' Creeds*, p. 380) applies the terms "forgery" and "imposture" to the publication of the Creed under the name of Athanasius, and reminds us that the same age produced the Forged Decretals.

[2] First seven General Councils: Nicæa, 325; Constantinople, 381; Ephesus, 431; Chalcedon, 451; Second Constantinople, 553; Third Constantinople, 680; Second Nicæa, 787. The Roman Catholic Church receives eighteen General Councils before the Vatican one of 1870.

the single or double procession of the Holy Spirit. The East, taking its stand on the earlier councils and creeds, refused to admit the *Filioque* ("and from the Son") clause into the Nicene Creed, and affirmed the single procession; the West took the other side. The lawfulness of image-worship and the date of Easter were other subjects of strife, the first especially. For images the Greek Church substitutes pictures. These were the ostensible causes of separation. The more potent cause, however, was the rivalry of the two pontiffs of Constantinople and Rome. The strife was almost as much political as ecclesiastical, and the decline of the Eastern empire greatly helped the victory of the Roman bishop. It is difficult to fix the exact date of the division. In the ninth century the two pontiffs had got to the point of excommunicating each other. The Greek Church, by its boasted title of "orthodox," casts the stigma of heresy on its Roman sister. The Roman Church has certainly shown most life and energy.

The following are the chief doctrinal standards:—

Greek Church.—First Six General Councils, 325–680 A.D.; to which are added the Quinisextine Council, 692; and 2 Counc. Nicæa, 787.

Confessio Dosithei (Jerusalem), 672.

Confessio Orthodoxa, 1643, work of the Patriarch, Cyril Lucar.

Two other Confessions have great influence, that of Patriarch Gennadius, presented in 1453 to the Sultan Mahmoud II., and that of the Patriarch Kritopulus (Alexandria), 1625.

Roman Church.—*Canons and Decrees of Council of Trent*, 1545–63.

Professio Fidei Tridentina, 1564, under Pius IV.

Roman Catechism, 1566, under Pius V.[1]

Lutheran Church.—*Augsburg Confession* (Augustana), 1530, chiefly Melancthon's work, presented at Augsb. Diet to Charles V., the most comprehensive statement of Re-

[1] Cramp, *Text-book of Popery*, 1839; Jenkins, *Creed of Pius IV.*

formation teaching, called also Conf. Aug. *Invariata*, in distinction from the Conf. Aug. *Variata* of 1540.

Apology for ditto, drawn up by Melanethon in reply to Roman Confutation of Conf. Aug., 1530.

Smalcald Articles, 1537, controversial.

Great and Small Catechisms, 1527–29.

Formula of Concord, 1577, drawn up by Chemnitz, Andreä, and four other divines.

Reformed Church.—*Basle Confession*, 1534, Œcolampadius and Myconius; *Helvetic Conf.* i., 1536, Bucer. These two belong to the Zwinglian side, the following to Calvin:—

Helv. Conf. ii., 1562, Bullinger; *Canons of Dort*, 1618–19; *Geneva Catechism*, 1545; *Consensus Tigurinus*, 1549; *Consensus Genevensis*, *Formula Cons. Helvetici*, 1675.

Gallic Confession, 1559, some say by Calvin.

Belgic Confession, 1562, *Scottish Conf.*

Heidelberg Catechism, 1563, Ursinus and Olevianus.

Westminster Conf., 1643–48; Longer and Shorter Catechisms.

Anglican Church.—39 Articles, 1571, Prayer-Book, and Catechism.

Wesleyan Church.—Wesley's First 53 Sermons and the Notes on the New Testament.

Society of Friends.—Barclay's *Apology*, 1676.[1]

4. Two other movements outside the sphere of Creeds demanding notice are *Mysticism* and *Rationalism*. These represent not distinct schools, but tendencies of thought present more or less in every age. Both are exaggerations of truth. If mysticism emphasises the spiritual nature of Christianity as a divine life in man and personal fellowship with God, it is evident that there is a true, scriptural mysticism. See John 14^{23}, 17^{23}, Gal. 2^{20}; also Paul's phrase, "in Christ" and "Christ in us," 2 Cor. 5^{17}, Rom. 8^{10}. This is the true mystical union, which is the soul of true religion. Very often personal, experimental

[1] Winer, *Confessions of Christendom*

religion is condemned under the name of Mysticism. The latter term should be reserved for the teaching which isolates the inward and spiritual from doctrine and the means of grace, and also for the theosophic speculation which seeks to penetrate into the secret depths of the Godhead. Mysticism in this form claims to know God by intuition, and aspires to essential union with him. Then it borders on pantheism. Erigena (9th cent.) and Jacob Behmen, †1624, represent it, and William Law, in so far as he follows Behmen. Mysticism in one form or another often arises as a reaction against hard ceremonialism or intellectualism in the Church. Bernard (12th cent.), Hugo St. Victor and Richard St. Victor (12th), Bonaventura (13th), were great mediæval mystics.[1] "The Brethren of the Common Life" and "Friends of God" were orders of mystics. Eckhart and Tauler (14th cent.), Thomas à Kempis (15th), are mystics of another kind, "Pietists" of the Middle Ages.[2] The Pietists of the seventeenth century were a reaction against the hard dogmatism of Protestantism (Spener, Tersteegen). The better mystics have rendered invaluable service to Christianity, keeping up a witness for spiritual religion. Fénélon and Madame Guion (17th cent.), St. Theresa and John of the Cross (16th cent., in Spain), Molinos (Spain, 17th cent.), are other examples. The charge of Quietism was brought against Molinos and Madame Guion.[3]

Rationalism is at the other extreme. It lays as great emphasis on reason and proof as mysticism does on feeling. Reason is the judge and man the measure of truth. Miracle, supernatural revelation, authority in matters of faith, are re-

[1] Dionysius the Areopagite (5th cent.), and Maximus the Confessor (7th), are earlier examples.

[2] Luther was greatly influenced by these and by the anonymous little work, *German Theology* (Macmillan). Henry Suso and Joh. Ruysbroek also deserve mention.

[3] Inge, *Christian Mysticism;* Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, 2 vols.; Law, *Spirit of Prayer*, for a statement of Behmen's views.

jected as infringing the rights or transcending the limits of reason. Christianity is represented as the perfection of natural religion. This tendency exists in endless difference of degree, from modest criticism to mere deism. Modern rationalism took its rise and shape in England about two centuries ago. Lord Herbert, †1648; Hobbes, †1679; Toland, †1722; Shaftesbury, †1773; Collins, †1729; Tindal, †1733; Bolingbroke, †1751, were among its leaders. From England the seed was carried to France, Holland, and Germany, where it grew into a terrible harvest, ending with Feuerbach and Strauss, †1874. In England the evil was largely checked by apologists like Lardner, Paley, Butler, the Boyle and Bampton Lectures, and still more by the Evangelical Revival. In Germany the revival of faith began with Schleiermacher, †1834, whose "Discourses on Religion, addressed to Educated Despisers of Religion," formed a turning-point in thought. The evangelical element in Schleiermacher was due to the Moravian influence of his early life. His teaching has modified all subsequent religious thought in Germany.[1]

5. The Christian Fathers, while they are not theologians in the technical sense, greatly influenced and often determined the course of thought in later days. The Orations of Athanasius against the Arians and Augustine's Anti-Pelagian Treatises[2] are republished by Dr. Bright (Clar. Press). Theology proper may be said to begin with the *Exposition of the Faith* of John of Damascus (8th cent.).

In the Middle Ages theology reigned as queen among the sciences. Anselm (†1109) in his *Cur Deus Homo* gave the first reasoned theory of the atonement. His *Proslogium* started the *a priori* argument for the Divine existence. While mediæval divines, whose name is legion, drew their material from Scripture and the Fathers, their principles of reasoning

[1] Hurst, *History of Rationalism;* Dorner, *Protestant Theology,* vol. ii. 66; Leland, *Deistical Writers in England;* A. S. Farrar, *Critical Hist. of Free Thought.*

[2] Published also in translations.

and forms of statement were ruled by Aristotle's metaphysical treatises,[1] a singular combination. Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences* was a text-book, and formed the subject of innumerable commentaries (†1164). Thomas Aquinas (†1274) summed up the learning and genius of those days. Though dying in his forty-ninth year, he found time to write works on philosophy, exegesis,[2] and theology, which fill from twenty to thirty folios. His *Summa Theologiæ* is still a text-book in the Roman Church. The great philosophical controversy of the scholastics was the one between Realism and Nominalism, the former holding (with Plato) that general ideas exist before and independently of things, the latter that they are simply human conceptions formed after and from things. The middle course was (with Aristotle) to regard them as only existing in things. Nominalism finally triumphed, and with its triumph came the dissolution of scholasticism. The fondness of mediæval divines for controversy and hair-splitting distinctions must not blind us to their industry, their religious sincerity, their philosophical acuteness. We have received much from them.[3] The tradition of Roman Catholic learning is well continued by Bellarmin, Petavius (*Opus de theologicis Dogmatibus*), Perrone (*Prelectiones Theologicæ*).

Protestant theology began with Melancthon's *Common-places*, 1521, consisting of expositions of the topics in the Epistle to the Romans. It ran through eighty editions in the author's lifetime, and gave its title (*Loci Communes*) to many more elaborate treatises. Then came the age of the great "Protestant Scholastics,"—on the Lutheran side, Chemnitz, †1586; Gerhard, 1637; Quenstedt, 1688; Calov, 1686; Hollatz, 1713;

[1] The knowledge of Aristotle in Europe in the Middle Ages came through his Arabian translators in Spain.

[2] His *Catena Aurea*, from the Fathers on the Gospels, has been translated in 8 vols.

[3] Each great teacher received a characteristic title. Albert the Great was the Universal Doctor; Alexander of Hales, the Irrefragable Doctor; Bonaventura, the Seraphical; Aquinas, the Angelical; Duns Scotus, the Subtle; William of Ockham, the Invincible Doctor.

on the Reformed, Calvin, †1564; F. Turretine, †1687. Calvin's *Institutes* is the prime authority for Reformed doctrine. Its arrangement follows the order of the Trinity. The old English theology is well worthy of study. It is divided into two schools, Anglican and Puritan, not unequal in learning, although differing in many respects:—Hooker (3 vols.), Barrow (8 or 3 vols.), Dean Jackson (*On the Apostles' Creed*, 12 vols.), Bull (8 vols., especially the *Defence of the Nicene Creed*), Waterland (6 or 12 vols., writes ably on Christ's Divinity, the Trinity, Sacraments, the Eucharist, Athanasian Creed), Pearson (on Apostles' Creed), Owen (16 vols.), Howe (6 vols.), Thomas Goodwin (12 vols.), John Goodwin, Baxter.

Modern writers.—Hodge, *System of Theology*, 3 vols., Augustinian; Pope, *Compendium of Theology*, 3 vols., Arminian; R. Watson, *Institutes;* Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics;* Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, 4 vols.; Oosterzee, *Dogmatic Theology;* Harold Browne, *On 39 Articles;* Gibson, *39 Articles*, 2 vols.; Moule, *Outlines of Christian Doctrine;* Orr, *Christian View of God and the World.*

6. *Branches of Theology.*—(*a*) Biblical theology presents the doctrines of Scripture in systematic order, noting their implications and connection. It presses Hermeneutics, Textual Criticism, Introduction, Archæology, Study of the Sacred Tongues, into its service. Biblical doctrine is of course the basis and starting-point of all other.[1] (*b*) Historical theology traces the changes of form which doctrine has undergone and the stages by which it has passed into dogma. Church history, and especially the history of dogma and creeds, here comes into use.[2] (*c*) Systematic or dogmatic theology combines the results of the two former branches into one connected statement.

[1] *Theology of O.T.*, Oehler, 2 vols.; Schultz, 2 vols. (Clark). *Theology of N.T.*, Schmid, Weiss, 2 vols.; Stevens, Beyschlag, 2 vols. (Clark); Stevens, *Pauline Theology* and *Johannine Theology.*

[2] Neander, *History of Christian Dogmas*, 2 vols.; *History of Christian Doctrines*, Hagenbach, 3 vols.; Shedd, 2 vols.; G. P. Fisher, Crippen (Clark).

(*d*) Practical theology deals with Homiletics, Pastoral Work, etc.

In Germany a separate subject, *Encyklopädie*, gives a brief survey of the entire field of theology, dividing and subdividing the several branches, with references to writers and works under each head.[1] Räbiger makes four divisions—Exegetical, Historical, Systematic, Practical. The first includes Hermeneutics, Linguistics, Biblical Criticism, Archæology, Jewish History, Introduction to O. and N. Testaments, Exegesis, Biblical Theology; the second includes Church History, which again covers History of Missions and Worship and History of Doctrines; the third includes Dogmatics and Ethics; the fourth, Church Organisation, Liturgies, Catechetics, Pastoral Work, Symbolics or History of Creeds Other writers give far more elaborate divisions.

7. *Order of Treatment.*—The subject of Christian theology proper, as of Scripture, is Redemption. Every doctrine is a doctrine of Redemption. But this again presupposes the truth of certain other doctrines, viz. the Divine Existence, Divine Revelation in Scripture, Divine Nature and Attributes, Divine Works of Creation and Providence, Sin. All these truths are clearly anterior and necessary to Redemption, which is a special provision for a special need. We must believe that God is, and that Scripture is his Word, before we can receive its teaching on the subject of Redemption. The Divine Nature and Attributes, Creation and Providence, would have been what they are had no need for Redemption arisen.

A natural order of discussion therefore is: 1. Doctrines Presupposed—Divine Existence, Divine Revelation in Scripture, Divine Nature and Attributes, Creation and Providence, Sin. 2. Doctrines of Redemption—Incarnation, Atonement, Nature and Conditions of Benefits of Redemption, Church and Sacraments, Future State.

[1] Hagenbach (translated by Crooks and Hurst, New York); Räbiger, 2 vols. (Clark); Cave, *Introduction to Theology* (Clark).

PART FIRST

DOCTRINES PRESUPPOSED OR PRELIMINARY

CHAPTER I

THE DIVINE EXISTENCE

The question arises, whether we come to know God's existence by intuition or by reasoning. The former view prevailed among the early Fathers, and is held by some German and English divines. Philosophical idealists will hear of nothing else, despising arguments which give us no more than probability even of the highest degree. The universal existence of religion and worship, the great systems of religion which have exerted such influence on the world, point to roots of religion in human nature. Atheism is not natural to man, it is always the result of reasoning. Man is naturally a believer and worshipper, bearing out Tertullian's saying about the "soul naturally Christian." But whether instinct and intuition give us the full idea of God, is another question. The facts just mentioned are sufficiently explained, if we suppose that self-evident truths play a part in the process. Divines who lay great stress on intuition, still use the common arguments.[1]

[1] Dr. Pope says, God's existence being "innate and connate does not mean that this full knowledge is found in every mind as an object of consciousness, but that the constitution of human nature is such that it develops a consciousness of God, when God presents himself, even as it grows up into a consciousness of self and of the outer world."—*Comp.* i. 235. Westcott, *Gospel of Life*, p. 34.

Principles, which we take for granted and cannot prove, underlie all our knowledge. The causal principle, so much used in the present argument, is assumed as universally true in all human knowledge and action. Experience cannot give us this element of universality and necessity.

Kant attacked the arguments, known as the cosmological, teleological, and ontological, from the philosophic standpoint, pointing out what they failed to do. Certainly they do not claim to possess mathematical stringency. Their effect is cumulative. They appeal at some points to the balance of probability, but the balance is immensely on the side of faith. Kant laid all the stress on the moral argument, and it seems to us that here also the appeal is to a balance of probability. If these old arguments do not prove everything, it does not follow that they are useless.

The Ritschlian school sets aside the same arguments along with all Natural Theology, using Kant's objections. We are said to owe all our knowledge of God to positive revelation, and finally to Jesus Christ. But supposing that on this or any ground we believe in God as the world's Creator and Ruler, does the world tell us nothing of its Maker? Psalmists, prophets, and apostles thought so. Even such knowledge as the heathen gained from this source was better than none. It prepared the way for fuller teaching.

The *a posteriori* argument branches into four parts, the cosmological, teleological, moral, and ontological.

1. Cosmological, or Aetiological. This is an argument from the mere existence of the world. The design argument belongs to the next head. The present argument, like the next two, is an application to facts of the law of causality, that every beginning must have a cause.[1] Is this principle intuitive, or a generalisation from facts? The first view is the more probable one, for wherever the terms of the proposition are understood

[1] Usually stated as "Every effect must have a cause," which is tautological. Rightly explained, however, the current phrase may be conveniently used.

it is seen to be self-evident. It is universally and necessarily true. But even if the principle were regarded as a generalisation from experience, its certainty would scarcely be lessened, for no principle is more abundantly confirmed by experience. There is no exception to its truth. An uncaused beginning is inconceivable, or self-contradictory. The empirical or sensational school of thought—Brown, Hume, Mill, Bain—define causality as mere invariable antecedence and sequence, rejecting the notion of efficient power or necessary connection. But causality includes more than invariable connection or sequence, which is often present where causality is never thought of. The saying *post hoc propter hoc* illustrates this. True, all that is visible is the connection—the causal power is interposed by reason to explain the connection. But is this an illusion or unwarranted conjecture, as empiricists and positivists say? Then our nature deceives us; for it is at its bidding that we seek a cause for facts, and are restless till we have found it. Positivism, in absolutely restricting our thought to phenomena, is fighting against the oldest and most deeply rooted instinct of human nature. It is also universally felt that only an intelligent cause is a true cause. Mere mechanical causes never satisfy us. The empirical philosophy would do away with the present argument for God and religion, because on its principles we must not ask for any cause whatever of the invariable connection into which it resolves causality. At the same time, it does away also with mind in man, mind being only conceivable as a cause of thought. Perhaps it matters less that it does away with matter as the cause or subject of phenomena,—all that it leaves being phenomena and their relations.

Applying, then, the principle of causality to the world, the argument runs: Every beginning has a cause; the world had a beginning (or, is an effect), therefore the world had a cause. Here all turns on the second premise. Had the world a beginning? Or, is it an effect? Is this view or the opposite one the more probable? It is not essential to our argument to consider whether the matter itself of the world had a beginning

or not. Looking at present only at the form of the world and its component parts, it is quite certain that these forms had a beginning, or rather many beginnings. It is matter of certainty that they are the result of previous forms, and these of others, and so on. The world and everything in it have taken their present shape as the result of previous states. Every atom yet discovered is "a manufactured article." A real atom is purely hypothetical. We are face to face then with a dilemma. Either this process has been going on from all eternity, or there has been a beginning in a cause adequate to the production of all that follows. One of these two conclusions is inevitable. The first, we may safely say, is no *conclusion* at all. It simply sends us on in an infinite regress from point to point. It may float as a vague possibility before the mind, but it has never formed the doctrine of a school, which is sufficient evidence of the verdict of the world upon it. The other inevitable conclusion is the theistic one. The theistic inference, then, does not follow directly from the use of the causal principle. It is the remaining alternative in a dilemma, the other member of which has been ruled out of court.

We have said that we do not need to prove that the matter of the world had a beginning. Still it is the more probable view, because the alternative is the eternity of matter. A cause that is adequate to the creation of the form of the world is adequate to the creation of its matter, which is thus superfluous as an independent existence, and excluded by the law of parsimony of causes. It would also be fatal to the independence of the other cause. As to the theory of matter being the cause of all things, this would make it the cause of mind. Mind may be the cause of matter, but not conversely.

It is said that this argument does not prove the necessity of an intelligent cause, much less a moral one. The first cause may be merely mechanical. But, speaking in a large sense, mind is part of the universe. Its cause must be intelligent. The most superficial glance also shows that the world is a unity,

which can only be explained as the result of intelligence. The chief argument, however, on this point falls under other heads.

It is also alleged that the argument does not prove the supposed cause to be infinite. The universe, if an effect, is only a finite one, and requires only a finite cause. This point also belongs to another branch of the argument—the fourth. Meantime it may be remarked, that one of the most notable fruits of science is its revelation of the immeasurable vastness and complexity of the universe. A cause adequate to the creation of such a system is at least practically infinite.

If it be said that the law of causality requires a cause for God himself, the reply is that neither intuition nor experience teaches us that everything must have a cause, but only every beginning, every event. "Everything must have a cause" is a pure assumption, which would lead us back in an infinite regress.

Agnosticism asks, "Why come to any decision at all? Why not leave everything in suspense?" Because such suspense is repugnant to human nature. And if our nature in compelling us to decide is not to be trusted, nothing is to be trusted. Why is the agnostic in religion not an agnostic in questions of health, business, character, where he has far less certain probabilities to go upon? Consistency is with the believer, not with the agnostic.[1]

2. Teleological. This is the design argument proper, or the argument from final causes. Its principle is a form of the causal principle. A particular kind of beginning (or effect) requires a particular kind of cause. It may be put thus: Order or purpose requires intelligence as its cause.[2] Whether this principle is intuitive or a generalised experience, its truth is undeniable. Wherever we see purpose accomplished, especially by the combination and adaptation of means, we know that the purpose is not in the means, but in some mind that existed

[1] Flint, *Theism*, Lect. iv.; Randles, *First Principles*, p. 25, etc.; Pearson on *Creed*, Art. i.; Barrow on *Creed*, Serm. vi. and vii.

[2] "Design implies a designer," is also tautological. Still the phrase is convenient.

outside of and before them.[1] Strictly speaking, there is no design or purpose in things, but only the marks of design, the design being in mind only. Illustration of marks of design in the universe is needless. The universe is one vast system of means and ends. We see this alike in the world of the little revealed by the microscope, and in the world of the great commanded by the telescope.

The fact is admitted by those who reject the argument based upon it. These say, "Undoubtedly the world is full of marks of design, or of what would be such in the works of man. But here the marks are deceptive." Why? "Because," it is said, "we cannot argue from art to nature. One is no guide to the other. That may be true in one sphere which is false in the other. We have seen watches made, but have not seen a world made." But even on the supposition that the law of causality originates in experience, is there any warrant for the assertion that the generalised results of experience are applicable only to artificial products? Though two and two watches make four watches, do two and two trees make five trees? Is it conceivable that this should be the case anywhere? The causal principle might just as well be restricted to each class of products as to the aggregate. We might just as well say that although a watch or bridge, as evidencing design, must be the fruit of intelligence, something that we have never seen in course of making need not be so. In the case of such a proposition as, "Order is the result of intelligence, and is impossible without it," how is the possibility of an exception conceivable? What valid reason can be given for its restriction? Dr. Flint's view is that the

[1] "For myself this obstinate conception occurs again and again, that the whole, as it develops and will be developed, in space and time, determined all the parts of that whole—which it could only do on the supposition that it pre-existed in thought—the thought, therefore, of some Being capable of *so* thinking and *so* acting,—not thinking or acting as a human being. I find this conviction even stronger in me than that which demands some one permanent being (conscious or unconscious) as mere *cause* of all this Becoming we witness; though the two lines of thought and feeling may easily be harmonised."—W. Smith *Gravenhurst*, 2nd ed. p. 415.

theistic position is not an argument from art to nature, but an application of the same self-evident principle to both,[1] and this is really the true view. The construction of watches, etc., is merely an illustration, and the basis of argument. We have argued, however, on the lower view of the causal principle. Every one, then, who rejects the theistic inference holds that although order, adaptation, purpose in human works can only be explained by an intelligent cause, the same things in nature, on an immensely greater scale and of a far more wonderful kind, require no such cause. A poor specimen of contrivance is impossible without intelligence; a miracle of what has every appearance of being contrivance is possible without intelligence! The atheistic theory has no explanation of the world, for a mere catalogue of phenomenal sequences is no explanation. There would be an excuse for atheism or agnosticism if no key to the mystery of nature were at hand, and if it were not a settled rule in other fields to argue from the known to the unknown; but when the key lies at our feet, and the rule is in common use, to refuse to see the key or apply the rule is the very height of sophistry.

The theory of evolution modifies, but it does not destroy, the design argument. According to that theory, species and single objects, instead of being created separately, are steps in a long process, parts of a self-developing organism. But this in no way alters the fact of adaptation of means to ends. If man, imitating nature, could make the objects he calls into existence reproduce themselves as plants and animals do, this would not be less evidence of designing skill on his part. If the human eye, instead of being created perfect at once, is a development from rudimentary forms, this does not affect the question of means and ends. The design on the evolution basis is on a large scale, and is seen in things as wholes instead of in the separate parts. My knowledge of the structure of a machine does not do away with the need of an intelligent maker. All

[1] *Theism*, p. 116. On whole argument see Lect. v. and vi.; Harris, *Self-Revelation of God*, p. 314; Janet, *Final Causes*, p. 322; W. Arthur, *Difference between Physical and Moral Law*.

that evolution or science gives us is insight into the mechanical structure or system of the world.[1]

Dr. J. H. Kennedy, in his *Natural Theology*, has drawn a strong argument from the presence of beauty as an ideal end in creation. It is difficult not to believe that the world was made, so to speak, with an eye to beauty, just as buildings are raised, pictures painted, poems written with this end in view. The impression on us is very real and strong. Is it merely a result of the forms of nature, not a foreseen end? As an end, it is an intensely ideal conception.

The modern doctrine of the universal presence of law is altogether in our favour. Human geometry is a trifle to the geometry of the universe. The movements of systems and the form of a crystal are determined with mathematical precision Were the world a chaos instead of a cosmos, we might dispense with intelligence at its source. This branch of the argument has always been felt to be the most conclusive and useful. The field of illustration grows with the growth of knowledge.

3. Moral. This argument is another application of the causal principle. The moral world, consisting of the laws of right to which man is subject, their operations and effects, is as real, as orderly and full of purpose, as the physical, and can only be explained by a cause of the same nature as itself. The chief fact of this world is conscience. Our argument is unaffected by any theory we form of the nature and origin of conscience.[2] However we define or derive it, it stands before us as a fact of unique character. It announces the supreme distinction of right and wrong; commands one, forbids the other; praises if we obey, condemns if we disobey. Its praise is sweeter, its condemnation heavier than any outward praise or blame. Still conscience does not make, it simply announces and administers, moral law. That law is independent of man, unvarying from age to age. How can it be pretended that the moral law is

[1] Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, p. 119.

[2] "Conscience is a man's judgment of himself according to the judgment of God of him."—Ames on *Conscience*, 1643.

of man's making, when it governs and often condemns him? Would he spontaneously set up a judge, accuser, and tormentor in his own breast? He no more determines what shall be the law of his moral life than he determines the conditions of his physical life. Moreover, the existence of purpose, adaptation of means to ends, is as certain in this as in the material world. The beauty of a virtuous life, the rewards and punishments of moral government, the motives urging to good and dissuading from evil, are as clear proofs of intelligence as anything in visible nature. The laws are as inexorable, the issues as certain, in one case as in the other. The existence, then, and order of the moral world not merely demand an author, but reveal his character, declare him to be the friend of righteousness and the foe of wrong.

This argument has always weighed much with thoughtful minds. Sophocles speaks of "The unwritten laws of God that know not change; they are not of to-day or yesterday, but live for ever." Cicero says of the moral law, "It is not one thing at Rome, another at Athens; one thing now and another in former or future ages; but in all ages and nations it is, has been, and will be one and everlasting." Kant was content to rest the whole argument for God on the moral law. Two things, he said, never ceased to call forth his wonder: the order of the starry heavens and the order of the moral world. Butler says, "Had conscience might as it has right, it would rule the world." "All's love, yet all's law," is Browning's dictum. St. Paul speaks of "the law written in their hearts."[1]

4. Ontological.[2] If the previous arguments are good, they have proved the existence of a great First Cause, powerful, wise, and just. We have, however, the ideas of infinity,

[1] Wace, *Christianity and Morality*, pp. 189, 205, 221; Flint, *Theism*, Lect. vii., viii.; Lacordaire, *God*, Conferences (Chapman & Hall); M'Cosh, *Method of Divine Government*.

[2] Often called *a priori*, as by Dr. Flint. The argument is one from ideas. Ontology = science of realities. To the old Greeks the only realities were ideas; phenomena were transient things, appearances. In our days the case is reversed.

eternity, of necessary as opposed to contingent existence, of perfect goodness. No matter whence or how we obtain these ideas, we have them. They must either be affirmed or denied of the Creator, whose existence has been ascertained. Infinity and finitude, absolute and dependent existence, being contraries, one or other of them must be predicable of every being, the Divine included. The only question then is, Which is the most rational course, to believe that the First Cause is infinite or finite, of absolute or dependent existence? The answer cannot be doubtful. To assert that he depends for his existence on another would only send us a step farther back. If we must believe in a Maker of the universe, if we must believe that he is either infinite or finite, it is obvious which alternative has most reason on its side. The other alternative would give us a doctrine made up of the most incongruous elements. The instinct which leads us to ascribe every possible perfection to the Maker of all things can scarcely be a mistaken one.

Another form which the argument takes is this. We have ideas of infinite goodness, truth, and holiness. Are these merely ideas? Or, is there a Being to whom they belong? If they are mere ideas, how can we account for their existence? Thus there is some measure of truth in Anselm's position, that the very idea of an absolutely perfect Being involves his existence;[1] at least to this extent, that the existence of the idea is

[1] Anselm, *Proslog.* 2: "Even a foolish man may be convinced that there is something in the intellect than which a greater cannot be thought. And certainly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the intellect alone. For if it were in the intellect alone, it might be thought to exist also in reality, which is greater. Therefore without doubt something exists than which no greater can be thought, both in intellect and in reality." At the same time it must be remembered that there is a fallacy in Anselm's argument as he puts it. We cannot argue from thought to fact, namely, that because we have an idea of a perfect existence there must be a reality corresponding to it. We can only say, "If God exists, his must be an absolutely perfect existence." And this is the course followed in the text. See Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, p. 252, and Descartes' comments, p. 253.

best explained on the supposition that it arises from the fact. Otherwise, the noblest ideas known to man are the veriest illusions. It will be said that it is easy to form ideas to which no realities correspond; but ideas which are among the oldest treasures of the race are not to be placed on a level with creations of individual fancy.[1]

Other ways of putting the third and fourth branches of the argument are summarised by Dr. Orr from Kant and Prof. Green.[2] Kant's argument for God as a postulate of the Practical Reason runs thus. Moral rectitude, unlike material things, has absolute value. It is the condition of human well-being. It ought to prevail and secure happiness, and, I am bound to believe, will do so. Otherwise my nature is a contradiction and plays me false. But the result, which I am bound to believe and strive after, is only possible if nature, which has so much to do with man's happiness, has been so constituted as to subserve this end. Therefore nature, which in itself has no moral character, has been so constituted by a higher Power. This argument is scarcely as direct and forcible as the one from the fact of conscience in man. "There is at least no ground in the being of things themselves to expect a progress, an advance from good to better, in nature or in history. If we find that we cling to the belief that the world does so advance, then this persistency of faith can only be due to the conviction that there is a true moral government of the universe; that the evil is something which does not belong to the essence of creation and is therefore separable from it: that the contest here is

[1] A good account of the nature of the *a priori* argument, and of the different forms it has taken in the hands of Plato, Augustine, Anselm, Descartes, Malebranche, and others, will be found in Flint's *Theism*, Lect. ix. See also Pope, *Comp. Theol.* i. 236; Smith's *Select Discourses*, Disc. i. and v. The *a priori* argument, so called, of Samuel Clarke, *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, and Gillespie, *Necessary Existence of God*, proceeds on a different line.

[2] *Christian View of God and the World*, pp. 124, 129.

not a war between rival powers, but a rebellion of a subject against his lord."[1]

Professor Green's form of the fourth argument may be stated thus. In the act of knowledge the mind brings with it certain modes or forms by which its thinking is conditioned—ideas of space and time, number and quantity, cause and effect. A world to which these ideas do not apply is inconceivable to us. The same is true of moral ideas. These therefore are necessary, universal ideas, not derived from the world, but brought to it. And we find that the world corresponds to them; the world is constructed in accordance with them and becomes intelligible through them. They are like the architect's plans and specifications before the building commences. These ideas therefore must have existed in an eternal Reason or Mind before creation.

It is evident that the four branches of the argument are mutually complementary. The first gives us the idea simply of vast power; the second adds personal intelligence, will, and wisdom; the third exhibits the Maker of the world as a moral governor; while the fourth invests him with the incommunicable perfections of Deity. Each line of reasoning is sound as far as it goes. It proves one thing, brings out one aspect of the idea of God. The whole gives us all the knowledge of God that is possible within the domain of natural religion. Not that unaided reason has ever discovered all this truth for itself. Whether reason in a normal state could do so, we can never certainly know. And again, the knowledge of God thus obtained is far below the knowledge we need and actually possess. Still, it forms the groundwork of the knowledge imparted in supernatural revelation. What the latter does is to assume and amplify this great fundamental truth of all religion.

What is the degree of certainty yielded by this argument? It is not of the absolute kind belonging to intuition and demonstration. But it is as much stronger than the certainty attaching to the beliefs of daily life as the evidences of power,

[1] Westcott, *Gospel of Life*, p. 28.

will, and moral character apparent in nature and human history are stronger than the evidences of the same qualities in man's works. What comparison is there between these two series of phenomena? One is as much higher than the other as the heavens are higher than the earth. We believe in intelligent minds around us, because of the evidence they give of their existence. We cannot see, hear, or touch them; they are seen only by the inner eye of reason, *i.e.* we infer their existence from their effects. A Christian's faith in the existence of a Supreme Mind rests on evidence precisely of the same kind, but far greater in amount. As the character of a book, or statue, or mechanical invention is the index of its author's ability, so the wonderful adaptations of the universe declare its Maker's glory. We cannot then imagine anything more rational than a Christian's faith in God. If our faith in history and science rests on rational grounds, with far stronger confidence we may say, "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth."

[Flint's *Theism* and *Anti-Theistic Theories;* Paley's *Natural Theology;* Howe's *Living Temple;* M. Randles, *First Principles of Faith;* Bowne, *Philosophy of Theism;* Row, *Christian Theism;* Dr. Harris's two vols.: *Philos. Basis of Theism, Self-Revelation of God;* Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctrine*, i. 212; McCosh, *Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral;* Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, 2 vols.; Lindsay, *Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion.*]

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

The two anti-theistic theories which most nearly concern us are Pantheism and Materialism. The first term is itself a definition,[1]

[1] "The All" is God, or God is "the All." There is some ground for the distinction which Luthardt draws between the tendencies of Eastern and Western Pantheism. "The former merges the world in God, and is

not so the second. A Materialist is not one who believes in the existence of matter, but one who believes there is nothing but matter. The two theories are radically opposed to Theism and to each other. Theism affirms the distinct existence both of the Creator and the creature. Pantheism denies the latter, Materialism the former. One leaves no creature to worship, the other no God to be worshipped. According to the one theory, everything is spirit, there is no matter; according to the other, everything is matter, there is no spirit. Yet these radically opposite theories have this feature in common, that they are monistic, admitting but one ultimate substance. The desire for unity is ineradicable in human nature; but it must not ignore any of the primary facts and distinctions of things. Pantheism and Materialism do this in confounding the properties of spirit and matter—thought and extension. Theism, on the contrary, satisfies the thirst for unity, so far as facts allow. While keeping spirit and matter apart, it traces them at last to their source in the divine will. The independence of matter is derived, not absolute.

Pantheism is peculiarly the error of the East, to whose speculative spirit it is congenial. It is there that it is worked out most systematically, and exerts the greatest practical influence. In the West it is the creed of the philosophic few. Pantheistic elements are found in the speculations of New-Platonism in Alexandria, of the early Gnostics, and of some of the mediæval Mystics. But the first thoroughgoing pantheist of the West is Spinoza, a Dutch Jew (1632–77).[1] Considering the charge of *a priori* reasoning so often brought against theologians,

consequently Acosmism. Hence it knows nothing of becoming, but only of being, of which particular phenomena are merely modifications (Eleatics, Spinoza). The latter merges God in the world, and is consequently Atheism. Hence it really knows only becoming, not being; it sees the Absolute only on the way to being, and therefore views it as a process (Heraclitus, the Stoics, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel)."—*Comp. d. Dogmatik*, p. 80.

[1] Martineau, *Study of Spinoza;* F. Pollock, *Spinoza, his Life and Philosophy.*

it is worth notice that Spinoza's system is perhaps the most perfect system of *a priori* speculation extant. He starts with certain premises, from which pantheistic doctrine is then deduced; but he has first put the doctrine into the premises. The rigid mathematical form of his speculations has a specious look, and is an attraction to many; but it is the veriest delusion. According to Hegelianism, Christianity is pantheistic in essence.

The most common form of pantheism is that which represents spirit and matter as temporary forms assumed by the absolute. They are real as forms, but not *in se;* they are phenomena, properties or accidents, the substance being the divine or the absolute. Two other possible, though uncommon, forms of pantheism, are the idealistic and materialistic: for the first, thought is the sole phenomenal form of the absolute; for the second, matter. But the common feature in all pantheism is, that it makes the essence of Deity consist in absoluteness, and so denies his personality. God is not the infinite, but the absolute, *i.e.* the sum of all existence, or the Unrelated. Any other view is said to be unworthy of God. Everything—strong and weak, good and bad, true and false—is included in the divine existence; God is all alike. But why should it be unworthy of God to exist in a state of relation to other existences, which in the last resort spring from his will? The Absolute must be able to originate such dependent existences, wills endowed with the power of moral freedom, else he would not be the Absolute. The theory that he has done so best explains the facts of life. Eventually pantheism is driven to deny the distinction between strong and weak, good and bad; weakness is only a lower degree of strength, evil of good. Besides, the term Absolute, like infinite, needs to be itself defined before it can become a definition. Absolute in what? And directly it is defined in any respect, the opposite is negatived. Such negation is not necessarily a defect; it may be an excellence, and its absence a defect. But, according to Spinoza and all pantheists, no negation (and therefore no definition) must be affirmed of God.

Personality is denied of God, on the ground that it implies limitation. It is argued that the idea of personality arises in us from the distinction between ourselves and others. But who, it is asked, or what is the other from which God is eternally distinguished? To this argument there are two replies. The idea of personality arises, not only from our observing a distinction between ourselves and others, but also from the distinction that we make between ourselves and our thoughts, the one element permanent, the other changing. Again, even if it were true that our idea of personality arises in the way stated, it would not follow that this is the only conceivable way in which it can arise. Human personality may be a copy of the divine, without being an adequate copy. Is personality an excellence or not? Is man better than an animal, because he is a self-conscious, self-determining agent? If so, how can such excellence be refused to God? Indeed, if God be the Absolute, on the principle of pantheism, he must be both personal and impersonal.[1]

Materialism is peculiarly the error of the West. Some of the earliest Greek philosophers leaned in this direction. Epicurus formulated the atomic theory, according to which the universe is the result of chance combinations of innumerable atoms. Still, all the intelligence and purpose evident in the universe must have been present germinally in the original atoms, the existence and marvellous properties of which are assumed, not accounted for. Lucretius put the atomic theory into verse. In modern days, Hobbes (1588–1679) led the way in materialistic tendency; Hartley and Priestley took the same course; Locke's philosophy has been interpreted in a materialistic sense. The enormous development of materialism in France, Germany, Italy, and England recently is well known. Mill, Bain, Spencer, Comte are of this school. While there is no necessary connection between materialism and physical science, the prominence given to physical researches, unbalanced by philosophical study, helps the spread of materialism.

[1] Flint, *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 334.

It is well to notice the identity between ancient and modern materialism. Epicurus assumed the existence of matter, endowed with force and subdivided into innumerable atoms of different sizes and shapes. How all this came into existence, is not said. Intelligence also must have belonged to this original matter, as it is found in the world. Similarly modern materialism begins with bare matter, but soon finds itself compelled to invest it with all the qualities necessary to produce the world as it is. Professor Tyndall spoke of matter as having in it "the promise and potency of every form of life," even intellectual and moral. Matter thus retains its name, but changes its character. Mind is made a function of matter. Strange that a mere function becomes the law of the world of matter from which it springs.[1]

A philosophical objection against pantheism and materialism in common is, that they deny the existence of an essential distinction between mind and matter. There is but one substance, either spirit or matter. According to one view, matter is merely a gross form of spirit; according to the other, spirit is a finer form of matter. The difference between such properties as thought, feeling, volition on one side, and size, hardness, weight on the other, is denied to be one of kind. It is enough to reply that hitherto all thought and language have assumed a radical difference between the two. On this point pantheism and materialism have against them a consensus of ancient and universal belief.

A common moral objection is, that the two theories are equally fatalistic. According to one, human life and thought and action are points in the evolution of the one absolute existence; according to the other, they are physical results of physical laws. In either case, freedom and responsibility are out of the question. Now one of the most certain facts of consciousness is that of moral freedom. The consciousness of existence is not more certain. All social and legislative action proceeds upon it. Any theory that runs counter to such a fact negation (and

[1] Orr, *Christian View*, p. 171.

is self-condemned. In our days the term determinism is substituted for necessarianism.

How can materialism explain the existence of abstract, immaterial ideas? Artistic, moral, and religious ideas are the antithesis of material. How also can it explain memory? Where and what is the centre of unity, in which past and present meet?[1]

Positivism, as taught by Auguste Comte (1798–1859), is a combination of agnosticism and materialism. According to it, mathematics and natural science are the only sciences. Metaphysics and mental philosophy are rejected. As mind, along with matter and God, is dismissed as unreal or unknowable, this is not strange.[2] The empirical definition of causality is adopted, and all inquiry into causes, efficient or final, forbidden. According to Comte, human knowledge passes through three stages—the theological, metaphysical, scientific. In the first the world and life are explained as the work of God or gods; in the second, as the effect of abstract powers and principles; in the third, of physical force and laws. The last, of course, is the true method. On this arrangement religion and philosophy should have been extinct long ago. The truth is that the three orders of ideas are co-ordinate, not successive. Comte's writings on social science have rendered good service. The recognition of social laws and of a science dealing with them is often ascribed to him. But we must not forget the Greek speculations on the subject. Comte's altruistic principle of morals is borrowed from Christianity, borrowed with scant acknowledgment. Strangely enough, after sweeping away every shred of religious doctrine, Comte set up a new religion, which has found less acceptance with his followers than his other teaching. Its god is the aggregate of humanity, its creed the dogmas of science,

[1] Flint, *ibid.* p. 39; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt*, Lect. iii.; Tymms, *Mystery of God.*

[2] Lewes, *Hist. of Philosophy*, 2 vols., written from the Comtist standpoint, treats philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle downwards, as mere dreamers.

its worship the worship of humanity, its immortality posthumous influence, its ministers and hierarchy positivist teachers.[1]

Agnosticism professes to be ignorant, and therefore neutral, on the questions of religious faith. It equally disclaims theism and atheism. But the ignorance, it seems, is not absolute Herbert Spencer holds it indubitable that there is a power behind phenomena, their cause and source, only we can know nothing further about it. Two things then are known: first, that there is such a Power; secondly, that its nature is inscrutable—two very considerable things to know. Then, this unknowable power, as in the case of materialism, is invested with all the qualities and attributes necessary to account for the present world, until the "so-called agnosticism is not an agnostic system at all, but a system of non-material or semi-spiritual pantheism."[2] "This ultimate reality is a Power; it is a Force, the nearest analogue to which is our own will; it is infinite, it is eternal, it is omnipresent; it is an infinite and eternal Energy from which all things proceed; it is the Cause of the universe, standing to it in a relation similar to that of the creative power of the Christian conception." This growth in the agnostic creed was inevitable, unless its adherents were to confess that they had no explanation of the world about us, which would have been simply a confession of impotence.

[1] Flint, as before, p. 39; McCosh, *Christianity and Positivism;* Arthur, *Positivism;* Tymms, *Mystery of God.*

[2] Orr, *Christian View*, p. 101.

CHAPTER II

THE DIVINE REVELATION IN SCRIPTURE

Revelation[1] means unveiling, here of God's mind and will to man. That Scripture is such a revelation has ever been the faith of the Church universal. The fundamental nature of this belief is evident from the consideration that Scripture is both the source and the standard of Christian doctrine, which it can only be on the supposition that it is God's voice to man. This subject includes the proof of three things: that Scripture is a *Divine Revelation*, is *Inspired*, and is the *Canon* of doctrine.

Sec. 1.—Scripture a Divine Revelation

By this is meant a special, supernatural revelation in distinction from the general, natural one given in creation, conscience, and history. The latter is the more ancient and universal. So far from being abrogated, it is assumed, reaffirmed, and illustrated in Scripture, Ps. 19, Rom. 1^{20}, 2^{15}, Acts 14^{17}, $17^{22\text{-}31}$. But this general revelation is the more liable to be mistaken, as it needs to be not merely interpreted, but spelled out from the facts of nature. All depends on the competency and honesty of the reader and interpreter. That man is not to be trusted in this capacity, is conclusively shown by the condition of the heathen world, where man was left without the help of special revelation. Besides, the fact of sin and the needs arising out of it are subsequent in time to God's

[1] All words of this termination may denote either the act or its result. When Scripture is termed a revelation, the latter is the meaning.

primitive revelation, and therefore are not provided for in it. Even a republication of the truths of natural religion with special divine attestations would not meet the new wants of man. Thus it is the fact of sin which has made a further revelation necessary. Accordingly, we find that the way of deliverance from sin is not merely the principal, but the only subject of Scripture, which from first to last treats of Redemption. As to the distinction between natural and revealed religion, while certain truths may be classed under one and certain under the other head, it does not follow that even those belonging to natural religion could be clearly and perfectly learnt from natural revelation. As matter of fact, both kinds of truth come to us at the same time, and it is impossible for us so to discriminate between the two as to assign them to different sources. When nature itself is regarded as a revelation, the distinction between natural and revealed falls out of sight; but the distinction, though conventional, is useful.

The evidences that Scripture is a divine revelation may be classed as Evidences Preliminary and Proper.

A. *Preliminary.*—(*a*) During the last fifty years such progress has been made in the subject of Comparative Religion as to enable us to form an opinion respecting the chief non-Christian religions. No increased knowledge of details is likely to alter our judgment on the essentials of these religions. One effect has been to deepen our wonder at the strength of the religious instinct in man that has given birth to these vast and powerful systems. There is no need for us to minimise the truth found in heathen religions, or to doubt that the Spirit of God has been at work in them (John 1[9]).[1] The early Christian apologists, like Justin, spoke of the old Greek thinkers as Christians before Christ. After every admission, the contrast is great enough to supply a strong argument for Scripture as a special revelation.

[1] Max Müller, Renouf, Sayce, Hibbert Lectures; also Manuals published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; Geden, *Studies in Comparative Religion;* Freeman Clarke, *Ten Great Religions;* Monier Williams, *Indian Wisdom.*

It is enough to compare the Scripture teaching, as well Old as New Testament, respecting the Unity, Spirituality, and Holiness of God. India is a favourable field of comparison, because the different stages of growth are all traceable. The Vedic Age begins with simple nature-worship and closes in the Upanishad treatises with unqualified pantheism. Pantheism continues in the later systems. The Vedānta, which is the favourite system of philosophy, formally teaches the doctrine, and it has remained ever since the esoteric creed of all classes. On the other hand, rank polytheism is the creed and practice of daily life among all classes. Henotheism—the exclusive worship of a particular deity for the time—may be found, but not monotheism. Buddhism in its original form was a theory of philosophic pessimism, morality without God, but has developed into idolatry, tempered by the Indian idea of absorption into Deity. The old Egyptian religion suggests henotheism, to which some would give the name of monotheism. Renouf says, "The magnificent predicates of the one and only God, however recognised by Egyptian orthodoxy, never in fact led to actual monotheism. They stopped short in pantheism" (Hibbert Lect. p. 230). We find similar phenomena in ancient Greece. The great philosophers rose to the idea of unity in the Godhead, which is also called monotheism by some writers. But it is doubtful whether the unity went beyond the notion of one principle or power, of which the ordinary deities were manifestations. Certainly the idea did not influence the life of any one. The issue of Greek philosophy in Neo-Platonism was pantheism. There can be no question of the divine Unity, Spirituality, and Holiness being found in the Old Testament, in elementary form in the earlier ages. Whence this great difference? There can be no doubt of the intellectual greatness and moral earnestness of the Hindus, Egyptians, Greeks, and others. In intellect the Jews are not to be named beside them. If any people could have found their own way to truth, the Hindus could. If they failed, who can succeed? The monotheism of the Jews is sometimes ascribed to the Semitic instinct

or genius for religion. But the Phœnicians, Babylonians, Arabians, who were Semites, were gross idolaters. Indeed, there is no instance of any nation having found its way to monotheistic faith without outside help. That monotheism was not in the blood of the Jewish people, is shown by their constant lapses into idolatry. Prophets and people were in frequent antagonism on this cardinal subject. In the case of all heathen religions, we regret to note the downward tendency on similar lines. In the Old Testament alone, and still more in the whole of Scripture, there is constant progress. The difference is explained by the supposition that, while no nation was altogether without divine guidance, there was special divine election and revelation in the case of the Jews.

(*b*) Influence of Christianity in the world. This has lately been put forward, not as a new argument, but as an old argument with new emphasis. Prebendary Row in his *Bampton Lectures* argues that it is unwise to rely so much upon the evidence of the Gospel miracles, when we can point to a present-day miracle in the beneficent revolution wrought by Christianity in the moral condition of the world. The genuineness of the Gospel miracles can only be established by a long historical inquiry, which few are able to pursue and which presents endless matters of controversy. On the other hand, we are able by this time to judge of the limits of human influence, and to say whether the work of Christianity is explicable as its result. Every fact in the moral world which plainly goes beyond such limits is as much a miracle as healing the blind and deaf. The change wrought by Christianity in every sphere of life is of this kind. The world has been transformed. A new character for purity, truth, mercy, justice has been impressed on it. This holds good despite all deductions and allowances. The author therefore advises that this evidence be put in the front. The credibility of the other miracles, including Christ's resurrection, comes in as a consequence. He himself follows this course.[1]

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, and *Manual of Christian Evidences*.

There is undoubtedly great force in the argument. The basis is sound. The moral world has its natural and supernatural side. Lecky's words are striking, "The simple record of three short years of active life has done more to regenerate and to soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophy and all the exhortations of moralists." The whole argument may be effectively used to prepare the way for others.[1] At the same time it will not be admitted without challenge. The argument requires considerable knowledge of history, past and present, for its appreciation. It is far more difficult to draw the line between the natural and the supernatural in the moral than in the physical life. Other factors of progress must be recognised, although these again owe much to Christianity. Objectors will also lay much stress on the failures of Christendom. These form a considerable deduction from the strength of the evidence, although Christians will contend that they by no means refute it. On the whole, it is a question whether the argument will not avail more in confirming faith than in removing unbelief.

(*c*) The Character of Christ. The uniqueness and perfection of Christ's moral character are universally admitted. Its uniqueness is seen in the harmonious blending of apparently inconsistent virtues, which exist in other cases separately and in excess. The sense of sin, so strongly characteristic of the best men, is absent in Christ's life. The character is not formally drawn out by the evangelists, but represents the impression made on the reader's mind. It is exhibited in word and act. Moreover, the life is related by four different writers, who set it in four different points of view. Either, then, the character is real, the writers simply describing what they saw and heard, or fictitious. The latter supposition is incredible. In that case, obscure Jews have accomplished what the greatest dramatists and novelists have never done—they have given to a fictitious creation such an air of reality as to impose on the

[1] Storrs, *Divine Origin of Christianity;* Loring Brace, *Gesta Christi*, Schmidt, *Social Results of Early Christianity.*

whole world. Besides, even writers of fiction are dependent on their age for materials. Where in the Jewish world of Christ's days were the materials of such a life to be found? If the character is real, the Christian position is established.

(*d*) Contrast between Christ's Teaching and that of Philosophy. Canon Row in his *Bampton Lectures* (p. 130) works out a strong argument on this ground. The points of contrast are as follows: (1) Philosophy begins with the speculative; they seek perfect definitions of virtue which are never reached. So with Plato in his *Dialogues*. Christ sketches a concrete morality, which has certainly never been excelled, if it has ever been equalled. (2) Philosophy aims at constructing a perfect State through which to regenerate individuals. See Plato's *Republic*. Christ begins with the individual. (3) The social schemes of philosophy were exclusive and aristocratic; they supposed culture, and gave up the lower and lapsed classes in despair. Christ's aims include all; if any preference is shown, it is for the neglected and lost. Christian philanthropy has created a new world. (4) Philosophy emphasised the stronger virtues—self-mastery, justice, courage, prudence. Christ puts the milder virtues first. He shifted the centre of gravity in ethics. The Church has only partially carried out his idea. "There can be no doubt that if, during the last three thousand years, the milder virtues had occupied the place which the heroical ones have held in men's estimation, the happiness of mankind would have increased a thousand fold." (5) Philosophy works through Habit, which is conservative, confirming in good and evil, but initiating nothing; Christ works through Faith, which is creative. Such contrasts involve much more than a difference of degree. Christ's teaching is on a new line. Its effect must be the creation of a new moral type. To say that this is explained by religious genius is not enough; because even genius does not create new types, but carries existing types to the highest point.

(*e*) Personal Experience. This is more a completing than a

preliminary argument; but so much attention has of late been called to it, that it is worth while to refer to the subject at this point. In some quarters, not merely Ritschlian, the personal, experimental evidence is advocated as the only valid or safe one. Historical evidence, and indeed all argument on the ground of natural theology, are ruled out of court. In the Ritschlian school this is done in the frankest way. Briefly put, the contention is that it is only in Jesus Christ that we meet with God. Nothing but the impression which Christ makes on us gives us certain knowledge of God's existence and character. This is sufficient alone, and no other evidence is of practical worth. Every other argument is open to question and cavil; but it is implied, this is not.[1]

This position implies that other grounds of certitude, all historical and philosophical grounds, are non-essential, however useful they may be in their place. It is scarcely necessary to remark on the amount of responsibility thus thrown on the individual and on subjective considerations. It is a burden from which many would shrink. The only confirmation possible in this case is the like experience in others,—a valuable confirmation, no doubt. But how is it possible completely to separate the objective and subjective? The medium of the experience is Scripture. The image of Christ which takes me captive and imparts such certitude is contained in the Gospels and Epistles. How then can the historicity of these books be indifferent to me? To the extent their authority or truthfulness is affected, my faith must suffer.[2] Dr. Dale, indeed, in his *Living Christ and the Four Gospels*, argues that a man who has come to saving faith in Christ through the Gospels may retain his faith even if the authenticity of the Gospels becomes doubtful to him. But the argument is open to

[1] Herrmann, *Communion with God.* At the same time we find Professor Kaftan, a member of this school, arguing for Christianity from its correspondence to an abstract, philosophical conception of religion, *Truth of the Christian Religion*, ii. 303.

[2] Forrest, *The Christ of History and Experience*, p. 323.

question. One who has had such an experience, if he were logical, might rather infer that he was mistaken throughout. Besides, while personal experience of the truth may suffice for great numbers who never think of pushing inquiry farther, there are many others of keen intelligence who need to have their reason satisfied. There must be harmony between heart and head. To put the whole case of Christianity on individual experience, is to give up the appeal to history and reason, and so abandon the position which Christians have taken in the past. That such a course is necessary or wise, we cannot conceive. It seems to us antecedently in the highest degree improbable that a religion which by supposition perfectly meets the needs of man's moral and religious nature, should contradict either history or philosophy. Religion is to be a "reasonable service." In the past philosophy has proved itself the handmaid of religion. If it cannot bring men all the way to Christ, it may bring them part of the way. It seems strange in these days, when the historical sense is so strong, to undervalue the historical side of Scripture. Our faith must rest on the threefold evidence of experience, history, and reason. As little can we imagine that, where religion and science touch, we can tolerate any contradiction between the two. No Christian can believe any doctrine which rests on premises scientifically false or unsound.

That personal experience of the truth is the crowning, indubitable ground of certitude, has never been questioned in the church.[1] It is the evidence of John 9^{25}, Rom. 8^{16}, 2 Tim. 1^{12}. It is the only evidence which the vast majority of Christians have ever had. This was what the Reformers meant by the "testimony of the Holy Spirit" in the heart to the truth of Scripture, its self-attesting power. No doubt Scripture is its own best witness. That evidence, existing on so vast a scale in all ages, so surprisingly alike in its contents, cannot be set aside as the offspring of illusion or error. To it Augustine's saying may be applied in all its force, "The whole world can-

[1] Stearns, *Evidence of Christian Experience.*

not be mistaken."[1] The aggregate of Christian life is a fact that has to be explained like other facts.

B. *Evidences Proper.*—These are the Miracles and Prophecy of Scripture. (*a*) Miracles are also called powers and signs in the New Testament (Acts 2^{22}, Heb. 2^{4}), powers indicating the source, miracles or wonders the impression made, signs the meaning. The last is the only term used in the Fourth Gospel.[2] Miracles are found chiefly, if not entirely, at three periods,—the days of Moses, of Elijah, and of Christ, each a crisis in the history of revelation. No complete definition of miracles is necessary or possible. Dr. W. B. Pope's description is near enough, "An intervention of the Supreme Power in the established course of nature," recognising as it does the system of natural law, the exceptional nature of miracles and the divine power to which they witness. An exact definition would only be possible if we knew the mode. Only the question of fact is important to us, not of mode. As alleged facts, miracles take their place beside other historical facts, and must be established by similar evidence. Descriptions of miracles as "violations" and "suspensions" of natural law are objectionable, because they assume knowledge of the mode.

As to the possibility of miracles, it is difficult to see how any one who believes in God and creation can doubt it. Doubt implies a very imperfect conception of God. There is much less readiness among men of science to question the possibility of miracles than there once was. Along with fixity of law we have also learnt the vastness and mystery of the universe. Even to the science of former days the world was much smaller and simpler than it is now. We recognise that it must have secrets not yet explored. Reasonable men of science allow that miracles are a question of evidence. A believer acknowledges that the system of fixed law on which the world is ruled creates a presumption against miraculous intervention,

[1] *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*, a favourite saying with Dr. Newman in another connection.

[2] "Works" also may be supposed to include miracles.

which can only be overcome by proof of corresponding strength. But his contention is that the proof is of this kind, that the historical and moral evidence is such as exists in no other case. Its cumulative, convergent character is unique.

The argument against the probability of miracles on physical grounds may also be met by an argument on the other side on moral grounds. If Christianity is a divine intervention for the salvation of men, it must be desirable that the fact should be attested by the strongest credentials. No one would deny that miracles, if possible, are of this class. Even if they do not appeal to all minds, they appeal to vast numbers. The Jews are not alone in requiring a sign. Nicodemus expresses a general conviction, John 3^{3}. Many still put their faith on the same ground.

As we have already seen, some apologists of our day condemn the excessive reliance on this evidence common in apologists of an earlier time. Dr. Bruce in his *Chief End of Revelation* does so, and insists that the Gospel miracles are not so much seals of revelation as part of it. We do not see how in presence of such passages as Matt. 11^{5}, John 5^{36}, $10^{25.\ 38}$, it can be denied that they have evidential force. This is not the only meaning, but it is one meaning. Particular reproofs like those in John 4^{48}, 20^{29} do not absolutely condemn faith founded on miraculous evidence. But we are thankful for the reminder that miracles are much more than displays of power. They reveal the grace and mercy and compassion of Jesus Christ as well. They say over again in act everything that has been already said in words. They are parables in action. Their teaching is just the same as that in the parables in Luke 15. All that Christ has said in words about the Father's mind and his own mind towards men he proves in these mighty deeds. Let any one consider the difference that the removal of the miracles would make in the teaching of the Gospels. We should still have the words, but without the speaking commentary of the acts. No one can say that the teaching of the miracles is unworthy of the Christian conception of God.

Another important point is the extent to which the miracu-

lous pervades the Gospels. They are part of the picture of Christ presented there. To remove them is to destroy the picture. Especially is this true of the Gospel of Mark, which is often said to be the most human of the Gospels as laying stress on the humanity of Jesus. In chapters 5 to 11 take away the miracles, and how much would be left? They are not the setting, the framework, but the picture itself. It is impossible to reject the miracles of healing and yet receive the miracles of the Miraculous Birth, the Incarnation, the sinless character, the Resurrection. The life is all of a piece, like the seamless coat. The physical and the moral are on the same divine scale.

The Apostle Paul as within the covers of Scripture is our nearest witness to Christ's life. It is true that he does not explicitly refer to Christ's miracles. We can explain this by the fact that his Epistles were written before the Gospels, and that the Christ he knew was the Risen One who appeared to him before Damascus. But plainly the Christ he preaches is a living, superhuman, nay divine, Being. It would be strange if Paul knew of no superhuman action in Christ's life. "It seems to me incredible that the apostle, and those to whom he wrote, could have attributed to the Christ of these Epistles the superhuman character with which he is evidently invested, while the narrative of his earthly ministry assigned to him no superhuman actions" (Row). Paul also himself claimed miraculous power, Rom. 15^{17-19}, 2 Cor. 12^{11-13}, Gal. 3^{5}. Could he have claimed for himself what Christ did not possess?[1]

The fundamental miracle of Christianity is the Resurrection of Christ. The other miracles and the entire Christian system stand or fall with it. It is sometimes unwise to stake great issues on a single act, but here we have no choice. It is the New Testament itself that does this by the prominence everywhere given to the fact. It is adduced as the supreme evidence

[1] Dorner, *Syst. Chr. Doctr.* ii. 146–133; Bruce, *Miraculous Element in Gospels* and *Apologetics;* S. Cox, *Miracles, an Argument and a Challenge;* Row, *Bamp. Lect.;* Godet, *Defence of Christian Faith;* Steinmeyer, *Miracles of our Lord.*

and made the ground of doctrine by Peter, Acts 2^{32}, 3^{15}, 1 Pet. 1^{3}; by Paul, Acts 17^{31}, 25^{19}, 26^{8}, 1 Cor. $15^{4.\,15.\,20}$; by John, Rev. 1^{18}, etc. Christ's appearance to Paul in vision is sometimes regarded as unreal. Paul himself did not so regard it. In 1 Cor. 15^{8} he puts Christ's appearance to himself on a level with the appearances to the other apostles; see 1 Cor. 9^{1}. It is plain that the early Church was built on this faith. If the resurrection did not take place in objective reality, the apostles and the whole of the early Church were either deceivers or deceived. The former position was maintained formerly, but the arguments of Paley's *Evidences* and similar works have quite shattered that position. The position now taken is that they were the victims of illusion. It is admitted by those who deny the fact of Christ's resurrection that the apostles and the early Church believed in it. The witnesses to their faith are the Lord's day, Easter, the change evident in the spirit of the apostles (as in Peter), the conversion of Paul, the New Testament, and the Church. How then is the faith of the early Church to be explained? The admission of the fact explains it, but nothing else does. The mythical theory is out of court. Myths require long time for their growth; the original circumstances must pass out of memory. But here, Paul's teaching comes within less than thirty years of the crucifixion. The only refuge left is the vision-theory of Renan. The apostles, seeing a vision, an apparition of Christ, which was the outcome of their own brooding hope and fancy, mistook it for reality. But the psychological difficulties are great. Such a confusion of fancy and fact is only possible on one of two conditions. First, in the case of weak-minded, half-crazy persons, which the apostles were not. And if they were, how could they persuade thousands to believe their story? Or, secondly, where something has become a matter of fixed belief and expectation. This the resurrection was not among the Jews. The idea was not unknown, as appears from John 11^{24} and other sources. Jesus had foretold his rising again on the third day after his death. But we are told of the incredulity

with which the words were received. Luke 24 shows us the disciples in a state of blank dismay and despair. It was the resurrection, proved by Christ's appearances to the disciples, which created faith, not faith which created the story of the resurrection. The idea was not familiar to the Jews, and is not an easy one in itself. We need not therefore wonder that at first it encountered doubt. Death and the grave were associated in the Old Testament with thoughts of gloom and fixity, Ps. 88^{10}, Eccl. 9^{10}. Again, we should have to suppose that such hallucinations happened to many persons simultaneously, and happened again and again. According to this theory, the whole Christian Church, the greatest birth of time, with all its beneficent fruit, had its origin in a huge illusion and blunder. Give us a second instance of the kind. F. C. Baur indeed thinks that, in order to explain Christianity and the Christian Church, we only need faith in the resurrection, not the fact. Quite so. But whence did the faith come?[1] "I believe that the resurrection of Christ is established by stronger evidence than exists for any other historical fact."[2]

(*b*) Prophecy as an evidence of Revelation is regarded simply in the limited sense of prediction. The broader sense, according to which the prophet was a specially commissioned messenger from God, the bearer of God's will, is left out of sight (Ex. 4^{16}, 7^{1}). Prediction was a small, incidental part of the prophet's work. Prediction is an evidence of divine knowledge, as the miracles just considered are an evidence of divine power. The evidence arising from the fulfilment of prediction is an ever-increasing quantity. It may be asked, If the evidential force of prediction depends on the future, what was its use at the time of prediction? Generally speaking, prediction appeared in times of national decline and distress, and was intended for purposes of warning and encouragement. Israel's golden age was in the future. It was "saved by hope."

[1] Fairbairn, *Studies in Life of Christ*, ch. xviii; Beet, *Credibility of Gospel*; Row, *Bamp. Lect.* Lect. vii.; Godet, *Defence of Christian Faith.*

[2] Marcus Dods, *Gospel of John*, ii. 155.

Great changes have taken place in the treatment of Old Testament prediction and fulfilment. Its conditional character, its dependence in form and expression on the time of its origin, its gradual development, are now better understood. Less stress is laid on single, isolated predictions than on the predictive character of the Old Testament as a whole. The two Testaments, separated by several centuries, form a unity. The earlier is a designed preparation for the later. On this view the evidential force is greatly increased. The Messianic prophecies may be taken as an example. These form a system of gradually increasing fulness and definiteness from the Seed of the Woman and the Seed of Abraham through the Moses-like Prophet, the Star of Balaam, the anointed King of the Psalms, Isaiah's Immanuel, to the Servant of Jehovah and the Priest-King of Zechariah. The idea of natural growth in prophecy and fulfilment is substituted for that of mechanical adjustment. "Fulfilment is related to prophecy rather as the plant with all its beauty of leaf and flower and fruit is related to the seed from which it has sprung."[1] The presence in the Old Testament of prediction in reference to individuals and nations is not to be given up.

What is the great religious lesson taught by prophecy? It is that of the divine government in the history of men. God's special government of Israel is related to his ordinary government as the physical miracles are related to God's rule in nature. Supernatural illustrates natural development. We see the former in the history of Israel, the latter in all other nations. In the prophets God is seen controlling the destiny of heathen nations as well as of Israel. In Jewish history the end was foretold, in other cases it is not.

Sec. 2.—Inspiration

A. *Doctrine of Inspiration.*—The most feasible distinction

[1] Orelli, *O. T. Prophecy of the Kingdom of God;* Kirkpatrick, *Doctrine of the Prophets;* G. G. Findlay, *Books of the Prophets;* Davison, *Discourses on Prophecy;* Payne Smith, *Prophecy a Preparation for Christ.*

between Revelation and Inspiration is the one which applies the former to the divine communication to selected agents, and the latter to the special divine influence insuring the accurate record of the communication in writing. Even without the latter we have at least as good reason for regarding Scripture as a substantially accurate record of the original revelation as we have for receiving ordinary historical narratives. Some writers think this is enough. Why, they ask, burden ourselves unnecessarily with doubtful or disputable positions? If Scripture is proved to be trustworthy by stronger evidence than any other ancient writings, why suppose a special influence assisting the writers? But the question is, does this view explain all the facts? The doctrine of inspiration is received not as directly taught in Scripture, but as necessary to explain the phenomena of Scripture. If, as previously argued, Scripture is a divine revelation, and if its statements are in the highest degree trustworthy, what does it say of itself? What does it claim to be? What is implied in its entire structure and contents? There might be revelation without inspiration. It might have been God's will to reveal the truth and leave the expression or statement entirely to human agency. At the same time it is evident that, if there is reason to believe in divine help in the writing, we have an additional security for the uncorrupted transmission of the truth.

The substance of the doctrine is that Scripture is divine in form as well as in contents. This is the view stated by Dr. Pope. "Inspiration, distinguished from revelation, denotes the specific agency of the Holy Ghost in the creation and construction of Holy Scripture." "The Scriptures, fairly compared and interpreted, declare it to be that special influence of the Holy Ghost on the minds of holy men, selected for the purpose, which qualified them to communicate from age to age an infallible record of divine truth concerning the redeeming will of God."[1] Drs. Hodge and Lee say substantially the same.[2] The work of revelation is generally connected in

[1] *Comp.* i. 156, 168.

[2] *System. Theol.* i. 155, 162; *Inspiration*, p. 27.

Scripture with Christ (John 1^{18}, Gal. 1^{12}, Matt. 11^{27}, Heb. 3^{1}), that of inspiration with the Holy Spirit (2 Pet. 1^{21}, 1 Pet. 1^{11}).

The moral and religious purpose running through Scripture is remarkable. This is apparent in the first chapter of Genesis, which treats rather of the Creator than of the creation. The same religious standpoint is found in all the historical books. Men and events are judged by a moral standard. The books which relate the history of the Israelitish nation are very imperfect if compared with ordinary histories. It is the story of a religion, not of a nation. History is here written from a unique point of view. "Viewed as a history of the nation of Israel, the Old Testament tantalises by its disappointing fragmentariness. It gives little or no account of many of the most important periods of national development. It affords little or no insight into many of the most instructive features of national life. . . . When it is viewed as the record of the revelation made to Israel and through Israel, in itself preparatory and imperfect, but ever looking forward to some future fuller manifestation of God to men, its many voices are found to combine in a true harmony."[1] The problem of the Book of Job is intensely moral. The treatment of the problem has called forth the wonder of men like Goethe, Froude, Carlyle. Even the Wisdom-books, such as Proverbs, are full of the religious spirit and aim. This fact, giving a unique character to both the Old and New Testament, is strongly suggestive of divine inspiration.

a. The Old Testament

The Inspiration of the Old Testament may be shown by a short and easy method, namely, by an appeal to the fact that Christ and the apostles treat it as a final divine authority. They endorse the Jewish belief of their day on the subject. What that belief was, we know from the statements of Josephus and Philo, one speaking for Palestinian, the other for Alexandrian Judaism. The prophet is the "interpreter" of God's will, Moses being the

[1] Kirkpatrick, *Doctr. of Prophets*, p. 6.

greatest prophet. The divine influence is made to overshadow the human activity; the prophet is little more than a passive organ. Philo uses the phrases "sacred Scriptures, sacred books, the sacred word, oracle."[1] Josephus has "sacred books, sacred writings, books of sacred Scriptures."[2] It is noteworthy that, as in regard to the Sabbath law, Christ and the apostles endorse the substance of Jewish faith without alluding to extreme interpretations.

The term Scripture carried with it the same connotation for the Jews that it does for us. We find it used in this sense (of course in reference to the Old Testament) about forty times in the New Testament (John 5^{39}, 10^{35}, Luke 4^{21}, Matt. 22^{29}), the Scripture, the Scriptures, Holy Scriptures (Rom. 1^{2}), the sacred writings (2 Tim. 3^{15}). The same Old Testament words are quoted both as divine (Matt. $15^{3\,ff.}$) and as human (Mark 7^{10}). See Mark 12^{36}; compare Acts 28^{25}, John 12^{41}, Heb. 10^{15}, 3^{7}, Acts 1^{16}. "That which was spoken by the Lord through the prophet" (ὑπὸ κυρίου διὰ τοῦ προφήτου, Matt. 1^{22}; see Acts 2^{16}). God is described as the speaker, Matt. 15^{4}, Acts 3^{25}, $7^{2.\,3.\,6.\,7}$, 13^{47}, 2 Cor. $6^{16\text{-}18}$, Heb. $1^{5\text{-}8.\,13}$, 3^{7}, $5^{5\,f.}$, $6^{13.\,24}$, 7^{21}, 8^{8}, $10^{5.\,30}$, 12^{26}, Jas. 2^{11}. The New Testament lays stress on the very words of the Old (Gal. 3^{16}, John $10^{34\text{-}36}$, Matt. $22^{32.\,43\text{-}45}$). Note the phrase "it is written," Matt. $4^{4.\,6.\,10}$, Rom. 1^{17}, Gal. 3^{13}.

b. The New Testament

The proof of the inspiration of the New Testament depends on the proof of two other facts: the promise of special help to the apostles in their official work, and the New Testament books being the work of the apostles or of those immediately connected with them. Neither of these two facts is difficult of proof.

(*a*) In Matt. $10^{19.\,20}$ and parallel passages, the help of the Holy Spirit is promised to the apostles in their public apologies for the faith. If these passages stood alone, no more help

[1] "Oracle" in Rom. 3^{2}, 1 Pet. 4^{11}, Heb. 5^{12}.

[2] Pope, i. 177; Lee, p. 53; Sanday, p. 72.

would be promised than is given to all believers in like circumstances. But there is a series of passages in St. John's Gospel ($14^{16.\ 17.\ 20.\ 26}$, $15^{26.\ 27}$, $16^{7.\ 12\text{-}15}$) which affirm much more. The Holy Spirit will enable the apostles to recall the past, and will communicate all further knowledge that is necessary. They are directed to wait in Jerusalem for the power from on high, which power they receive in its fulness at Pentecost. The transformation in their character is marvellous. This endowment of power bore upon every part of their apostolic work; and in that work none could compare in importance with the recording for all after time of the origin and doctrines of the Christian faith.

(*b*) The New Testament books all bear the names of apostles and helpers of apostles. The proof that this repute is genuine may be postponed till the question of the Canon comes up. The historical evidence is the same in both cases. We assume then for the present that the Christian tradition on this subject is to be trusted.

The authority claimed by the apostles is the highest possible, Gal. $1^{8.\ 12}$. St. Paul could not have used such language unless he had been conscious of teaching in the divine name. If the "prophets" mentioned in Eph. 2^{20} are the Old Testament prophets, as is most probable (comp. 2 Pet. 3^{2}), the apostles are put on a level with them. It has often been observed that in 2 Pet. $3^{15.\ 16}$, St. Paul's writings are implicitly called "Scriptures."

An objection is sometimes drawn from the way in which the Old Testament is quoted in the New. These quotations, it is said, are so free that the writers cannot have ascribed divine authority to the ancient Scriptures. Dr. Lee, however, has shown that the quotations are by no means so inexact and capricious as is represented. A fourfold law governs them:— (1) Where the Septuagint agrees with the Hebrew in meaning, it is quoted literally. (2) Where it gives a wrong meaning, the Hebrew original is translated. (3) In a few cases the quotation agrees with neither. (4) One New Testament writer follows

the Septuagint, another the Hebrew in the same passage. There are no doubt some difficult cases, which need to be considered by themselves.

B. *Theories of Inspiration.*—No definition of inspiration has been generally received in the Church; none has been attempted by any General Council. The doctrine has been assumed from the first, as is evident from the fact that all parties in the Church have always appealed to Scripture as the final authority. Such belief in the divine authority of Scripture supposes inspiration of some kind. In the early days of the Church the leaning was to a strict view of inspiration, the early Fathers from Justin in this respect following the lead of the Jews. The Scripture writer was compared to a lyre in the musician's hands. This strict view is reproduced and even exaggerated in some creeds of the Swiss Reformed Church.[1]

The most extreme view of modern days is that of Verbal Inspiration, which makes the very words of Scripture to be given by God. Few would question the truth of the view in regard to some parts of Scripture. The objection is to its application to the whole. It overlooks the variety of subject and style in Scripture, some books leaving more scope to the writers than others. The historical parts evidence selection, compilation, revision on the writers' part. Even the more reflective portions evidence similar intellectual activity. How is the theory reconcilable with differences in narratives of the same events and records of the same discourses? The different styles of the sacred writers again reflect the different character of the writers. To suppose that the Holy Spirit assumed the idiosyncrasies of the different writers is an intolerable idea. When those who hold verbal, literal inspiration have made allowances, as they do, for all these circumstances, their theory scarcely deserves to be called verbal.

Other terms used are Dynamic and Plenary, which do not say much. All depends on the meaning given to them. The first is intended to emphasise the writer's share in the result,

[1] Pope, *Compend.* i. 181.

the natural exercise of his faculties and gifts; the other insists on the true element in the Verbal theory, while avoiding its extreme statements.

The first obvious condition of a complete definition or theory is that it shall take account of all the facts of the case. If old theories have dwelt too exclusively on the divine factor, modern theories have dwelt as exclusively on the human. How can the latter explain the differences already pointed out between Scripture and all other records of revelation? A true theory will recognise both factors—the divine in the unique spirituality and purity of the teaching, the other in the marks of human workmanship. The use of compilation, the presence of early elementary ideas of truth in keeping with the character of the age, the non-scientific language, different presentations of the same subject — these and similar features are quite compatible with inspiration.[1] The union of the divine and the human in Scripture is sometimes compared to the idea of incarnation. The comparison of course does not increase our knowledge, but it supplies an analogy. The analogy also reminds us that in both cases it was the divine that at first received almost exclusive attention, the human coming into prominence later.[2]

Sometimes inspiration is ascribed only to the writers, not to the writings. But as we only know the writers through the writings, the distinction is useless to us. There have been many speculations respecting different modes and degrees of inspiration. Undoubtedly there were differences of mode

[1] "There are some books in which the divine element is at the *maximum*, and others in which it is at the *minimum*."—Sanday, p. 398.

[2] "Scripture as a whole is God's one perfect and complete instrument, giving forth to those who wish to learn its one saving music from many notes combined."—Origen. "At length all is finished. A profound piece of music, a vast oratorio, perfect and of elaborate unity, has resulted from a long succession of strains, each for itself fragmentary. On such a final creation, resulting from such a distraction of parts, it is indispensable to suppose an overruling inspiration, in order at all to account for the final result of a most elaborate harmony."—De Quincey in Lee, p. 113.

and degree; but it is difficult to be positive in detail. If inspiration itself, like the incarnation, is mysterious, definition is almost presumptuous. On the subject of the incarnation, the Church Councils were more anxious to exclude error than to give positive definitions.

The inspiration of Scripture must not be confounded with that of ordinary Christians, still less with "inspiration" of writers in general. Only a difference of kind can be the ground of any claim to authority.

[Sanday, *Inspiration;* Lee, *Inspiration of Holy Scripture;* Bannerman, *Inspiration of Holy Scripture;* Charteris, *N.T. Scriptures;* Rooke, *Inspiration;* Hastings, *Bib. Dict.* on "Bible."]

Sec. 3.—Canon of Scripture

This truth follows from the two previous ones. If Scripture is divinely revealed and inspired, it must be the canon of religious faith and conduct.

The term canon (*κανών*, rule)[1] has two shades of meaning, passive and active. It is first measured, *i.e.* itself made a rule; then it measures other things. We cannot speak of Scripture being made a canon by human authority, but only of its being recognised as such.[2]

A. *Passive,*—the recognition of Scripture as a rule of faith and conduct. Undoubtedly the formal statement of this idea was of slow growth, taking several centuries to arrive at completeness. As the phrase, "History of the Growth of the Canon," may be easily misunderstood, some explanation is necessary. It might mean, and is often represented as meaning, that books of the New Testament, once not regarded as divine, came gradually to be regarded in this light. But how was this possible? Which of the early Christian Churches or writers ever pretended to confer authority on any book? They never

[1] Other applications are ecclesiastical ones, — canonical, canons of councils, etc.

[2] Hastings' *Dict. of Bible,* "Canon."

professed to do more than believe and teach as the Christians before them did. If any book was without divine authority in the Church, it could never acquire it. The position here is precisely the same as in the other dogmas, *e.g.* the Trinity. All that is new is the formal, precise statement of the idea of supreme authority attaching to certain books and no others, and the expression of this idea in an apt phrase. The substance of the truth is as old as Christianity. We are again met by the Romanist statement, that we owe the Canon of Scripture to the Church. Undoubtedly we owe to the Church what has just been stated, and no more. We do not owe to it the idea of scriptural authority, which is the kernel and essence of the truth. If we do, let any one tell us when and where the Church made any book authoritative that was not so before. The local Synod of Carthage, 397 A.D., only professed to state what books were received in the Church as Scripture; and in doing even so much it went grievously wrong as to the Apocrypha, like the Council of Trent nearly twelve centuries afterwards.

a. Old Testament

The Old Testament, as we now have it, was taken over by the Christian Church from the Jews. Josephus (about 90 A.D.) gives the number of Old Testament books as twenty-two, whereas the number usually given was twenty-four. He probably joined Ruth with Judges, and Lamentations with Jeremiah, as was sometimes done. The New Testament itself quotes or refers to all the books except Obadiah, Nahum, Ezra and Nehemiah, Esther, Canticles, Ecclesiastes. The references of course are incidental. The first two are included in the Minor Prophets, the next two go with Chronicles, which is alluded to. Philo does not refer to the last three and a few others.[1] Again, the incidental character of the references must be remembered. The threefold division of the old Testament—Law, Prophets, Former and Latter, (Holy) Writings—is referred to in Eccle-

[1] Ryle, *O.T. Canon*, p. 149.

siasticus about 130 B.C. The dates of the closing of the Canon of the Law and the Prophets are about 430 and 300 B.C. respectively. The Holy Writings are recognised about 100 B.C.[1] The final closing of the last section is later. Doubts respecting one or two books were only silenced about 90 A.D., when a Jewish Council met at Jamnia. Esther, Canticles, Ecclesiastes were the "disputed" books of the Old Testament. Doubts were occasionally expressed even respecting such books as Ezekiel and Proverbs. The Jews evidently used critical discrimination.[2]

The *Apocryphal*[3] books (14), added to the Old Testament, arose in Alexandria. They are partly translations from the Hebrew and partly original works by and for Greek-speaking Jews. The books are not found in the Hebrew Canon of Palestine. Even in Alexandria the Apocryphal books were not canonised in the strict sense. It may seem strange that they were more current in the West than in the East. Eastern Fathers like Melito, Origen, Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, adhered to the Hebrew Canon;[4] Epiphanius seems doubtful. Josephus has only the Hebrew Canon. Jerome, a great authority on biblical subjects, and Hilary also follow the Hebrew Canon. The reception in the West was due to the fact that the early Latin version (the Itala) was made from the Septuagint, which thus passed into use. Augustine sanctioned the inclusion of the Apocrypha at the Carthage Synod 397 A.D. Despite Jerome's authority, the Roman Council of Trent canonised the Apocrypha. It is an important fact that the New Testament writers, who usually quote the Old Testament from the Septuagint, ignore it.[5] Some of the early Fathers, like some Protestant

[1] Ryle, Sanday, words in Hastings' *Dict.*, "O.T. Canon."

[2] Canonical books were said to "defile the hands."

[3] Apocrypha = hidden, *i.e.* for private, not public use. Art. in Hastings' *Bibl. Dict.* i.

[4] Doubts are expressed about Esther.

[5] New Testament writers show acquaintance with it. Heb. 11^{34-38} points to 1 Macc., Heb. 1^{3} to Wis. 7^{24}. Jude refers to the apocalyptic Book of Enoch.

Churches, sanction the reading of the books for edification, not for proof of doctrine.[1]

b. The New Testament[2]

Dr. Westcott's *New Testament Canon* divides the period of the growth of the Canon into three parts: A.D. 70 to 170, the time of Hegesippus; 170 to 303, the persecution of Diocletian; 303 to 397, the third Council of Carthage.

The principal difficulty is in the first period, and the difficulty arises from the scantiness of the remains of early Christian literature. If we may suppose that the writers whose works have perished were as full of incidental references to the New Testament as those whose works remain in whole or in part, nothing could be more abundant than the evidence.

First, the Apostolic Fathers. *Clement of Rome* (96 A.D.).[3] His Epistle to the Corinthians mentions Paul's to the same church, "Take up the Epistle of the blessed Paul the apostle. . . . He charged you concerning himself and Cephas and Apollos." He has many allusions to the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well as to Matthew, Luke, and Romans. His quotations begin with "It is written," "God saith." The Epistle of *Barnabas* (72) is steeped in the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews, though greatly inferior in spirit and tone. He introduces a quotation from Matthew with "as it is written." *Polycarp* has more references to the New Testament than any other writer of his day, but they are all tacit. He says to the Philippians, "The blessed and glorious Paul wrote letters to you." Peter's influence on him is marked. *Hermas* bears the same relation to St. James that Barnabas does to the Hebrews. He seems to speak for the Judaizing party. James and Revelation are often alluded to. There are clear allusions to Matthew, Luke, John, and Acts. Christ's words are paraphrased. *Ignatius* (107) refers almost exclusively to Paul, whose teaching on the

[1] See exhaustive article in Hastings' *Bible Dict.* "Apocrypha."

[2] See p. 58.

[3] See Phil. 4^3.

relation of Christianity to Judaism he reproduces. He has also reminiscences of Matthew and John.

The Apostolic Fathers contain references then to Romans, 1 and 2 Cor., Gal., Eph., Phil., 1 and 2 Tim., Heb., James, 1 Pet., 1 John, and Revelation. Many of the facts of Christ's earthly life are mentioned, such as the miraculous Birth, Baptism, the Star, the Resurrection, and Ascension.

The writer, however, on whom controversy chiefly turns, is Justin Martyr (150), whose two Apologies and Dialogue with the Jew Trypho are extant. Not the least valuable part of his testimony is his recital of all, or nearly all, the facts of Christ's earthly life in exact coincidence with the Gospels. So close is the correspondence, that, were the Gospels lost, we could recover the substance of the history from Justin.[1] The points of discrepancy are so slight as not to be worth mention.[2] Either, then, Justin got his knowledge from our Gospels, or from other documents essentially identical with them. For all that is vital to our position, it matters little which is the fact. But really the writers who speak so fluently of other documents lying behind our Gospels should give some proof of the existence of such documents. Our Gospels exist, no others do. Of course as matter of abstract possibility our Gospels may have been derived from earlier writings. But where is the evidence of such derivation? How is it that those earlier documents, which, as the earliest depositories of the faith, must have been unspeakably precious to the Church, have passed away and left no trace behind? Their existence is mere conjecture and possibility.

Justin uses the term "Gospels," but his ordinary name for the writings he refers to is "Memoirs of the Apostles." If these are not our Gospels, what are they? He speaks of them as "composed by apostles and those who followed them."

Justin probably refers to Matthew, Mark, Luke (John),

[1] Westcott, *Hist. of Canon*, p. 94. For Justin's life, see Smith's *Dict. Christ. Biogr.*

[2] *Ibid.* p. 138.

Revelation, Colossians, Romans, Corinthians, 2 Thess., Hebrews. "The Catholic Epistles, Titus, Philemon only left no trace."

The testimony of *Papias* is only known to us through Eusebius. His five books, *Exposition of Oracles of the Lord*, would have been invaluable[1] if they had survived. He speaks of the Gospel of Matthew in Hebrew, and of Mark as a disciple of Peter, not of Christ. We gather also that he knew John's Gospel. Eusebius says that he quoted 1 John, 1 Peter, and held the inspiration of Revelation. His silence about Paul is significant, because it arose from his Judaizing tendencies.

Two other witnesses are the Muratorian Canon (end of second century) and the Syriac Version of the New Testament (Peshito, first half of second century). The first derives its name from the scholar who unearthed it in the Ambrosian library in Milan in a MS. of the seventh or eighth century. It is evidently a translation from the Greek, and is imperfect at the beginning and end. Internal evidence fixes its great antiquity. It professes to give an account of the New Testament books. What is its account? Luke is put in the third place, and is mentioned as Paul's companion. The fourth place is assigned to John. The Acts is a record by Luke "of those acts of all the apostles which fell under his notice." 13 Epistles of Paul are mentioned, 9 to churches and 4 to individuals. There is also mention of 1 and 2 Cor., Eph., Phil., Col., Gal., 1 and 2 Thess., Romans, and less clearly of Revelation, 2 and 3 John, and Jude. Those not mentioned are 1 Pet., 1 John, James, 2 Pet., and Hebrews. No apocryphal books are added.

The Peshito is the most venerable of translations. It became the basis of translations into Arabic, Persian, and Armenian, and is still used by all Syrian sects. It omits only 2 and 3 John, 2 Pet., Jude, and Revelation.

The only book of which hitherto no mention is found is 2 Peter. All the rest—namely, 4 Gospels, 13 Epistles of Paul, 3 of John, 1 Pet., James, Jude, Rev., Hebrews—are referred to more or less. Dr. Westcott says: "With the exception of

[1] So of the Five Books of Memoirs by Hegesippus.

Hebrews, 2 and 3 John, 2 Pet., James, Jude, and Revelation, all other books of the New Testament are acknowledged as apostolic and authoritative at the close of the second century."[1]

Between 170 and 303 A.D., we find references to the less known books as follows: to 2 Peter "perhaps," Revelation of John, Heb., James, Jude, in Origen; to Heb.,[2] Jude, 1 John, and Revelation, in Clement of Alexandria; to Heb., 2 and 3 John, Revelation,[3] in Dionysius; to Jude and Revelation, in Tertullian, Cyprian, etc.; to Revelation, in Hippolytus; to Heb. and Revelation, in Methodius. No book is added.

Eusebius (270–340 A.D.) closes the list. His testimony is valuable for two reasons. He had in his hands works which have since perished. He had also made a special study of early Christian history. Treating of the present subject, he divides the New Testament books into three classes: Acknowledged, Disputed, and Spurious. The first class includes the 4 Gospels, Acts, Paul's Epistles, 1 John, 1 Pet., Revelation; the second, James, Jude, 2 Pet., 2 and 3 John; the third, Revelation, "if not by the Apostle John," of which evidently he had no doubt. "Disputed" may easily be misunderstood. It is plainly used to indicate books which were less generally known and used. It will be seen that the books coming under this head are not those which are much used in the establishing of doctrine.

Two circumstances that would seem to put forgery and interpolation out of the question are, that the Christian Scriptures were read in public worship,[4] and the existence of different parties and sects which appealed to the same books. Some of the first commentaries issued from writers who stood apart from the majority of the Church. Witness the *Diatessaron* of Tatian, and the commentaries of Heracleon.[5] The fanciful

[1] P. 293. [2] "Written in Hebrew and translated by Luke."
[3] "Inspired, but not John's."
[4] Referred to by Justin, Tertullian, Origen. The first says, "The memoirs of the apostles, or the writings of the prophets, are read as time allows; and when the reader has ended, the president makes a discourse," etc. [5] Quoted in Clement and Origen.

argument of Irenæus, to show that only four Gospels were possible, is well known.[1]

Another mode of stating the argument is to take the acknowledged New Testament at the close of the second century (see Westcott above), and reason back to apostolic days. Dr. Dale has done this in reference to the four Gospels.[2] Irenæus is directly connected with Polycarp, a disciple of John. It is impossible that Irenæus' New Testament, which was ours, should have differed from Polycarp's, and Polycarp must have known the facts. With the four Gospels and Paul's four undisputed Epistles, we have the substance of New Testament doctrine. The same argument may be applied to the whole book. Papias (a friend of Justin), Justin, the Muratorian Canon, Peshito, the Apostolic Fathers, are the links in the chain of witnesses, each touching the other. On the opposite hypothesis, a wholesale manufacture of Gospels and Epistles of such a character must have gone on in the second century. Where are the writers capable of such productions? The measure of capacity at that time is seen in the crowd of apocryphal writings. Even the writers mentioned are far below the New Testament level, and they again are far above the apocryphal writers. Is the production of John's Gospel, or the Prison Epistles or Pastorals credible or conceivable in any part of the second century?

We may well ask, What other works of the ancient world are attested by such various and converging lines of evidence?

B. *Active sense.*—The Scripture is the rule of Christian doctrine and practice, the sole and final court of appeal in the Christian Church.

The only heresy to be noticed on the subject is that of the Roman Church. Protestant creeds are unanimous in rejecting every other source and standard of revealed truth. Eng. Art. vi.: "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be

[1] Charteris, *N. T. Scriptures*, Lect. iii.–vi.

[2] *Living Christ and Four Gospels.*

believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite and necessary to salvation." West. Conf. i. 6: "The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture; unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men." *Form. Conc.*: "We believe the only rule and standard, by which all dogmas and all teachers are to be measured and judged, is no other than the writings of the prophets and apostles, as well in the Old Testament as the New."[1]

The Roman Church receives Scripture as we do, but co-ordinates Tradition with it. *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv.: "The holy Synod . . . ever keeping in view the removal of error, and the conserving of the purity of the gospel in the Church . . . and seeing this truth and discipline to be contained in the written Scriptures, and the unwritten traditions, which, received by the apostles from Christ's own lips, or handed down by the apostles themselves at the Holy Spirit's dictation, have come down to us,—following in the footsteps of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with equal feeling of piety and equal reverence all the books, as well of the Old as of the New Testament, the same God being the author of both, and also the traditions, whether pertaining to faith or morals, which were dictated, so to speak, by the very lips of Christ or by the Holy Spirit, and have been preserved by continuous succession in the Catholic Church."[2]

Bellarmin says: "We assert that all essential doctrine,

[1] Credimus . . . unicam regulam et normam, secundum quam omnia dogmata omnesque doctores æstimari et judicari oporteat, nullam omnino aliam esse, quam prophetica et apostolica scripta cum V. tum N.T. Winer, *Conf.* p. 42; Cramp, *Text-Book of Popery*, Rule of Faith, p. 39; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* i. 104, 151.

[2] Synodus . . . hoc sibi perpetuo ante oculos proponens, ut sublatis erroribus puritas ipsa evangelii in ecclesia conservetur . . . perspiciensque hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, quæ ex ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptæ, aut ab ipsis

whether as to faith or morals, is not expressly contained in the Scriptures, and therefore, beside God's written Word, God's unwritten Word (*i.e.* the divine and apostolical traditions) is necessary."

Let the official definition of tradition be marked. They are doctrines "received from Christ's own lips by the apostles," or "handed down by the apostles at the Holy Spirit's dictation" to our days. If, then, the distinctive doctrines of the Roman Church—Transubstantiation, Eucharistic sacrifice and worship, devotion to the Virgin, the Immaculate Conception, Purgatory, Masses for the Dead—are traditions in this sense, we must suppose that they were taught by Christ and the apostles, but for some reason or other were not recorded, but handed down by word of mouth, and only brought out to light ages afterwards! It is needless to say that if this could be proved, every Christian would at once bow to such authority. As matter of fact, the only traditions which answer to this definition are those contained in Scripture. Where were these doctrines during the long interval between Christ's days and the time of their publication? "Preserved by continuous succession in the Catholic Church." Where, in what writers?

The Roman Church is not faithful to its only official definition of tradition. A much wider range, indeed a totally different meaning, is ascribed to the term. The traditions "received from Christ's own lips," or "handed down by the apostles at the Holy Spirit's dictation," are simply opinions and interpretations advanced at different periods by different teachers, allowed to remain for a longer or shorter time in this nebulous condition, then taken up, discussed, and stamped

apostolis, Spiritu Sancto dictante, quasi per manus traditæ, ad nos usque pervenerunt: orthodoxorum patrum exempla secuta, omnes libros tam V. quam N.T., cum utriusque unus Deus sit auctor, nec non traditiones ipsos, tum ad fidem tum ad mores pertinentes, tamquam vel ore tenus a Christo, vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatas et continuâ successione in ecclesiâ catholicâ conservatas, pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ suscipit et veneratur.—*Ibid.* pp. 38, 40.

with official authority. Thus it is evident that some authority is needed to sit in judgment on these individual opinions, and separate the true from the false. The Roman Church does not accept all indiscriminately, it rejects many even of Augustine's views. This final interpreting authority is the Church, and in the last resort (according to the newest definition) the Pope. To this the doctrine of Tradition has come. For ages it was disputed whether the interpreting authority was the whole Episcopate speaking through General Councils, or the Pope, or both combined. Now we are told that the voice of the Church is the voice of the Pope speaking officially on questions of faith and morals. This last decision is the logical outcome of the Roman system. The difference is immaterial.[1]

Where is the voice of the Church or the Pope to be heard? In Papal Bulls, in Canons and Decrees of Councils. Nowhere else. None else are infallible. Only doctrine formally defined is of authority (*de fide*). All else is as much private judgment as anything in Protestantism. The amount of defined doctrine is enlarged or minimised by controversialists, according to need. A bishop or priest interpreting decisions of Councils is as fallible as any Protestant teacher. Now the great argument against Scripture as the sole divine authority is its supposed obscurity and difficulty of interpretation. But what of Papal rescripts and Conciliar definitions, with their ecclesiastical Latin and highly technical phraseology? "Scripture is difficult and needs to be interpreted." Here is the interpreter—the Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, the Bull *Ineffabilis* of December 8, 1854, etc. etc.! This is called explaining the obscure by the simple![2] If it be said that, as in other con-

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv.: "Holy mother Church, whose (office) it is to judge concerning the sense and the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures." Winer, p. 50. "The Catholic Church enjoys to-day the same authority and the same divine assistance as in the days of the apostles; it therefore possesses the same infallibility." Malou, quoted in Winer, p. 41.

[2] See the alleged obscurity of Scripture fully and conclusively discussed in Dean Jackson, *Works*, Bk. ii. chaps. xii.–xvi.

cerns of life, we may trust competent interpreters, may not precisely the same be said of Scripture? What have we gained on the head of directness or greater simplicity? Besides, where is the infallible teaching which was held out as a bait? We are no nearer to it than before. We are left as much as ever at the mercy of fallible teachers and of our own understanding.

One retort we cannot withhold. A favourite popular argument of Roman disputants is that on the Protestant standpoint divine authority attaches to the original text of Scripture only, and that in trusting to translations we have only human authority. So, we may reply, on the Roman theory divine authority belongs only to the *ipsissima verba* of Papal and Conciliar decrees and definitions, not to any translations of them. How are we better off, if we are left to the teaching of fallible bishops and priests?

Another argument in favour of a living infallible interpreter is the alleged incompleteness of Scripture. The inspired Epistles are a supplement to the Gospels. But where is there any hint of a further designed supplement of the same kind?

Another alleged advantage of such a standing authority is just as illusory. It is supposed to deliver us from the uncertainty and liability to err belonging to private judgment. But is no action of individual judgment necessary in the Roman Catholic? Has he not to decide on the claims of the Church? Must he not satisfy himself, first, that it was Christ's will that the Church should possess this power, and secondly, that the Roman Church is the Church? The first is a question of Scripture interpretation, the second involves a vast historical investigation. We think that any one competent to decide these questions is *a fortiori* competent to decide any question of essential Christian doctrine, and shall continue to think so until we see proof to the contrary. The latter question especially is one that would tax the greatest powers. The authority of the Church cannot be appealed to, for it is this

very authority that is in question. To take such a conclusion on trust is not very rational. The only difference then between Romanist and Protestant is that the former brings his judgment to bear on a different and vastly more difficult question. He decides, as the result of inquiry, that the Church is the authority which God intends him to trust absolutely. And yet there is no action of private judgment in the Romanist position! The fact is, the acceptance of the entire theory rests and can rest on nothing else. A Romanist performs a gigantic act of decision once for all, a Protestant spreads it over the whole of life. The former, because he is not always deciding, thinks he never does so. Really it is very unkind and unwise in writers to say such harsh things of a power on which their own position depends. Indeed it is more than unwise, it is suicidal. Unless the action of the human mind, under proper guards and checks, is to be trusted, the Roman as well as the Protestant case is lost. To decide, as the Romanist does, by means of private judgment, that private judgment in matters of faith is wrong and a root of all evil, is a strange proceeding.

The difficulty of interpreting Scripture is immensely exaggerated, for a purpose. No doubt there is difficulty enough in all that relates to points of language, history, science, chronology, and so forth. But these matters are quite apart from the knowledge necessary to Christian living. The two things, however, are dexterously and fallaciously mixed up. But does infallibility give any aid in inquiries into the subjects which form the real difficulty of Scripture? Are Roman exegetes and scholars in advance of Protestant? Is the humble member of the Roman communion wiser on such questions than an ordinary Protestant? We trow not. The dissensions springing from the exercise of private judgment are exaggerated in the same way. As has been already shown, there is far greater unity of belief among Christian Churches than is generally supposed.

A strong objection to the Roman theory is, that it weakens the sense of individual responsibility. Blind belief and obedience become the highest virtue. Where else is such

unreasoning, indiscriminate submission and dependence required of us? Why should we suppose that to be the law in the religious life which is the law nowhere else? Everywhere else the consciousness of responsibility, of the possibility of mistake, is the keenest spur to caution and energetic effort. Remove this, and we sink into slaves and machines, the greatest check upon error and fraud is destroyed. Dependence, indeed, is the natural condition of childhood; and the strongest condemnation of the whole tendency of Roman teaching is, that it keeps Christians in a state of perpetual childhood; moral independence, and the strength that comes of it, are at an end.

It is a mistake to suppose that Protestantism undervalues the traditions and teachings of the Church as such. It simply repudiates Tradition as a co-ordinate authority with Scripture, practically above Scripture. In every other aspect Protestantism values at its highest the light to be gained from the unfolding thought of the Church. Fathers, doctors, schoolmen, Reformers, are all witnesses and teachers from whom there is much to be learnt.

Dr. Newman, in his theory of development, gave a new form to the Roman argument. According to this theory, the specially Roman doctrines are not present in Scripture, but are developed out of germs in Scripture. It is evident that we here come back to the same view of the Church as an infallible interpreter, because amid the countless developments that have appeared, we need some authority to separate the true from the false. We can as little discover the supposed germs in Scripture as the fully formed doctrine. But then we are told, "The Church discovers them there," and we have to acquiesce.[1]

Moreover, the interpreting authority of the Church is itself a development. If it guarantees everything else, what guarantees it? We are said to receive the Scriptures on the authority of the Church. Yes, we reply, on its authority as a witness, but not as a judge. If in the latter sense, how is the authority of

[1] Mozley, *Theory of Development;* Archer Butler, *Letters on Romanism.*

the Church established but by the authority of Scripture? If Augustine meant the latter in the oft-quoted words, "I should not have believed in the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church had impelled me," he is entangled in this vicious circle.[1]

Again, no such living authoritative interpreter was known in Judaism, where it would have been more necessary, if necessary at all. The Rabbins, indeed, claimed such authority for their interpretations, but we know how Christ treated the claim. To set up such authority now, is to make Christianity less free and spiritual than Judaism.

There is, indeed, a true doctrine of development, which is a universal law of life; every doctrine has undergone change of form. But to apply the term to quite new doctrines is a misnomer. For the rest, the theory of Dr. Newman has not found much favour in the Roman Church, for it gives up the old claim of antiquity made in behalf of Roman doctrine.

It is evident that the Roman doctrine of the Church is fundamental. It carries all the rest. If there is such an infallible interpreter of the divine will, a standing organ of

[1] "If they say, 'We must believe the Scriptures to be the word of God before we can believe the infallibility of their Church,' they overthrow their own and establish our own positions. For thus they make the Scripture a rule of our faith, at the least in this one article of the Catholic Church's infallibility. . . . But if the Scriptures may be the immediate and infallible rule of their belief in this article, what reason possibly can be imagined why they should not be the infallible and immediate rule of their faith in all other parts or articles of their creed? For I call heaven and earth, men and angels, to witness betwixt ours and the Romish Church, whether the articles of Christ's Incarnation, his Death, his Passion, his Burial, his Resurrection, his Ascension, his Intercession for us, the Resurrection of the Dead and Life Everlasting, etc., be not to any man's capacity in the world, much more plainly set down in sundry places of Scripture, than the infallibility of the present Romish Church, in these words, 'Peter, feed my sheep; Peter, to thee I give the keys of heaven; Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church. It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and us:' or in any place her sons can challenge for it."—Jackson, Bk. ii. chap. xxx. 9, and all the chaps. xix.–xxxi.

revelation, we have no choice but to believe whatever it says. And if there is not, the entire Roman system collapses.

[On Canon, see Westcott, *Hist. of Canon of N.T.;* Charteris, *N.T. Scriptures, their Claims, etc.;* Salmon, *Infallibility of Church;* Dale, *The Living Christ and the Four Gospels;* Ryle, *Canon of O.T.;* W. H. Green, *Canon of O.T.* (Murray); Hastings' *Dict. of Bible, O.T. and N.T. Canon;* Buhl, *Canon and Text of O.T.*]

CHAPTER III

THE DIVINE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES—THE TRINITY

SEC. 1.—DIVINE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

(*a*) *Biblical Treatment.*—One of the strongest evidences of the divine origin of Scripture, and especially of the Old Testament, is the lofty, pure conception of the character of God that is given. No doubt the addition made in the New Testament is in itself considerable; but in comparison with the additions on other subjects it is not so. The Old Testament doctrine of God is much more than an outline of the New Testament one. In substance it is the same, and needed only a few more touches in order to completion. Christ and the apostles take over bodily the Old Testament idea of God. When that idea is compared with the heathen beliefs of the same time, the difference is seen to be immense. When its elements are reviewed, it is seen to contain all that is fundamental in Christian doctrine.

The God of the Old Testament is a *Personal* Being. He is represented everywhere from Gen. 1[1] as speaking, acting, dealing with persons. All the characteristics of personality are ascribed to him. The anthropomorphic language used seems to exaggerate this truth, and to be inconsistent with the highest spirituality and unity. It is not so, for such inferences are precluded by other representations. But the impersonal deity of pantheism and philosophy is utterly foreign to Old Testament thought. The first verse of Scripture distinguishes God from and raises him above creation. The truth of the divine *Unity* pervades the whole of the Old Testament. In Gen. 1[1] the

plural noun (Elohim) is combined with the singular verb. Even if the noun were a relic of polytheistic days, there is no polytheism in Old Testament teaching. If Israelites ascribed reality to other deities, Scripture does not. There is no need to multiply passages. Deut. 6^4 defines the creed of all Old Testament writers.[1]

Spirituality is implied, if not expressed, Ex. 20^4, Deut $4^{12.\,15\,ff.}$, Ex. 33^{20}. Great stress is laid on the divine *Eternity*, Gen. 21^{33}, Deut. 32^{40}, Ps. 90^2, $102^{24\,ff.}$, Isa. 40^{28}, 57^{15}. *Immutableness* is asserted, Ps. 102^{27}, Mal. 3^{16}. *Omnipresence*, Ps. $139^{7\,ff.}$, Jer. 23^{24}, Isa. 6^3, 2 Chron. 6^{18}. The divine *Omniscience* deeply impressed Old Testament believers, Ps. $94^{9\,ff.}$, $139^{1\,ff.}$, 1 Sam. 2^3, Prov. 15^3, Isa. 40^{28}. *Omnipotence*, Gen. 18^{14}, Jer. 32^{17}. The divine *Wisdom* is highly extolled, Job 38^{36}, Ps. 104^{24}, Prov. 8^{22}. In the six attributes last mentioned *Infinity* is implied.

On the moral side *Righteousness* is a leading Old Testament attribute. It undergoes development, but it is present from the first. Faithfulness and truth are other forms of it, Gen. 18^{25}, Ex. 9^{27}, Deut. 32^4, Ps. 36^7. In the Psalms it is akin to goodness; but as the latter attribute is treated separately, it is scarcely the same. It is righteousness that makes God the trust and refuge of his people, Ps. $7^{9.\,17}$. The divine *Goodness* is a constant theme of praise, especially in the Psalms, Ps. $104^{27\,f.}$, 145^9. *Mercy*, grace, compassion are exalted still more, Ex. 34^6, Ps. 145^8, 103^{13}, Mic. 7^{18}. *Holiness* is less a single moral attribute than the sum of all. It is all that separates God from and exalts him above the creature; and this is pre-eminently his moral nature, Ex. 15^{11}, Lev. 20^{26}, Isa. 6^5, 40^{25}, 57^{15}.[2]

Put all these attributes together and they form a conception of God's character which cannot be equalled in the contemporary world for purity and sublimity, and which nearly

[1] Oehler, *O.T. Theology*, i. 152, 159.

[2] On all these points see Oehler, i. 126 ff., and Schultz, ii. 100 ff., and especially their exposition of the divine names.

approaches the New Testament level. It may be asked, What difference is made on this subject by the acceptance of the critical theories of the Old Testament? The answer is, very little. Nothing is altered in the essentials of the doctrine. The later prophets found upon the teaching of the earlier ones. The general, elementary nature of the teaching in the earlier books is a sign of antiquity. The doctrine of the later prophets, while moving on the same lines, is much developed. The God of Abraham and of Isaiah is essentially the same.

In the New Testament the Old Testament doctrine of God becomes explicit, emphatic, and complete. God's *Spirituality* is asserted and made the rule of worship, John 4^{24}. The *Wisdom* is chiefly illustrated in redemption, Rom. 11^{33}. It is chiefly in regard to the Love and Fatherhood of God that advance is seen, although even here the substance of the truth is anticipated. Prophets and Psalmists seem often on the point of addressing God as the Father of the individual believer, but they never do it. The nearest approach is in such passages as Ps. 103^{13}. "In the Old Testament the particular word 'love' is hardly ever applied to God; and where it does occur in a later writer, it denotes God's special covenant love for Israel."[1] In John 3^{16}, Rom. 5^{8}, 1 John 4^{8}, the revelation of God culminates.[2]

(*b*) *Theological Treatment.*—The relation of essence or substance to attribute is not readily defined. Is the essence simply the sum of the attributes? Are the attributes simply the unfolding of the essence? In other words, are the two things identical or different? In favour of a difference the usage of thought and language may be appealed to. Substance is conceived as underlying attribute, attribute as characterising substance. If the distinction of the two is a necessity of thought, this is a strong argument in favour of a real distinction. It may then be asked, If essence is different

[1] Schultz, ii. 160.

[2] New Testament passages on the several attributes will readily occur. In the Old Testament only specimen passages are referred to.

from attributes, what is it? Take the attributes away, and where is the essence? It may be impossible to give an answer, and yet inseparable things are not necessarily identical. The point is immaterial to us here. We have, however, to guard against the two most prevalent errors respecting the nature of the divine attributes. One is, that they are simply human conceptions, with nothing corresponding to them in the divine nature. Although, it is said, we cannot help forming such conceptions, we must remember that they are mere anthropomorphisms on our part and accommodations on God's. This mode of thought has always been popular among writers of a philosophical cast, such as Augustine, Aquinas, the Scholastics, and some Lutheran and Reformed divines.[1] Mediæval Nominalism also favoured it. But it is most unreal and unmeaning. Whence do we obtain the conceptions but from Scripture? Is the revelation there given a mere illusion? If man is made in God's image, must not his nature be an index of the divine? When we are told to ignore all distinctions, and to think of God as simple, abstract being, essence or act, we find it difficult to obey. Is it not enough at every step to bear in mind the imperfection of human language, and to try to avoid everything unworthy of God? To class the divine attributes with such anthropomorphisms as ascribe human organs to God is strange confusion. Martensen describes the attributes truly enough as "not human modes of apprehending God, but God's mode of revealing himself." A kindred error consists in the denial of all distinction between the attributes themselves. The same criticism applies here. We can no more conceive of power and knowledge as identical in God than in ourselves. And are these two attributes more distinct than justice and love?

Attributes are to be distinguished from predicates, such as Creator, Ruler, etc. The latter are derived from divine acts, and are indefinitely numerous. The former are permanent

[1] "And so our intellect distinguishes things which are not distinct in the object." The truth is, the attributes are neither more nor less distinct in God than the analogous qualities in us.

characteristics of the divine nature, and are limited in number.

It is not easy to find a classification of the divine attributes, perfectly free from objection.[1] In the Middle Ages, a threefold classification was generally adopted, *viâ negationis*, *eminentiæ*, *causalitatis*. Denying imperfections of God gives us one class; affirming good qualities in the highest degree, the second; the necessity for a cause, the third. The modern arrangement is a twofold one. Absolute, essential, immanent, quiescent, incommunicable attributes are set in contrast with relative, transitive, etc. Objections may be raised against every division. The chief point is to remember that no division is perfect. The terms absolute and relative are as acceptable as any. Under the former term are included the attributes which belong to the divine Being in himself, apart from creation; under the latter, such as belong to him in relation to creatures. The latter are subdivided into those relating to all creatures and those relating to moral creatures only. But we must be careful to avoid the notion that the relative attributes originate anything new in God, they can only be the manifestation of powers already existing. Every divine attribute is necessarily existent, but not necessarily active.

It is scarcely accurate to reckon spirituality and infinity as attributes. God *is* spirit (John 4^{24}). Spirit is his essence. We know the nature of spirit to some extent from ourselves. We know it as the seat of knowledge, feeling, and action, in a word, as the seat of personality; and the divine perfections will be found to come under one or other of these heads. But we have only an imperfect conception of pure spirit. The fact that the very word spirit, and all terms denoting spiritual powers and acts, are taken in the first instance from material things, makes it difficult for us to exclude material notions altogether. Add infinite, and we have a brief definition of God—infinite Spirit, *i.e.* a Spirit infinite in all the attributes of spirit. Like

[1] Pope, *Comp.* i. 289; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* i. 420; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 91.

absolute, the term infinite is vague, and needs to be defined. Fill it with such contents as power, etc., and the several divine attributes follow. Whether infinite is a positive or negative idea, is a disputed point. Although the term is negative, the idea need not be so. In our attempts to approach the infinite, the finite is our starting point, and every enlargement of the idea represents our effort to leave the finite behind. Here especially the difference between apprehension and comprehension is to be borne in mind (p. 7). Both, however, represent real knowledge.

One of the most august features of the divine existence is that it is self existence, unoriginated, necessary, independent, the cause of all other existence, itself uncaused. Even the phrase *causa sui*, sometimes applied to the divine Being, is wrong. He could not but be; he could not but be what he is. He is at once the most necessary and most free of all beings.

The Absolute attributes made prominent in Scripture are ETERNITY and IMMUTABILITY, both in awful contrast with creaturely existence. Eternity is infinity in duration. The 90th Psalm is a magnificent tribute to its glory. It is generally thought of as excluding the successions of past, present, and future, which are designations of time. Augustine defines it as that in which past and future are not, but only present. Time began with the world. It is a question, however, whether in using such language we are not using words without meaning to us. Certain it is that we can only think of eternity as unbeginning and unending time. *Immutability* is akin to eternity. See Jas. 1^{17}, Ps. $102^{25\text{-}27}$. Immutability refers to the divine nature and character, not to divine action. It does not preclude acts of creation, of redemption, and retribution. God changes his works without changing his counsels, says Augustine. To Augustine this was the dominating attribute.

The Relative attributes are OMNIPOTENCE, OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPRESENCE, INFINITE WISDOM, and GOODNESS. *Omnipotence* is infinity in power, and may be defined as the power to do

everything that is a conceivable object of power. A contradiction is not this (Matt. 19[26]). A distinction is sometimes made between absolute and regulated power (*potentia absoluta, ordinata*). The former is God's free unconditioned power, the second his power as conditioned by second causes. *Omniscience* is infinity in knowledge (Ps. 147[5], Heb. 4[13]). Although belonging to the relative attributes in one respect, omniscience no less rightly belongs to the essential. The divine knowledge is incapable of growth. Once God knew himself and knew creation as possible, now he knows creation as actual. A difficulty has been raised to the effect that omniscience involves predestination, and does away with human freedom. How can an act be certainly foreknown and yet free? But the nature of knowledge must be remembered. It no more influences action in God than in us. God may foreknow without foreordaining. God's knowledge does not determine our action, but the converse. At all events, we are free, and God does foreknow. Both facts are equally certain. The objection would also make God the author of evil, for he certainly foresees evil, as prophecy proves. Distinctions have been drawn between natural, free, and intermediate knowledge.[1] The first is God's necessary knowledge of himself and his acts; the second, his knowledge of things dependent on his will; the third, his knowledge of what would take place in circumstances different from the actual ones. For the latter, see Matt. 11[23], 1 Sam. 23[12]. When *Omnipresence* is distinguished from Immensity, by the latter is meant God's transcendence above space, by the former his intimate presence in space (Jer. 23[24], Ps. 139[7-12]). His presence must be thought of as real, not merely a presence by influence and operation. As far as possible, we must put away all material ideas of extension and diffusion. *Wisdom* is applied knowledge, using the best means for the best ends. It has been argued that the idea of the use of means, and so of wisdom, implies imperfection, and is a mark of the creature. This term, like all others, needs to be modi-

[1] Luthardt, *Comp. d. Dogm.* p. 290.

fied and corrected when applied to the divine Being. In the divine works, the distinction between means and ends is less sharply drawn. Both in nature and grace the same acts wear both characters; the means are ends, and the ends are means. By *goodness* is meant benevolence. The vast amount of pain and suffering in the world seems to contradict it. The suffering of the animal world is easily exaggerated from our standpoint. The lower organisation of animals, and the absence of the thought that looks before and after, make a vast difference. In the human world, if the suffering due to sin and wrongdoing were taken away, the amount would be greatly diminished. According to Scripture, all suffering is, directly or indirectly, due to sin. Sin brought death into the world and all our woe. Above all, Scripture makes known a divine system of redemption, which is ever counteracting evil and working for good.[1]

The Attributes referring to moral beings may be summed up under two heads, JUSTICE and LOVE. Holiness again is a convenient designation to include both. Both in the Old Testament and the New, justice and love are constantly distinguished from each other, and are celebrated with equal emphasis. One may, in a sense, be called the virtue of the Old Testament, and the other of the New; the Old Testament giving prominence to righteousness, the New to love. Still the two covenants acknowledge both attributes as equally essential to God. God's eternal hatred of sin is as certain as his love of sinners. Faithfulness and truth are righteousness in word. Grace, compassion, mercy, complacency, are different forms of love.

Attempts are made in some quarters to resolve justice into love. But the distinction is too emphatically drawn in Scripture to allow this to be done. According to this representation, God's acts in punishing sin and rewarding virtue are expressions of the same feeling. If Scripture uses different language so habitually to express the same meaning, it is most confusing and misleading. 1 John 4^8 is quoted, but see also 1 John 1^5. The distinction is confirmed by human reason and experience.

[1] ORR, *Christian View*, p. 219.

Justice demands, love gives; one seeks right, the other happiness; one insists on what is due, the other foregoes what is due.[1] The two qualities are certainly not opposed to each other; they are in perfect harmony, but they belong to different relations. A just character and a loving character are different in conception. They suggest different ideas and awaken different feelings. Quite as good a case might be made out for resolving love into justice.

Man, having been made in the divine image, all the divine attributes are reflected in his nature. Naturally, as well as morally, he is a partaker in the divine nature. It is easy to see that the consideration of God's perfections supplies abundant motive for reverence, fear, and trust.[2]

Sec. 2.—The Trinity

The existence of a distinction of persons in the Godhead is a truth of pure revelation. It could be known in no other way, because it relates to the inner life of the Godhead, the constitution of his nature (1 Cor. 2^{11}). The doctrine includes two elements: unity and distinction, each element being equally essential. So far from the doctrine being inconsistent with the divine unity, the Unity is an integral part of the Trinity. The removal of the unity would as effectually destroy the idea of the Trinity as the removal of the distinction.[3] The combination of the two elements involves no logical contradiction, because they refer to the Godhead in different respects; one to the nature, the other to the persons. The mere fact of incomprehensible mystery is no objection, every truth respecting God being no less mysterious.

The formal definition of the doctrine was subsequent to the

[1] German writers say, the principle of one attribute is self-affirmation, of the other self-communication.

[2] Charnock, *Discourses on Divine Essence and Attributes;* Dean Jackson, *Treatise of Divine Essence and Attributes,* Bk. vi.

[3] "Neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the substance." —Athan. Creed.

definition of the doctrine of Christ's person. It was the logical result of the doctrine of the Incarnation and the Holy Spirit, being the completed Christian view of the nature of the Godhead. The final definition was not the work of any Council; it grew up and was generally accepted spontaneously. The Athanasian Creed, as we have seen, arose in this way. Whatever the origin of that Creed, there can be no doubt that it expressed the mind, not merely of theologians, but of the whole Christian Church. As the product of a particular age, its terms are subject to revision, but its substance has been held in the Church from the beginning.[1]

Of the technical terms used in defining the doctrine (Trinity, nature, essence, person), the most important one is person (personal subsistence, hypostasis), which is employed here in a special sense. It means less than when it is used of creatures, men, or angels, and more than a distinction merely of names, or aspects, or attributes. The last would give us merely a nominal, Sabellian Trinity, the former would end in Tritheism.[2] Three human persons are exclusive and independent of each other, the three persons in the Trinity are inclusive. Neither one is without the other. We connect different functions with their names, but this is only in a relative sense. "When we speak of persons amongst ourselves, we mean individuals *mutually exclusive* of one another. When we use the word of the divine

[1] Orr, *Christian View*, p. 302.

[2] "We say 'three persons,' not that the mystery be uttered, but that it may not be altogether passed by in silence; for the greatness of the unspeakable matter cannot be explained by this phrase."—Aug. *Trin.* v. 9. Owen in his treatise on the Trinity is able as ever, *Works*, ii. 377. He distinguishes between the "substance" of the doctrine and its technical statements, arguing cogently the necessity and use of technical terms. Objectors are fond, he says, of attacking the latter while ignoring the former. "Their disputes and cavils shall be against the *Trinity*, *essence*, *substance*, *personality*, *respects*, *properties* of the divine persons, with the modes of expressing these things; whilst the plain *scriptural revelation* of the things themselves, from whence they are but explanatory deductions, is not spoken to nor admitted into confirmation."

Three, we mean to express what is *mutually inclusive.* What one person does amongst us, as we speak of human individuals, another person does not do. On the other hand, when we speak of One Person of the Blessed Trinity acting, we imply that his action involves and brings with it the action of the others. What the Father does he does always and everywhere, essentially and necessarily, through the Son by the Spirit. Wherever the Son acts he acts from the Father by the Spirit. Wherever the Spirit acts, he brings with him in his action the Father and the Son" (Gore). The whole nature and attributes of God are possessed by each Person, but in a different manner. Sabellianism and Tritheism are the two extremes to be avoided.

The technical terms employed are *ousia* (*being*), *substantia, essentia, natura,* for the one common essence; *hypostasis, prosopon, substantia, persona, personal subsistence,* for the separate persons; *idiotes,* for the distinctive characteristic of each person, namely, nongeneration, generation, procession. In the ante-Nicene period *hypostasis* and *substantia* were frequently used for the common essence. Afterwards they were applied to the separate persons. *Prosopon* (face) was soon discarded, as too unsubstantial. *Perichoresis* was used to denote the intercommunion or common possession of nature and attributes.[1]

The doctrine of the Trinity is a strong safeguard of the Divinity of Christ in the true sense, excluding all lower and metaphorical meanings.

A distinction is sometimes made between the Immanent (or

[1] "We use the word person, not in the sense it has when applied to men, but in a modified and quite special sense. We employ it to denote a mysterious distinction in the divine Being, that Scripture makes known to us, the nature of which we cannot positively conceive; but in virtue of which we believe that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are truly distinct, and each is truly God, while yet there are not three Gods, but one God only. The distinction is more than one of different modes of viewing the same being, as when we think of God as almighty, wise, and good; but less than that of different beings, as when we distinguish God, angels, and men."—Candlish, *Work of Holy Spirit,* p. 29.

Essential) and Economical (Dispensational, Revealed) Trinity, but it is a very formal one. The latter implies and rests upon the former, unless we are to accept Sabellianism.[1]

A.—DOCTRINE OF TRINITY

The sole question is, Does Scripture teach this doctrine? We say it does, in three ways.

1. *Old Testament Intimations.*—The doctrine is not one of those clearly made known in the Old Testament. Those who discover it there do so by means of the light reflected from the New. The fact that the Jews did not know the doctrine is sufficient proof that it is not an Old Testament doctrine. It may seem strange that so great a truth was kept in reserve; but this was only in accordance with the law of development which governs all revelation. It is a question whether there is not as great an advance in respect to other truths. A reason for the divine reserve may perhaps be found in the necessity for time to allow the doctrine of the divine Unity to take deep root in human thought. The proneness of the Jews to idolatry is evident enough from their history. And we can easily see that such a doctrine as that of the Trinity might have been perverted in the same direction. Still there are hints, which readily expand into the New Testament doctrine.

(*a*) The use of the divine name in a plural form (Elohim), along with a verb singular, is certainly remarkable (Gen. $1^{1.\ 26}$), especially remembering the stress laid on the divine Unity and the idolatrous tendency of the Jews. If the phrase is to be explained as a plural of majesty or an anticipation of royal style, why is not the verb plural too? Even if the phrase is a survival of polytheistic days, all polytheistic ideas are eliminated. The triple Benediction (Num. $6^{24\text{-}26}$) and Doxology (Isa. 6^{3}) may also be referred to in the same connection.

[1] "A divine person is nothing but the divine essence, upon the account of an especial property, subsisting in an especial manner."—Owen. See his reply to objections, *Works*, ii. 409.

(*b*) There is a remarkable series of incidents in the Old Testament which seem to be more than angelic appearances, and which are best explained as Theophanies.[1] The speaker is an angel, and yet more than angel. The divine name and authority are used in a way that is out of place in a creature. An ambassador never speaks as the angel does. There has always been a school of exposition that has seen in this angel the Son of God anticipating the Incarnation. One reason given by the expositors is that it seems to be a principle of Scripture that all revelation of God is through the Son, who is the final revelation; the Father himself never speaks, if we may say so, in his own person. Observe the case of Abraham, Gen. 18^{17}; Jacob, 32^{24} (Hos. $12^{4.5}$); Joshua, Josh. 5^{14}; Moses, Ex. 23^{20}; the scene at Bochim, Judg. 2^{1-5}; Manoah, 13^{20-23}; Mal. 3^{1}.

(*c*) In the Book of Proverbs (ch. 8), Wisdom speaks like a person. If this is a mere poetical personification, it is a striking one. Philo's doctrine of the Word at Alexandria grew out of Solomon's use of the term Wisdom. There is a great interval, however, between Philo's Word and St. John's. Even if the first is personal, which is doubtful, it is a creature.[2]

(*d*) Prophecy describes the person and work of the Messiah in terms that point to a divine Being. We rely less on particular names and titles than upon the entire position assigned to him, and the character of the work he was to do. Whether the Jews expected the Messiah to be divine is uncertain; and whether they did or not, we can judge of the range of prophecy for ourselves. See Gen. 3^{15}, Ps. 2, 45, Isa. 6, 7, 9, 42, Mic. 5^{2}, etc.

2. *Inferential Argument.*—Scripture, on the one hand, undeniably teaches the Unity of God. Of this there is no question anywhere. On the other hand, it speaks just as clearly of three divine persons, distinguished from each other in name and office, and yet standing in certain definite relations to each other and to the world. The only way of explaining

[1] Oehler, *Theology of Old Testament*, i. p. 188.

[2] See Westcott. *Introd. to Comm. on St. John's Gospel*, p. xviii.; Jackson, *Works*, Bk. vii. ch. xxvii.; Schaff's *Comm. on St. John*, p. 3.

and harmonising these, at first sight discrepant teachings, is the doctrine of the Trinity.

(*a*) The divine Unity is taught. There is no need to argue this.

(*b*) Three divine Persons are spoken of.

The Father is again and again distinguished from the Son and the Spirit.

Christ is represented as the divine Son of God. The proof of this is reserved until we come to the doctrine of Christ's Person. Here the fact is assumed.

The Holy Spirit is spoken of as a divine Person. The proof may conveniently be indicated here. He is called God, cf. Acts 28^{25} and Isa. 6^{9}, Acts $5^{3.4}$. He is the object of blasphemy, Matt. 12^{31}. He is the agent in Regeneration, John 1^{13}, 3^{6}, and Sanctification, 2 Thess. 2^{13}, 1 Pet. 1^{2}. He performs miracles, Acts 2^{4}, 10^{45}, Rom. 15^{19}, Heb. 2^{4}. He is the source of Inspiration, 1 Pet. 1^{11}, 2 Pet. 1^{21}, Eph. 3^{5}, Heb. 3^{7}. He is Creator, Gen. 1^{2}, omnipresent and omniscient, Ps. 139^{7}, 1 Cor. 2^{10}.[1]

That the Spirit is a person is clearly shown by the use of the masculine pronoun (ἐκεῖνος) in John $16^{7.13}$, 15^{26}. This is the more striking as the pronoun is in apposition with a neuter noun. He makes intercession, Rom. 8^{26}; testifies, teaches, hears and speaks, bestows gifts, etc. See also Acts 10^{19}, 13^{2}.[2]

(*c*) Since there is but one God, and Father, Son, and Spirit are each God, it is clear that within the divine unity there are personal distinctions. The only other possible interpretation is the Sabellian one, to the effect that Father, Son, and Spirit are simply different aspects or manifestations of God. But this is excluded by the sharp distinctions drawn in Scripture between Father, Son, and Spirit. The Father loves and sends the Son; the Son leaves and returns to the Father, loves, intercedes with, and prays to the Father. So the Father and Son send the

[1] Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. xxxiv.; Candlish, *Christian Doctrine of God.*

[2] Smeaton, *Doctr. of the Holy Spirit*, Cunningham Lect. (Clark); Candlish, *The Work of the Holy Spirit.*

Spirit; the Spirit intercedes with the Father—the Spirit takes Christ's place. If, then, Father, Son, and Spirit are only God under different aspects, the New Testament is a mass of confusion.

3. *Express Statements.*—The terms of the Baptismal formula, Matt. 28^{19}, and Apostolic Benediction, 2 Cor. 13^{14}, should be carefully considered. See also Eph. 2^{18}, Jude $^{20.21}$, 1 Pet. 1^{2}. The doctrine underlies such passages as Rom. $15^{16.30}$, 1 Cor. 12^{4}, Eph. $1^{3.13}$, 1 Thess. $1^{3.5}$, 2 Thess. 2^{13}, Tit. 3^{4-6}.

B.—DOGMA OF TRINITY

We have hitherto dealt with the doctrine of Scripture on the present subject, but every doctrine has also a dogmatic form. Doctrine summarises the statements of Scripture on a particular point, adding and diminishing nothing; dogma formulates the principles and relations involved in the doctrine and the inferences following from it. Every dogma, therefore, is of the nature of a theory, giving the *rationale* of the facts. Owing to the rise of error and controversy, the dogma of the Church on the present subject was formulated early, assuming its final shape in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, and has never been altered since. For different reasons, Romanists and Rationalists are fond of saying that we owe the dogma of the Trinity, not to Scripture, but to the Church: the former, that they may compel us to receive other dogmas on the same authority; the latter, that they may discredit the doctrine altogether. The reply to both is, that although the form of the dogma is due to the Church, the substance is found in Scripture. Let the Romanist satisfy us that the same can be said of his special dogmas, and we will receive them. Let the Rationalist satisfy us that the substance of the dogma is not scriptural, and we will discard it, as he has done. The form or technical statement is useful as a test of accurate interpretation of Scripture and a guard against error, but it is not essential. The Church did without it once, and could do without it again. It may be technically true to say that the Ante-Nicene Church had no

dogma of the Trinity, just as ordinary Christians have none now. But both the one and the other worship the Son and the Spirit as divine persons; and where this is done, we have the material facts of the case. That the Ante-Nicene Church was Trinitarian in this sense, *i.e.* as ordinary Christians are Trinitarian now, is amply shown by Dr. Burton in his *Ante-Nicene Testimonies*.[1]

The first occasion of the formal definition of the doctrine was the appearance of the Sabellian error, which was known also as Monarchianism and Patripassianism. The first name denotes that there is only one principle, one beginning, in the Godhead; Trinitarianism asserts three principles. The second was a nickname given by Tertullian; if the Son is the Father under a different name, the Father suffers. Sabellianism had two phases. According to one, the three persons are simply different aspects of God,—the Father is God immanent, the Son God revealed, the Spirit God active. Praxeas (200 A.D.), against whom Tertullian wrote, Sabellius of Ptolemais, Noetus of Smyrna (230), Beryllus of Bostra (250), converted to orthodoxy by Origen, held this view. According to the other opinion, held by Artemon, Theodotus (two persons of this name), and Paul of Samosata (260), the Son and Spirit are powers emanating from God. God merely dwells in Christ as in men, only more perfectly. One view, while denying personal distinctions, makes the Son and Spirit divine, the other anticipates Unitarianism. The first view is often called *Modal*, the second *Dynamical*, Sabellianism. In both cases there is no personal distinction, the Trinity is only a nominal one. Sabellianism never had much influence in the Church, and was never the creed of a community; it is too obviously opposed to the teaching of Scripture. There have often been individual cases of Sabellianism. In modern days Schleiermacher and Rothe occupy this position.[2]

The second occasion was Arianism, a much more formidable

[1] See Treffry, *Doctr. of Eternal Sonship*, p. 421.

[2] Pope, *Comp.* i. 272, and Fernley Lect.; Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* i. 257; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* i. 367.

error. Arianism—originated by Arius, an Alexandrian presbyter—directly denied Christ's Deity, and so made a Trinity impossible. According to Arianism, Christ was a super-angelic creature, the first creature, through whom all other creatures were made. Pre-existence was ascribed to him, but not eternity,—divinity, but not deity (*θειότης*, Rom. 1[20]; but not *θεότης*, Col. 2[9]). He was a fallible creature, actually but not necessarily impeccable. Arianism had a long history, rising and falling with the favour of the imperial court. Athanasius was the leading champion against it, and through his influence it was condemned at the first General Council of Nicæa, 325 A.D. Great difficulty was experienced in finding a decisive test of the views held by Arians. They were ready to ascribe the divine name and attributes, as well as divine worship, to Christ—of course in a secondary, delegated sense, as the Socinians did in later days. But they could not ascribe eternity to Christ. According to them, "there was once a time when he was not." Nor could they say that he was "of the same substance" with the Father, *ὁμοούσιος*. They said that he was "of like substance," *ὁμοιούσιος*, which is true of man. The difference of an iota expresses the difference between infinite and finite. Accordingly, these two points became the accepted tests of Arian views and of the true Deity of Christ. The clauses, "Begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father," in the Nicene Creed, condemn Arianism.[1] Arianism again has never been the creed of any sect in the Church, but there have been individual Arians.[2]

The Council of Nicæa merely put into formal shape what had been taught substantially by writers like Tertullian, Irenæus,

[1] *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός, γεννηθεὶς οὐ ποιηθείς, ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρί—from the substance of the Father, begotten not made, of one substance with the Father.* See also first part of Athanasian Creed.

[2] On Arianism, see Gwatkin, *Studies in Arianism;* Pope, *Comp.* i. 274, and Fernley Lect.; Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* i. 307; Newman, *Arians of the Fourth Century;* Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* i. 371. On Nicene Council generally, see Stanley, *Eastern Church,* Lect. ii.–v.

and Origen. The term "trinitas" appears first in Tertullian.[1] Origen greatly influenced the development of thought on the question. He asserted the eternal generation, laid just emphasis on the distinction of the divine persons, and gave currency to the Scripture term "Son" in preference to "Logos"; but, failing to lay equal stress on the unity of nature, and giving too great prominence to the subordination of the Son, he unconsciously paved the way for Arian teaching. He called the Father ὁ θεός, *the God*; the Son θεός, *God*. He would not call the Son αὐτόθεος, *God self-existent*, and thought ὁμοούσιος, *of the same substance*, favoured Sabellianism, which at least proves that he was no Sabellian.

The internal relations of the Trinity which it is important to notice are the *Eternal Generation* of the Son and the *Eternal Procession* of the Holy Spirit. These are names for mysterious, hyperphysical processes, which we can only accept on trust. What the difference is between generation and procession no one can explain. Pearson ventures to say, "Though everything which is begotten proceedeth, yet everything which proceedeth is not begotten."

The idea of *Generation* is implied in the title "Son." Strong objection has been made against the phrases Eternal Generation and Eternal Son as a combination of contradictory terms. Generation and sonship imply posteriority in time, which eternity directly excludes. The objection is conclusive if such terms are applied to the divine life in precisely the same sense as to human, but it is not so. The terms are the nearest and fittest supplied by human language to denote divine relations.[2] In so applying them, we must exclude from them everything inconsistent with the idea of God. The term "eternal" is added for the express purpose of negativing the idea of tem-

[1] In the treatise against the Sabellian Praxeas. *Trias* (τριάς) is found in Theophilus of Antioch (180 A.D.).

[2] Dean Jackson, *Works*, Bk. vii. ch. xxv. 8; Hooker, v. 54, 2; Pope, *Comp.* i. 273; see also Treffry, *Doctr. of Eternal Sonship*, pp. 9, 37, 47 219, 247, 388, etc.

poral posteriority. What else can be done? What term could be substituted for "Son," against which the same objection would not lie? What other names are there for the eternal Persons of the Trinity? An eternal Father implies an eternal Son, and eternal Son implies eternal generation. The phrase is also intended to exclude the idea of creation. Generation from God, not creation by God. What the Son is, he is by necessity of nature, not by the will of another, as the creature is. The very term "Son" at once asserts identity of nature and implies some sort of dependence. "Whatsoever Christ hath common unto him, the same of necessity must be *given* him, but naturally and eternally given," Hooker.[1]

No doubt the relation of Son implies also the idea of subordination. There is no difficulty in regard to official subordination, which necessarily attaches to the work of Mediator, and which no one denies. Nor is there any difficulty in accepting a subordination of order in the case both of the Son and Spirit. The difficulty is how to answer the question, Does the subordination apply to the divine nature of the Son and Spirit? The point is one of the utmost delicacy. History shows that where subordinationism in this sense is accepted, Arianism is not far off. How can such subordination be reconciled with Deity in the supreme sense? How can it be applied to such attributes as eternity? Yet some ancient writers, whom Pearson follows, have not hesitated to hold that perfect identity of nature is quite consistent with subordination in respect of the mode in which the nature is possessed. Pearson says, "That privilege or priority consisteth not in this, that the essence or attributes of the one are greater than the essence or attributes of the other; but only in this, that the Father hath that essence of himself, the Son by communication from the Father." "Because he is from the Father, therefore he is called by those of the Nicene Council in their creed, *God of God, light of light,*

[1] Passages in which the Father is called God in an eminent sense: John 1^{1}, $3^{16.\ 17.\ 18}$, 14^{1}, Rom. 8^{3}, Heb. $1^{1\text{-}3}$, 2 Cor. 13^{13}, etc. See also 1 Cor. 3^{23}, 11^{3}, John 20^{17}, Rev. 3^{12}, John 17^{3}, 1 Cor. 8^{6}, 15^{28}.

very God of very God.[1] The Father is God, but not of God; light, but not of light. Christ is God, but of God; light, but of light. There is no difference or inequality in the nature or essence, because the same in both; but the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ hath that essence of himself, from none; Christ hath that essence not of himself, but from him." In other words, the Son has the same essence as the Father, but has it by eternal communication from the Father, and this communication is eternal generation. The words, *The Father is greater than I* (John 14^{28}), were applied in support of this view. The Westminster Confession (2^{3}) puts these distinctions well: "The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father and the Son." "The Holy Church throughout all the world" acknowledges its Head to be "the everlasting Son of the Father."[2]

The only direct Scripture evidence for the *Procession* of the Holy Spirit is John 15^{26}. "Which proceedeth" was interpreted in early days of an eternal process, not the temporal mission. The present tense "proceedeth" is pointed out. Also, it is difficult to see why the temporal mission, already implied in the previous clause, should be repeated. On the other hand, modern expositors[3] take the preposition used—*para*, from the side of; not *ek*, out of—as decisive against the ancient interpretation. In this case the term *procession* (*ekporeusis*) falls away. Then we must rely on indirect proof. As the Spirit is called "the Spirit of God" (Rom. 8^{9}) and "Spirit of the Father" (Matt. 10^{20}), and is said to be sent by the Father (John 14^{26}), so he is called "Spirit of Christ" (Rom. 8^{9}, 1 Pet. 1^{11}) and "Spirit of the Son" (Gal. 4^{6}), and is said to be sent by Christ (John 15^{26}, 16^{7}). This similar temporal relation, it is argued, implies a similar essential relation to Father and

[1] *θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ—God from God, light from light, true God from true God.*

[2] Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, i. ch. ix.

[3] Westcott, Milligan and Moulton, in commentaries on the passage.

Son. As the Son eternally proceeds from the Father by generation, so the Spirit by breathing; and the above parallel argues the same relation to the Son. Or, more exactly stated, the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. This is the statement made by the early Latin Fathers.[1] The Greek Fathers stopped at the proceeding from the Father. The *Filioque* was inserted in the Nicene Creed at the Synod of Toledo, 589, and this was confirmed by subsequent Western Councils.[2] The whole question rests upon theological inference, and refers to profound mysteries.

The divinity of the Spirit never gave rise to serious controversy, because it was virtually decided in the rejection of Arianism. An Arian necessarily regarded the Spirit as a creature. The sect of the Macedonians[3] (named after Macedonius, Bishop of Constantinople) contested the divinity of the Holy Spirit for a time, but they were condemned at the General Council of Constantinople, 381. The clauses of the Nicene Creed referring to the Spirit were added to the creed about the time of that Council: "The Lord and Giver of Life, who proceedeth from the Father, who with the Father

[1] Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, Fulgentius, Leo. See Pearson on Creed. Pearson says that Epiphanius, among the Greeks, spoke of the Spirit "receiving eternally" (John 16^{14}) from the Son. The Greeks also said that the Spirit is "of or from the Father."

[2] "Seeing therefore the Father is of none, the Son is of the Father, and the Spirit is of both, they are by these, their several properties, really distinguishable from each other. For the substance of God with this property *to be of none* doth make the Person of the Father; the very self-same substance in number with this property *to be of the Father* maketh the Person of the Son; the same substance having added unto it the property of *proceeding from the other two* maketh the Person of the Holy Ghost. So that in every Person there is implied both the substance of God which is one, and also that property which causeth the same person really and truly to differ from the other two."—Hooker, Bk. v. 51, 1. See also Shedd, *History of Christian Doctrine*, i. 329; Treffry's treatise, *The Eternal Sonship of Christ.*

[3] They were Arians or Semi-Arians; Gwatkin, *Studies in Arianism;* Shedd, *History of Christian Doctrine*, i. 358.

and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the prophets."

The faith of the Church on this subject is well expressed by Dr. Pope: "The One divine Essence exists in a Trinity of co-equal, personal Subsistences: related as the Father, the eternal Son of the Father, and the Holy Spirit eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son."[1]

Beside forming the basis of divine worship, the doctrine gives us a glimpse into the inner life of Deity. That inner life is a scene of reciprocal activity and affection. It contains the eternal archetypes of the noblest human relations. Personality, fatherhood, sonship in creatures, are faint copies of the ideal realities in God. See Eph. $3^{14.15}$: "The Father, from whom every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named."[2]

[See the exhaustive and able treatment of the doctrine in Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. 344–465; Orr, *Christian View*, p. 302.]

[1] *Comp.* i. 259.

[2] "We *speak* of these things in a poor, low, broken manner,—we *teach* them as they are revealed in the Scripture,—we labour by faith to adhere unto them as revealed; but when we come into a steady, direct view and consideration of the *thing itself*, our minds fail, our hearts tremble, and we can find no rest but in a holy admiration of what we cannot comprehend."—Owen, i. 330.

CHAPTER IV

CREATION AND PROVIDENCE

Sec. 1.—Creation

Creation may mean either the act of creation or the created universe. Creation in the first sense is either primary[1] or secondary, the creation of matter itself, or giving shape to matter already existing. It is only of the first that we need to speak here.

The specifically Christian definition of creation is the creation of matter out of nothing. This idea was unknown, or rather rejected, in heathen antiquity, where the maxim "From nothing nothing comes" was held to limit even divine action. This maxim, founded on man's inability to originate new matter and on the observation of nature, where there is no absolute beginning, is true enough in reference to man. But its application to Deity is another proof that "the world by wisdom knew not God." Creation in the highest sense is the characteristic of omnipotence in distinction from finite power; otherwise the difference is merely one of degree. The idea neither involves a self-contradiction nor violates the causal principle, for an adequate cause is assigned. At the same time it maintains the supremacy of spirit over matter in the fullest degree. The alternative is the eternal existence of matter, which was held universally in the heathen world. On that view spirit and matter are co-ordinate, and the divine independence is abrogated.

[1] Synonyms of primary are essential, absolute, immediate.

Although primary creation is not expressly asserted in Scripture, it is implied. "The heaven and the earth" (Gen. 1^1) is the Hebrew equivalent for "universe," in which the substance of matter is included. The same may be said of "all things," John 1^3. "Things which are seen were not made of things which do appear," Heb. 11^3. The Hebrew and Greek words for create do not indeed originally imply absolute creation, but they acquire this meaning from the context. However, the Hebrew *bārā* is used with peculiar dignity of divine action only.

Origen, who is always original and often eccentric, held the notion of eternal creation. According to him, matter is eternal, but eternally dependent on the divine will. Its existence is not absolute and underived. An argument used in support of this notion is, that as creation is an effect of the divine goodness, and this goodness is eternal, there can never have been a time when creation was not. But it does not follow from the eternity of the divine goodness that it was eternally active. This would be to make, not merely its existence, but its operation necessary. The argument also implies that God has done all he can do, in which case the universe is as infinite as God. Besides, the very idea of goodness requires that it be free in its exercise.

The doctrine was put at the head of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as a protest against the Manichæan principle of the necessary evil of matter and the pantheistic idea of emanation from God. If matter was created by God, it could not be evil in itself. Creation also implies difference of nature between Creator and creature, while emanation involves identity. Both these thoughts are implied in Gen. 1. The doctrine is still necessary as a protest against Materialism in every form.

The modern theory of evolution only modifies our view of the mode of creation, making it a process instead of an act, the work of ages instead of the work of a moment. Against the idea of quite unbroken continuity of development there is the fact of breaks between the inorganic, vegetable, animal, and

human worlds. Here there seems to be a series of beginnings requiring new creative acts. But even if these chasms were bridged and unbroken continuity established, it would not do away with the necessity of a Creator at the beginning. If the world is a self-unfolding, growing organism, all that emerges in the process must have been present in germ from the first. The fact of order and system and design is not abolished. Creation is not made less real or wonderful. Nor does this mode of creation necessarily imply that from the moment of its creation the world is independent of its Creator. It may be continuously dependent. Indeed, this is involved in the thought of divine immanence. Again, it is no necessary part of the idea of creation that the Creator should be placed outside his work as an artist or architect. An immanent Creator is just as conceivable. Mr. Illingworth has shown that we have an analogy in our own personality.[1] In us the spirit as "self-conscious, self-identical, self-determined" is different from matter, *i.e.* transcendent to matter, and yet as impressing itself on and revealing itself in matter, first in our own bodies, and next in influence on external objects, is immanent in matter. Here we have an analogy to the two aspects of creation.

The only possible motive of creation is goodness or love, which rejoices in the impartation of good on the largest scale, Gen. 1^{31}, Prov. $8^{30\,f.}$. There was no need in the divine life to be supplied. The purpose or final cause is the existence of a world wherein dwells righteousness. The material is the servant of the spiritual, the natural of the moral. Heaven and earth are to be the scene of the kingdom of God.[2]

Sec. 2.—The Divine Image in Man

That man was made in the divine image, is the uniform

[1] *Divine Immanence*, ch. 3.

[2] Pope, *Comp.* i. 361; Pearson, Art. i.; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 21; Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. xii.; Orr, *Christian View*, p. 145.

teaching of Scripture, Gen. $1^{26.27}$, Ps. 8^{5}, 1 Cor. 11^{7}. But the constituents of this image have been variously conceived. The choice lies between two views. The image consists either —(1) in the powers of man's rational and moral nature, and the conformity of those powers to the divine will; or (2) assuming the first as constitutive of man, in the second alone. The first is the more usual view. It was the view of the Schoolmen, who made God's image in man consist of man's natural attributes and their moral conformity to God's will. Augustine, like many others, distinguished between "image" and "likeness," making the first consist in knowledge of truth, the second in love of virtue. Roman Catholic divines generally make man's nature correspond to the "image," and original righteousness to the "likeness"; but they regard the second element as a supernatural addition, not a part of man's original nature. If the first view be adopted, then it is only the second part of the image that was lost or could be lost by sin. For man to have lost the first would have been to cease to be man, and so to cease to be responsible and capable of recovery. In favour of the second view is the consideration that it makes the original image coincide with what is restored in redemption. Redemption does not give back any substantive faculty of human nature, which had never been lost, but only restores every faculty to its normal state. See Eph. 4^{24}, Col. 3^{10}.[1] Righteousness, which is the gift of redemption, is not a faculty like reason or conscience, but a quality; it is the normal exercise of moral powers. Is it not then better to regard this as forming the divine image? Man's rational and moral nature is implied as constituting the capacity for righteousness. As matter of fact, all the powers of man's nature exist in full action in the wicked; it is their right action that is wanting.

What man's original perfection included is not stated in Scripture, and can only be matter of speculation. There is no need to put that perfection extravagantly high. Error and evil were of course excluded. Adam was made subject to the law

[1] Laidlaw, *Bible Doctrine of Man*, pp. 105, 109, etc.

of growth, though the growth might and ought to have been in knowledge and goodness only.[1]

The doctrine of the divine Image has important bearings on the questions of Redemption, Incarnation, and Immortality. It made the first two possible. It is only a rational and moral being who is capable of redemption. The same powers which constitute the capacity of redemption constitute the possibility of Incarnation. Animal incarnations are the grotesque caricatures of heathenism. It seems most reasonable to reckon Immortality among the fundamental elements of human nature. It seems inseparable from the powers of reason and divine knowledge. Like these powers, it is not lost in the Fall, its character is changed.

Respecting the way in which the soul or spiritual nature of man is transmitted, three theories have been advanced. Origen was alone in holding the *Pre-existence* of individual souls, a Christianised transmigration. The notion has much against it, and little in its favour. Memory supplies no trace of a former state. The sense of unity in the race and the likeness between individuals are unexplained. The truth lies between Traducianism and Creationism. According to the first, the soul is transmitted like the body; according to the second, it is directly created by God. Both theories have always had advocates in the Church, and for both something can be said. The former best explains the fact of hereditary qualities and the transmission of sin. On the other hand, it is alleged that the theory has a materialistic taint, implying that spirit is transmitted by division like matter. But this need not be implied; division may not be the only mode of transmission; the laws of spirit must differ from those of matter. It is also objected that on this theory our Lord's soul could not be sinless; but the circumstances of his human nature are altogether unique. As there was miracle in respect of the conception, so there may have been in other respects. In early days Tertullian favoured Traducianism; in later days Luther and Lutherans. Creationism has found the greatest amount of favour. The Greek Church, Jerome, the

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 77.

mediæval divines, Calvin accept it, Augustine being doubtful. The theory seems to maintain most firmly the independence and high prerogatives of spirit, Heb. 12⁹. On the other hand, it fails to explain the intellectual and moral likeness between individuals, and it fails to explain original sin. These are qualities of the spiritual nature, and to find their source in the flesh is unphilosophical and Manichæan. The whole question is speculative rather than practical.

[Beck, *Biblical Psychology;* Laidlaw, *Bible Doctrine of Man;* Orr, *Christian View*, p. 161.]

Sec. 3.—Providence

This subject is fruitful in practical edification. We only notice here one or two points. Providence is generally described as General and Special, and made to include Preservation and Government.[1] It negatives both the deistic and pantheistic views of God's present and constant relation to the world. According to the former, the relation is one of pure Transcendence, *i.e.* God is not merely distinct from, but altogether unconcerned in, the world's life; according to the second, it is one of pure Immanence, *i.e.* it has no existence apart from that life. Standing between these two extremes, holding the truth and rejecting the error involved in them, the doctrine of Providence asserts against one a true divine immanence, and against the other a true divine transcendence. God is at once intimately present and active in every point of creation, and at the same time distinct from and above the world's life. The divine life and the human life are not separated by an impassable gulf,

[1] Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 22: "*Pronoia*, providence, is chiefly occupied in taking care, first, that the world shall be perfectly fitted for permanent existence, then that it needs nothing, but chiefly that it shall possess the utmost beauty and every form of adornment." He is arguing against the Epicurean deists, who said, "The gods care not for human affairs. God does nothing, is not agitated by thought, carries on no operations."—Luthardt, *Comp. d. Dogmatik*, p. 120.

as deism says, nor do they run into each other, as pantheists say.

The mode of God's action in Providence has been much discussed. To describe it as *Continuous Creation* is to go too far, and to merge Providence in creation. The world would then have no continuous existence. So far as the phrase asserts the constant dependence of the creature on the Creator (Acts 17^{28}), it is useful.

The theory of *Concursus* (concurrence, co-operation), in some form or other, must be admitted. God works through second causes, through the established order of things; and in saying this, we say that these have no necessary or absolute existence. Their independence, while real, is derived and limited. Man himself belongs to the order of second causes, though in the highest rank. God's ever-present action is universal in the strictest sense. Even the power by which men do evil is from God, the power being from God, and the moral quality from the abuse of man's will. The Lutheran Quenstedt uses as an illustration the act of writing, which depends, not partly on the hand and partly on the pen, but equally and entirely on both.[1] Confronted with the difficulty of moral evil, he draws the distinction between the act and its quality just mentioned.[2] The phrase Concurrence also implies that God respects the nature of the beings he has created. "God co-operates with second causes according to their nature, with free causes freely, with necessary causes necessarily, with weak causes weakly, with strong causes strongly, working according to his own universal and most gentle rule."

God's acts of government are sometimes described as Permission, Restraint, Direction, Final Determination. "God permits, indeed, but does not will what is permitted."

[Dorner's discussion of Creation, etc., will well repay study, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 9–103; Orr, *Christian View*, p. 145.]

[1] Pope, *Compend.* i. 447; Luthardt, p. 122.

[2] "God exerts influence on sinful acts as to their being and natural aspect, not as to their deformity and moral aspect."

CHAPTER V

ACTUAL AND ORIGINAL SIN

Scripture says nothing on the question, which has never ceased to awaken and baffle curiosity, of the real or metaphysical origin of moral evil. So far as Scripture is concerned, any theory is admissible which does justice to all the facts of the case. It refers only to the historical origin of sin in the world. According to Genesis, sin was imported into the world from without. It arose at first, as it arises still, through temptation. Beyond this point Scripture does not go. Only the bare facts of the first sin are recited; the significance of that sin for the race is gradually revealed afterwards.

A good definition of sin is found in St. John's word *ἀνομία* (1 John 3^4), lawlessness, deviation from or contrariety to law. Other terms, such as *ἁμαρτία*, iniquity, transgression, unrighteousness, include the same idea of deviation, which again presupposes a fixed rule or law. This rule or law exists first. Right comes before wrong. One is that which ought to be, which has a right to exist; the other, that which ought not to be, which has no right to exist. Some, who explain good and evil as two sides of a necessary antithesis, argue as if wrong were necessary to the existence of right. Certainly the idea or notion of wrong is given in the idea of right, but not the fact or reality of wrong. The two things are not co-ordinate, as this theory supposes. The rule in the present case is God's law in all its breadth. The very giving of that law to man implies that he is a free moral being, capable of keeping or violating it. A brute is incapable of sin. God's law commands

as well as forbids, commands love to God and our neighbour as well as forbids hate. The absence of such love, indifference, is sin as well as active wrong. "Sin is disobedience to the law of God in will or deed." It is to be remembered also that all sin, as sin, is against God. Strictly speaking, we do not sin against men. Dr. Pope's definition of sin,[1] "the voluntary separation of the soul or the self from God," is taken from the contents of God's law. That law requires man to acknowledge God's right in him, and surrender himself to God's service. Sin is the rejection of this demand.

In nothing is the superiority of Scripture teaching, especially of the Old Testament, better seen than in its doctrine of sin. Sin is viewed as a moral offence against God. The law of which it is a violation is God's law, and that law is the expression of his nature and will. Thus the truth and completeness of our view of sin depend on our knowledge of God and his law. Now the one theme of the Old Testament, as of all Scripture, is God and his will. Righteousness and holiness are among his chief attributes, are indeed his essence. Sin as antagonism to righteousness and holiness is what God forbids, hates, and punishes. It is for want of clear knowledge of God that other religions fail in their conception of sin. Some of these are superior to others in this respect, but all are far behind the Old Testament religion. It is because the New Testament conception of God is the highest and fullest that its doctrine of sin is the most complete. Christ came to complete the revelation of the law, which becomes stricter in his hands. He sums up God's law in two great commands, which are taken from the Old Testament, although they receive new emphasis. By that higher law of Christ we are judged. Every transgression of that law is a sin against God. Even our offences against one another are sins against God. The Scripture idea of sin finds perfect expression in Psalms 32, 51, 130,

[1] This definition applies to actual sin only. In reference to original sin, it applies to its beginning in Adam.

143, Luke 18^{13}, 1 John 1^{9}, 2^{1}. "Sin is moral evil viewed as an offence against God." [1]

God's anger against sin and man's penitence for it (Ps. 51^{17}) correspond one to the other. God's anger is plainly taught both in the Old Testament and the New. There is no aspect of God's character which has given more offence, but there is little reason for offence. It is the effect and evidence of his holiness. We only need to remove from it all the imperfection which inheres in human anger in order to see that it is compatible with divine perfection, Ps. 91^{7}, Rom. 1^{18}. That anger is already revealed in part in the punishments which follow evil-doing, and in man's self-condemnation, remorse, and fear on the commission of sin.[2]

Sin, both actual and original, assumes two forms, or is known by two signs, guilt and corruption. Guilt, again, is distinguished as blameworthiness and liability to penalty, *reatus culpæ* and *reatus pœnæ*. Both these forms of guilt meet in actual sin; the second only is found in original sin. Actual sin includes sins of desire and intention as well as of word and deed. Corruption or depravity denotes the evil state of man's nature which is the secret fount of actual sin, and is perhaps best described as sinfulness.

The penalty which certainly follows guilt is death, both physical and spiritual. Rom. 5^{12} can scarcely leave it doubtful that in man's case the former is the effect of sin. He was designed originally for physical immortality. As physical death is the separation of soul from body, so spiritual death is the separation of the soul from God. This separation is the opposite of the state of divine fellowship for which man was made, and which constitutes eternal life. The perpetuation of this state of separation is eternal death.

The two axioms by which all theories must be tried are

[1] Candlish, *Bibl. Doctr. of Sin;* Oehler, *O.T. Theology*, i. p. 229; Schultz, *O.T. Theol.* ii. ch. xiv.

[2] Simon, Essay on God's Anger in *Redemption of Man;* Candlish, *ibid.* p. 46.

God's holiness and man's freedom. Tried by these tests, all the theories hitherto proposed fail. *Dualism* derives moral evil from the nature of matter. Spirit is pure, matter impure; sin is the result of contact between the two. This was the doctrine of Manichæism and Gnosticism, and Manichæism was an offshoot of the old dualistic religion of Persia. If matter is regarded as created by God, God is made the author of sin; if it is held to be eternal, God is not supreme. In either case sin is necessary. According to another theory, sin is the consequence of a *finite* nature.[1] The finite as such is evil. Sin springs from limitation of knowledge and power. On this view also sin is necessary. The finite as such cannot be good, and can only become so by passing into the infinite. The pantheistic tendency is evident. Moreover, good and evil are made quantities instead of qualities. F. C. Baur and others of pantheistic tendencies favour this theory. A kindred, though not identical, view makes sin a mere negation, the simple absence of good. Augustine seems to have been the author of this favourite idea. He thought that, if sin was a mere nonentity, the necessity for seeking a cause for it was done away. But sin is more than a negation, more than the mere absence of what ought to be; it is just as positive as good, it is the presence of what ought not to be. The will is not passive but antagonistic in evil. A third theory, which traces sin to the possession of a *sensuous nature*, has a Manichæan taint.[2] Besides being open to the objections already mentioned, it leaves spiritual sins unexplained. The seat of all sin is in the will, of which the flesh is the instrument.[3]

According to Scripture teaching, sin originates in man's spiritual nature, and is an act of free will. Without freedom there is no guilt, no blameworthiness. But man blames him-

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 362.

[2] *Ibid.* ii. 375–382.

[3] Pope, *Comp.* ii. 20; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 18; Orr, *Christian View*, p. 204; Müller, *Christ. Doctr. of Sin*, vol. i. 271–412, and the whole treatise.

self, judges and condemns himself, is often filled with remorse, and so in the most practical way confesses his freedom and acknowledges the sin to be his own act. When he says, "I ought not to have done this," he implies, "I need not have done it; I could have done otherwise." All my sin, original included, is the result of a free act somewhere, in myself or another before me. Sin, therefore, is not the result of mere weakness or imperfection, not imperfect good, not a stage in man's progress to good, but that which ought not to be and need not have been. All criminal legislation proceeds on this basis. If man is the creature of circumstances, the slave of his own passions, he ought not to be punished, but taught better and trained. All criminal jurisprudence is based on retribution. Punishment merely as a warning and deterrent could not be justified, although reformation may be combined with punishment. What crime is in human law, sin is in the divine kingdom. Not merely religion, but social order, stands or falls with human freedom. Happily man's own consciousness is the chief witness to the fact.[1]

All that we can say in the way of theory is that the very idea of freedom implies the possibility (not the fact) of evil. The conversion of possibility into fact is man's work. The sole question of interest is whether a world constructed on the basis of freedom or one constructed on the basis of necessity is best. In the latter case, not only is evil excluded, but good also. Virtue is then as necessary as the action of physical law. It is not man's own act or choice. He has nothing to say to his own moral character. The guilt and misery of sin are no doubt excluded, but so also are the merit and the true happiness of virtue. It is open to argument whether this would not be a greater evil than the permission of sin. Besides, while sin is permitted by God, it is eventually overruled for good, perhaps even for greater good.

[1] Orr, *Christian View*, p. 200.

Sec. 1.—Actual Sin

The universality of guilt with all its consequences is taught in passages like Gen. 6^{12}, Ps. 14^{1-3}; cf. Rom. 3^{10}, Isa. 53^{6}, Gal. 3^{22}. The universal commands to repent and believe in order to forgiveness imply the same truth. The first chapters of the Epistle to the Romans expressly assert and argue the sin and guilt of all mankind. This fact constitutes the necessity for the work of redemption, which the apostle goes on to expound.

The universal extent of inward depravity may be inferred from the universality of outward sin. So general a fact can only be explained by as general a cause. An invariable effect requires an invariable cause; and the effect is invariable. However different in form and degree, sin is universal. The universal necessity of conversion, as taught in Scripture, is another proof. See Gen. 6^{5}, 8^{21}, Ps. 51, Matt. 7^{11}, 15^{19}, John 3^{3}, Eph. 2^{3}, 4^{22}. Another testimony to the same truth is found in St. Paul's antithesis of Flesh and Spirit. The germ of this idea is contained in Christ's words, John 3^{6}. Here "the flesh" must mean the whole of human nature,[1] including flesh, soul, and spirit in its sinful state. The whole nature is designated from the part which governs the rest. The idea is fully worked out in St. Paul's Epistles, Rom. 7^{19-25}, $8^{6.\,7.\,8.\,13}$, Gal. $5^{19.\,22}$. "The spirit" may be interpreted either as the whole nature, so designated from the part which has become the governing power, or as the Holy Spirit who creates the new spiritual life. "The flesh" is an awfully vivid description of man as morally corrupt.

Sec. 2*a*.—Doctrine of Original or Hereditary Sin

Peccatum originis or *originale*. "The fault and corruption

[1] See also John 1^{14}. Note by Dr. Gifford in *Speaker's Comm.* Introduction, p. 48; Godet, *Comm. on Romans*, i. 127; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 318.

of the nature of every man," Eng. Art. ix. It consists of the same two elements, guilt and depravity, which, however, undergo a modification. Guilt here means simply the *reatus pœnæ*, the *reatus culpæ* being cut off (p. 108). Depravity means a tendency or bias to evil. The *reatus culpæ* in the case of original guilt resided in the first sinner, as representing the race. We inherit the consequences of his act. The two ideas of responsibility for the act, and liability to consequences, are separable under a federal constitution such as that on which man was created. An important question is, which is first, guilt or depravity? An attempt has been made to represent depravity as transmitted in the way of natural consequence, and the guilt to follow from this. This was the theory of the French Reformed School of Saumur (Amyraldus, 17th cent.), known as the immediate theory. But it only raises another difficulty. How, on this theory, is the transmission of moral evil to be justified? There is no justification. Moral evil is transmitted just like physical.[1] On the other hand, the transmission of guilt, in the restricted sense already explained, is perfectly justifiable, if the representative or federal principle is justifiable in the moral as in other spheres. And then the transmission of guilt becomes the basis for the transmission of a corrupt nature.

The classical passage on Original *Guilt* is Rom. $5^{12\text{-}19}$. All through the passage a parallel or contrast is struck between the two men who are treated as the two Heads or Representatives of the race. The apostle's thought is centred on the benefits coming to the race through the one man, Christ,—coming independently of our action. He sets off these benefits by contrasting them with the evil coming to the race through one man, Adam, coming independently of our action. Unless this is the apostle's meaning, his parallel has no force. And the details of the passage bear out the central thought so understood. The unfinished protasis of ver. 12 would run,

[1] Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* ii. 350; Pope, *Comp.* ii. 78; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* ii. 205; Fisher, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* p. 342.

"As through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin, and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned; so through one man righteousness entered into the world, and life through righteousness, and so life passed unto all men, for that all became righteous, or were justified." If this is not expressly said, it is implied through the rest of the passage: see ver. 14, "who is a figure of him that was to come." According to ver. 12, "death entered and passed unto all men," *i.e.* virtually, when the one man sinned. The "passing of death unto all men" is then justified by the statement, "for that all sinned." When? When all virtually died, *i.e.* in Adam. The converse also is implied, namely, that all were justified in Christ, *i.e.* conditionally, provisionally, so far as God's purpose is concerned. If the reference were to the sin and death of individuals apart from Adam, we should expect "for that all have sinned," as well as "death has passed unto all men." Augustine, in saying "all sinned in Adam," was technically wrong, but substantially right. To suppose the apostle to mean that individuals die because of their personal sin, would contradict the main teaching of the paragraph. Besides, how could the death of infants be explained? No doubt, at first sight St. Paul's teaching might seem to lead to Universalism. But he is here dealing with the objective aspect of salvation, its general provision by God, under which aspect it is universal. It is on the subjective side that conditions come in, and these are dealt with elsewhere. See also ver. 19, "were made," or constituted "sinners," 2 Cor. 5^{14}, 1 Cor. $15^{22.45}$.[1]

Original *Depravity* is taught in passages like Ps. 51^{5}, John 3^{6}, Eph. 2^{3}; see also Gen. 5^{1-3}, Job 14^{4}. "Flesh," as we have seen (p. 111), is the designation of a certain moral state, namely, of human nature as fallen or corrupt. "That which is flesh" (John 3^{6}), thus, is equivalent to "corrupt nature." And the reason assigned is that it is "born of the flesh";

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 339. "The sick giant stretches from east to west. The Lord comes from heaven to heal the sick one."—Augustine.

like begets like. In the same way "spirit," *i.e.* renewed human nature, is so because "born of the Spirit." "We were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest," Eph. 2^3. "By nature," the apostle says, we were exposed to the divine wrath. Attempts have been made to explain "children of wrath" by "children of disobedience," Eph. 5^6, the possessive being subjective instead of objective. But what authority is there for supposing "wrath" to be a special characteristic of Paul and the Ephesian Christians, and indeed all Christians, "even as the rest"? "Wrath" is constantly used by St. Paul, without qualification, for the divine anger. See Rom. $2^{5.8}$, 5^9, 9^{22}, 12^{19}, 1 Thess. 1^{10}, 2^{16}, 5^9; also Matt. 3^7, John 3^{36}, Rom. 1^{18}, etc.

It must be remembered that the Scripture doctrine of Original Sin is simply a way of explaining certain undeniable facts of human history, the facts of sin and death. Apart from it, the power and universality of sin are without explanation, and death is without moral justification. That death is not a normal, natural event in the case of man is shown by our instinctive, inevitable shrinking from it. Deny Original Sin, and actual sin remains, with its mystery deepened. We know little of the mystery of evil now; we should know still less, indeed nothing at all, in the other case.

The doctrine is also in harmony with the principle of the solidarity of the race. Man is not an isolated unit in his physical, intellectual, or social life. He comes into the world with a certain endowment, which he can improve, but to which he cannot add. One man is born a prince, another a beggar; one a poet, another an artist; one clever, another dull. One inherits abilities, position, connections, intellectual, moral, and social qualities which render success certain and easy; another "by nature" is heavily, even hopelessly, weighted in all these respects. All these things we owe to the race, not to ourselves. We do not make them, and cannot alter them. Not individualism but organic unity is the principle on which man's life is constituted. The human world, like the material one, is not a

mass of unconnected atoms, but a system, a cosmos, whose parts act and react at every point. This doctrine says that the same law holds good in man's spiritual life. Redemption is founded on the same principle. Pelagianism, in denying the possibility of a Fall in Adam, denies the possibility of Redemption in Christ.

Arminianism calls attention to the fact that Redemption was coeval with the Fall. Man was never left under the unchecked dominion of sin and death. Mr. Wesley says, "Allowing that all the souls of men are dead by nature, this excuses none, seeing there is no man that is in a state of mere nature; there is no man, unless he has quenched the Spirit, that is wholly void of the grace of God."[1] Thus, no one is abandoned to the power of evil or in reality utterly corrupt. Even in the wicked the spirit strives against the flesh, and checks its power. When it ceases to resist, spiritual death is complete. Extreme doctrines of original sin, such as Augustine's, assume that man actually is what he would have been if he had been left entirely to the power of sin, apart from all modifying, restraining action of divine grace.[2]

The Westminster Confession, ch. vi., says that our first parents "became dead in sin and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body," and that "they conveyed the same death in sin and corrupted nature to all their posterity." This was so modified by the Declaratory Acts in 1892 of the Scottish Free Church, as to mean that depravity merely affects every part of our nature.[3]

Redemption cuts off the entail of original guilt, at least provisionally, and provides a remedy for original corruption. In the case of infants dying before sinfulness issues in actual sin, the remedy takes effect of itself; in the case of adults, it needs an act of individual appropriation. No one dies eternally through original sin alone.

[1] Serm. "Working out our own Salvation."
[2] Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* ii. 329–333.
[3] Denney, *Studies in Theology*, p. 82.

Sec. 2*b*.—Dogma of Original Sin

While the substance of the dogma is common to all Churches, its formal statement varies. The common truth is the fall of the race in Adam and its redemption in Christ. The two go together. If one is impossible, so is the other. In that case we are left to work out our own salvation in the most absolute sense. It is to the West that we owe the formal definition of this doctrine. The East has taken little or no interest in the question. The occasion of the definition was the error of Pelagianism, which knows only individual sin. According to it the individual is everything, the race nothing; every man comes into the world in the same moral state as Adam, he falls through influence and example, he saves himself in the same way; death is a natural occurrence, not a penalty.[1] The teaching was condemned at Councils like Carthage, 412 A.D., and Ephesus, 431.[2]

It was in opposition to this theory, which undermined the very foundations of redemption, that Augustine formulated a theory of Original Sin. In doing so, however, he only gave definite expression to the thoughts of preceding teachers like Cyprian, Ambrose, Tertullian, and Hilary. With immense wealth of argument from Scripture, reason, and experience, he established the moral unity of the race, the federal headship of Adam, and the transmission of his sin to mankind. He undoubtedly pushed these ideas too far, at least in statement, saying, "In Adam all sinned, for we were all that one man."[3] It is not always easy to separate the true ideas in Augustine's teaching from their extremes. Overlooking the fact that divine

[1] Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* ii. 93; Fisher, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* p. 183.

[2] Dorner, vol. ii. p. 338.

[3] Augustine translates Rom. 5^{12}: "'In whom all sinned'; we were all in that one man, for we were all that one man." Luthardt, p. 146. The translation is verbally wrong, but substantially right (p. 113). See his *Anti-Pelagian Treatises*, edited by Canon Bright (Clar. Press). Shedd, ii. 50.

grace began to operate contemporaneously with the Fall, he made human nature really an unrelieved mass of corruption. On this supposition, man's only possible attitude to grace is a passive one—he has no power to accept or resist. As all men are equally impotent, while all are not saved, the cause of the difference cannot be in man, but must be in God. That cause can only be God's determination to save some and not others. Here we have the primary germ of predestinarianism. But, setting aside extreme statements and inferences, the substance of Augustine's teaching has passed into the creeds of all Churches.

The extreme doctrine provoked reaction as early as the fifth century. The Semi-Pelagianism which arose then was an attempt at compromise. It dwelt on the negative aspect of sin, and made man capable of originating good, which divine grace completes. This was the doctrine of John Cassian, Faustus of Rhegium, etc., while Hilary, Prosper, Cæsarius of Arles, took Augustine's line. The local synods of Arles and Lyons in 475 favoured the new movement, which again was condemned by those of Orange and Valence, 529.[1] While Pelagianism has never been adopted by any Church, and never could be, Semi-Pelagianism infects many Churches. The Roman Catholic doctrine of original sin is not free from it.

The only Churches which accept Augustine's doctrine in full are those which follow Calvin, who simply gave logical completeness to the teaching of the greatest of the Fathers. Luther indeed followed Augustine as fully as Calvin, but the Lutheran Church has not done so.

The best form of Arminian doctrine, as held by the Methodist Churches, teaches that, while in human nature of itself "dwelleth no good thing," on the ground of Christ's redemption it shares universally in prevenient grace. Such grace comes to man unconditionally, and is the power by which men consent to and accept further grace. Here the essential

[1] Shedd, ii. 104; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* ii. 342; Banks, *Devel. of Doctrine*, i. 180.

truth of Augustine's doctrine is preserved, while the errors of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism are avoided. Any original goodness in man is denied, but he is not reduced to utter impotence. Every man loses in Adam and gains in Christ. The legal and moral headship of the Second Adam is as effective as that of the first Adam; the former is more potent for good than the latter was for evil.[1]

> "In him the tribes of Adam boast
> More blessings than their father lost."

The grace which comes to every man in Christ, if rightly used, will lead to salvation: "The natural man is without the power to co-operate with divine influence. The co-operation with grace is of grace." The good seen in unregenerate men is due to redemption.[2] In affirming the action of grace as well as of sin from the time of the Fall, Arminianism avoids the prime error of Augustine.

Some further remarks on confessional differences may be useful. The Roman view of man's original nature and the effects of the Fall is as follows. Man's nature consists of flesh and spirit, each opposed to the other, and each seeking supremacy. The original righteousness, which kept the flesh in due subjection to the spirit, was no part of this nature, but a superadded gift. Only this latter was lost by the Fall. Thus man was simply thrown back into his original state; he lost nothing belonging to his nature, but something supernatural. It is obvious to remark that on this view man's nature as created was morally neutral; it was not actually moral, but only capable of a moral character, the moral element residing in the supernatural addition.[3] Indeed, a Manichæan taint seems present; for, without the bridle of the supernatural gift, the triumph of the flesh seemed assured. The Roman Church calls the natural contrariety of flesh and spirit concupiscence, which, while the material and source of sin, is not itself sinful; it is

[1] Rom. 5[15. 17. 20. 21].

[2] See chap. iii. *infra*.

[3] Jackson, Bk. x. chs. iii. xii. xiii.

in fact a mere natural propensity.[1] The effect of the Fall is thus much more negative than positive. Yet the original nature is supposed to have suffered some weakening from the Fall,[2] and the fact of inherited sin is taught, which baptism washes away.[3] On the other hand, the Protestant confessions make original righteousness a constituent of man's nature, not something additional. In the Fall, therefore, the nature itself suffered loss. Not of course that any substantive part or faculty of it was lost. By its very idea righteousness is not a substance or faculty, but a quality or character of substance or faculty. Protestants have always held their position on this point to be involved in the statement that man was created in the divine image. The loss inflicted by the Fall was positive. *Conf. Augsb.* p. 9: "They teach that after the Fall of Adam, all men, begotten in order of nature, are born with sin, *i.e.* without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence."[4] Eng. Art. ix.: "Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the fault or corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit, and therefore, in every person born into the world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation; and this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated, whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek *φρόνημα σαρκός*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God; and though there is no condemnation for them that

[1] Winer, *Conf.* pp. 89, 99.

[2] Bellarmin says: "Man is now born prone to evil, infirm, ignorant," *ibid.* pp. 86, 88.

[3] Winer, *ibid.* p. 103.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 89: Docent, quod post lapsum Adæ omnes homines, secundum naturam propagati, nascantur cum peccato, h. e. sine metû Dei, sine fiduciâ erga Deum, et cum concupiscentiâ.

believe and are baptized, yet the apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin."[1] The *Apology* for the *Augsb. Conf.* says: "Our adversaries argue that concupiscence is penalty, not sin; Luther argues that it is sin. It has been said before that Augustine defines original sin as concupiscence. Let them find fault with Augustine, if this view is inconvenient. Moreover, Paul says (Rom. 7^{7}): I had not known concupiscence to be sin, unless the law had said: Thou shalt not lust. Again (Rom. 7^{23}): I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into subjection to the law of sin which is in my members. No cavilling can overthrow those testimonies, for they plainly call concupiscence sin."[2]

It was from their not recognising the action of divine grace in the unregenerate that the Reformers were so unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of any good works before conversion. Hence all the Reformation creeds speak in the sense of Art. xiii., often in stronger language.[3] The Lutherans, holding baptism to be the means of regeneration, make a difference between the baptized and unbaptized in this respect, holding the former capable of good works. The jealousy shown for the honour of divine grace was admirable but mistaken.

[Tulloch, *Christian Doctrine of Sin;* Wesley's *Treatise on Original Sin.* Dorner's discussion of the whole subject is very thorough, *Syst. Christian Doctrine*, ii. 297–405, and iii. 9–142; Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, 2 vols.; Candlish, *Biblical Doctrine of Sin.*]

[1] "Hath *the nature of sin*," *i.e.* is of sinful tendency. This is not so strong as the *Apology*. "*The bias to evil* is innate and congenital; and this makes it the nature of man, as being inherent and not accidental." Dr. Pope, *Comp.* ii. 64, and *Higher Catechism*, p. 122. Yet the Augustinian and Lutheran extreme is nearer the truth than the Semi-Pelagian one.

[2] Winer, p. 105; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 348.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 112–114.

PART SECOND

DOCTRINES OF REDEMPTION

CHAPTER I

PERSON OF THE REDEEMER

The doctrine of Sin would naturally be followed by that of the Atonement. But as the value of redemption depends on the character of the Redeemer, a previous question is, Who and what is Christ, the Redeemer? The reply of the Church, founding on Scripture, is the doctrine of the Incarnation. A divine Incarnation includes three points, — perfect Divinity, perfect Humanity, and a perfect union between the two.[1] The most perfect union known to us is the one called personal, a union constituting the natures into a new,[2] indissoluble personality. Even the union of body and soul in man supplies only an imperfect analogy, because the elements united are not complete natures, but only parts of natures, and because the union is dissoluble. The Church has always guarded the integrity of these three elements with great jealousy. The

[1] "Some things he doth as God, because his Deity alone is the well-spring from which they flow; some things as man, because they issue from his mere human nature; some things jointly both as God and man, because both natures concur as principles thereunto." Hooker, v. 53, 3.

[2] An acute Irish critic objects to the word "new," with some reason, inasmuch as the divine person of the Son pre-existed. Still, we speak of the divine-human person, and one is afraid of docetism.

loss or mutilation of either one is fatal to the idea of incarnation. As we shall see afterwards, all error on the subject has touched one or other of these three points. One error has mutilated the human nature; another has denied the divine; a third has substituted transmutation or absorption for union; a fourth has reduced the union to a relation of moral likeness and sympathy, like the one existing between every believer and God.

Thus, the person of Christ is absolutely unique. Christ is not God simply, nor man simply, but God-man. Two natures, each complete in its several attributes, meet in him, neither confounded together nor acting independently, but so constituting one person that the acts of each are the acts of the person. It is this feature of absolute uniqueness which makes it impossible to bring illustrations from other sources. The Incarnate life is different in its constituents from every other life. The union is as mysterious as that of the three Persons of the Trinity, only the terms nature and person are here transposed. In the Trinity we speak of one nature and three persons, here of one person and two natures.[1]

Each of the three elements is equally important in relation to the idea of Incarnation. In one age such stress is laid on the Divinity that the Humanity is obscured, as in the first Christian centuries. In the present day the converse tendency is strong. Sometimes the union is pressed until it becomes identity, in another it is so relaxed as to make of Christ two persons. The first is Eutychianism, the second Nestorianism. But union is not identity, it implies distinctness as really as oneness. The importance of the Humanity is often overlooked from the fact of the doctrine taking the form of a proof of Christ's Divinity. The reason of its taking this form is that only the divinity is called in question, the humanity is admitted on all sides.

[1] See p. 86.

Sec. 1.—Doctrine of Christ's Divinity in Scripture

The old method of proof is to select and classify the passages bearing on the question, irrespective of the part of Scripture in which they are found. The new one, followed by writers like Liddon and Whitelaw,[1] is to epitomise the testimony of each inspired writer separately. Each method has its obvious advantages and disadvantages. Here we take the first course as the most compendious.

1. The Divine Name given to Christ in the highest sense. John 1^1. This is the only passage in which the reference to Christ is quite undisputed. The context is too clear to admit of doubt. The first clause affirms Christ's pre-existence, and is of course inconsistent with simple humanitarianism. The "beginning" was evidently before the creation mentioned in ver. 3. The second clause affirms Christ's distinctness from and yet presence with God.[2] It precludes Sabellianism, but not Arianism. The third clause directly excludes Arianism. Note also the verbs. The Word "was"; all other things "were made" or "became." The Word did not become, was not made. The only way of evading the force of the passage is to say that "God" in the third clause of ver. 1 means "God" in a delegated, secondary sense. Where is the authority for saying this of "God" in the third any more than in the second clause? This sense is precluded by the ascription in the third verse of creation to Christ, unless Christ is a delegated Creator also. But the statement that "all things"

[1] *How is the Divinity of Jesus depicted in Scripture?* (Hodder & Stoughton).

[2] "The phrase 'was with God' is remarkable. The idea conveyed by it is not that of simple co-existence, as of two persons contemplated separately in company (*εἶναι μετά*), or united under a common conception (*εἶναι σύν*), or (so to speak) in local relation (*εἶναι παρά*), but of being (in some sense) directed towards and regulated by that with which the relation is fixed. The personal being of the Word was realised in active intercourse with and in perfect communion with God." Westcott in *Speaker's Commentary*, p. 3. See also pp. 10, 11. Comp. 1 John $1^{1,2}$.

were created by Christ excludes him from the class of created beings. The use of the divine name in the highest sense is also in harmony with the entire strain of the Gospel, the purpose of which is to set forth Christ's divine glory.

Rom. 9^5. The reference of the verse to Christ is disputed, but on insufficient grounds. The view that the last clause is a doxology to the Father[1] is untenable—(*a*) because a doxology would be out of harmony with the strain of the paragraph, which is one of profound sorrow for the unbelief of the Jews. What has occurred to turn the wail into an anthem? The mention of Christ's Jewish descent according to the flesh? But this is simply the crowning privilege (the adoption, the glory, etc.) of the Jewish people; and these privileges are enumerated, not as grounds of joy or praise, but as aggravations of the apostle's wonder and sorrow at the unbelief of his nation. So sudden a transition as the doxological interpretation implies would be abrupt, and out of step with all that has preceded. (*b*) "As concerning the flesh" is a limitation, implying that in another relation Christ did not come of the Jews. This other relation should surely be stated in some form. It is so stated substantially in Rom. $1^{3,4}$, 1 Tim. 3^{16}, 1 Pet. 3^{18}. On the ancient interpretation of the present passage it is so stated, but not on the new one. (*c*) The position of "blessed," which ordinarily precedes its subject in doxologies, as in Luke 1^{68} and many other places, while here it follows. (*d*) The words of the last clause occur in Rom. 1^{25} and 2 Cor. 11^{31} in a declaratory sense. There the reference, no doubt, is to the Father, but the sense is declaratory, not doxological. In the present paragraph the Father is not mentioned. The strongest argument on the other side is that it is not St. Paul's usage to call Christ God, and therefore that it is unlikely he would do so here. But precisely the same might be said of St. John, who yet, as all admit, does call Christ God in the first verse of his Gospel.[2]

[1] See margin of Revised Version.

[2] See an excellent note by Dr. Gifford in *Speaker's Commentary*, p. 178.

These passages are sufficient on this head. No adequate reason, however, can be given for contesting the reference to Christ in 1 John 5^{20}. There is no need to insist on the new rendering in Tit. 2^{13}. Even on the old rendering the co-ordination of God and Christ is significant. In 1 Tim. 3^{16}, external authority is for the Revised Version, internal probability for the old. The use of the relative pronoun without antecedent, or even a reference to "God" in ver. 15 as antecedent, is singular. Accepting, however, the new version, we then observe that the phraseology of the verse is inapplicable to a mere man—"manifested" in the flesh.

2. Passages implying Christ's possession of the divine nature. John $5^{17.\ 18}$. Christ justifies his work on the Sabbath by the divine example. He compares his own act of healing to the Father's work of providential government which is continued on the Sabbath. The Jews understood him to claim sonship of the most absolute kind, making God "his own Father"; and Christ, instead of correcting, accepts and confirms the interpretation.

10^{30}. Here also the context fixes the meaning. None can pluck believers out of "my hand" or out of "the Father's hand." Christ then justifies the interchange of phrase by saying, "I and the Father are one." The unity meant, therefore, is one of power and so of essence, not merely of likeness and sympathy such as obtains between believers and God, 17^{21}. Calvin thinks that "harmony of will" is meant.[1] But it is difficult to see how this would justify the expression "out of my hand."

Phil. $2^{6\text{-}8}$. Christ's humility is illustrated by his descent from a higher to a lower state of being (ver. 7), and by his conduct in that lower state (ver. 8).[2] The descent is the becoming man (ver. 7), as is evident both from the terms employed and from the fact that the second act of lowliness (ver. 8) was done in the human state. What, then, was the

[1] Dods, *Gospel of John*, i. 342.

[2] Note the distinction of principal and subordinate clauses in vers. 7 and 8 in Revised Version.

previous state of being (ver. 6) from which Christ descended? It was a "being in the form of God." "Form," though not equivalent to "nature," implies the possession of the nature; it is the expression of the nature. The form of one order of being cannot be united with the nature of another, as, *e.g.*, man and angel. If "the form of a servant" and "the likeness of men" imply Christ's possession of the nature of a servant and of men, then "the form of God" implies his possession of the nature of God.[1] The divinity and humanity of Christ stand or fall together, for one is expressed in the same terms as the other. Or, rather, the divinity is expressed in stronger terms than the humanity. "Form" is stronger than "likeness" and "fashion." His humanity may be denied with more reason than his divinity. Note also "being made" and "taking" in reference to the lower state, in contrast with "being" in the higher.[2] The interpretation of this passage is a decisive test of the humanitarian view of Christ's person. It is only possible at all on this view by diluting the spirit of the passage

[1] Chrysostom in his *Comm.* says: "What then should we say in answer to Arius, who said that the Son is of other substance (than the Father)? Tell me, what is the meaning of this—'He took the form of a servant'? He became man, says Arius. Therefore also *subsisting in the form of God*, he was God. For the word used in both places is *form* (μορφή). If the one is true, the other is true: *the form of a servant*, man by nature; therefore *the form of God*, God by nature."

[2] Both Lightfoot's and Ellicott's exposition of this passage should be consulted, as well as that of the following one. See Owen on "Christ as the Image of the Father," *Works*, i. 69. Gifford, *The Incarnation*, a Study of Phil. 2^{5-11}. Dr. Gifford shows that the imperfect participle implies not only past existence but continued existence in the form of God (pp. 18, 97); that form, while not = nature or essence, is inseparable from it, and = essential form (pp. 30, 35, 97); that *on an equality with God* means a mode of existence which may be changed without change of nature (pp. 44, 55, 98); that it was this mode of existence of which he emptied himself (p. 74). "It is undeniable that this coincidence between the verb and its participles (v. 7) necessarily fixes the action of *emptied* (ἐκένωσεν) at the first moment of the Incarnation, and excludes all attempts, such as those of Luther and his followers, to assign it to any later period of Christ's human life" (p. 75).

and the separate phrases to the lowest minimum of possible meaning.

Col. 1^{15-17}. "Image" is St. Paul's equivalent for St. John's "Word," and is akin to the "form" of Philippians. It includes both likeness and representation. "First-born" of all "creation" has at first sight an Arian look, and was eagerly seized on by the early Arians. But so to interpret it would be to make it contradict the rest of the paragraph, in which all creation is ascribed to Christ.[1] A creature who is also Creator would be a strange combination of ideas. "First-born of all creation" (πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως) = "first-born in respect of all creation." The genitive is that of the point of view. The genitive, like our possessive, case has so many shades of meaning that it has constantly to be interpreted from the context, *e.g.* the love of God. "The first-born from the dead" (ver. 18) is a different phrase (πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν). St. Paul's "first-born" is equivalent to St. John's "only-begotten," but the idea of comparison is added, "first, only." The chief point of the passage is the ascription of all creation to Christ. This is done in universal terms of the strongest kind. Christ is the medium or agent in creation (in him, through him), the end of creation (unto him), before creation (before all things), the support of creation (in him all things consist). The idea of medium or agent is quite consistent with the inner relations of the Trinity.

Heb. 1^{3}. "The very image of his substance," the strongest possible language, implying distinction and equality at the same time. "Substance" (R.V.) is better than "person." The term *hypostasis* or *substance* was early appropriated to signify "person" in the Trinitarian controversy, but the New Testament use is of course anterior.

[1] "First-born" in regard to creation; cf. 1 Pet. 2^{19}, "conscience toward God." Westcott says: "Christian writers from early times have called attention to the connection of the two words applied in the N.T. to Christ 'the only Son' (μονογενής) and 'the first-born,' (πρωτότοκος, Col. 1^{15}), which present the idea of this Sonship under complementary aspects. The first marks his relation to God as absolutely without parallel; the other, his relation to creation as pre-existent and sovereign." *Speaker's Comm.* p. 12.

3. Christ the Son of God. This is Christ's standing designation in the New Testament on the lips of St. Paul and St. John, and on Christ's own lips.[1] In what sense is the title used? Christ is either the Son of God in the same sense as Christian believers and the angels, or in a higher sense peculiar to himself. If the first were the true sense, how could Christ be called *the* Son of God, just as he is called Jesus Christ? A designation which a person shares with many others can never become a proper name of that person. It is evident that the title has a special meaning in reference to Christ. Whether that sense is a divine one must be learnt from the context and the surroundings of the phrase. A careful consideration of passages like Matt. 11^{27}, 16^{16}, 22^{42}, 26^{63}, Rom. $1^{3.4}$, and numerous passages in St. John's Gospel, can scarcely leave the matter doubtful. *We* become children of God by receiving Christ, and believing on his name. As Son he is above the angels (Heb. 1), above Moses ($3^{5.6}$). He is the eternal Son (Heb. 1^{8}). He is God's "own" Son (John 5^{18}, Rom. $8^{3.32}$), "only-begotten" Son (John 1^{18}, 3^{16}).[2] It is true, the miraculous conception and the Resurrection seem assigned as reasons for Christ's Sonship (Luke 1^{35}, Acts 13^{33}), but they can only be subordinate reasons. They would not alone justify all that is predicated of Christ in this character.[3] An official sense has

[1] "Son of Man" is Christ's most usual phrase, but the other occurs, see Matt. 11^{27} and St. John's Gospel 5^{19-23}, etc.

[2] "The rendering (*only-begotten*) somewhat obscures the exact sense of the original word (*μονογενής*), which is rather 'only-born.' That is, the thought in the original is centred in the personal Being of the Son and not in his generation. Christ is the One only Son, the One to whom the title belongs in a sense completely unique and singular, as distinguished from that in which there are many children of God (ver. 12 f.). The use of the word elsewhere in the New Testament to describe an only child (Luke 7^{12}, 8^{42}, 9^{38}, Heb. 11^{17}) brings out this sense completely." Westcott, *Speaker's Comm.* p. 12.

[3] Owen, *Works*, xii. 177, etc. (Goold's ed.), a full and unanswerable argument from Scripture; Kennedy, *The Self-Revelation of Jesus Christ*, p. 155; Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. xxi.; Treffry, *Eternal Sonship*, p. 166 and *passim*.

sometimes been given to "Son," as though it were equivalent to Messiah. But no one would choose the term "Son" to denote office. It denotes natural relation, and nothing else. The official idea is already expressed by such terms as Messiah, Lord, Prophet, Priest. On the official interpretation we should have tautology in Matt. 16^{16} and John 1^{49}.

4. Christ the Lord. In some passages of the New Testament, this title, in reference to Christ, seems to be used interchangeably with Jehovah; cf. Matt. 3^{3} with Isa. 40^{3} and Mal. 3^{1}, John 12^{41} with Isa. 6, 1 Pet. 2^{3} with Ps. 34^{8}, 1 Pet. 3^{15} with Isa. 8^{13}, Heb. $1^{10\text{-}12}$ with Ps. 102^{25}. But apart from these special cases, wherever in the New Testament the term Lord occurs Christ is meant, except in quotations from the Old Testament. In most places this is certainly the case, and in no place is it impossible. See, *e.g.*, Heb. 2^{3} and context, Jas. 2^{1}. The argument used above of "Son" applies also to "Lord." Why is the title not given to any prophet or apostle? If Christ were only a greater prophet or apostle, there is no reason why it should not be so given. Surely there might be lords of different rank and authority. But Christ and Christ only is designated the Lord.[1]

5. Christ Pre-existent. Though this cannot be inferred merely from Christ being "sent" into the world (see John 1^{6}), the number of times the phrase is used of Christ (nearly thirty times in St. John's Gospel) is remarkable, and can only be explained by supposing that it has a special sense in reference to him. Other similar phrases are quite unequivocal in meaning: John 3^{31}, "cometh from above, from heaven"; 13^{3}, "came forth from God and goeth unto God" ($6^{33.\ 38.\ 51.\ 62}$, $16^{27.\ 28}$, 17^{5}, 1 Cor. 15^{47}, Mark 1^{38}, Eph. $4^{8\text{-}10}$). See also John $1^{1.\ 15}$. Westcott finds in the latter passage absolute, essential priority, including, of course, priority in time.[2]—

[1] Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. xxii.

[2] "The precedence in dignity (3^{3}) which Christ at once assumed when he was manifested was due to his essential priority. He *was* in his essence (8^{58}) before John, and therefore at his revelation he took

John 8^{58}. The Jews understood Christ to affirm his own actual existence before Abraham. If Christ did not mean the same, he trifled with them and with words. He uses his accustomed solemn preface, "Verily, verily, I say unto you." If he only meant existence in the divine thought or purpose, this is true of every human being, and of every great man especially. Note again the different verbs, "Before Abraham *became*, I *am*;" Vulgate, "Antequam fieret Abraham, ego sum." Pre-existence does not indeed necessarily imply eternity and divinity; but taken in connection with the other proofs, it can mean nothing else. It is remarkable with what unanimity the personal pre-existence of Christ is set aside by writers of a modern school. Wendt explains away the idea in John 17^{5}, 8^{58}.[1] Ritschl speaks ambiguously, "For us Christ, as pre-existent, is hidden."[2] He refers Col. 1^{15} to the exalted Christ. How can this aversion, to say the least, to the idea be explained? How explain the description of pre-existence as a fanciful figure of speech among the Jews for high excellence? What possible difficulty can there be in admitting the fact for one who believes in Christ's real divinity?

the place which corresponded with his nature. The original phrase in the second clause (πρῶτός μου, Vulg. *prior me*) is very remarkable. It expresses not only relative, but (so to speak) absolute priority. He was first altogether in regard to me, and not merely former as compared with me." *Speaker's Comm.* p. 13. In the light of this exposition Westcott's previous remark, that "the supposed reference to the pre-existence of the Word seems to be inconsistent with the argument," sounds strange. "Absolute priority" means every kind of priority, temporal included.

[1] *Teaching of Christ*, ii. p. 168.

[2] *Justif. and Reconc.* p. 471. Mr. Garvie in *Ritschlian Theology*, p. 292, quotes Herrmann as accepting real pre-existence. Perhaps this can be reconciled with the statement ascribed to the latter, that "all speculations respecting the pre-existence of Christ must be declined with a heart as cold as ice." See the discussion in Denney, *Lectures in Theology*, pp. 51–63; Orr, *Ritschlian Theology*, p. 132; Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, p. 317 f.; Orr, *Christian View*, p. 508.

6. Divine Acts. Creation and Judgment are the two greatest acts of God in the physical and the moral world respectively, implying possession of the highest divine attributes and authority. Both are ascribed to Christ. For Creation, see John 1^3, Heb. 1^3, Col. 1^{16}; and Judgment, Matt. 7^{23}, 13^{42}, 25^{31}, John $5^{22.27}$, 2 Cor. 5^{10}, etc. Creation is indeed said to be "through" and "in" Christ; but this precisely expresses the divine function or relation of the Son in creation, providence, and redemption alike. The early mention of Christ as Judge in Matthew's Gospel should be noticed, disproving as it does the assertion that the Synoptic Gospels differ from St. John's Gospel on this subject.

7. Unique Claims and Position of Christ. He ever preaches himself as the object of faith, the Way to the Father, the Light of the world, the Resurrection and the Life. Who else could do this? The apostles preach Christ, Christ preaches himself. Paul says, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ"; Christ says, "He that believeth in me." This expresses all the difference between Christ and those who stand nearest to him, and the difference is immense. It implies a corresponding difference in the nature of Christ and of the apostles. Matt. 11^{27} speaks of a mutual knowledge of the Father and the Son, which is quite unique. In John 3^{16} the greatness of the Father's love is determined by the greatness of the Son. In Rom. 5^8 God commends "his own love" to us "in that *Christ* died for us." In 8^9, "Spirit of God" and "Spirit of Christ" are used interchangeably. In vers. 35 and 39 "love of Christ" and "love of God" are used interchangeably.[1] In 2 Cor. 8^9 Christ is said to have been rich, and to have shown his grace by becoming poor for us. If he was a mere man, when and in what sense was he rich, and how did he become poor for our sakes? In Gal. 1^1 "from man" and "through man" are expressly opposed to "through Jesus Christ and God the Father." In Jude [21] believers are exhorted to look "for the

[1] In ver. 35 there is another reading, "love of God," but the Revisers prefer the old reading.

mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life," just as they are to "pray in the Holy Spirit," and "keep themselves in the love of God,"—the strongest possible testimony to the supreme Deity of Christ. The salutation at the head of nearly all the Epistles runs, "Grace and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ," Rom. 1^{7}, etc. What fitness would the comparison in John 14^{28} have on the lips of a mere man? See also John $14^{13.\,14}$, Heb. 1, Matt. $10^{32.\,33.\,37}$, 11^{28}, John $10^{17.\,18}$, for incidental evidence. "When I ask myself what are the proofs of Christ's divinity which the Scripture affords, when I inquire whether he did himself claim to be God, I find evidence of this not so much in texts where this in as many words is asserted,—though these are most needful,—but far more in the position toward every other man which he uniformly, and as a matter of course, assumes. What man, that was not man's Maker as well as his fellow, could have required that father and mother, wife and children, should all be postponed to himself; that when any competition between his claims and theirs arose, he should be everything and they nothing? That not merely these, which though very close to a man, are yet external to him; but that his very self, his own life, should be hated, when on no other conditions Christ should be loved?"[1] The Christology of the Gospels and Epistles is the belief of Christ's immediate disciples. Paul knows himself in agreement with the other apostles, and assumes that the churches he is writing to believe the same. Christ's teaching has not passed through an intermediate generation. The time and the agents for the growth of legend and myth are wanting. The Epistles speak for the whole of the first Christian generation. The belief of the apostolic age may be usefully made the starting-point of the argument.[2]

[1] Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, p. 251; Lacordaire, *Jesus Christ*, "Conferences" (Chapman & Hall); Godet, *Defence of Christian Faith* Lect. vi.

[2] Gore, *Bampt. Lect.* p. 58; Orr, *Christian View*, p. 251.

Sec. 2.—Inferences from the Doctrine

(*a*) Unity of Christ's Person. We saw before that the Church formulated the doctrine of the Trinity as a means of harmonising different statements of Scripture, which affirm the existence of three divine persons and the divine unity. Scripture gives the materials which human thought then elaborates. The doctrine of Christ's person is arrived at in a similar way. Scripture ascribes human attributes and acts to Christ, implying the complete human nature in him; it also ascribes divine attributes and acts to him, implying the divine nature in him, and yet it knows but one Christ. One person speaks and acts, both in a divine and human way. He is the subject of both classes of attributes and acts. All this is compendiously expressed in the statement that in Christ there are two natures in one person. This is what is meant by the hypostatic union. In Christ there are not two centres of life, but one, just as in ourselves. The life has two sides, but it is one. We conceive the person as underlying the natures or constituted by them. The bearing of this on the Atonement is obvious. The death of Christ is the death of a divine person, his death in a human nature, but still his death. Hence its extraordinary value. If the human nature merely existed side by side with the divine without personal union, its acts and sufferings would be apart from and unaffected by the divine. But it is not so. The nature which suffers and dies has become an integral part of the life of the divine Son. See John 3^{13}, 6^{62}, Acts 20^{28}, 1 Cor. 2^{8}.[1]

(*b*) Christ's Absolute Sinlessness. For this characteristic, so essential to a perfect Atonement, the Incarnation is an absolute guarantee, 2 Cor. 5^{21}, Heb. 4^{15}, 7^{26}. As to the fact of

[1] Owen, *Works*, i. 235; Jackson, Bk. vii. chap. xxx. "Inasmuch as the whole human nature in itself was but an appendix of his divine person (no person distinct from it), whatsoever Christ Jesus did do or suffer in this nature, was done and suffered by the Eternal Son of God," viii. chap. i. folio ed. i. 763. Hooker, Bk. v. 53, 4. The phrase "appendix" is not happy.

Christ's absolute sinlessness, there is perfect unanimity in the Church. But on one point two opinions are held, namely, whether sin was possible to Christ or not, some affirming the possibility, others denying it. Both schools of thought equally deny the fact. One holds the *posse non peccare* (able not to sin), the others the *non posse peccare* (not able to sin). Certainly at first sight there is much to be said for the possibility. Otherwise, Christ's temptation seems unreal, his victory seems to lose force for us, his sympathy with us to be imperfect. But what is meant by the reality of temptation? Is temptation more real to the good or the bad? Which suffers most from inducements to dishonesty; the honest or dishonest? Does the reality of temptation increase with the liability to yield to it? In point of fact, it is the most upright and virtuous who feel most keenly the assaults of sin. The purer the nature, the keener the pang of solicitation to wrong. Absolute purity, then, instead of neutralising temptation, would lend it greater keenness. The argument from sympathy would prove too much. If sympathy depends on actual identity of circumstances, actual sin in Christ would surely have still further heightened his sympathy. Really the argument lies the other way. The farther any one is removed from sin, the more valuable his sympathy. We need the help of the strong, not of the weak. Is sympathy with man impossible to angels? Edward Irving saw the tendency of the argument, and ascribed a sinful nature to Christ. This the whole Church has ever denied. As to example, is not God himself proposed as our example? The insuperable barrier to the possibility of sin in Christ is the idea of the Incarnation. How is the possibility of sin conceivable in the case of a human nature personally united to the divine? We see no way of meeting this difficulty. The unique position in which human nature is placed in the Incarnation must have modifying effects.

(*c*) Christ's Human Nature Impersonal.[1] Here again we

[1] John of Damascus and Peter Lombard first developed the idea, Luthardt, p. 174. "If the Son of God had taken to himself a man now

have two schools of opinion, one affirming the impersonality as necessary to the unity of Christ's person, the other denying it as infringing on the perfection of his humanity. The dispute really seems to be one of definition of terms. The two sides understand personality and impersonality in different senses. When writers like Canon Liddon, following in the wake of the whole Catholic school, affirm impersonality, they mean that the human nature never existed and acted apart from the divine, a surely indisputable proposition. From the instant of its creation, Christ's human nature was assumed into union with the divine. To give it a separate centre of life and action is to divide Christ into two persons, the error of Nestorianism. The personal Word existed previously, and took into union with himself, not an individual already existing, but human nature. Again, those who affirm the personality seem to mean by it completeness, an equally indisputable truth, asserted by the other side and by the whole Church. If by personality we understand the presence in Christ of all the elements of the human—body, soul, spirit—thought, feeling, will—then his human nature was personal by universal acknowledgment. But if by it is meant that Christ's humanity existed and acted apart from the divine, how can any believer in the unity of his person assert it? The impersonality, then, is a corollary of the

made and already perfected, it would of necessity follow that there are in Christ two persons, the one assuming and the other assumed; whereas the Son of God did not assume a man's person unto his own, but a man's nature unto his own Person, and therefore took *semen*, the seed of Abraham, the very first original element of our nature, before it was come to have any personal human subsistence." Hooker, Bk. v. 52, 3. "We deny that the human nature of Christ had any such subsistence of its own as to give it a *proper personality*, being from the time of its conception assumed into subsistence with the Son of God." Owen, xii. 210. And further on the point, "Christ was a true man, because he had the true essence of a man, soul and body, with all their essential properties. A peculiar personality belongeth not to the essence of a man, but to his existence in such a manner. Neither do we deny Christ to have a person as a man, but to have a human person," etc. See also Jackson, Bk. vii. chap. xxx. 7; Orr, *Christian View*, p. 282.

unity, and is affirmed in this sense. It seems best to say, "Christ was man," not "Christ was a man."[1] It is a mistake to suppose that the idea of the impersonality of Christ's human nature is taught only by the Catholic school of divines. The Puritan Dr. Owen is on the same side. He says, "The eternal person of the Son of God, or the divine nature in the person of the Son, did, by an ineffable act of his divine power and love, assume our nature into an individual subsistence in or with himself; that is, to be his own, even as the divine nature is his" (i. 329). Thus, "the eternal person of the Son" did not assume "a human person," but "human nature." "The prevention of that nature (the human) from any subsistence of its own—by its assumption into personal union with the Son of God, in the first instance of its conception—is that which is above all miracles." "Although the person of Christ, as God and man, be constituted by this union, yet his person absolutely, and his individual subsistence, was perfect, absolutely antecedent unto that union."[2] Trench says: "This question could never have been so much as started, except in a Nestorian severance of the Lord into two persons, and this in the contemplation of a human person in him as at some moment existing apart from the divine. When we acknowledge in him two natures, but these at no time other than united in the one person of the Son of God, the whole question at

[1] "The attempt to express the truth with precision is beset with difficulty, and even with peril. Thus, in using the words 'personality' and 'impersonal' in relation to Christ, it is obviously necessary to maintain the greatest reserve. For us 'personality' implies limitation or determination, *i.e.* finiteness in some direction. As applied to the divine nature, therefore, the word is not more than a necessary accommodation, required to give such distinctness to our ideas as may be attainable. The word 'impersonal,' again, as applied to the Lord's human nature, is not to be so understood as to exclude in any way the right application of the word 'man' to him, as it is used both by himself (John 8^{40}) and by St. Paul (1 Tim. 2^{5})." Westcott in *Speaker*, p. 11.

[2] *Works*, vol. i. pp. 15, 45, 229, 234; see also pp. 224, 226, 239, and note on previous page.

once falls to the ground. Christ was perfect man in the sense of having everything belonging to the completeness of the human nature; but there is not, and there never at any moment has been, any other person but the Son of God; his human body and soul at the very moment of their union with one another were also united unto the eternal Word, so that there is not, nor ever has been, any human person to contemplate."[1]

Sec. 3.—Dogma of Christ's Person

This is the only dogma in the whole range of theology which the whole Christian Church receives without important variation or modification. With respect to other doctrines, such as Original Sin and Atonement, while there is agreement about essentials, the differences in dogmatic statement are considerable. But all Christendom substantially accepts the teaching of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. None give a more uncompromising support to the creeds than the great Puritan divines. They knew full well that it is not a question of Nicene metaphysics, but of vital doctrine. In nothing is the wisdom of the early councils and creeds more clearly seen than in their being content with negativing error; they do not go on to frame positive theories.

Among the many forms of error discussed and rejected in early days, Unitarianism was not one.[2] Individuals within the Church may have betrayed Unitarian tendencies, but this was all. Each of the great heresies on this subject, even Arianism, was far removed from such teaching, and as a rule tended in the opposite direction. Not Unitarianism, but Docetism, which reduced the human in Christ to mere illusory appearance, and made the divine everything, expressed the prevailing spirit of the early ages. Perhaps Ebionitism may be thought to be an exception; but too little is known of it to allow it

[1] *Studies in the Gospels*, p. 27.

[2] Except in so far as Unitarianism is akin to Sabellianism.

to be taken into account. There is no proof whatever that it had any place within the Church, or was recognised as a form of Christian life and thought. The same is true of Gnostic speculations.

Among the pioneers of Christian thought Irenæus is an interesting figure. He is fond of speaking of Christ as the recapitulation of humanity.[1] The idea is a many-sided one, embracing the notions of summing up, fulfilment, and reparation. Christ's person recapitulated human nature, his work recapitulated the old dispensation, his obedience recapitulated Adam's disobedience. Both to Adam and Christ the title "universal, essential man" is given. The idea is taken from Eph. 1^{10}.

The erroneous speculations which gave rise to definitions, and which were formerly rejected, were Arianism, Apollinarianism, Nestorianism, and Eutychianism. Of the first we have already said enough (p. 93).

Apollinarianism[2] (Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea) denied to Christ a human spirit (πνεῦμα), allowing to his human nature only a body and an animal soul (ψυχή). The place of the higher principle was taken by the divine Logos. The theory was supported by three arguments. First, the exclusion of the human spirit was supposed to be necessary in order to Christ's sinless-

[1] "The Son of God, existing always with the Father, and made man, recapitulated in himself the long line (*expositionem*) of men, offering salvation to us in summary form, in order that we might recover in Christ Jesus what we had lost in Adam, *i.e.* the being after God's image and likeness. For because it was not possible that the man who had been once vanquished and destroyed by disobedience should remake himself and win the prize of victory, and it was impossible that he who had fallen a prey to sin should obtain salvation, the Son—existing as the Word of God, descending from the Father and made flesh, and descending even to death, and perfecting the work of our salvation—did both." Quoted in Owen, *Works*, i. 26.

[2] On these heresies, see Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Lect. ii.; Fisher, *Hist. Christian Doctr. passim*; Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* i. 394; Pope, Fern. Lect. p. 189; *Comp.* ii. 135; Cunningham, *Hist. Theology*, vol. i. ch. x.

ness, as though contact with a sensuous nature necessarily defiled the spirit. Then, it was said that only on this supposition is the unity of Christ's person conceivable. If the spirit, which is the seat of will and personality, is present, we have two persons. And again, a human spirit was said to be superfluous, inasmuch as it was of the same nature as the divine Logos or Reason, which was well fitted to take its place. Whatever these arguments are worth, they are far outweighed by a single objection on the other side. To take away the spirit from human nature is to take away its distinctive element. A body and animal soul do not constitute human but brute nature. The humanity is thus mutilated, and the idea of Incarnation destroyed. It was also urged by the Church, that if the human spirit was not assumed by Christ, it did not share in redemption (*τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον*, "that which is not assumed is not healed"). All the great Fathers opposed the heresy, which was condemned at Constantinople, 381 A.D. Long afterwards, the clause "he descended into Hades," *i.e.* in spirit, was adopted in the Apostles' Creed as a protest against it.[1]

Nestorianism (Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople) divided Christ into two persons. Whether Nestorius intended to do this is more than doubtful, but such was the tendency of his teaching. He started with the principle that the human is incapable of the divine, and so could never get from one to the other. He admitted only a unity of relation, not a personal one. The test in the controversy was the term *θεοτόκος*, *Mother of God*, which Nestorius would not accept. At first sight, indeed, the term seems objectionable. But all that was meant to be asserted by it was that in Christ there is but one person, that Mary did not give birth to a man who was afterwards united to the Logos. Staunch Protestants have defended the theological, not the devotional, use of the term.[2] Nestorius would only call

[1] Pearson on *Creed;* Barrow on *Creed*, Ser. xxviii.

[2] Shedd, *History of Christian Doctrine*, i. 399; Dr. David Duncan of the *Colloquia Peripatetica* defends the term, but the reference has escaped me.

Mary Χριστοτόκος, *Mother of Christ*. His opponent, Cyril of Alexandria, was personally a far less estimable character, but he took the right side on this question. While preserving the distinctness of the two natures as jealously as Nestorius, he gives them only one centre in the personality of the Logos, who, existing antecedently, assumed the human nature into union with himself. Nestorius's connection with the Antiochian school of teaching partly explains his aberration. His error was condemned at Ephesus, 431.[1]

Eutychianism (Eutyches, presbyter of Constantinople) was a reaction from the former error. In his anxiety to avoid a duality of persons, Eutyches merged the human nature in the divine. After the Incarnation he acknowledged but one nature. This error was condemned at Chalcedon, 451.

It is important to observe that the last three errors were not propounded by deniers of the Incarnation, but were intended as theories of the Incarnation.[2]

The clauses of the Chalcedon Creed which were directed against these errors are the following: "Perfect as to his godhead and perfect as to his manhood, truly God and truly man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting; consubstantial with the Father as to his godhead, and consubstantial with us as to his manhood; acknowledged in two natures *without mixture, without conversion, without division, without separation*. We confess not a Son divided and sundered into two persons, but one and the same Son." The four important terms are ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως. The Athanasian Creed says: "Perfect God and perfect man; of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting. Who, although he

[1] Luthardt, *Comp.* p. 172; Owen, *Works*, i. 230.

[2] "Athanasianism is just the negation of all possible theory on the subject of Christ's person; and so, too, of his work. All the heresies are just explanations of the mystery." Duncan, p. 104. See Hooker, Bk. v. 51, etc. Another point that has exercised theological speculation is, why it was the Son in particular who became incarnate. See Hooker, Bk. v. 51, 3; Owen, *Works*, i. 27; Jackson, Bk. vii. ch. xxv. 6.

be God and Man, yet he is not two, but one Christ; one, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God; one altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person." Dr. Pope says: "Christ is truly God, perfectly man, unconfusedly in two natures, indivisibly in one person."[1]

The three errors just noted were afterwards revived in other forms, Eutychianism in Monophysitism, Apollinarianism in Monothelitism, Nestorianism in Adoptianism. Monophysitism left only one nature in Christ, a composite one, in which the human became merely an accident of the divine. Monothelitism robbed the human nature of the faculty of will, replacing it by the divine will. The Church rightly held to two wills, as integral parts of the natures, the human being harmonious with and subordinate to the divine. The errors were condemned at the fifth and sixth Councils of Constantinople, 553 and 680. Adoptianism rose in Spain in the eighth century. According to it, Christ was God's Son by nature as to his divine nature, by adoption as to his human. Its Nestorian tendency was instinctively felt and rightly condemned, Council of Frankfort, 794.[2]

[1] *Comp.* ii. 107.

[2] Banks, *Devel. of Doctr.* ii. 9. It may be well here to give the Nicene Creed, "drawn up at, or soon after, the Council of Nicæa," bracketing the clauses added afterwards: We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God [begotten from the Father before all worlds], light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, of one substance with the Father; through whom all things were made, who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate [from the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary], and was made man [and was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate], and suffered [and was buried], and rose again the third day according to the Scriptures, and ascended into heaven [and sat down at the right hand of the Father], and shall come again to judge the living and the dead, [whose kingdom shall have no end]; and in the Holy Ghost [the Lord and the life-giver, which proceedeth from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, which spake by the prophets; in one Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church; we

As is well known, the Ritschlian school, and many more who, while not belonging to that school, are in sympathy with its point of view, repudiate the entire system of Christological definition of the early Church as more philosophical than biblical and religious. The objection can scarcely be to the philosophical treatment of religious truth, for the objectors themselves philosophise, even if unconsciously. When it comes to a choice between Platonism and Kantianism, all truth may not be with the latter. "Christianity became metaphysical simply and only because man is rational. His rationality means that he must attempt to give account of things, as Plato saw, because he was a man, not only because he was a Greek," Canon Gore. We allow, of course, that in early days, and still more in later days, logical and metaphysical methods were carried to excess; but this is by individual writers, and we are concerned only with such accepted forms as the Nicene Creed. The case against the mingling of Greek philosophy and Christian doctrine will never be better stated than is done by Professor Kaftan in his *Truth of the Christian Religion*.[1] One point is that Greek thought put knowledge in the first place, valued knowledge for its own sake, whereas the Christian religion puts conduct and practice first; and so orthodoxy took the first place in the Church. Another way of stating the difference is to speak of the primacy of intellect and of will, and make them opposites. But why pit one against the other? Are they inconsistent? Is not each first in its own sphere? The separation, and still more the antithesis, of the two are irrational. Unless it is proved that not merely Plato, but the Christian Church, made knowledge the prime or only essential, the contention is beside the mark; and it is not proved. The Church never substituted knowledge

confess one baptism for remission of sins; we look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come]. Amen. See Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, p. 256; A. Hahn, *Bibliothek d. Symbole*.

[1] Two vols. (Clark). The same view underlies Hatch's Hibbert Lectures on "The Influence of Greek Ideas, etc., on the Christian Religion."

for faith, even if it sometimes unduly valued knowledge. Is not knowledge sought for its own sake in science? How else is proficiency possible? But is not the accurate knowledge thus acquired applied in practical life? There has never been an age of the Church when the claims of practical life were utterly ignored.

Professor Kaftan tries to make out that philosophy affected the substance, not merely the form of doctrine.[1] The Church has always held that in shaping theology by the aid of philosophy it was only dealing with the form, not the matter of truth. For example, the Nicene definitions, and any others of the same kind, simply state, by way of defence against certain errors, the doctrines of faith that are common to us and the Ante-Nicene Church. If they do more, we give them up. But, as we think, they do not. They add nothing; they say nothing new. Take the case of Arianism. The Arians predicated Deity of Christ in an ambiguous sense. On Ritschlian principles, it was wrong, anti-Christian, to use a philosophical term as a test. But when it was used, it was seen that the Arians did not hold Christ's Deity in any true sense. Dr. Kaftan adduces the Logos-doctrine as an example of what he means by a change in the substance of doctrine. Undoubtedly the doctrine played a far greater part in theology than it does in the New Testament, although it has no place in the Creeds. Still the idea is found in Scripture. It was not the only term used in theology. The term Son is as common in Athanasius and others; and Son, which is so prominent in the New Testament, raises the same problems as Word.

As Protestants, we are not bound to all the terms and definitions of the Nicene system. Let the objectors give us better terms, let them show us that they hold the substance of truth which the definitions guard, and we are content. We only keep the old defences till better are found. The fault we find with the objectors is that they do not hold the substance, which alone is of supreme value to us. We have not yet seen the new

[1] Vol. i. p. 75.

definition which makes Christ divine in a real sense. We cannot trust and worship him as God merely because he perfectly revealed God, and is the Founder and ideal embodiment of God's kingdom among men.

One of the commonplaces of history is the preparation of the ancient world for Christianity. For anything we can see, Greek forms of thought may have been as much a part of the preparation as the Greek language and the Roman law, and as indispensable.[1] There seems to be something providential in the moderation of the early Church in its work of definition. It was only anxious to exclude unscriptural error. That secured, it went no farther. Canon Gore, in his *Bampton Lectures*, while alive to the danger and the abuse of dogmatic definitions, well maintains their necessity. "They were negative, rather than positive," intended to ward off error, not to give a perfect philosophy of truth. "At least it is a fact that the dogmas which have the assent of the whole Church are few in number, and we can see in this the hand of providence" (p. 109).

To say that the use of Christological and Trinitarian terms raises insoluble questions is only to say that we do not comprehend the incarnation and the Godhead. The same mystery besets the simplest articles of natural religion. To say that we begin with philosophical definitions of the person of Christ and the nature of God, is not correct. The Church began with the facts of the Gospels—the life, the teaching, the character found there. It rose from them to doctrinal statements. The facts of Scripture teaching and Christian life are our starting-point, and they continue to be the test of all definitions. The problems are found in Scripture; the creeds are attempts at solution, however imperfect. If the theology is rightly stated, it exists already in solution in the Gospels. "The Gospels present us with a Christ, divine and human, whose personality, if complex and difficult to analyse, yet presents a marvellous

[1] Kaftan acknowledges that the process was inevitable and useful. See also Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, p. 21.

and impressive unity. The four great dogmas (against Arius, Apollinaris, Nestorius, Eutyches) are our guides in contemplating the picture, and the Gospels respond to the anticipations which they raise, and fill up the meagre outline into a living whole" (p. 107). "These decisions simply express in a new form, without substantial addition, the apostolic teaching as it is represented in the New Testament. They express it in a new form for protective purposes, as a legal enactment protects a moral principle. They are developments only in the sense that they represent the apostolic teaching worked out into formulas by the aid of a terminology supplied by Greek dialectics" (p. 96). The objectors begin with the facts and stop there, or profess to do so.

Mr. Somerville, in his very original work, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, argues that Paul's Christology is derived from his own spiritual experience, from the new life which came to him from the Exalted Christ. "His Christology was the product of his experience, the expression of what he had found Christ to be in his deepest life" (p. 33). "The Christ of Paul is Christ interpreted to him by his vivid consciousness of the divine life which he owed to him. His Christology is the account of that experience in the terms suggested by thought and reflection upon it" (p. 14). Without some historical starting-point, Paul's impressions of what the heavenly Christ was to himself would yield only a very subjective theology; and accordingly we are told, truly enough, that Christ's Death and Resurrection, and, we may add, his Messiahship, were the central facts to Paul. His theology consisted in the interpretation of these facts. And beyond that, the Exalted Christ is simply the earthly, historical Christ glorified; for, as we are frequently reminded, we only know the heavenly Christ through the earthly. While in sympathy with Ritschl's principles and methods, the author arrives at conclusions which few members of that school would accept, *e.g.* pre-existence (p. 198). The entire argument gives great importance to Paul, of whose authority Ritschl's followers make short work, as the author

notes, Preface, p. vi. The volume is interesting as an attempt to reach the old conclusions on new lines. "There is no doubt that to Paul and the mass of believers the Man Christ Jesus, Risen and Exalted, stood in the place of God, and was the object of worship. . . . Of his divine power they had the most convincing evidence in the consciousness of the new life, with the moral strength it imparted, which he had quickened within them. In contact with him, and in the experience of his gracious love forgiving their sins, they were in communion with God in the riches of his love, and were conscious of changes of thought and feeling and purpose, which could only be ascribed to the will of God" (p. 145).[1]

We need not linger on such idle speculations as the Nihilianism of the Middle Ages, which argued that the Incarnation made no change in the life of the eternal Son. The Docetic spirit shows here again its persistent force. The divine life no doubt remains unchanged in itself, but not in its relations. Peter Lombard favoured, Aquinas and Scotus opposed, the notion.

Another point on which opinions differ is, whether the Incarnation would have taken place if there had been no sin. In the Middle Ages, Rupert of Deutz argued that it would, Aquinas that it would not. In our days, Martensen and Dorner and others advocate the first alternative.[2] They argue that it is unworthy to make the greatest work of divine grace depend on man's sin, so that if there had been no sin there would have been no incarnation. On their view, all that depends on sin is the form which the incarnation took. Apart from sin, redemp-

[1] Forrest, *The Christ of History and Experience*. The two series of lectures delivered in the same year are strangely complementary.

[2] Augustine says: "Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine. If man had not perished, the Son of man had not come." Luthardt, p. 167. The other school maintain that the Incarnation is necessary to the perfection even of unfallen humanity. See also Dean Jackson's excellent remarks, Bk. viii. ch. iii.; Owen, *Works*, i. 23; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 260; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 217, iii. 141; Orr, *Christian View*, p. 319.

tion, suffering, and death would have been unnecessary, and the incarnate life of the Son of God would have taken a glorious form. But all such speculations and assertions are beyond our competence. Undoubtedly the obvious suggestion of Scripture is that incarnation is in order to redemption. Sin is in no case the cause or source, but merely the occasion of incarnation as of redemption. While it is quite true that the Incarnation not only fulfils purposes of grace, but is also God's highest revelation of himself, we cannot say that a perfect revelation would have been impossible in any other way. "Secret things belong unto the Lord."

Socinianism took its name and its rise from two Italians of noble rank, Laelius and Faustus Socinus, uncle and nephew, who in the sixteenth century migrated from Italy, first to Switzerland and then to Poland. Faustus embodied their views in the *Racovian Catechism* (1605), and his work, *De Jesu Christi Servatore*. Socinianism utterly rejected the doctrines of the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, and vicarious Atonement, going much farther than ancient Arianism and Sabellianism. Still, while making Christ a mere man, it ascribed to him several prerogatives which have fallen away in Unitarianism. He was preserved from taint of sin by miraculous conception; he was specially endowed with the Holy Spirit at his baptism, and early in his ministry was taken up to heaven to receive special instruction and authority; his Resurrection was held fast, as well as his exaltation at the Ascension to dignity and power over angels as well as men; worship is due to him—of course only such worship as the Roman Church gives to the Virgin Mary The Holy Spirit is explained away as a divine influence. The forensic view of the atonement was also an object of special attack.

In the last century, and somewhat earlier, an Arian party arose in England, represented by Samuel Clarke, as well as by Whiston, Whitby, and others. The chief permanent effect was in calling forth the replies of Bull (*Defence of the Nicene Faith*) and Waterland. Views ranging from Socinianism through

Arianism to Unitarianism prevailed extensively both in the English Church and the Dissenting communities; witness the names of Hoadley, Blackburne, Lindsey, Belsham. The two latter became avowed Unitarians. The chief Unitarian teacher was Dr. Priestley. The history of many of these writers and movements shows that Unitarianism is often a reaction against extreme Calvinism.

The divinity of Christ, in the proper sense, is a stone of stumbling to many modern theologians—Schleiermacher, Rothe, Beyschlag, Lipsius, Ritschl, and others. These apply the terms Godhead, God-manhood, Incarnation to Christ, but in a different sense. Christ to them is the ideal man, the perfect Son of God, the sinless Saviour. This is no doubt high language. Sinlessness implies a moral miracle. In what sense are these terms used of Christ? In a purely ethical sense. Christ is the Son of God as believers are, but originally and perfectly. The difference, while great, is one of degree. He is Son in a unique sense, because we become sons through his teaching and example. All idea of sameness of essence is excluded, and with it all participation in divine attributes proper. This is the entire drift of Wendt in his *Teaching of Jesus.* All essential difference between Christ's Sonship and ours is elaborately explained away. Ritschl says:[1] "The disciples of Jesus are received into the same relation to God in which Christ stands to his Father," no qualification being added. A test is supplied in the idea of pre-existence. Ritschl indeed calls it a "barren thought," even if it were true. At least, it is an effectual test of the sense in which Christ's divinity is held. Its importance is shown by the strenuous denial and argument with which it is met. Certainly if Christ is divine in the sense in which God is divine, he existed eternally. But this is not allowed. Only an ideal pre-existence, existence in God's thought and purpose, is admitted. Beyschlag holds that Christ pre-existed, simply as an impersonal (divine-human) principle in God. According to Ritschl, the passages in

[1] *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 387.

Colossians and Ephesians which ascribe creation to Christ, apply to him as "the exalted Lord," and therefore must be taken metaphorically.[1] "Firstborn can be understood only in the metaphorical sense, as in Rom. 8^{29} = he who is preferred." "The eternal Godhead of the Son, in the sense here described, is perfectly intelligible only as an object of the divine mind and will, that is, only for God himself. Christ exists for God eternally as that which he appears to us under the limitations of time. But only for God, since for us, as pre-existent, Christ is hidden" (p. 471). "The community," *i.e.* the Church, "is the eternal object of God's will of love" (p. 472). Evidently in one case as in the other, the existence is ideal. Dr. Orr writes: "There may be participation in the divine life—even in the divine nature—on the part of the ordinary believer; but the man in whom God thus dwells, does not on this account regard himself as divine, does not speak of himself as a divine person, does not think himself entitled to divine honours, would deem it blasphemy to have the term 'Godhead' applied to him."[2]

Ritschl in his long chapter on the "Doctrine of Christ's Person and Life-Work,"[3] makes it clear that he will have nothing to do with the old doctrine of two natures in one Person; but what he substitutes as his own meaning of Godhead is far from clear. Sometimes he makes the term a summary expression for moral qualities and powers, such as Revelation of God and Lordship over the world, Grace and Truth, Patience in Suffering. "The twofold significance we are compelled to ascribe to Christ as being at once the perfect revealer of God and the manifest type of spiritual lordship over the world, finds expression in the single predicate of his Godhead" (p. 389). He entered on this state at his exaltation (p. 400). "Paul, indeed (Phil. 2^{9}), fixes the precise moment when the Person, who till then had not been declared God, received

[1] *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 401 ff.
[2] *Christian View*, p. 275.
[3] *Justification and Reconciliation*, ch. vi.

the divine name and the universal Lordship" (p. 405). "The grace and truth manifested in the discharge of his vocation and the loftiness of his self-determination . . . are the features in the earthly life of Christ which are summed up in the attribute of his Godhead" (p. 463). The sense in which Godhead is here defined might be affirmed of Christian believers in a different degree. It really seems as if the term meant simply the possession of a moral nature. Rejecting the phrase "a mere man" as applied to Christ, Ritschl says: "By a mere man (if I ever used the expression), I should mean man as a material entity apart from every characteristic of spiritual and moral personality. I am far from regarding any one, even of my opponents, as a mere man, for I assume, in every one of them, some good results of upbringing and some measure of real worth" (p. 397). Grace and truth, we are told, are the criteria by which St. John would have us form our conception of Christ's Godhead. "John does not mean us to seek in Christ for the divine attributes of omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience. . . . In so far as the divine Revelation or Word of God is active in this personality, or is to be conceived as the form of its activity, the point at issue is clearly the definition of God's being. Since this being of God is spirit, and will, and above all love, it can therefore become effective in a human life, for human nature as such is laid on the lines of spirit, will, and love" (p. 454).

The pre-existent Christ is said to be unknown and unknowable to us. We are pointed to the exalted Christ. But then our knowledge of the latter is drawn from and limited by the earthly, historical Christ. "The idea of the Godhead of the exalted Christ depends for its convincing power entirely upon whether the marks of this Godhead can be found in his historical existence upon earth" (p. 405). "The Godhead or universal lordship of Christ must be apprehended in definite features of his historical life, as an attribute of his existence in time." Once venture to draw an inference or reason from what is said to what is implied, and you are in danger of all sorts of

fanaticism. Equally narrow is the rejection of every attribute or predicate of God and Christ that cannot be directly verified in personal religious experience. Experience is one means of verification, but not the only one. The understanding and reason have their place as judges of truth. "Every cognition of a religious sort is a direct judgment of value. The nature of God and the divine we can only know in its essence by determining its value for our salvation." When Ritschl says that we must begin with what Christ has done in us and thence ascend to our knowledge of Christ himself, we are with him. The fault is that he never ascends from what Christ does to what he is, from what he is to us to what he is in himself. On p. 460 Ritschl protests most energetically, and not very courteously, against those who say that Christ's making God's end in the world his end (as Ritschl says) proves only his oneness of will with God, not oneness of nature. As if, he exclaims, the essence of character were not shown in the will! Ritschl here identifies will with nature, whereas it is only a part of nature. We must not go deeper than will and argue to nature. Dr. Orr says: "Everywhere else, he argues, one judges that it is in the form of will the nature is known. He forgets to add that it is precisely the drawback of his theology that it will not allow us to go back from will to nature."[1] Mr. Garvie in his able work, *The Ritschlian Theology*, says, in very strong language, that Christ having the worth of God does not mean that he has not the being of God. "When Ritschl says that Christ has the worth of God, he means that Christ is God." Where does Ritschl himself say this? According to the above exposition, the question seems to turn on what is meant by the being of God in Christ.[2]

[1] *The Ritschlian Theology*, p. 131; Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, p. 309.

[2] P. 267. Mr. Garvie's work is on the whole a fair estimate and criticism. The faults as well as the merits of the system are pointed out. At present changes are going on in the Ritschlian school. Some members, by no means all, are drawing nearer to old positions, p. 387.

The Lutheran Christology presents some points of peculiarity. Its starting-point is the *Communicatio Idiomatum*, by which is meant the communication of the properties of the divine nature in Christ to the human, the latter being thus endowed with omnipresence, omniscience, omnipresence, etc. This is held to be a necessary consequence of the Incarnation. No one, it is said, can hold the Incarnation in earnest and deny this inference. But the inference is evaded. Why does not the communication of the properties of the human to the divine follow by like necessity? This, of course, is not asserted; indeed, is strenuously denied. But if logical necessity is good in one case, how can it be bad in the other? The Eutychian confusion of natures is not held, but it is dangerously near. Besides, the doctrine seems to reverse the aspect under which the Incarnation is contemplated. Scripture ever presents it as an act of condescension on the part of the divine; the Lutheran doctrine represents it, in effect at least, as principally an elevation of the human.[1] The doctrine of the *Communicatio Idiomatum* is practically applied to support the Lutheran idea of Consubstantiation. It is in virtue of this effect of the Incarnation that Christ's body is endowed with ubiquity and unites itself with the Eucharistic elements. Whether there is any further connection between these two Lutheran articles, we need not inquire. Lutheran

[1] "We do not confound the *difference of natures*; but we confess, not, as you assert, that Christ was made God, but that God was made Christ; not that when he was poor he was made rich, but when he was rich he was made poor that he might make us rich; for not when he was in the form of a servant did he accept the form of God, but when he was in the form of God he accepted the form of a servant; in the same way, not when he was flesh he was made the Word, but when he was the Word he was made flesh." Maxentius, quoted by Owen, i. 15. Owen says of the Lutheran doctrine: "For that which some have for a long season troubled the Church withal, about such a *real communication of the properties of the divine nature into the human*, which should neither be a transfusion of them into it, so as to render it the subject of them, nor yet consist in a *reciprocal denomination* from their mutual inhering in the same subject,—it is that which neither themselves do, nor can any other well understand," i. 233.

expositors generally interpret the whole of the passage, Phil. 2^{6-8}, of the Incarnate Son, giving it this peculiar turn.

The doctrine of the *Communicatio* at once raised other questions. How is the asserted possession of divine attributes by Christ's human nature to be reconciled with the phenomena of his earthly life, in which those attributes do not appear? In the Reformation age two answers were given to this question. The great theologian, Brentz of Tubingen, said that these attributes were really possessed and exercised by the human, but both possession and exercise were veiled under infirmity, suffering, and death. The Ascension was the first display of these attributes on the part of the man Christ Jesus. Brentz's followers were called Kryptists. Another equally great theologian, Chemnitz of Giessen, said that while the attributes were communicated in the Incarnation to the human, they were not exercised or only partially exercised. This was the self-emptying of the Incarnate Son. At the Ascension divine powers began to be fully and openly exercised by the human. The Kryptists and Kenotists both equally held the common Lutheran doctrine of the *Communicatio*. They differed as to what followed. One made Christ during his earthly life veil the use, the other made him renounce the use, of divine powers. The emphasis laid on the difference between the states of Humiliation and Exaltation should be noticed.[1]

The Kenotism of our own day is a much bolder theory. It is an attempt to explain the mode of the Incarnation by St. Paul's phrase "self-emptying" (Phil. 2^{7}). The theory is advocated both by Lutheran and Reformed divines.[2] They find fault with the ancient definition of two natures in one person as only securing a verbal unity. There are various shades of Kenotist doctrine. The most extreme and consistent one is that of Gess, who holds that the divine Son became a human soul; there are not two souls. Yet it is a human soul, because the

[1] Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Lect. iii.

[2] Lutheran — Liebner, Hofmann, Thomasius, Luthardt, Delitzsch, Martensen, Gess; Reformed—Ebrard, Godet.

Son transformed himself. In Apollinarianism the Word was simply a substitute for the soul. The difference between the depotentiated Son and a human soul is that he became a human soul by his own act. Gess accepted all the consequences of the theory, as that for a time the work of the Second Person of the Trinity was suspended. The advantage supposed is that we thus obtain complete unity of person and life in Christ, who in the Gospels is to all intents and purposes a man. His miracles are wrought by delegated power. The motive of the speculation is good, namely, to do full justice to the human side of Christ. But at what a cost! How a change in the divine Trinity itself is compatible with the divine Immutability, it is difficult to see. Besides, on Dr. Gess's showing, unreality (docetism) is introduced into Christ's person. His soul is human and yet not human. Some germ or potency of the Godhead must remain; for the divine self-consciousness, although extinguished for a time, reawakens. Other forms of the theory are less thorough. Thomasius supposes that the divine Son first empties himself of the attributes of omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, and then assumes to himself a complete human nature, including body and soul. Here, then, side by side are a depotentiated Son of God and a human soul, which is the old doctrine over again. Godet in his Commentary on John (i. 362, 396) seems to agree with Gess. "*The Word became flesh* can only, as it seems to me, signify one thing, viz. that the divine subject entered into the human mode of being at the cost of renouncing his divine mode of being. The personal subject remained the same, but he exchanged the divine state for the human state; and if at a later time he recovers his divine state, it is not by abandoning the human, but by exalting the latter to the height of the former." "There are not two opposite states co-existing in the same subject, but a single subject passing from one mode of being to another, which he will gradually transform so as to render it in the end capable of possessing all the attributes of the former." "Jesus no longer possesses on

the earth the attributes which constitute the divine state." Everything in him is human. He "loses for a time his self-consciousness as a divine subject." He recovers the divine consciousness at the Baptism, and the divine state at the Ascension.

It is evident that great pressure is put on Paul's phrase "emptied himself." That phrase is capable of a much simpler explanation. He "emptied himself" of the state of equality with God which he had, but which he would not retain at all cost. He exchanged one mode of existence for another without sacrificing the form or nature of God. The equality meant is "the condition of glory and majesty which was the adequate manifestation of his divine nature, and which he resigned for a time by taking the form of a servant."[1] There was a veiling or giving up of the divine glory. This is the view that has always been held in the Church. Without ceasing to be what he was, he became something that he was not. Equally unwarranted stress is laid on "became" in John 1^{14}. Godet says: "It is a curious fact that Protestant orthodoxy has refused till now to accept the meaning of 'became' in all its strictness." We may reply that even extreme Kenotists are open to the same charge. If they really took the word in literal strictness, how could there be the subsequent development to the fulness of divine life? It is evident that the divine essence somehow remains in a passive state. We prefer Bishop Westcott's statement in his Commentary on John, p. 10. "The word *became* must not be so understood as to support the belief that the Word ceased to be what he was before; and the word *flesh* must not be taken to exclude the rational soul of man. The clear apprehension of the meaning of the phrase, so far as we can apprehend it, lies in the recognition of the unity of the Lord's Person before and after the Incarnation. His personality is divine. But at the same time, we must affirm that his humanity is real and complete. He, remaining the same Person as before, did not simply assume

[1] Gifford, *Incarnation*, p. 55.

humanity as something which could be laid aside: *he became flesh.* He did not simply become 'a man': he became 'man.' The mode of the Lord's existence on earth was truly human, and subject to all the conditions of human existence; but he never ceased to be God."[1]

Sec. 4.—The Two States of the Incarnation

1. The State of *Humilation* extends from the Miraculous Conception and Birth to the death of Christ inclusive. The Incarnation itself is not included in this state, for it continues still in the state of Exaltation. The Humiliation, strictly speaking, includes all those acts and states of Christ's life which are extra to the idea of Incarnation, such as the Conception and Birth, the Circumcision, Baptism, Fasting, Temptation, Sinless Infirmity, Death and Burial. The Incarnation might have taken place, Christ might have been perfect man, apart from these circumstances.

2. The State of *Exaltation* begins with the Resurrection, is continued in the Ascension, and completed in the Session at God's right hand. Some make it begin earlier, with the descent of Christ's Spirit into Hades. But this view depends on a doubtful interpretation of a difficult text, 1 Pet. 3^{19}. Lutheran and Catholic divines all make the passage refer to such a descent, though they are not agreed as to the meaning and purposes of the descent. There are, however, other interpretations, which have on their side an equally eminent series of expositors. A strongly disputed interpretation is too slender a basis on which to found doctrine.[2]

The Resurrection is the first stage of the Exaltation. It is God's reversal of the world's judgment passed on Christ in the crucifixion. Christ died on the assertion that he was the Son of God, Matt. 26^{63}. The Father in raising him from the

[1] Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Lect. iv.; Gifford, *The Incarnation*; Hall, *The Kenotic Theory* (Longmans).

[2] See Dr. Salmond in Schaff's *Commentary*, vol. iv. 215.

dead confirms the assertion, Rom. 1^4.[1] The Resurrection is also a divine seal on Christ's work, Rom. 4^{25}, 8^{34}. In it the Prophet is glorified.

The Ascension glorifies the High Priest, who now enters the eternal Holy Place, Heb. 4^{14}, 9^{25}. He ascends to intercede and bless.

The Session is the glorification of the King. He now assumes the mediatorial crown and sceptre, which he will continue to bear till the consummation of all things, 1 Cor. 15^{28}. His attitude is the sign of triumph past and the pledge of triumph to come.

[Liddon's Bampton Lecture; Pope, Fernley Lect. on *Person of Christ;* R. L. Ottley, *Doctr. of the Incarnation*, 2 vols.; H. M. Scott, *Origin and Development of the Nicene Theology* (Chicago); Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 145–373; Powell, *Principle of the Incarnation;* Forrest, *The Christ of History and Experience;* Owen's two treatises, *The Glorious Mystery of the Person of Christ*, and *Meditations and Discourses on the Glory of Christ* (vol. i. of his works); Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Cunningham Lecture; Gore, *Bampton Lectures on the Incarnation*, 1891; Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology.*]

[1] "Justified in the spirit," 1 Tim. 3^{16}; "Convince of righteousness," John $16^{8.\ 10}$.

CHAPTER II

DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT

The constitution of Christ's Person gives value to his Work. It is significant that, when Christ's work is spoken of, our thoughts fix at once on this part of it. This is his work pre-eminently, but not the whole of it. In the full sense his work embraces everything he does in his threefold office of Prophet, Priest, and King. These Old Testament offices and orders found their fulfilment in Christ, in whom they all meet, and meet perfectly. He is the ideal Prophet, Priest, and King. His title of Messiah refers to all three mediatorial offices. The Atonement is simply his work as Priest, but it is central, fundamental to the rest.

He is the Ideal Prophet. The old prophets were inspired teachers. They owed their office, not to right of birth, but to a direct divine call. They were specially chosen for and called to their work, thus foreshadowing the Christian ministry. Their function was moral and religious teaching. Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, were simply the chief leaders of a "goodly fellowship." Christ is greater than Moses, not merely a guide in the Way, but himself the Way, the Truth, the Life, the Light of the World. He speaks of himself and in his own name.

The Ideal Priest. He is not only Priest but sacrifice, and perfect in both capacities. "He offered himself." He is thus at once the culmination of the priestly order and of the sacrifices for sin which they offered. In one capacity he is our representative, in the other our substitute.[1]

[1] Pope, *Comp.* ii. 216–248.

The Ideal King. Ancient prediction from its very first utterance looked forward to a regal conqueror; and, as time went on, the person, empire, and triumphs of the King became clearer and clearer. David's and Daniel's predictions especially fed the Jewish expectations of a coming King. But the expectations took a wrong colour. They were intensely, perhaps exclusively, secular. Christ is a King and has a kingdom, but "not of this world." His authority is founded on free consent. His empire is in and over human hearts. We need not wonder at the mistake of the Jews, for Christians have repeated it. The persecutions of the Roman Church, and the attempts made by Reformers like Calvin to enforce morality by means of the civil power, proceed on the same mistaken views. Christ's ideal kingdom of heaven has yet to be realised.[1]

We must carefully distinguish between the doctrine and the dogma of Atonement, or between fact and theory. The doctrine or fact, taught in Scripture, is matter of universal Christian belief. There is no Church that does not take its stand on the position that Christ's death is the meritorious ground of human salvation, which is the core of the atonement. Apart from the necessity of atonement, it would be hard to justify the incarnation and suffering of the Eternal Son. But as to the theory or dogma there is considerable diversity of view. Even here, however, there is more substantial agreement than is sometimes thought.[2]

[1] Dorner on "Three Offices," *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 381; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 295.

[2] "The doctrine of redemption and atonement lay outside the dogma-forming work of the ancient Church. Just as little as the doctrine of the appropriation of salvation by faith did it become the subject of ecclesiastical discussion and action; hence both sides of Christ's work found no confessional expression in ancient times. Not that the thing itself was absent from the Church's faith. Redemption and atonement through Christ rather formed its vital centre, the basis of the whole of Christianity and the postulate of all other dogmas."—Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 3rd Part, p. 169. No heresy arose in this field to compel the Church to define and formulate its faith, as was the case with the doctrine of Christ's Person.

It is sometimes questioned whether the vital idea of the vicarious purpose of Christ's death belongs to the doctrine or to the dogma, *i.e.* whether it is got from Scripture or is supplied by human thought. We wonder at the doubt, for the fact is both expressed and implied in Scripture. Christ himself says, "The Son of Man came . . . to give his life a ransom for many" (δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν), Matt. 20^{28}. Substitution is here expressed twice over, in the "ransom" and the "for" = instead of.[1] St. Paul's language is so similar as to suggest quotation, "who gave himself a ransom for all" (ὁ δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων), 1 Tim. 2^{6}. The ἀντί is here combined with the noun, and the more common ὑπέρ is put in its place. The latter preposition is the one most frequently used in the New Testament to express the bearing of Christ's death on us, and is the most suitable as implying benefit, advantage.[2]

The idea of substitution is implied in such passages as Rom. $5^{6\text{-}8}$, 2 Cor. $5^{14.\ 15.\ 21}$, Gal. 3^{13}, 1 Pet. 3^{18}, John 10^{15}, Tit. 2^{14}, Heb. 2^{9}. Christ's conduct in dying for us is compared to that of one dying for a good man. It is most natural to suppose that the thought in the latter case is that of one dying instead, in the place, of a good man. In the other passages there is no doubt respecting the meaning. In 2 Cor. 5^{14}, the inference, "therefore all died," only holds good if "one died for all" by dying instead of all (comp. Philem. [13], 2 Cor. 5^{20}, 1 Cor. 1^{13}).[3] The idea is also implied when it is said that Christ bore our sins, Heb. 9^{28}, 1 Pet. 2^{24}, 1 John 3^{5} (John 1^{29}). The phrase

[1] See also John 10^{11}.

[2] See Tischendorf's note in Crawford, *Doctr. of Atonement*, p. 495.

[3] "It is, of course, certain that ὑπέρ in itself, and also in the passages cited, is not = ἀντί; but it can only be meant in this sense." Thomasius, *Christi Person*, etc., 3rd Part, p. 101. See Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. N.T.* i. 232, on 1 Pet. 3^{18}: "The contrast which is made so prominent between the righteous and the unrighteous necessarily gives the idea, that the suffering which was endured in behalf of these ought to have been endured by the unrighteous themselves." See also Schmid, *Bibl. Theol. N.T.* p. 391, and Meyer on Gal. 3^{13}.

"to bear sin" is a Jewish one with a fixed meaning.[1] See Lev. 10^{17}, 19^{8}, 22^{9}, $24^{15.16}$, Ezek. 18^{20}. When transferred to Christ by Jewish writers, it must have the same meaning. But whose sin can Christ bear except the sin of others? Bushnell tries to explain away bearing sin as sympathy for the sinner, and refers to Christ being said to bear our sicknesses, Matt. 8^{17}. But, in addition to the answer just given, according to St. Peter, Christ bore our sin "on the tree." Besides, he showed sympathy with sickness by removing it. Respecting the Atonement, we have to consider the Doctrine, the Theory, and modern Divergent Theories.

Sec. 1.—Doctrine of Scripture

In itself, Christ's death is a Sacrifice; in its effects, it is a Propitiation, Redemption, and Reconciliation or Atonement.

1. In itself, in its nature or essence, it is a *Sacrifice.* This is the subject of elaborate argument in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The description of Christ's divine glory in the first chapters is merely an introduction to the description of his priestly work. The subject is presented in the form of a parallel and contrast to the Jewish priests and sacrifices, which are represented as divinely intended types of Christ; see especially chs. 9 and 10. The Jewish sacrifices needed constant repetition, Christ's one offering is sufficient; their merit was by imputation, his is intrinsic; they are temporary, his sacrifice is for ever. Express sacrificial terms are applied to Christ, $9^{14.28}$.[2] To suppose that the language is a mere accommodation to Jewish ideas, and is to be taken in some improper or figurative sense, is to reduce a whole book of Scripture to mere word-play.[3] "Unless we are to treat the

[1] Crawford, *Scripture Doctrine of Atonement*, p. 33.

[2] Owen, xii. 425.

[3] "They say, it is true Christ was a priest; but only he was a *metaphorical* one. He offered sacrifice; but it was a *metaphorical* one. He redeemed us; but with a *metaphorical* redemption. And so we are justified thereon; but with a *metaphorical* justification. And so, for

Epistle to the Hebrews as a portion of Scripture possessing no permanent value to the Church as a source of instruction in Christian truth, we must regard Christ's priesthood as a great reality, as *the* reality, whereof the legal priesthood was but a rude shadow, not even an exact image."[1] If, then, the parallel is to hold good, Christ's sacrifice means whatever the Jewish sacrifices meant; and on this point doubt is impossible. Lev. 17^{11} defines the purpose of sacrifice in unmistakable terms; it is to make atonement or expiation.[2] Maurice's teaching, that sacrifices were nothing but a symbol of the offerer's self-devotion, finds no support in the Old Testament. On this supposition they had no reference to sin, but were simply pictorial ways of expressing religious truth or sentiment. The expiatory phraseology and ideas connected with the sin-offering would then be inexplicable. Besides, to suppose that the sole purpose of the vast sacrificial system of the Jews was to symbolise spiritual truth, is to suppose an immense expenditure of means for a comparatively small end.

Again, the uniform language of the New Testament respecting the effect of Christ's death is only explicable on the supposition of its sacrificial nature. How is the emphasis so constantly placed on Christ's *blood* to be explained save on the ground that it was shed sacrificially? See Heb. 9^{12}, etc., Rom. 3^{25}, Eph. 1^{7}, 1 Pet. $1^{2.\,19}$, 1 John $1^{5.\,6.\,7.\,8}$. Christ says, "This is my blood, which is shed for the remission of sins," Matt. 26^{28}. Unless Christ's blood is sacrificial, what special connection is there between it and the remission of sins? We are "justified by his blood," "we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son," Rom. $5^{9.\,10}$. The same question may be asked here. True, his death cannot be altogether separated from the life that went before and the resurrection that followed. Still his death is isolated in these passages, and placed in special relation to our

aught I know, they are like to be saved with a *metaphorical salvation*." Owen, ii. 430.

[1] Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Lect. vi.

[2] See also Lev. 1^{4}, $4^{20.\,26}$, 5^{16}.

salvation. His death was the propitiation, and as such the ground of forgiveness. See also Luke $22^{19.20}$, John 10^{11}, Rom. 8^{32}, Gal. 2^{20}, Eph. 5^{20}, 1 Thess. $5^{9.10}$, Tit. 2^{14}, Heb. 2^{9}, 1 John 3^{16}, Rev. 1^{5}.[1]

The efficacy of Christ's death is traced in Scripture to Christ's divine dignity—1 John 1^{7}, Heb. 9^{14}; to his holiness—1 Pet. $1^{18.19}$, Heb. $7^{26.27}$; his love—Eph. 5^{2}; the voluntariness of his suffering—John $10^{17.18}$. These are the requisites of a perfect, all-sufficient sacrifice.

2. In its effects Christ's sacrificial death is a Propitiation, Redemption, Reconciliation.

Propitiation, of which God is the object, Rom. 3^{25}, 1 John 2^{2}, 4^{10}, Heb. 2^{17} (Luke 18^{13}); ἱλασμός, ἱλάσκομαι. The word "atonement," as it occurs often in the Old Testament, corresponds to "propitiation," not to "reconciliation."[2] The Hebrew word for "expiate, propitiate" (כִּפֶּר), is invariably rendered in the Septuagint by some form of the words above given,—a striking evidence that it is the Godward aspect of sacrifice that is the principal one. Propitiation is the appeasing of anger. Rom. 3^{25} is full of interest. However ἱλαστήριος is construed, the sense is the same. Some expositors think that the adjective had hardened into a noun and become equivalent to "propitiatory" (כַּפֹּרֶת), the name for the mercy-seat. God set forth Christ as a propitiatory, a mercy-seat or means of propitiation, but this view is not generally accepted. We see the interconnection of ideas again in כֹּפֶר, *ransom*.[3] Undoubtedly God is nowhere said in Scripture to be the object of propitiation; but what else can we suppose? The Old Testament sacrifices or expiations were offered to God; and to whom but to God must Christ's sacrifice have been offered? One explanation given of the silence of Scripture is the desire to

[1] Crawford, *Scripture Doctr. of Atonement*, p. 96; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* iii. 411.

[2] See Trench, *Syn. of N.T.* p. 279.

[3] Crawford, *Scripture Doctr. of Atonement*, p. 78. See Meyer on the passage. Dale, *Atonement*, p. 236.

avoid giving countenance to heathen extravagances. "Christ offered himself without blemish unto God," Heb. 9^{14}. To say that God did not need to be propitiated is to deny the necessity of sacrifice altogether.

Redemption, of which man is the object, Col. 1^{14}, etc., ἀπολύτρωσις. Generally some form of this word is used; but the phraseology is varied by the use of the ordinary word for "buy, buy back," ἀγοράζειν, 1 Cor. 6^{20}, Gal. 3^{13}. It is true that redemption came to mean simple deliverance, without reference to the means by which it is effected. But it retains its proper force in the New Testament, as is shown by the fact that the price or ransom is often mentioned, 1 Pet. 1^{18}, Matt. 20^{28}.[1] He gave "himself," "his life." Christ bought us with this price, he did not buy salvation for us. Hence we are called a "people of possession," Tit. 2^{14}, 1 Pet. 2^{9}.[2]

Reconciliation, of which God and man are the objects, καταλλάσσειν, καταλλαγή. It is true that the term is often used of the reconciling of one party, and in Scripture refers apparently to the reconciling of man only, 2 Cor. $5^{18\text{-}20}$, Rom. 5^{10}, Col. 1^{21}, Eph. 2^{16}. Still in its full sense the idea is a reciprocal one; and it would be hard to explain the use of the term if only half the meaning were included. We can only get the true meaning of words from usage and the context. Reconciliation means the mutual laying aside of enmity. In God, of course, the enmity is judicial, not personal.[3] That there

[1] "Indeed, Moses is called λυτρωτής, Acts 7^{35}, in reference to the metaphorical redemption of Israel out of Egypt,—a deliverance by power and a strong arm; but shall we say, because that word is used improperly in one place, where no price could be paid, where God plainly says it was not done by a price but by power, therefore it must be so used in those places where there is express mention of a price, both the matter of it and its formality as a price, and speaking not a word of doing it any other way but by the payment of a price?" Owen, xii. 419, also the whole of ch. xxviii.

[2] Crawford, as before, p. 605.

[3] Owen distinguishes between the "*real enmity* on our part against God" and the "*law enmity* on the part of God against us," one being

is such enmity in him is implied in propitiation. The latter term, however, describes only one side of the process, while reconciliation includes both. Matt. 5^{24} and 1 Sam. 29^{4} show that, while one side of the process is spoken of, the other is meant. "Be reconciled to thy brother" evidently means that the man addressed is to go and obtain his brother's forgiveness. See ver. 23, "there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee." There is much to suggest the same sense in Rom. 5. "Reconciled" in Rom. 5^{10} must be partly equivalent to "justified" in ver. 9, *i.e.* "justified" must be included in "reconciled."[1] And what is justifying but God's laying aside his anger against us? So in ver. 11 we are said to "receive" reconciliation, an inappropriate phrase if it means only an act of our own. We are also said to be reconciled "through the death" of Christ, which again points to an objective act. In 2 Cor. 5^{19} God reconciling the world to himself is explained by "not reckoning unto them their trespasses," *i.e.* forgiving and receiving them to favour. According to Trench's note given below, ver. 20 refers to the human reconciliation, our submission to the divine will and authority.[2]

"physical," the other "legal or moral," *Works*, xii. 414. On the whole idea of reconciliation, see Owen, ch. xxix. "It is not said anywhere expressly that God is reconciled to us, but that we are reconciled to God; and the sole reason thereof is, because he is the *party offended*, and we are the *parties offending*. Now, the party offending is always said to be reconciled to the party offended, and not on the contrary. So Matt. $5^{23.\ 24}$," p. 535. Crawford, pp. 67, 427, 448.

[1] Owen, xii. 415.

[2] See Trench on this group of words, *Synonyms of N. T.* p. 279. "The Christian καταλλαγή has two sides. It is first a reconciliation, 'quâ Deus nos sibi reconciliavit,' laid aside his holy anger against our sins, and received us into favour,—a reconciliation effected for us once for all by Christ upon his cross; so 2 Cor. $5^{18.\ 19}$, Rom. 5^{10}, where καταλάσσεσθαι is a pure passive, 'ab eo in gratiam recipi apud quem in odio fueras.' But καταλλαγή is secondly and subordinately the reconciliation, 'quâ nos Deo reconciliamur,' the daily deposition, under the operation of the Holy Spirit, of the enmity of the old man toward God. In this passive middle sense καταλάσσεσθαι is used, 2 Cor. 5^{20}, cf. 1 Cor. 7^{11}. All attempts to

Formerly Socinian writers got rid of the doctrine of expiatory sacrifice by giving another meaning to the passages containing it. The Broad Church school did the same. Now many writers like Dr. Wendt, under the constraint of a more thorough and candid exegesis, acknowledge that St. Paul teaches the doctrine beyond question, but endeavour to show that he has little support in the rest of the New Testament. Paul's doctrine was due to his Jewish training, and is not binding on us. No doubt we owe to Paul the most elaborate exposition of the doctrine. It forms the centre of his view of redemption. But he is not alone; see 1 Pet. 2^{24}, 3^{18}, 1 John 2^{2}, 4^{10}. That the Lord Jesus himself, before the sacrifice itself was offered, should speak with reserve, is only what we should expect. We know how slow the disciples were to take in higher truth. But his teaching is not without plain intimations on the subject. The words at the institution of the Supper are too clear and authentic to be evaded, Matt. 26^{28}, see also Mark 10^{45}, John 10^{11}. The large space given in each of the four Gospels to the account of Christ's suffering and death is only explicable on the supposition of a special meaning belonging to that suffering and death.[1]

Sec. 2.—Dogma of Atonement

There is no generally received theory of the atonement corresponding to the theory of Christ's Person in the Nicene Creed. This may seem strange. It is probably owing to the fact that there has always been general unanimity in the Church on the truth that forms the core of the atonement, namely, that

make this the primary meaning of the word, being indeed the secondary, rest not on unprejudiced exegesis, but on a foregone determination to get rid of the reality of God's anger against sin," p. 279. Crawford, as before, p. 65.

[1] "We find allusions in the New Testament to current doctrines that were subversive of the Christian faith. We do not find one that suggests the suspicion that any section of Christians denied that Christ's death was the ground of man's salvation; and in this matter we are safe in saying that the teaching of Paul echoes the testimony of the entire Church." Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, p. 79.

Christ's death is a sacrifice for sin and the ground of its forgiveness. We may go further, and say that there was always at least the beginning of a theory on the subject in the idea of satisfaction to law and justice implied in the fact of sacrifice. The idea of satisfaction arose early and has maintained itself in the faith, the creeds, and the preaching of the Church. The Apostolic Fathers, as might be expected, go little further than the letter of Scripture; still they regard Christ's suffering as vicarious. The same is true of all the chief Fathers. The term "satisfaction" occurs in Hilary of Pictavium and Ambrose (Luthardt, p. 210).[1] Anselm (†1109) was the first to reason out the theory of satisfaction in his *Cur Deus Homo.* In him the satisfaction is more to God's honour than to law or justice. Still this is more a difference of phrase than of substance. Honour implies obligation, and is a sort of higher law or justice. Sin is the greatest offence against God's honour; reparation is due; forgiveness without it would be unbecoming; man cannot make such reparation for himself; it can only be made for him by the God-man,—such are the leading thoughts which have passed into the faith of the Church as at least parts of a complete theory.[2] Anselm simply developed the teaching of former Church writers. Aquinas reproduces Anselm's teaching. The Reformation took up Anselm's doctrine. It is said, indeed,

[1] See Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of Atonement*, p. 420; Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* vol. ii.

[2] On Anselm, see Shedd, ii. 273; Dale, *Atonement*, p. 279; Lidgett, p. 451. "The debt was so great that none but God could pay it, and none but man owes it; therefore one must pay it who is God and man." Anselm. The metaphor of a debt is not of course meant to be a complete account of the nature of sin, though objectors often argue as if it were, making a metaphor the basis of absurd inferences. The single point of comparison is the obligation of the debtor to make restitution, an unfortunate circumstance for the objectors, who maintain that no restitution is due from the sinner or required by God. "Sin is not properly a debt, for then it might be paid in kind, by sin itself; but is called so, only because it binds over the sinner to *punishment*, which is the satisfaction to be made for that which is properly a transgression, and improperly only a debt." Owen, ii. 431; Crawford, pp. 429, 451.

that the Reformers substituted the idea of law for honour; but this, as we have seen, is a change rather in form and degree than in substance. The Roman Church says (*Counc. Trent*, vi. 7): "Christ made satisfaction to God the Father for us." Lutheranism (Augsb. Conf. p. 10): "By his own death he made satisfaction for our sins." Reformed (Conf. Helv. ii. 15): "Christ assumed and took away the sins of the world and made satisfaction to God's justice"; (Westm. Conf. viii. 5): "The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father." Anglican (Art. xxxi.): "The offering of Christ once made is the perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, both original and actual;" Communion Office: Christ made on the cross "a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world." We thus see that the idea of satisfaction, which is not a term found in Scripture, has found general acceptance as an explanation of the doctrine of sacrifice.

This view of the atonement is generally described as forensic, judicial, juridical, and is closely connected with the conception of God as Judge, Moral Ruler, Sovereign. It is condemned by some as unworthy of God, borrowed from criminal courts of justice, or even from heathen notions of sacrifice.[1] If we ask whether the conception of God as Judge and Ruler of the world is true and scriptural, we do not see how it can be denied. Granting that Father is the final, New Testament representation of God, it is not the only one even in the New Testament. The kingdom of God, the righteousness and holiness of God, the ideas of judgment, justification, and condemnation (Matt. 25, etc.) imply the opposite. The emphasis laid on God's wrath (John 3^{36}, Rom. 1^{18}, 2^{5}, 5^{9}, etc.) points the same way.[2] There is

[1] Socinus said: "If we could but get rid of this justice, even if we had no other proof, the fiction of Christ's satisfaction would be thoroughly exposed and would vanish," in Shedd, ii. 376.

[2] See an excellent essay on God's Anger in Simon, *Redemption of Man*. Also Candlish, *Bibl. Doctr. of Sin*, p. 46.

nothing unworthy or lowering in the idea of retributive righteousness. All that is necessary is to remove from this class of ideas the defects belonging to them in human practice as we do in regard to other divine attributes. A sinner under the condemnation of law is a criminal. Judicial is often wrongly opposed to moral on this subject; judicial action is a part of morality, though not the whole. There is no antithesis between the two terms. Those who oppose the thought of retributive justice in God bring it in again in other forms. Mr. Somerville explains the righteousness of God in Rom. 3^{25}, "not as punitive or retributive justice, but as holy love, a will ever faithful and true to its own law, which is the salvation of men in a manner consistent with eternal truth and holiness."[1] Righteousness "is love pursuing its end, which is the recovery of man to God, in a holy way, *i.e.* a way in keeping with his character as holy" (p. 281). If it is right to combine righteousness and love in one phrase, "holy love," it must also be right to consider them separately. There is no opposition between the two, but they are as distinct as knowledge and power. It is interesting to observe that Bushnell in a later work had recourse to the expiatory idea as explaining Christ's death.[2]

Atonement is equally inconceivable without righteousness and without love in God. Without righteousness there would be no need of atonement; without love it would be impossible. It is always represented in Scripture as a display of both attributes, Rom. 3^{25}, 5^{8}, 8^{32}, 1 John 4^{10}, John 3^{16}. Love is the source, not the effect, of the atonement. Because God loved us, he gave his Son as a propitiation. But if he gives in one capacity, he receives in another. He himself bore the penalty due to us. He satisfied himself, propitiated himself. Rather than law and justice should be ignored, he honoured them in our stead. Thus, righteousness and love are equally magnified. There is truth in Anselm's argument that it would be in the highest degree unfitting that

[1] *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, p. 282; Goebel and Ritschl are quoted to the same effect.

[2] Orr, *Christian View*, p. 351.

justice in God should be slighted or exposed to suspicion. And in the very act of himself meeting the claims of justice, love was manifested in unique fashion. If it is a mistake, as we hold it is, to make the atonement a manifestation of justice only, it is equally a mistake to make it an expression of love only. Love must be shown in some practical way, in averting danger or procuring good. If Christ's death was a sacrifice for sin, the greatest evil is averted, the greatest good effected. The end is adequate to the means employed. But if his death was simply an instance of martyr-like fidelity in his vocation, where was the unique example of love? Where was the need for such self-sacrifice?

The vicarious principle involved is a general law of life. Sympathy and love, all self-sacrificing sentiments of friendship, patriotism, and affection, include a vicarious element. If a mother cannot save her child by suffering in its stead, she would fain do so. We inherit privileges procured for us by the labour and suffering of others. Self-sacrifice is everywhere recognised as the highest form of love. Is this impossible to God? Right in the creature, is it wrong in the Creator? Does our nature mislead us in the admiration and reverence we feel for this highest form of virtue? Without it the love of God would not be perfectly manifested. Even the love of the incarnation would be less than the love of atonement. Love which brought the sinless One into direct contact with our sin was love to the uttermost.

If it is said that sin cannot be transferred from one to another, we reply with a distinction. Sin cannot be transferred in itself, but it can be transferred in its penalty. The solidarity or unity of the race renders this possible in the vicarious way just mentioned.[1] Representative responsibility is a familiar fact. The acts of my representative are my acts. Christ is a representative man, the new Head of the race, Rom. 5^{19}, 2 Cor. $5^{14.\ 21}$. "Him who knew no sin he made sin on our behalf." He was made sin in the only sense in which this is possible,

[1] Rom. 12^{5}, Gal. 6^{2}.

namely, by the penalty being laid on him. Penalty indeed is inseparable from guilt; but this need not be personal guilt, but liability to penalty voluntarily assumed. It should be noticed that "*God* made him sin," as in Rom. 3^{25}, Isa. 53^{6}. "Him who knew no sin" is not said so emphatically without reason. His holiness was a condition of his atoning work, Heb. 7^{26}, 1 Pet. 3^{18}.

We must not suppose any opposition between the Father and the Son, or think of the Son as removing unwillingness in the Father. Father, Son, and Spirit are of one mind and will in all things, although one Person in the economy of the Trinity is more conspicuous in certain acts than another. "Never let us think of Christ as prevailing with God to grant us a salvation which he was unwilling to bestow, but always as the substitute whom God himself was pleased to provide, because in his great mercy he desired our salvation."[1] The righteousness and love manifested were equally the righteousness and love of the three Persons of the Godhead.

In ascribing a penal character to Christ's suffering, we do not mean that he was punished as we are, but that he bore our punishment vicariously. The hymn which says, "The Father hath punished for you his dear Son," is a condensed way of saying this. In the same sense we say that he bore God's wrath. No wrath rested on him personally as on us.[2] It is often said that God cannot be angry with us and love us at the same time; but experience shows the opposite. A parent is angry with a wicked, ungrateful child, but the love is not extinguished. The father in the parable was angry with the prodigal, and yet continued to love him with the love of compassion, which becomes on the prodigal's return a love of approval. The distinction between Judge and Father applies here again (p. 168). The phrase "vicarious suffering" is to be preferred to "vicarious punishment."

If we are asked what were the elements in Christ's sacrifice

[1] Crawford, *Doctr. of Atonement*, pp. 193, 447; Lidgett, *ibid.* p. 282.
[2] 1 Pet. 2^{24}, Isa. 53^{5}.

which gave it value, we must reply his spotless holiness, his representative character, and self-sacrificing love; and when we remember that he is divine, and that thus we have in him divine holiness, a divine representative, and divine love, we see that the value is raised to the highest point. In his death the race makes satisfaction to God, and when I believe in that death as the sacrifice and propitiation for my sin I affirm the satisfaction made by my representative, 2 Cor. 5^{14}. On my union with Christ by faith the atonement made provisionally and ideally for me becomes fact for me. It is as if, clothed with Christ's qualifications, I had died when he died and done honour to God's law. It is affecting to remember that the Lord's death, unlike every other, was his own act. "I lay down my life." "He gave himself." His suffering was an act, his *passio* an *actio*.

This is the Godward, objective side of the atonement, and the objective side is essential, fundamental. The sacrifice is offered to God, the satisfaction made to him. Then the way is opened for the manward aspect, the effect of the atonement as a motive to repentance and faith. The exhibition of the heinousness of sin, the holiness of God, above all of his redeeming grace and love, is the most powerful means to draw men away from sin to God. Perhaps in the anxiety to maintain the Godward aspect of the truth the second aspect was often neglected. It is emphasised in Scripture, Rom. 5^{8}, 1 John 4^{10}. But it is a far greater mistake to make this the whole of the atonement and ignore the Godward reference. The very ground and material of the appeal are done away when the higher aspect is denied. The universal, unconditional benefits which follow from the atonement are great. All legal barriers in the way of human salvation are removed. The divine righteousness or justice is honoured and demonstrated. God is just as well as merciful in forgiving. The gift of the Holy Spirit and the influence of grace are secured for all. It would be difficult to estimate the efficacy of divine grace in limiting the power of sin, counteracting temptation, upholding conscience,

inclining men to good, preparing the heart for fuller grace. All this work of the atonement is before conversion and apart from faith in the full sense.

A striking fact in our days is the number of evangelical writers firmly maintaining an objective atonement, who argue against the forensic, judicial theory—a reaction doubtless against the excessive prominence given to it in former times. One is safe in saying that it is much more easy to point out defects in the theory than to find a better rationale of the subject. This, if I understand rightly, is the position taken by Dr. Simon in his *Redemption of Man*. He disputes the distinction between personal and official, leaving only the former and putting God's anger in the place of justice, holding, of course, the anger to be just. But this change will not render the doctrine more acceptable to objectors. The personal aspect is much more open to attack. Mr. Somerville in the work already mentioned takes the same ground. Mr. Scott Lidgett in his thoughtful volume [1] argues at length against the judicial and for the paternal aspect. He holds that the demand for satisfaction arises from the fatherly relation. The idea of fatherhood, he thinks, has been unjustly stripped of its sterner elements. God as Father both requires and provides satisfaction for sin. We very much doubt whether Fatherhood, while it is the final and highest, is the only aspect of God in Scripture. The Sovereign and Ruler and Judge is more conspicuous in the Old Testament and is present in the New. The New Testament revelation scarcely abolishes or supersedes, it rather completes, the old idea of God. The attempt to incorporate the demand for satisfaction in the fatherly character is more daring and ingenious than successful. The result is to change the Father into the Ruler and Judge, or at least to add the latter set of ideas to the former. The two domains cannot be identified. If God is nothing but Father, the Socinian will hold the field. As we are often reminded that there is no opposition between righteousness and love, we may remark there is none between Judge

[1] *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement.*

and Father, and yet they are distinct. They may be united in the same person; but they are not to be confounded.

The germs of modern aberrations appear in the Middle Ages. Abailard (†1142) denied the necessity of satisfaction, and made Christ's death simply an exhibition of divine love. God is already reconciled. Christ lived and died to declare this fact and so to draw men to God. All the effect of his work is on man. Duns Scotus (†1308) admitted only a relative necessity of atonement, and in keeping with his theory of the supremacy of will ascribed its value to the divine will merely, not to intrinsic qualities. As Christ's human nature only could be the subject of merit, that merit is only finite. The value of the atonement is what God declares it to be. On this basis anything would have sufficed; Christ's passion was not necessary, except as a means of impressing man. His theory bears the name of *acceptilatio*.[1] The question as to whether the necessity of the atonement is absolute or not has been answered in different ways. Some ground the necessity in God's essential justice. Others, while holding that the way chosen must be the best one, decline to decide whether it was the only possible one.

A strange notion appearing in early ages was to the effect that the ransom-price was paid to Satan. Satan had acquired certain rights over man as a master over slaves or a conqueror over captives; and these rights must not be extinguished by force but satisfied by just means. Then, after this preamble, guile is introduced. Satan agrees to accept Christ's human soul as an equivalent; but he is ignorant of Christ's divinity, and when he gets Christ into his power he is unable to keep him. Christ's humanity is even represented as the bait that lures Satan to his undoing. This grotesque notion appears most plainly in Gregory of Nyssa (†395) and Gregory the Great (†604). But its influence is greatly overrated, especially when it is made a chief source of the doctrine of atonement, as by

[1] "In Roman law, an acquittance from obligation by word of mouth, without real payment," Pope, *Comp.* ii. 306, 313; Shedd, *Hist.* ii. 347.

Baur.[1] Gregory Nazianzen (†390) energetically repudiated the notion. In writers like Irenæus, Origen, Theodoret, Augustine, Leo the Great, and even in Pope Gregory, it only appears alongside other more scriptural views. Irenæus acknowledges no rights of Satan, saying "he rules us unjustly," "the enemy had unjustly led man captive." He makes Christ conquer Satan in the wilderness. Baur applies his words "by persuasion" (secundum suadelam) to Satan, but they apply to man. Theologians like Athanasius, Hilary, Cyril of Alexandria, know nothing of the idea. Anselm gave it its death-blow.[2] We need to remember that in ancient days Satanic agency filled a larger place in men's thoughts than it does now. The bondage to Satan involved in a life of sin was much more strongly emphasised.

Sec. 3.—Other Divergent Theories

A. Those views of atonement which affirm a Godward aspect are called objective, asserting effects of Christ's work which are independent of us. Those, on the other hand, which admit only a manward aspect are called subjective.[3] The true doctrine includes both aspects. Subjective theories see in Christ's death merely means of influencing man, convincing him of God's love, winning him to gratitude, inspiring him with trust and courage. That death is a great exhibition of divine sympathy and love as well as an example of fidelity and self-sacrifice of the highest kind. These theories are often called "Moral" or "Moral Influence" theories, but they have

[1] Even Dr. Dale attaches too much importance to it, *Atonement*, p. 277.

[2] "Was it the law of Satan we had transgressed? Was he the judge that cast us into prison? Was it him to whom we were indebted? Was it ever heard that the price of redemption was paid to the jailer? Whether any of the ancients said so or no, I shall not now trouble myself to inquire, or in what sense they said it; the thing in itself is ridiculous and blasphemous." Owen, xii. 519; Shedd, ii. 245; Pope, ii. 300.

[3] The use of the word is not quite accurate, but it may be admitted in default of a better term.

no special right to the name. It is evident that on this view Christ's death only influences us in so far as we yield ourselves up to it; there is no unconditional benefit. It is quite true that on the orthodox view salvation is only given to faith. But many blessings come without condition on our part—obstacles removed, grace procured, the Spirit given to all. Subjective theories are at one in excluding all idea of sacrifice proper—expiation, substitution. Christ's death holds no unique position. It only benefits us by teaching and example. The sole difference between Christ and other great teachers is one of degree. These theories fail to explain the emphasis laid in Scripture on Christ's death in particular (p. 162). Our contention is that the ordinary doctrine provides for the exercise of moral influence in the highest degree. Something unique is done. The greatest evils are averted, solid benefits are actually conferred, God is exhibited in the most affecting light. Subjective theories are true as far as they go, but they do not go far. They leave out the cardinal and essential. They deprive Christ's work of its unique features.

(*a*) Early Socinianism placed the Prophet in Christ above the Priest, if it did not, indeed, entirely merge the second in the first. We are saved solely by believing Christ's teaching and following his example. His death attests his truthfulness and fidelity, and so is simply that of a martyr. On this view it is difficult to explain Christ's distress and anguish in presence of the cross; many of the servants have shown greater fortitude than the Master. Early Socinianism took a far higher view of Christ than modern Unitarianism.[1] While making him a mere man, it held fast to his Resurrection and Ascension. As a reward for his extraordinary merit, he was supposed to be invested with special dignity and power; he was made man's Lord and Judge; his readiness to sympathise and help constitutes his priestly function.[2] Christ is indeed the Prince

[1] See Winer, *Confessions of Christendom*, p. 64.

[2] Crawford, as before, p. 287; Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, vol. ii. chap. xxiii.

of Martyrs, "Head of the Martyrs' noble host." But this character, which in others is so glorious a title to honour, is overshadowed in Christ by the higher glory of Redeemer and Saviour. His sufferings were not simply exemplary, but redemptive, atoning. See 1 Pet. 2^{21}, 3^{18}.

(*b*) The school represented by Bushnell's name resolves Christ's Priesthood into Sympathy. His *Vicarious Sacrifice* elaborately explains the vicarious element which is involved in all sympathy. Still, if this is all, there is nothing special in Christ's work. Bushnell himself said: "The suffering of Christ was vicarious suffering in no way peculiar to him, save in degree." Sympathy is certainly a necessary qualification for a priest, Heb. 4^{15}, 5^{2}. It is pre-eminently the priestly spirit necessary in all spiritual work. No high work for God can be done without it. But it is only a qualification for priestly work, not the work itself. The Epistle to the Hebrews, after showing that Christ possessed the requisite qualifications, goes on to speak of the work he did as priest,—he offered a sacrifice for sin, the sacrifice being himself. The advocates of this theory are driven to explain all that is said in the Epistle about Christ's proper work as priest, which forms the very theme of the Epistle, as mere figure of speech and condescension to Jewish notions, a course which makes a whole book of Scripture practically meaningless, in fact mere rhetorical artifice. "Christ is called a Priest by poetic licence rather than in plain prose." Dr. Bruce justly says: "Unless we are to treat the Epistle to the Hebrews as a portion of Scripture possessing no permanent value for the Church, as being indeed nothing more than an ingenious piece of reasoning for a temporary purpose, we must regard Christ's priesthood as a great reality."[1] It is remarkable that in the later part of *Vicarious Sacrifice* Bushnell is obliged to admit that Christ's death can only be explained by the idea of propitiation, and in his later work, *Forgiveness and Law*, he does this still more fully.[2]

Besides, sympathy must be embodied in some practical service,

[1] *Humiliation of Christ.* [2] Orr, *Christian View*, p. 351.

evil averted or good bestowed. Men never make sacrifices merely for the purpose of expressing sympathy and love. Still less can we imagine the divine Father surrendering the Son to humiliation and death for this purpose apart from imperative need. The sympathy is not the sole end, but comes out in the rendering of help.[1]

(*c*) Another form of the theory, held by Maurice, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, is known as the Mystical theory, "Redemption by Sample" (Bruce). According to it, Christ is the perfect example of what we ought to be. He rendered to God the perfect devotion and obedience which we ought to render. This is the only meaning of sacrifice in Scripture—self-consecration to God's service, self-sacrifice. The sole purpose of the Jewish sacrifices was to set forth this truth symbolically. Dr. Bruce well states Maurice's view thus: "Christ, as the root and archetype of humanity, in his own person offered up man as an acceptable sacrifice to God, in the sense of exhibiting in his life and death the entire surrender of the whole spirit and body to God, and the complete renunciation of that self-will which is the cause of all men's crimes and misery. Such self-sacrifice was what was really meant by all the legal sacrifices; for the victims died, not as substitutes for the offerer, but as symbols of his devotion. What these legal sacrifices dimly foreshadowed, Christ perfectly realised. In his life and death he offered up the one complete sacrifice ever offered, the perfect example of self-surrender and devotion to the divine will; and God accepted the sacrifice, as made, not by an individual, but by the race as represented by its archetypal man."[2] It might seem at first sight as if in these words the fact of representation or substitution were accepted; but it is certain that nothing could be more opposed to the entire drift of Mr. Maurice's teaching. Christ is simply, as with Schleiermacher, the ideal man, and is accepted as such by God. All that he did he owed to God on his own account. Ritschl expressly says that every-

[1] Crawford, *Scripture Doctrine of Atonement*, pp. 297, 335, 371.
[2] *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 310.

thing he did as priest, he did for himself.[1] Nothing could show more clearly than this statement what his view of Christ's priesthood is. It has in it nothing expiatory. Indeed, he says that for Christ as for us priestliness means simply drawing nigh to God.

(*d*) A peculiar theory, advocated by Dr. M'Leod Campbell,[2] makes the essence of the Atonement to consist in Christ having made a Perfect Confession of sin for us. He saw, as we cannot, into the depths of sin, and was thus able to make an adequate acknowledgment of it for us. The necessity of reparation is admitted, and the reparation is found in what is really an act of vicarious repentance on Christ's part. Not to say that the sense of personal guilt, which forms the core of repentance, must be wanting in Christ's case, we find it impossible to think of repentance as performed vicariously. If there is any act that is essentially and exclusively personal, it is repentance. But even if this objection were removed, we have to ask whether repentance alone is a sufficient atonement. Campbell's teaching, like Socinianism, assumes that it is. In this case man's repentance alone would suffice, if it were higher in degree. Nothing but a difference of degree is left between what Christ did and what man himself might do.

F. W. Robertson's views on this subject are important because of the influence of his name. But it is not easy to define them. In truth, Robertson speaks with two voices. So far as profession goes, nothing could be more definite and satisfactory than many of his utterances. In the sermon on "The Sacrifice of Christ" (iii. 90), he emphatically teaches its "vicarious" character, although his exposition only seems to amount to this, that Christ was the victim of the world's sin in general, and that he is "the realised ideal of humanity." In the sermon on "The Good Shepherd" (ii. 265), he rejects "the meagre explanation" of Unitarians; "they say that Christ

[1] *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 474.

[2] *Nature of the Atonement*, etc. Dr. Bruce traces the notion to Jonathan Edwards and Rupert of Deutz. Crawford, pp. 327, 331, 369.

merely died as a martyr, in attestation of the truths he taught." Again, in the sermon on "Caiaphas's view of Vicarious Sacrifice" (i. 132), whatever may be thought of the exposition given, Christ's vicarious sacrifice is expressly affirmed: "It was a sacrifice for the world's sin." But when we ask what the nature of this sacrifice was, the only answer we get is that it is the spirit of self-sacrifice in Christ. This is asserted again and again. There is not a word about expiation or propitiation, so far as we know The drift of the sermon on "The Sacrifice of Christ" (iii. 101) is, that we receive the benefit of Christ's act of self-sacrifice only by imitating it. In the sermon on "Christ the Son" (ii. 144), after making "entire surrender to the divine will," the essence of sacrifice, he adds, "all other notions of sacrifice are false," and characterises certain extreme statements as "borrowed from the bloody shambles of heathenism, and not from Jewish altars." Here he seems quite to coincide with Maurice's teaching. In the sermon on "Caiaphas," it is not easy to decide whether he is arguing against expiation and satisfaction in every form, or only against certain inferences from it or ways of putting it. How the statement that Christ's death was the inevitable result of his character and work is reconcilable with his own words in John 10^{18}, 19^{11}, it is not easy to see. "The self-sacrifice of Christ was the *satisfaction* to the Father."[1] Throughout, the main, if not the sole, reference is to the effect on man's mind and heart.

B. A theory, favoured by High-Church and Catholic writers,[2] inclines to make Redemption coincident with the Incarnation The very union of the divine with human nature is supposed in some way to have sanctified the race. The grace is actually experienced when the believer is united with the humanity of Christ, which is done in the Sacraments, the Sacraments being regarded as an "extension of the Incarnation." It is hard

[1] See also sermons on "Reconciliation by Christ" (iv. 208) and "The Sinlessness of Christ" (iv. 77).

[2] Wilberforce, *Doctrine of the Incarnation;* Oxenham, *Catholic Doctrine of Atonement;* Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, p. 268, etc.

to know what is the Scripture warrant for the speculation. Redemption is never there specifically connected with the Incarnation, nor is the act of the Incarnation made specially prominent. Compare this reticence with the emphasis laid on Christ's passion and death, both in the Gospels and Epistles, and the frequent, we may say constant, ascription of atoning efficacy to the death. Moreover, if the work of atonement was accomplished in the Incarnation, the passion and death were superfluous and unjustifiable. It may also be worth while to add, that the theory is irreconcilable with the prominence given to the cross and passion in High-Church and Catholic forms of worship. The Communion service of the English Church commemorates the love of God in giving his "only Son Jesus Christ to suffer death upon the cross for our redemption, who made *there* a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world." The High-Church school, whatever it may think of the Thirty-nine Articles, acknowledges the Prayer-Book as a rule of doctrine. It is difficult to avoid the impression that much that is said by some writers against the notion of vicarious satisfaction, and especially against extreme forms in which it has been held by individual writers, is prompted by prejudice against the Reformation, which, without exception, was rigidly faithful to the central doctrine of Atonement.

The view under consideration is due to the early Greek theology, to which we are advised by some writers to return.[1] The Greek teaching on Sin and Redemption is commended as freer, more humane and less dialectical. The truth is that on this side of truth the thought of the early Greek Church was less developed. All its strength was expended on the truths connected with the Incarnation. It never had any theory of Sin or Atonement. Indeed, at that time even in the West thought on these subjects was not more advanced. The East never had any doctrine of Predestination; it rather leaned to extreme views of the extent of human freedom. But it would not be

[1] Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought.*

correct to suppose that the identity of Redemption with Incarnation was the view of the Greek Church generally. It was one of many thoughts thrown out by different writers. It can easily be shown that the prevailing belief was in Christ's death as a sacrifice for sin, the means of forgiveness, and a satisfaction for sin. Wherever these views are held, we have the germs of further developments, such as arose in the Western Church. Some references may be useful.

The Apostolic Fathers follow the apostles immediately in point of time. Clement says that "Christ's blood was poured out for our salvation; he gave by the will of God his body for our body, his soul for our soul." "Let us look steadfastly to the blood of Christ, and see how precious it is in the sight of God, which being shed for our salvation hath obtained the grace of repentance for the whole world. . . . We are not justified by ourselves, neither by our own wisdom or knowledge or piety, or the works which we have done in holiness of heart, but by that faith by which almighty God hath justified all men from the beginning." Ignatius, while dwelling much on the union with Christ effected by his death, speaks of Christ as One "who gave himself to God, an offering and sacrifice for us." He stirs believers up to duty "by the blood of God." Polycarp writes: "Christ is our Saviour, for through grace are we righteous, not by works, for our sins he has even taken death upon himself. . . . To those to whom the death of Christ, which obtains the forgiveness of sins, does not prove a ground of justification, it proves a ground of condemnation." In the anonymous Epistle to Diognetus of the same period, we read: "God himself gave up his own Son a ransom for us, the holy for the unholy, the good for the evil, the just for the unjust, the incorruptible for the corruptible, the immortal for the mortal. For what else could cover our sins but his righteousness? In whom was it possible for us the unholy and the ungodly to be justified, except the Son of God alone? O sweet exchange, O wonderful work, O unlooked for benefit! That the sinfulness of many should be covered

in one, that the righteousness of one should justify many ungodly."[1]

It is not easy to disentangle the thoughts of Justin, Origen, and Irenæus[2] on the subject. Origen gives expression to many views, which are not harmonised. In one place he even speaks of Christ "making God propitious to us." In the two latter writers Satan's rights play a part in the exposition.[3]

Athanasius well represents the position of the Eastern Church. While his doctrinal interest lay elsewhere, he clearly enough maintains the fact of sacrifice, substitution, and satisfaction in Christ's death. The notion of a ransom to Satan does not appear in him. He argues strongly against the sufficiency of repentance as a satisfaction for sin.[4] Man was in danger of perishing altogether. In order to prevent this the divine Logos, who was himself imperishable, assumed a body like ours, and by his death fully satisfied the claims of the divine law. This was done by his death, which was of infinite value as the death of the God-man. This emphasis on the death shows that the redemption was not effected simply by the incarnation. "Christ as man endured death for us, inasmuch as he offered himself for that purpose to the Father." "The first and principal ground of the Logos becoming man was that the condemnation of the law, by which we are burdened with guilt and eternal punishment, might be removed by the payment of the penalty." "His death is the death of all, the death of mankind; in him all died." If the incarnation alone redeemed, why was the death necessary?[5]

C. The Governmental or Rectoral theory of Grotius and Dr. Wardlaw[6] finds the chief purpose of atonement in the public

[1] Shedd, ii. 207, 218; Banks, *Devel. of Doctr.* i. 8.

[2] Irenæus, although living in the West, was Eastern in thought and sympathy.

[3] Shedd, ii. 231; Lidgett, pp. 430, 432.

[4] Shedd, ii. 242; Norris, 285.

[5] Shedd, ii. 239; Norris, p. 282.

[6] *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols.; Crawford, p. 380; Shedd, *Hist.* ii. 356.

vindication of the divine law and government. It was much more for man's than God's sake, to prevent the laws which are so closely bound up with man's welfare being trifled with. This, indeed, is one of the purposes or results of the atonement, but it can scarcely be regarded as the chief or only one. The theory has too utilitarian an aspect. It gives God's greatest act too much the air of an expedient. Nothing but the highest moral necessity, grounded in God's nature, would justify such humiliation on the part of God's everlasting Son. Even the incidental results of the Incarnation, such as the present theory supposes, are great; still, they are only incidental.

We may here mention, and partly repeat, some points ever to be borne in mind on the present subject. 1. One is the harmony of the principle of atonement with the "solidarity" of the race, and the law of substitution at work in society. "The one for the many" represents a principle that is one of the chief factors in the world's progress. The mission of some is to think, suffer, sacrifice for others. The whole gain of their lives descends to the race because of the unity binding individuals together.[1] 2. The difficulty, if there is any, does not lie in Christ dying for the guilty, but in his dying at all. The high moral purpose does not increase, it rather lessens the difficulty. Christ being sinless, death had no claim on him; yet he died. His sinlessness and his death are facts admitted by all with whom we need to argue on this question. But, indeed, where is the supposed wrong? Whenever in extraordinary circumstances men are found willing to face danger and suffering for the good of others, they are looked upon as examples of the highest virtue. Why should Christ's act be judged differently? So far as it was an instance of self-sacrificing love, where is the difference? "For a good man some would even dare to die." The most heroic human virtue only reaches so far as to do this for friends. Christ did the same for a world of enemies. 3. Christ's act was legitimate and

[1] Dorner, *Syst.* iv. 89, 99, 107; Gilbert, Lect. iii. vi. vii.; F. W. Robertson, *Sermons*, i. 138; Simon, *Redemption of Man*, ch. ii.

voluntary in the most perfect degree. No man has absolute power over his own life; Christ had. "No man taketh my life from me," John 10^{18}. 4. An enlightened conscience can only be satisfied with forgiveness that does not infringe on law and justice. Mere safety from merited penalty may satisfy selfish fear, but it cannot satisfy a conscience awake to the majesty of righteousness. Such a conscience puts the glory of God and the good of the whole before its own peace.

[Dale, *Christian Atonement;* Crawford, *Scripture Doctrine of Atonement;* Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement;* Smeaton, *The Lord's and the Apostles' Doctrine of Atonement*, 2 vols.; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* iii. 401–429, and iv. 1–124; Gilbert, *The Christian Atonement;* Fisher, *Hist. Christian Doctr. passim;* Simon, *Redemption of Man;* Lyttleton, Essay in *Lux Mundi;* Cave, *Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice.*]

Sec. 4.—Universal Extent of the Atonement

This is one of the points of difference between Arminianism and Calvinism. The idea of a limited atonement was not and could not be learnt directly from Scripture. The absence of all restriction (John 1^{29}, 3^{16}, 1 John $2^{1.2}$), the universal terms used (1 Tim. 2^{4-6}, Heb. 2^{9}, Rom. 5^{18}, 2 Cor. 5^{14}, Tit. $2^{11.12}$), the statement that Christ died even for the lost (Rom. 14^{15}, 1 Cor. 8^{11}), the commands to all to repent, point to the opposite conclusion. The idea really arose as a necessity of the theory of predestination, with which the statements of Scripture just referred to had then to be brought into harmony by inserting qualifications. Admit the unconditional election of individuals to salvation, and other consequences follow, such as particular redemption, irresistible grace, the denial of free-will, unconditional perseverance.[1] The argument is, "All are saved for whom Christ died, and yet all are not saved; for, unless we accept the first position, we

[1] These are the "Five Points" in the Calvinist controversy.

must believe that God's purpose fails." But does God will our salvation unconditionally? And if his purpose is conditional there is no failure. Another argument, to the effect that unless God had decreed the salvation of some absolutely, all might have refused, and so God's plan have fallen utterly to the ground, is very far-fetched. Unscriptural and dangerous as the theory of Predestination is, it is unjust to charge it entirely upon Calvin and Luther. Augustine was its real author. He adopted it in extreme recoil from Pelagianism. Admit his extreme doctrine of Original Sin, and then, if any one is to be saved at all, it can only be the work of divine power without assent or concurrence of man. Man can have no more to say to his own personal salvation than to his original redemption. Here is the fountain-head of the whole theory. Calvin simply borrowed Augustine's system, and worked it out completely on every side.[1] Supra-Lapsarian Calvinism includes even the Fall in the divine decree; Infra-Lapsarian puts the decree after the Fall. The Roman Church, though it has no formal definition on the subject, has always been anti-Augustinian on this question; so with Lutheranism and the High-Church school. On the other hand, the Low-Church school, the Reformed Churches of the Continent, the Presbyterian Churches, the old Independents, and the Baptists, are, or were, all Predestinarian or Augustinian.

[1] "There's no such thing as Calvinism. The teachings of Augustine, Remigius, Anselm, and Luther were just pieced together by one remarkable man, and the result baptized with his name." Duncan, *Colloquia Peripatetica*, p. 9. The Jansenists or Port-Royalists in the Roman Catholic Church held Augustine's doctrine of predestinarianism, but they were quickly suppressed by the bull Unigenitus and the secular power.

CHAPTER III

THE EXPERIENCE OF SALVATION

The blessing of atonement just considered is universal, unconditional, objective; the blessings now to be considered are individual, conditional, subjective. Calvinism speaks of their "application"; Arminianism prefers to speak of their "administration." The Holy Spirit is in a special sense the administrator.[1]

The question of the relation of divine to human agency in this field is the question of the relation of divine grace to free-will.[2] Augustine denied the second, Pelagius denied the first. Arminianism tries, while avoiding the two extremes, to maintain the truth in both. Not that it puts the two factors on a level. On the contrary, it puts grace first and makes it supreme. The Spirit is given to all men as the fruit of atonement, and grace works in all, works towards salvation. This holds good of all without exception, has held good since the beginning. It holds good of the unconverted before conversion, of those who never are converted, of the heathen who have never heard of Christ. Anticipating human desire and effort (hence called prevenient grace), it checks and counteracts sin, inspires and fosters good inclination, and allures to the search for more grace. This universal divine working is the source of moral good and beauty in the irreligious. When welcomed and followed up, it passes into saving grace. Nothing but neglect

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 168.

[2] T. Goodwin, *Work of Holy Ghost in our Salvation*, *Works*, vol. vi., except the Calvinism.

or resistance prevents its having this issue in any case. It is here that Arminianism and Predestinarianism part company. The latter holds what it calls "common grace," which it credits with all the effects just mentioned, but which never becomes or can become effectual saving grace. Common grace belongs to all, effectual grace only to the elect individuals. Such a distinction can never be reconciled with Scripture, with the divine justice, or with human responsibility. If we are asked whether the power by which man accepts God's proffered grace is from God or from man, we answer, From God. "The power by which man co-operates with grace is itself of grace" (Pope). But every man has it by divine gift. According to Augustine,[1] there is no power to co-operate with God until after regeneration, and if so, no responsibility. We hold that such power and responsibility exist from the first dawn of moral life. Arminianism is often charged with the error of semi-Pelagianism, which gives to man the power to orginate good in himself, and only makes divine help necessary to its completion. The above statement shows that the charge is without foundation.

Although Augustine's doctrine of Predestination was never adopted by the Church as a whole, it led to fierce controversy and much division.[2] In the ninth century it was defended in all its severity by Gottschalk, a Saxon monk, and as strongly resisted by Hincmar and Rabanus Maurus. Synods condemned it, and Gottschalk died in prison. The Schoolmen only adopted portions of Augustine's system. Bradwardine, Archbishop of Canterbury in the fourteenth century, like Gottschalk, held the twofold decree of election amd reprobation. Wyclif and Huss are on the same side. It may be said that the whole of the Protestant Reformation was at first Predestinarian. There is reason to think that Luther's views on this question softened somewhat in his later years, and it is certain that Melancthon's did. The Lutheran symbols are not predestinarian. Zwingli

[1] See Smith's *Dict. Biogr.* "Augustine."

[2] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 342; Banks, *Devel. of Doctrine*, ii. 12; Fisher, *Hist. Christian Doctr. passim.*

was like Calvin in his predestinarianism, but, unlike him, he betrays a tendency to universalism, not to speak of pantheism. It was Calvin who first worked out Augustine's doctrine to its final issues, and made it the cardinal point of a theological system. His starting-point, like his great predecessor's, was the complete bondage of man's will to evil. Salvation, therefore, can be nothing but the execution of a divine decree, which fixes its extent and conditions. The Incarnation, the work of the Spirit, the agencies of the Church, are simply the necessary means for accomplishing a necessary end. The Church consists of the elect. Reprobation is involved in election. Fore-knowledge and fore-ordination are identical. Calvin asks: "Why do we speak of permitting, except because he so wills?" And all this is for the glory of God! Calvin's definition runs: "Predestination is the eternal decree of God, by which he has decided with himself what is to become of each and every individual. For all are not created in like condition; but eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal condemnation for others."[1] "A horrible decree, indeed, I confess. He so foreknew, because he so determined by his own decree." Yet he tries to throw the blame on man: "Man therefore falls, God's providence so ordaining, but he falls by his own fault." The 17th article of the English Church teaches a moderate form of predestination.[2]

[1] Cur permittere dicemus, nisi quia ita vult? Prædestinationem vocamus æternum Dei decretum, quo apud se constitutum habuit, quid de unoquoque homine fieri vellet. Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes; sed aliis vita æterna, aliis damnatio æterna præordinatur *Instit.* iii. 21, 5.

[2] Winer (*Conf. of Christendom*) classifies the "Reformed" creeds as "those which maintain a stricter predestination," and those "which have a milder expression, or give prominence to universal redemption, or keep silence on the question." In the first class are the Gallic and Belgic Confessions, Canons of Dort, Formula Consensus Helvetici, Westminster Confession; in the second the Basle Confession, Helvetic ii., Thirty-nine Articles, Art. xvii. Ample quotations are given from these as well as from the Arminian and Lutheran Creeds, p. 162. Pope, *Comp.* ii. 351.

The scriptural use of the term Conversion well illustrates the union of the two factors in actual salvation, denoting as it does both the divine (Jer. 31^{18}, Acts 3^{26}) and the human (Acts 3^{19}, 11^{21}) side. The term itself is ambiguous. It is generally applied to the commencement of spiritual life and to the work of inward renewal, but it may cover the whole process.

As the agency of the Holy Spirit is so prominent in the experience of religion, it may be well to refer somewhat more fully to Scripture teaching on the subject (see p. 90). It need not surprise us that the Old Testament is reserved respecting the person and work of the Holy Spirit. We cannot always be sure that any distinction between the Spirit and God is implied; but the same may be said of the New Testament. Yet we know that the New Testament teaches such a distinction. It is also quite in keeping with the Old Testament that the Spirit's activity in creation and providence should be emphasised, Gen. 1^{2}, Ex. 35^{31}, Job 26^{13}, Ps. 104^{30}, 139^{7}. The Spirit is viewed as the active energy of God, which quite accords with New Testament conceptions. It should be observed that the moral activity and personal character of the Spirit appear more plainly, or at least are more plainly intimated, in later passages of the Old Testament (see Isa. 42^{1}, 48^{16}, 61^{1}, $63^{10\,f.}$, Ezek. 11^{5}, 36^{27}, Zech. 4^{6}; yet Gen. 6^{3}, Ps. 51^{11} must be earlier). As the Holy Spirit was the agent in all spiritual life as much in ancient as in later days, we are justified in seeing references to his presence and work in such passages. "His" or "thy Holy Spirit" is only found in Ps. 51^{11}, Isa. $63^{10\,f.}$. It is well remarked that in the second part of Isaiah especially the tendency is to make the Spirit personal, 48^{16}, 61^{1}, 63^{10}. So many references to the Spirit brooding, speaking, ruling, guiding, being grieved, can scarcely all be explained as poetical personification.

Even in the New Testament we find a similar reserve. The teaching of Christ in the Gospels marks a great advance in clearness and fulness. Still it is only after Pentecost that the

revelation is complete. A reason is given for the reserve, John 7^{39}, 16^{7}. His coming in fulness is matter of promise, Luke 24^{49}, John 14^{26}, 15^{26}, Acts 1^{8}. His divine personality is put beyond doubt by Christ himself (p. 90). From this point not only is the Spirit active in every part of the work of salvation, but we see him at work. The Book of Acts, from its frequent references to the subject, has been aptly called "the Gospel of the Holy Spirit."[1] The phrase "Holy Spirit" occurs between eighty and ninety times in the New Testament. In the Acts and the Epistles we see the fulfilment of the promise in John 14^{26}, 16^{13}. St. Paul in all his Epistles is the chief expounder of the Spirit's work in human salvation, especially in the four undisputed Epistles — Rom., 1 and 2 Cor., Gal. The distinct personality is seen in passages like Rom. 8^{26}, the divinity in 1 Cor. 3^{16}, 6^{19}. He is the Spirit of Christ, Rom. 8^{9}, and of the Father, vv. 11, 14. The body becomes a temple through his indwelling, 1 Cor. 3^{16}, 6^{19}. He is both co-ordinated with and distinguished from Father and Son, 2 Cor. 13^{14}. In some passages it is not certain whether the Holy Spirit is meant, or man's spirit under his influence, Rom. 8^{4}, Gal. 5^{16}. In truth the apostle seems to pass from one to the other. In later Epistles the Spirit is the seal and earnest of redemption, Eph. $1^{13\,f.}$, 4^{30}.[2]

Sec. 1.—Conditions of Salvation

Man's co-operation comes out clearly in the two great conditions of Repentance and Faith. "Repentance is true sorrow for sin, with sincere effort to forsake it." "Faith in Christ is a saving grace, whereby we receive him, trust in him, and rest upon him alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the

[1] Plumptre, Introd. to Comm. on Acts.

[2] See Art. by Dr. Swete, *Holy Spirit*, in Hastings' *Bib. Dict.* iii.; Owen, *Pneumatologia;* Goodwin, *Work of Holy Spirit in our Salvation;* Walker, *The Spirit and the Incarnation;* Smeaton, *Doctr. of Holy Spirit;* Hare, *Mission of the Comforter.*

gospel."[1] These definitions rightly call attention to the fact that in each case the emotional element is the principal one,—"sorrow, trust." Both repentance and faith are acts of the whole man; intelligence, feeling, and will are all engaged, but the determining element is feeling. Knowledge leads on to feeling, and feeling to action. The knowledge involved in repentance is specific knowledge, knowledge of the personal character and heinous nature of sin as done against God. Such personal conviction issues in sorrow for sin, "repentance toward God," Acts 20^{21}. Confession and amendment are the final step, Matt. 3^{8}.

Saving Faith, according to the teaching of Protestant Churches, is personal trust in Christ. Apol. A. C.: "The faith that justifies is not merely historical knowledge, but it is to assent to the promise of God, in which the remission of sins and justification are offered freely for Christ's sake. . . . Faith is not only knowledge in the understanding, but also trust in the will, *i.e.* it is to will and accept what is offered in the promise," etc.[2] "It is to believe, to rely on the merits of Christ, that for his sake God is certainly willing to show mercy to us," Apol. A. C. "A very firm confidence and abiding assent of the mind," Helv. ii. "A hearty confidence which the Holy Ghost works in me through the Gospel, that not only for others, but for me also, the forgiveness of sins, everlasting righteousness and blessedness

[1] See also Pope, *Comp.* ii. 371, 376, 411. Mr. Wesley draws a distinction between the sense and degree in which repentance is necessary and that in which faith is necessary. The efficacy of repentance depends on the presence of true faith. "Repentance and its fruits are only *remotely* necessary; necessary in order to faith; whereas faith is *immediately* and *directly* necessary to justification. It remains, that faith is the only condition which is *immediately* and *proximately* necessary to justification." Serm. xliii. See also Serm. v.

[2] "Illa fides, quæ justificat, non est tantum notitia historiæ, sed est assentiri promissioni Dei, in quâ gratis propter Christum offertur remissio peccatorum et justificatio." "Fides est non tantum notitia in intellectu, sed etiam fiducia in voluntate, h.l. est velle et accipere hoc quod in promissione offertur," etc.

with God, are bestowed of his grace," Cat. Heidelberg.[1] "A sure trust and confidence that Christ died for *my* sins, that he loved *me* and gave himself for *me*."[2] Faith is thus trust in Christ for a specific purpose. Of course, it presupposes both knowledge and intellectual faith in God's revelation and in Christ. But the latter kind of faith may and often does exist without leading to trust. Roman teaching makes faith intellectual and general. It does not recognise faith in the particular sense just mentioned. Winer says justly: "The Romanists most assuredly require faith as a personal disposition on the part of him who shall attain justification; but that faith is not a trust in the merit of Christ, it is that general credence of the doctrines of the Christian revelation which is rooted in the understanding."[3] Bellarmin says: "The object of faith, which heretics restrict to the promise of special mercy alone, Catholics would make as wide as the Word of God. . . . Then they differ as to the faculty and power of the mind, that is the seat of faith. The former put faith in the will, defining it as trust, and so confounding it with hope. Catholics teach that faith has its seat in the understanding. Lastly, (they differ) as to the intellectual act itself. For they define faith by knowledge; we by assent."[4] The Protestant interpretation is abundantly justified by the habitual phrase used in Scripture in describing the faith necessary to salvation—believing *in* and *on Christ* (John $3^{15.\ 18.\ 36}$, 6^{40}, 1 John $5^{10.\ 13}$, Gal. 3^{26}, Acts 16^{31}).[5] Faith

[1] Winer, *Conf. of Christendom*, p. 186, etc.

[2] Wesley, vol. v. p. 60.

[3] Winer, p. 189.

[4] Winer, p. 190. Bellarmin goes on to say, "Judgment or assent is twofold, for one kind follows the reason and evidence of the case, the other follows the authority of the speaker; the former is called knowledge, the latter faith."

[5] Even Peter Lombard says: "It is one thing to believe upon God (*in Deum*), another thing to believe in God (*Deo*), another thing to believe God (*Deum*). To believe in God is to believe those things to be true which he says, which even the wicked do; and we believe in man, not upon man. To believe God is to believe that God is, which also the

has been well described as "the flight of a penitent sinner to the mercy of God in Christ."

The repentance and faith of a penitent are to be distinguished from those of the Christian believer.[1] In the latter case, repentance and faith are in order to a further degree of holiness. A believer has also a faith of assurance, a persuasion "that I, even I, am now reconciled to God." The latter is frequently confounded with penitent faith in order to forgiveness. The confusion is pernicious. It can never be a seeker's duty to believe that he is already forgiven. He must believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, *i.e.* as he is set forth in Scripture, and he is set forth as the universal, sufficient, accepted propitiation for sin. The same mistake is made in some creeds. *Conf. Aug.*, "and believes that his sins are remitted for Christ's sake."[2]

Faith is not only a condition, like repentance, but also an instrument. We are justified through, not on account of, our repentance and faith.[3]

Only Arminianism does justice to these conditions. Calvinism is naturally shy of them, its writers either ignoring them or confounding them with the repentance and faith of believers. But in doing so they overlook or set aside an important aspect of the teaching of the New Testament, which speaks often and emphatically of these acts as preceding, and necessary in order to, personal salvation. It is folly to say that the fulfilment of conditions interferes with the sovereign freeness of salvation, and would form a ground of pride. Are we purely passive in receiving other gifts of God? Does our action detract from the freeness of those gifts?

wicked do. To believe upon God is by believing to love him, by believing to go to him, by believing to cleave to him and be incorporated with his members," Luthardt, p. 249 ; Owen, v. 85, 100.

[1] See Wesley on *Repentance of Believers*, Ser. xiv.

[2] Winer, p. 191.

[3] Owen, vol. v. 109.

Sec. 2.—Blessings of Salvation

Justification, Regeneration, and Sanctification are contemporaneous and inseparable. Every one who experiences the first blessing experiences the others at the same time.[1] In thought, however, the order cannot be changed. It would be unnatural to suppose man born again before he is justified or forgiven. Speaking of the first two blessings, Wesley says: "The former relates to the great work which God does *for us*, in forgiving our sins; the latter to the great work which God does *in us*, in renewing our fallen nature. In order of *time*, neither of these is before the other; in the moment we are justified by the grace of God, through the redemption that is in Jesus, we are also 'born of the Spirit'; but in order of *thinking*, as it is termed, justification precedes the new birth," Serm. xlv.

A.—JUSTIFICATION

(*a*) The Roman and Protestant Churches differ fundamentally not only as to the condition but also as to the nature of justification.[2] According to the former, it is making man just by infusing righteousness of nature, being thus equivalent to sanctification or to the entire process of salvation; according to the latter, it is making just by declaring or pronouncing just.[3] This difference of view as to the nature of the blessing has probably much to do with the difference of view as to its condition. If the Roman view on the first point is the scriptural one, there is some reason for including good works at least among the

[1] "No man is justified without being regenerated and adopted, and no man is regenerated and made a son of God who is not justified," Watson, *Works*, xi. 248.

[2] Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* iii. 114; Dorner, *Syst. Chr. Doctr.* iv. 194; Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, vol. ii. ch. xxi.

[3] It is not a declaring innocent. Man is guilty, and can never be acquitted as a criminal in a human court is acquitted.

means of the blessing. This difference of meaning must be borne in mind throughout. Thus, when the Council of Trent says, "If any one shall say that the wicked is justified by faith alone, so that he understands nothing else to be requisite to his obtaining the grace of justification, . . . let him be anathema,"[1] the wide range given to *justified* must be remembered. When, again, Protestant Churches declare with Paul that "a man is justified by faith apart from the works of the law," the limited range given to the same term must be remembered.

A single quotation from the Tridentine Council will set forth the Roman idea with sufficient clearness. "Justification is not the remission of sins alone, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inner man by the voluntary reception of the grace and gifts, by which man from unrighteous becomes righteous, and from being an enemy becomes a friend, that he may be an heir according to the hope of eternal life, . . . by the righteousness of God, by which he makes us righteous; endowed with which by him we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only reckoned, but are truly called and are righteous, receiving righteousness in us."[2] The Protestant symbols declare with one voice that justify means in Scripture to declare just. "Justification here signifies not to be made righteous, from being wicked, but in the forensic usage to be pronounced righteous. . . . To be justified is to obtain remission of sins. . . . To justify in the forensic usage means to absolve the guilty and pro-

[1] Winer, p. 184.

[2] Justificatio non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum unde homo ex injusto fit justus et ex inimico amicus, ut sit heres secundum spem vitæ æternæ . . . justitia Dei, quâ nos justos facit, quâ videlicet ab eo donati renovamur spiritu mentis nostræ et non modo reputamur, sed vere justi nominamur et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes, Winer, p. 179. It must not be forgotten that Dr. Pusey, and the great party which agrees with him, teach this doctrine of Trent as well as other doctrines. On the whole difference between the Roman and Protestant doctrine, see Dean Jackson, Bk. iv. ch. vii.; also Cramp, *Text-Book of Popery*, p. 73.

nounce righteous, but on account of another's righteousness, namely Christ's, which righteousness of another is imparted to us by means of faith," Apol. A. C.[1] The 11th Article of the English Church and the Westminster Confession speak to the same effect.[2] Mr. Wesley says: "The plain scriptural notion of justification is pardon, the forgiveness of sins. It is that act of God the Father, whereby, for the sake of the propitiation made by the blood of his Son, he 'showeth forth his righteousness (or mercy) by the remission of sins that are past.'" While, however, justification is substantially the same as forgiveness, it is also different. Otherwise, why two terms instead of one? Justification is forgiveness in accordance with law, a putting right in relation to law. There might be forgiveness without justification. The very term just or righteous suggests the idea of law, implying as it does a standard of comparison. According to Liddell and Scott, the Protestant interpretation is the only one known to classical usage (δικαιόω, "to hold as right or fair, deem right, think fit," implying a judgment passed respecting something).[3]

The final decision turns upon the Scripture use of the term. The best way to ascertain this is to observe its use in relation to other subjects. In passages like Ex. 23^{7}, Deut. 25^{1}, 1 Kings 8^{32}, Ps. 51^{4}, 143^{2}, Prov. 17^{15}, Isa. 5^{23}, $50^{8.9}$, Luke $7^{29.35}$, 10^{29}, 16^{15}, Matt. 11^{19}, 1 Cor. 4^{4}, the sense of making

[1] Justificari hic significat non, ex impio justum effici, sed usu forensi justum pronuntiari. . . . Consequi remissionem peccatorum est justificari. . . . Justificare h.l. (Rom. 5^{1}) forensi consuetudine significat reum absolvere et pronuntiare justum, sed propter alienam justitiam, videlicet Christi, quæ aliena justitia communicatur nobis per fidem, *ibid.* p. 180.

[2] Winer, p. 187.

[3] "How can δικαιοῦν possibly signify 'to make righteous'? Verbs indeed of this ending from adjectives of *physical* meaning may have this use, *e.g.* τυφλοῦν, 'to make blind.' But when such verbs are derived from adjectives of *moral* meaning, as ἀξιοῦν, ὁσιοῦν, δικαιοῦν, they do by usage, and must, from the nature of things, signify to *deem*, to *account*, to *prove*, or to *treat as* worthy, holy, righteous," Canon Evans on 1 Cor. 6^{11}, in *Speaker's Comm.* See also Godet's Excursus in *Comm. on Romans*, vol. i. 157.

intrinsically just is out of the question.[1] In every case it is the passing of a judgment that is meant. When, then, Paul, "a Hebrew of the Hebrews," with his mind steeped in the Jewish Scriptures and in current Jewish ideas, takes the term, and, without any intimation of a change of meaning, applies it to God's relation to man, we have no reason for departing from the meaning fixed by usage, especially when this is in perfect harmony with the context. See Rom. $3^{19.\ 20.\ 24\text{-}26}$, Acts $13^{38.\ 39}$.

In Rom. 5^{18}, 8^{34}, justify is opposed to condemn. To condemn is not to make really bad, but to pronounce an adverse judgment. What, then, must justify mean?

In Rom. $4^{4\text{-}8}$, justifying is plainly treated as equivalent to imputing righteousness, forgiving iniquities, covering sin, not imputing sin. Otherwise the quotation from the Psalms has no relevance. Here also there can be no question of making internally righteous. See Gal. 3^{6}, Jas. $2^{23.\ 24}$, Luke $18^{13.\ 14}$.

The most powerful evidence, however, in behalf of the Protestant interpretation, is that supplied by the whole strain of the first five chapters of the Romans. In chaps. 2 to 5 the apostle is moving in a circle of legal or forensic ideas—law, guilt, condemnation, propitiation, justification. All these terms hang together. To make justify mean the imparting of intrinsic righteousness, would be out of harmony with the rest of the exposition. The latter idea is first introduced in chap. 6, where we have an entirely new set of figures and terms. In the earlier argument, all men are pronounced guilty before the law, and then on the ground of the great propitiation (3^{25}) they are "justified." What can this mean, in the connection of thought, but to be set free from guilt and condemnation?

The nature of the objection which the apostle supposes to be raised against his teaching (3^{31}, 6^{1}), confirms our interpretation. Some one objects that the doctrine of a man being justified "by faith apart from the works of the law," makes the law of none effect. Now, if "justify" meant on the

[1] Luthardt, *Comp.* p. 257; Owen, v. 125, etc.

apostle's lips to make a man internally righteous, how could such an objection ever occur to any one? It would be absurd; and it is not likely that St. Paul or Scripture would condescend to notice mere nonsense. But, according to the Protestant interpretation, such an objection seems plausible at first sight. Some one might ask, If justification, so defined, is by faith only, what is the use of the law, what room is there for obedience to it? And precisely the same objection is made by Roman and other controversialists against the Protestant doctrine of justification, which is denounced as immoral and opposed to the interests of holiness—a tolerably conclusive proof that Paul's doctrine and ours are the same.[1]

There is a close connection between the forensic aspect of the atonement and the forensic nature of justification, the former being the ground of the latter. It is true that the forensic is not the only aspect of atonement, as we have seen, but it is one aspect; and justification is not the whole of salvation, but it is part. Simple forgiveness would remit penalty without regard to law and its satisfaction. Justification does so on the ground of the satisfaction made to law. It is, so to speak, legal forgiveness. It is difficult to see where the legal element in the work of atonement finds practical application, if the legal nature of justification is denied.

An objection is sometimes made, that the Protestant doctrine makes God, in declaring a sinner just, declare what is contrary to fact. The objection is a mere verbal cavil. What is meant is that for the sake of Christ God treats guilty man, when penitent, as if he were righteous. Christ's merit is reckoned his, so that the divine action is not contrary to truth and fact. The same objection might be raised against forgiveness in any

[1] Thomasius (*Christi Person und Werk*, Theil 3, ii. 223) gives interesting quotations from Origen, showing that that keen thinker very early saw the true relation between faith and works. "And I think that faith is the first beginning and very foundation of salvation; but hope is the growth and increase of the structure, while love is the perfection and top-stone of the whole work."

form. In forgiving a sinner, God treats him as he does not deserve to be treated, *i.e.* regards him as not a sinner. Is this unjust?

The objection, that the doctrine is inimical to the interests of morality, has been already considered. There would be weight in it if Protestantism or Scripture made this blessing the whole of salvation. No doubt it was greatly emphasised at the Reformation, as it had been forgotten. But the necessity of sanctification is just as earnestly maintained. In fact, it is inseparable from the earlier blessing. Every one who is justified is born again and sanctified at the same time. The blessings are different aspects or parts of one divine act.

According to the Protestant definition, justification is complete at once; according to the Roman one, it is progressive. Here again the meaning of the terms in the different confessions must be borne in mind.

A peculiar phraseology, used in Calvinistic and other circles, to describe justification, is the imputation of Christ's righteousness.[1] The term to impute or reckon is used in Scripture in reference to this subject, but it is faith, not Christ's righteousness, that is said to be reckoned for righteousness (Rom. 4^{3-9}, Gal. 3^{6}, Jas. 2^{23}). The argument used to justify the phrase in question is, that as the object of faith is Christ's righteousness, the imputation of faith involves the imputation of its object. But this consequence does not necessarily follow. Even granting that the object of faith is correctly stated, the question is, In what aspect or for what purpose is that righteousness believed in? It need not be in order to personal appropriation, but simply as constituting a valid expiation. The argument, in short, is a *non-sequitur*. Other developments of the phraseology are still more suspicious. Christ's righteousness is divided into active and passive, the first being his perfect observance of God's law, the second his expiatory suffering, and both are said to be reckoned to us. If the former is reckoned

[1] Advocated by Owen, vol. v. p. 162, etc. See Crawford, *Scr. Doctr. of Atonement*, p. 444.

to the believer, so that he is regarded as having kept God's law in Christ, it is hard to see how this is consistent with the requirement of holiness in us. We know how earnestly the inference is disavowed, but we do not see how it is to be logically avoided. It is said in defence that we just as much need Christ's perfect obedience to supply the defects of our obedience, as we need his meritorious suffering to atone for our guilt; otherwise we must suppose the demands of the law to be lowered to meet our weakness. But is not the same mercy which cancels our guilt equal to the forgiveness of our imperfections? Why resort to the artificial and unnatural notion of a vicarious holiness? If there are spheres of life in which substitution is out of place, surely the region of personal holiness is one of them. Mr. Wesley accepts the phraseology, putting his own meaning upon it. He takes it as another way of denying human merit and affirming that we are justified solely for Christ's sake. But those who use the language mean more by it than this. He says: "As the active and passive righteousness of Christ were never, in fact, separated from each other, so we never need separate them at all. It is with regard to these conjointly that Jesus is called 'The Lord our Righteousness.' But when is this righteousness imputed? When they believe; in that very hour the righteousness of Christ is theirs; it is imputed to every one that believes, as soon as he believes. But in what sense is this righteousness imputed to believers? In this: all believers are forgiven and accepted, not for the sake of anything in them, or of anything that ever was, that is, or ever can be done by them, but wholly for the sake of what Christ hath done and suffered for them," Serm. xx. It need only be remarked that the language thus explained is a round-about way of saying what might be said far more clearly and simply.[1]

(*b*) Faith the ONLY CONDITION of justification.[2] Protestant-

[1] Pope, *Comp.* ii. 446.

[2] Justification by faith alone is often called the material, the sole authority of Scripture in matters of faith, the formal principle of Protest-

ism is as unanimous in making faith the sole condition, as it is in making forgiveness the sole content, of the blessing. *Solâ fide* is its watchword here. "Solâ fide nos justificamur coram Deo, quia solâ fide accipimus remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem, propter Christum, quia reconciliatio seu justificatio est res promissa propter Christum, non propter legem," Apol. A. C., Article xi. of English Church. Westminster Confession, chap. xi. sec. 1.[1] The Roman condemnation of this view, with its different definition, has been already quoted.

It is clear that Scripture is with us on this point; see Rom. $3^{20\text{-}28}$, 4^{4}, Eph. $2^{8\text{-}10}$, 2 Tim. 1^{9}, Tit. 3^{5}, Acts 16^{31}. The first passage is enough to settle the question. The apostle says, concluding his argument, "We reckon therefore that a man is justified by faith apart from the works of the law." Whatsoever justification means, works of the law are excluded from the means by which it is obtained. If justification means sanctification, as Rome says, works are excluded from it. This passage does not stand alone, as the above enumeration shows. The reference cannot be to works of the ceremonial law, for in the whole context "the law" is spoken of in general terms. The ceremonial law did not exist in Abraham's days, 4^{2}. In chap. 4^{4}, the apostle even argues that the blessing must be through faith, in order that it may be of grace. The explanation given by the Council of Trent, "We are said to be justified by faith, because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification,"[2] is like saying that a

antism. On Faith and Good Works see Dean Jackson, Bk. xi. chs. xxx. xxxi. "We are justified by faith *alone;* but we are not justified by that faith which *can be alone.* Alone, respects its influence unto our justification, not its nature and existence. And we absolutely deny that we can be justified by that faith which *can be alone;* that is, without a principle of spiritual life and universal obedience, operative in all the works of it, as duty doth require," *Treatise on Justification,* Owen, *Works,* v. 73.

[1] Winer, p. 185.

[2] Winer, p. 184.

man is made wise and learned by the alphabet, because the alphabet is the beginning of all knowledge.[1]

Nothing has done more to obscure the truth on the present subject in the Roman Church than the doctrine of the possibility of merit in man. This merit is said to be of two kinds or degrees. When man before justification yields to prevenient grace, he is said by a merit of congruity (*meritum de congruo*) to deserve an increase of grace. The justified merit eternal life in a higher sense by a merit of condignity (*m. de condigno*). "Since Christ himself is ever infusing, as the head into the members, virtue into the justified themselves, which virtue always precedes and accompanies and follows their good works, and without which they (the good works) cannot in any way be pleasing and meritorious before God, it is matter of faith that nothing more is wanting to the justified themselves, to entitle them, by those good works, which are done in God, to be considered as having satisfied God's law as to this earthly life, and, if they die in a state of grace, as having merited the eternal life to be attained in due time."[2] So Bellarmin says: "The common judgment of all Catholics is, that the good works of the righteous are meritorious in the true and proper sense, and that they merit not this or that reward, but eternal life itself."[3] It is true, human merit is traced to Christ's merit as its source, and Christians are warned against self-confidence

[1] Barrow on Apostles' Creed, Serm. iv. and v.

[2] Con. Trid. vi. 16: Cum ille ipse Christus tanquam caput in membra . . . in ipsos justificatos jugiter virtutem influat, quæ virtus bona eorum opera semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur, et sine quâ nullo pacto Deo grata et meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis justificatis amplius deesse credendum est, quominus plene illis quidem operibus, quæ in Deo sunt facta, divinæ legi pro hujus vitæ statu satisfecisse et vitam æternam suo etiam tempore, si tamen in gratiâ decesserunt, consequendam vere promeruisse censeantur, Winer, p. 196; Banks, *Devel. of Doctrine*, ii. 68; Fisher, *Hist. Christian Doctrine, passim.*

[3] Habet communis catholicorum omnium sententia, opera bona justorum vere ac proprie esse merita, et merita non cujuscunque præmii, sed ipsius vitæ æternæ, Winer, p. 197. On the doctrine of Merit, see Jackson, *Works*, Bk. xi. chs. xxvii. xxviii.

and pride. But the doctrine is a dangerous one; fine distinctions are soon rubbed off in common use, and the modicum of truth at the basis of the doctrine may be put in safer and more moderate terms.

St. James (2^{14-26}) seems at first directly to contradict St. Paul. In vers. $^{15.\ 16.\ 19}$ he gives an example of the kind of faith which is too little for justification, a simply intellectual, inoperative faith, faith without fruits of holiness. Paul never said that such faith would save. In fact, he says over and over again precisely the same as James (Gal. 5^{6}, Eph. 2^{10}, Tit. 3^{8}, Rom. 3^{31}, $8^{4.\ 13}$, 13^{8-10}, Rom. 6). The two writers are treating of different subjects. One is instructing a seeker respecting the means of salvation, the other is exposing a pretended believer. Substantially, James is treating of the kind of faith that saves. Or we may say that one apostle speaks of a sinner's justification, the other of a Christian's, two different justifications being meant. A Christian justifies his faith, proves it to be genuine, by works.[1]

Dr. Pope in his *Compendium*[2] gives a valuable and interesting account of the history of thought on this subject. We will merely indicate the points which deserve attention. One is the source of the error of the Roman Church in Augustine, who does not distinguish between justification and sanctification. "God justifies (man) not only by remitting the evil he has done, but also by bestowing charity, that he may forsake evil and do good by the aid of the Holy Spirit." Another sentence is quoted, which seems to indicate a sense of the distinction, "Works follow the man who is justified, they do

[1] "Works justify and perfect faith, not in the nature of the thing, but in the sight of man, to whom they witness the livelihood and perfection of faith, not as causes, but effects and signs of our justification; they are not only signs, but conditions concomitant or precedent;" and more in Jackson on *Creed*, Bk. iv. sec. 1, ch. xi. folio ed. i. p. 686, also sec. 2, ch. vi. Owen, v. ch. xx. Owen argues that Paul and James have a different purpose, intend a different kind of faith, and speak of justification in a different sense.

[2] ii. 418–451.

not go before the man yet to be justified." A favourite distinction of the Middle Ages is between *Fides informis*, bare intellectual faith, and *Fides formata charitate*, faith informed by love. The latter is sanctifying faith, the former does not amount to justifying faith.

Calvinism, which places repentance and faith differently from Arminianism, makes justification a consequence of regeneration. According to it, man is first regenerated in fulfilment of an eternal decree, and then Christ's righteousness, active and passive, is imputed to him. He is regenerated through union with Christ, and he is united to Christ by faith, which again is the gift of God. Faith and repentance also are fruits of regeneration, not precedent conditions.[1] An Augustinian asks, How can a man utterly dead spiritually repent or believe? Wesley holds repentance in believers, but with a view to advance in holiness. Some Lutheran teachers have followed Calvin in his order.[2] Arminians also have used erroneous language. Thus Limborch speaks of Faith, "on account of which God is graciously willing to bestow on man remission of sins and the reward of eternal life" (p. 443).

In a series of quotations, Dr. Pope shows that the practice of good men, who teach error, is often better than their creed. Augustine says: "Our righteousness is true, on account of the truly good which is before it; but in this life it is so slight and impoverished, that it consists rather in the forgiveness of sins than in the perfection of virtues." "My sole hope rests on the death of my Saviour. His death is my merit, my refuge, my salvation, my life, my resurrection; my merit is the mercy of the Lord. He who doubts of the pardon of sin denies that God is merciful" (p. 421). Anselm gives these directions for dealing with a dying man: "Dost thou believe that thou canst not be saved but by the death of Christ? The sick man answereth, Yes. Then let it be said to him: Go to, then, and whilst thy

[1] Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.* ii. 529. Hodge does not mention repentance in his *Systematic Theology*.

[2] Pope, pp. 440, 441.

soul abideth in thee, put all thy confidence in this death alone, place thy trust in no other thing, commit thyself wholly to this death, cover thyself wholly with this alone, cast thyself wholly on this death, wrap thyself wholly in this death. And if God would judge thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy judgment, and otherwise I will not contend or enter into judgment with thee. And if he shall say unto thee that thou art a sinner, say, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and my sins. If he shall say unto thee that thou hast deserved damnation, say, Lord, I put the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thee and all my sins; and I offer his merits instead of my own, which I ought to have but have not. If he shall say that he is angry with thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy anger."[1] But the most remarkable testimony is that of Bellarmin: "Because of the uncertainty of our own righteousness and the danger of empty boasting, it is safest to place our whole trust in God's sole mercy and benignity. This only we say, it is safer to forget merits, however obtained, and to look to God's mercy alone, both because without revelation no one can certainly know that he has real merits, or will persevere in them to the end, and also because nothing is more easy in this scene of temptation than for arrogance to spring from contemplating good works" (p. 434).[2]

[For full details, see Dorner's *History of Protestant Theology*, 2 vols.]

B.—REGENERATION

The nature and limits of this blessing are by no means so clear as in the case of its sister blessings. The very various definitions of it given in the Church are, in part at least, the consequence of the comparatively slight treatment of it in Scripture. It sometimes stands in theology for the outward rights

[1] P. 425; Shedd, ii. 281.

[2] T. Goodwin, *Object and Acts of Justifying Faith*, vol. viii.

and privileges of the Christian state, to which baptism is the introduction. But if this were all that is meant, it would be hard to explain the solemnity of Christ's teaching or the ground of Nicodemus's wonder in John 3. It cannot denote less than the beginning of a new inward, spiritual life. Taking it in this sense, others have only put a difference of degree between it and sanctification. But if this be so, it is not a distinct blessing at all; it is merely another name for the first stage of sanctifica tion, and two terms are needless. It seems better, therefore, with Dr. Pope (iii. 5), to limit the first term strictly to the communication of the new life, of which sanctification then takes charge. The new birth thus corresponds to natural birth. Regeneration is as decisive and instantaneous a work as justification, and as little capable of degrees.[1] This interpretation also explains why the blessing is seldom named in the Scripture biography of the new life.

The idea of a New Birth is only found in John 3^{3} (compared with $1^{12.13}$), 1 John 3^{9}, etc., Tit. 3^{5}, which is of doubtful interpretation; 1 Pet. $1^{3.23}$. Other figures, however, have been explained as having the same meaning—Creation, 2 Cor. 5^{17}, Eph. 2^{10}, Gal. 6^{15}, Eph. 4^{24}; Resurrection, Rom. $6^{4.5}$, Col. 2^{13}, 3^{1}, Eph. $2^{5.6}$; Renewal, Col. 3^{10}, Rom. 12^{2}, Eph. 4^{23}, Tit. 3^{5}. It is evident that a complete, radical change is meant, the divine Spirit being the agent, the divine Word the means. The Psalmist prays for this blessing, Ps. 51^{10}.

Dr. Pope's view of Adoption differs from the ordinary one in annexing it to Regeneration rather than to Justification. It is

[1] "It is that great change which God works in the soul when he brings it into life; when he raises it from the death of sin to the life of righteousness," Wesley, Serm. xlv. He says, it is wrong to speak of regeneration "as a progressive work, carried on in the soul by slow degrees, from the time of our first turning to God. This is undeniably true of sanctification; but of regeneration, the new birth, it is not true. This is a part of sanctification, not the whole; it is the gate to it, the entrance into it. . . . The same relation which there is between our natural birth and our growth, there is also between our new birth and our sanctification."

the bestowal of the rights and privileges of the regenerate state. It is quite true that, like justification, adoption is a legal idea. Still it is a different legal idea. In one case man is a criminal treated as righteous, in the other case he is a stranger treated as a child. Why should not the Second Birth carry legal privileges with it? It seems natural that privilege should follow state, not the converse. On the other hand, Wesley and Watson make adoption accompany justification, as both denote a change of relation, not an inward, moral change. It will be observed that Adoption is St. Paul's word, the New Birth St. John's. And there can be little doubt that Paul is thinking more of privilege, Rom. 8^{14-17}. St. Paul uses both "son" and "child" of the Christian, St. John only the latter, reserving the former for Christ. The term "son" rather connotes privilege and dignity, the term "child" community of nature and the affection springing out of the relation. The privileges are such as Filial Access to God (Rom. 8^{15}, Matt. 6^{9}), Freedom (John 8^{32}, Gal. 4^{5}), the possession of the Spirit (Luke 11^{13}), Inheritance, Life, Glory, God.[1]

c.—SANCTIFICATION

Sanctification is the growth and perfecting of the new regenerate life. Holiness denotes the finished result of the process. We have to notice the Nature, Progressiveness, and Perfection of the blessing.

(*a*) Nature of Sanctification.—On its negative side it is the

[1] See Watson's *Works*, v. 159, xi. 248. "The idea of 'child,' as distinguished from 'son,' which does not occur in this connection in St. John except Rev. 21^{7}, is that of a community of nature as distinguished from that of a dignity of heirship. . . . St. John dwells characteristically upon the communication of a new life, while St. Paul dwells upon the gift of a new dignity and relation. When St. Paul brings out the newness of the Christian's being, he speaks of him as a new 'creation.' The language of St. James (1^{18}) and of St. Peter (1 Pet. $1^{3.23}$) corresponds with that of St. John," Westcott, *Speaker's Comm. on Gospel of St. John*, p. 9.

removal of evil from human nature, on its positive the creation or infusion of good, and especially of love to God and man, which is the sum of goodness (Rom. 13^{10}).

The *negative* work of purifying is expressed by καθαρίζω, καθαρός, καθαρότης, the words used of the cleansing of lepers, Matt. $8^{2.3}$, 10^{8}, 11^{5}, etc. In the spiritual application, the presence of evil is always supposed, 2 Cor. 7^{1}, Heb. $9^{14.22.23}$, 1 John $1^{7.9}$.

The *positive* side is expressed by the great word, occurring with its cognates so frequently in the New Testament, ἅγιος ("saints," 1 Cor. 1^{2}, Eph. 1^{1}, etc., ἁγιάζω, ἁγιότης occurs twice, ἁγιάσμος ten times, ἁγιωσύνη thrice), corresponding to the equally sacred term of the Old Testament, קָדוֹשׁ, Eph. 5^{26}, 1 Thess. 5^{23}, Heb. 2^{11}, 9^{13}, 10^{10}, 13^{12}, etc. Whatever the derivation of the word, the idea which it expresses is generally admitted to be separation of man and earthly things for the divine possession and service. In the Old Testament places, objects, times were so set apart,—the temple, and in it especially the Holy Place; the Sabbath, the vessels and instruments of worship. In reference to the divine Being himself he is separated from the earthly, imperfect, impure, sinful. Thus his Holiness includes his majesty, righteousness, moral perfection. The moral idea developed but slowly and is most conspicuous in the prophets, especially Isaiah. The moral idea is evident in passages like Isa. 5^{16}, 6^{5}, Hab. 1^{13}. The moral is thus distinguished from the ceremonial holiness of places, priests, instruments. As set apart for God, things and persons belong to him. So Israel is a holy nation, Ex. 19^{6}. Ideally holiness in the moral sense is the qualification for service, Lev. 19^{2}.

In the New Testament the moral sense is supreme. The divine Spirit is Holy as the author of holiness in us. In John 17^{11} the title is given to God in a peculiarly solemn way as denoting the sum of moral perfection. Christians are holy by divine call, 1 Cor. 1^{2}, as Paul was an apostle by divine call, Rom. 1^{1}. The distinction in the use of the different nouns is

not always observed in the New Testament. Ἁγιάσμος, denoting properly the act or process, tends to denote the result, and so to ἁγιωσύνη.[1] Christians are God's possession (κλῆρος), as the Old Testament priests were, and ministers, Tit. 2^{14} "a people for his own possession," 1 Pet. 2^{9}, Rom. 12^{1}, 6^{13}, 2 Cor. 5^{15}, Eph. 5^{27}, Rev. 1^{6}. They are all priests to God, Rev. 1^{6}.[2]

Whether we speak of sanctification or consecration, the act is God's. Dedication seems a better word to describe our act of self-devotion to the divine will. But why depart from the old usage, which speaks of God sanctifying man, and of man consecrating himself?

The "spiritual sacrifices" which Christians are to offer are all the duties of a Christian life, duties of gratitude, obedience, and worship to God, and of justice, truth, mercy to man. It is evident that they include the whole of human life; nothing is outside them or apart from them. It is only another way of stating the same truth, to say that a Christian offers himself to God, not a part of his life, but himself in all his thoughts, intentions, and acts. If a Christian himself is God's, all his life is God's, all is religious and sacred—business, time, study, intellect, wealth, influence. "In that day shall there be upon the bells of the horses, Holiness unto the Lord," Zech. 14^{20}. No idea is more comprehensive or more practical than that of Christian holiness.

Mr. Wesley thinks there is a direct witness of the Holy Spirit to the fact of sanctification as to forgiveness (*Works*, xi. 420). But neither the reasons he gives nor the quotations in support from Scripture are quite convincing. The change wrought in the former blessing is in God's attitude to us, and requires, or at least admits, outward attestation. The change in the latter case is from first to last in us, and may be expected to "shine in its own light." The passages of Scripture quoted are general in their terms. No one will question the possibility of this

[1] Sanday-Headlam, *Comm.* on Rom. 6^{19}.

[2] Art. *Holiness*, Hastings' *Bib. Dict.* vol. ii.; Oehler, *O.T. Theol.* ii. 154; Schultz, ii. 167.

second direct witness. But its necessity is not so clear. Nor can it be said to be common. It has not been made prominent in Methodist teaching.

This would be the place for an exposition of Christian Ethics; for what is ethics but applied holiness, the detailed working out of holiness in practical life? Martensen calls holiness "the last word of theology, the first of ethics." The usual defect in the treatment of this subject is the failure to bring out the distinctively Christian aspects of ethical teaching. Christian ethics is to natural ethics as the Christian religion is to natural religion. Undoubtedly there is a morality that is independent of religion and religious faith, a morality that is never to be thought lightly of. But Christianity brings man into new relations, out of which arise new duties and sentiments. It also gives a new colour, new sanctions and reasons, to old virtues and obligations. The task of Christian ethics is to bring out this side of the subject into the clearest light.[1] The ethical teaching, of which the New Testament is full, is charged with the religious and Christian spirit.

(*b*) Progressiveness. — The work of holiness, both on its negative and positive side, as a dying to sin and a living to righteousness, is a gradual one, 2 Cor. 7^{1}, 2 Pet. 3^{18}. The new life grows to maturity. Scripture implies and experience proves that the evil nature remains after conversion, held down, never allowed to emerge into act, in process of transformation, but still there, and from time to time giving signs of its presence. Of course, as matter of possibility, the work of inward holiness might be perfected in the moment of conversion; we are speaking of what is the rule and what is according to analogy. God brings his works to perfection by degrees. Perhaps we may suppose that he does so because he would have the creature co-operate in the process, instead of doing all the work himself at a single stroke. Why should the highest

[1] Martensen, *Christ. Ethics*, 3 vols. (T. & T. Clark); Dorner, *Syst. of Christ. Ethics;* Davison, Fern. Lect., *The Christian Conscience;* Smyth, *Christ. Ethics.*

work of all be an exception? The higher we rise in the scale of creation, the higher the order of being, the slower we find growth to be. After St. Paul has said (Rom. 6^{11}), "Reckon ye yourselves dead unto sin," he says (ver. 12), "Let not sin reign in your mortal body." What necessity could there be for the latter exhortation, if the former statement meant that sin was utterly destroyed? We must not take a single passage by itself, but consider the whole of St. Paul's teaching together. The state described in vers. 2 and 11, "dead to sin," is consistent with the possibility of sin remaining, and with the necessity constantly to yield the members in service to God. If no danger of sin remained in any shape or form, how is this language to be explained? We pray to be forgiven our trespasses. What is the source and spring of these trespasses, which need forgiveness, if no inward evil is left? The apostle speaks of the destroying of sin as "mortifying" and "crucifying" the flesh, Rom. 8^{13}, Gal. 5^{24}. We do not see why the particular form of death, "crucifying," should be chosen, except to mark its lingering nature. "Mortifying," indeed, simply means killing in any way. Still, sudden death is the exception, not the rule. Usually, and mercifully, dying is a slow process. And when it is the death of an evil nature that is in question, we should expect the process to be proportionately slow.

The practical danger of saying that the work of sanctification is complete at conversion, is that of lowering the idea of perfect holiness, and the danger is a serious one. Tell the Christians of everyday life that they are already perfect, and their conceptions of the meaning of holiness and of the extent of its demands will be greatly narrowed, the motives to further effort will be weakened. Let the standard for the converted be set as high as possible, but let it be a standard still to be attained, not one "already attained." The difference in point of stimulus is immense. In practical life we find that those who look on themselves as "already perfect" at conversion, abandon church fellowship and means of grace, and relapse into selfish isolation and indolence.

Mr. Wesley in his first Sermon, commenting on the words, "Whosoever is born of God sinneth not," says that believers sin not habitually, wilfully, by evil desire or by infirmity, *i.e.* they are free from actual sin. But in Serm. xiv. he earnestly maintains the necessity of repentance and faith in order to entire sanctification. The highest degrees of grace are to be attained by the same means as the lowest. He speaks of "the mischievousness of the opinion that we are *wholly* sanctified when we are justified. It is true we are then delivered from the dominion of outward sin; and at the same time the power of inward sin is so broken that we need no longer follow or be led by it. But it is by no means true that inward sin is totally destroyed; that the root of pride, self-will, anger, love of the world, is then taken out of the heart; or that the carnal mind and the heart bent to backsliding are entirely extirpated." We believe that this statement is true to Scripture and the facts of experience. See also Serm. xiii. "On Sin in Believers."

(*c*) Entire Sanctification possible in the present life.—The possibility and necessity of perfect holiness form part of the universal faith of Christendom. The only point on which Methodist doctrine goes beyond that of other Churches is in earnestly maintaining its possibility in the present life. Some say at death, some say after death in an intermediate state of purification. Purgatory is a device for perfecting the good and fitting them for the vision of God. But why at death or after death rather than before? What prerogative is there in time, or what power will be at work then that is not at work now? If there had been limitation or restriction, it would surely have been stated in Scripture. The mere absence of any such restriction is a presumption in favour of the Methodist doctrine.

We need go no further than the first law of perfect love to God, given through Moses (Deut. 10^{12}), and renewed by Christ (Luke 10^{27}). This, with the second great commandment, includes all that any one meant or ever could mean by any phrase used on this subject—Christian perfection, entire sanctifi-

cation, perfect love, or perfect holiness. The law was surely meant to be kept. We do not keep it, but we might and ought. Mr. Wesley often says that his doctrine means no more than these precepts require.[1] The apostle must have expected his prayer in 1 Thess. 5^{23} to be answered. See also Tit. 2^{14}, 1 John 1^{7}, $3^{8.9}$, Heb. 9^{26}, Eph. $3^{14\text{-}21}$, Matt. 5^{48}. The Sermon on the Mount is a picture of moral and spiritual perfection, and we cannot suppose Christ to have given impossible precepts. To think that our natural evil, our temptations, or the circumstances of life, put obedience to God's law out of the question, is to make these superior to the grace of God and the power of the Spirit. It is to limit what God has not limited—the virtue of the Atonement and the efficacy of faith. After describing, if words can describe, a perfect religious character (Eph. $3^{14\text{-}19}$), the apostle directs us to the power by which it is to be attained: "Unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us."

Any one who will read Mr. Wesley's own account of his teaching on this subject, in his two sermons, "Christian Perfection" and "The Scripture Way of Salvation,"[2] will see how careful he is to guard it against misunderstanding, self-deception, and abuse. He does not teach some impossible, absolute perfection, one that excludes progress or makes falling away impossible, one that is independent of Christ and faith, of watchfulness and prayer, but one that is relative to our nature and condition, that is wholly derived from and dependent on God's grace in Christ, and therefore, instead of encouraging pride, is merely another and the strongest motive to humility.

[1] "What is implied in being a perfect Christian? The loving God with all our heart, and mind, and soul, Deut. 6^{5}," vol. xi. 387. "It is love excluding sin; love filling the heart, taking up the whole capacity of the soul," Serm. xliii.

[2] And still more his treatise on the subject, *Works*, xi. 366, "Plain Account of Christian Perfection," published separately (C. H. Kelly). Mr. Wesley's most important sermons are published in a cheap form, *The Marrow of Methodism*. See also Beet, *The New Life in Christ*.

A perfect character is one that is perfect in humility, as well as in every other grace. The two sermons, on "Sin in Believers" and "The Repentance of Believers," are especially clear and definite in their exposition of the conditions and means of the higher blessing.[1] Repentance in this case means a sense of sinfulness still remaining, a sense of its guilt in itself, sorrow for it, and intense desire to be delivered from it. Faith means "a divine evidence and conviction" that God has promised such deliverance, is able and willing to make good the promise, and that he does it. Thus, sanctification in its completeness, like justification, is by faith, not by works, by faith that it may be of grace. "By this token you may surely know whether you seek it by faith or by works. If by works, you want something to be done *first*, *before* you are sanctified. You think, I must first *be* or *do* thus or thus. If you seek it by faith, you may expect it *as you are;* and if as you are, then expect it *now*. It is of importance to observe that there is an inseparable connection between these three points—expect it *by faith*, expect it *as you are*, and expect it *now*."

The qualifications with which Wesley surrounded his teaching, and which most persons will think a merit, are made by Canon Mozley the subject of sharp criticism.[2] Dr. Mozley makes much of Mr. Wesley's admission of the possibility of involuntary transgressions or mistakes in a state of perfection, as well as of Mr. Wesley's avoidance of the phrase "sinless" perfection. Of course, if Mr. Wesley had denied such possibility, and had favoured the latter phrase, his teaching would have been still more repugnant to the critic. Indeed, such extreme teaching would have been instantly refuted by facts. Thus the whole question is whether a state, qualified in this way, deserves to be called perfect. Dr. Mozley evidently regards it as a sorry sort of perfection at best. "It is plain that a complicated state of the question like this, full of artificial and fine

[1] See also Serm. xliii. vol. vi. 50.

[2] Lectures and other Theological Papers, *Modern Doctrine of Perfectibility*.

distinctions, and of balks to and checks upon both sides, is not one in which a doctrine of perfection can properly be put forward. A doctrine of perfection ought to be a simple transparent doctrine, otherwise it is not worth having." In other words, there is no perfection but angelic and absolute! The admission of such qualifications as involuntary transgression is not fairly described as a "complicated" doctrine, "full of artificial and fine distinctions." Even the highest perfection possible to a creature, say angelic, would still have to be limited in comparison with the divine. Would such a statement be "complicated," "full of artificial and fine distinctions"? Mr. Wesley says, "I believe a person filled with the love of God is still liable to involuntary transgressions. Such transgressions you may call sins if you please: I do not." Would Dr. Mozley have called them sins in the strict sense? And if they are not, how are they a deduction from a state of moral perfection? Yet this qualification is said "to vulgarise and degrade the very standard idea of perfection altogether." Dr. Mozley also thinks that Wesley insists on a perfect Christian being taken by others at his own estimate. "Wesley is always forcing his perfect men" upon the public. "This virtually gives any man whatever the right of declaring himself a perfect man, and throwing the *onus probandi* that he is not perfect upon others. They must prove some definite sin against him. . . . The objector is prevented then from all power of disproving the man's perfection, provided he only abstains from open sins, and behaves with general fervour. The gift is vulgarised and degraded by the low standard of proof which is required for it." We quite agree that a profession of the highest state of grace should be justified by corresponding fruit. But it does not follow that the fruit will be such as will commend itself to a worldly judgment. At what price does such a judgment assess the qualities which Christ puts first in the ethical scale, Matt. 5^{3-12}? Wesley does not say that a Christian can never be mistaken in his profession, but only that, if he uses all the means, mistake is highly improbable, which is true. "Whence

is it that some imagine they are thus sanctified, when in reality they are not? They do not judge by all the preceding marks, but either by part of them, or by others that are ambiguous. But I know of no instance of a person attending to them, and yet deceived in this matter. I believe there can be none in the world." Besides, the one who condemns may be in error. "'But he does not come up to my idea of a perfect Christian.' And perhaps no one ever did, or ever will. For your idea may go beyond, or at least beside, the scriptural account. It may include more than the Bible includes therein, or, however, something which that does not include. Scripture perfection is, pure love filling the heart, and governing all the words and actions. If your idea includes anything more or anything else, it is not scriptural; and then no wonder that a scripturally perfect Christian does not come up to it." Another objection of the critic is to the alleged possibility of so high a gift being lost, "which vulgarises and empties the gift of reality." Wesley may have been mistaken in saying "it is an exceeding common thing for the persons to lose it more than once, before they are established therein." The probability seems to be strongly the other way. It does not seem probable that one who is established in grace can fall away as easily as one who is not. But we do not see at all how the simple possibility can be excluded, or how it "vulgarises" the doctrine. While probation lasts, it must apply to every possession of man. May not a state of pardon be lost, and is it "vulgarised" by the possibility? But a state of perfect grace implies such a degree of insight and stability as seems to put man practically beyond the reach of danger.

The prayers in the Anglican liturgy, "Grant that this day we fall into no sin," and "Cleanse the thoughts of our hearts . . . that we may perfectly love thee," imply the whole "Modern Doctrine of Perfectibility," if they are understood in the natural sense. The Roman Catholic Church holds the possibility of perfect sanctity on earth, but confines it to very rare cases and conditions. Its idea of sainthood and use of the term "saint"

are quite different from St. Paul's (1 Cor. 1^2, 2 Cor. 1^1, Eph. 1^1, etc.). Here all Christians are called saints, they are "sanctified in Christ Jesus." The restriction of the idea and term has undoubtedly done great harm in encouraging the opinion that perfect Christian character is only possible under exceptional conditions, and in making such a wide distinction between "saints" and the "religious" and ordinary Christians. The result must be to lower the average of Christian life. Still the admission that Christian perfection is possible is valuable.[1]

"(1) Not only sin properly so called (that is, a voluntary transgression of a known law), but sin improperly so called (that is, an involuntary transgression of a divine law, known or unknown), needs the atoning blood. (2) I believe there is no such perfection in this life as excludes these involuntary transgressions, which I apprehend to be naturally consequent on the ignorance and mistakes inseparable from mortality. (3) Therefore *sinless perfection* is a phrase I never use, lest I should seem to contradict myself," Wesley, xi. 396. "Is this death to sin, and renewal in love, gradual or instantaneous? A man may be dying for some time; yet he does not, properly speaking, die till the instant the soul is separated from the body: and in that instant he lives the life of eternity. In like manner, he may be dying to sin for some time; yet he is not dead to sin till sin is separated from his soul: and in that instant he lives the full life of love. And as the change undergone, when the body dies, is of a different kind, and infinitely greater than any we had known before, yea, such as till then it is impossible to conceive, so the change wrought, when the soul dies to sin, is of a different kind, and infinitely greater than any before, and than any can conceive till he experiences it. Yet he still grows in grace, in the knowledge of Christ, in

[1] There is a large treatise by Rodriguez, a Spaniard, entitled *The Practice of Christian Perfection*, and in Cardinal Bona's work, *A Guide to Eternity*, there is a chapter on the "State of the Perfect," where we read: "There are but few that arrive at this perfection; but some there have been in all ages."

the love and image of God; and will do so, not only till death, but to all eternity. How are we to wait for this change? Not in careless indifference or indolent inactivity; but in vigorous, universal obedience, in a zealous keeping of all the commandments, in watchfulness and painfulness, in denying ourselves, and taking up our cross daily; as well as in earnest prayer and fasting, and a close attendance on all the ordinances of God. And if any man dream of attaining it any other way (yea, or of keeping it when it is attained, when he has received it even in the largest measure), he deceiveth his own soul. It is true, we receive it by simple faith; but God does not, will not, give that faith, unless we seek it with all diligence, in the way which he hath ordained. This consideration may satisfy those who inquire why so few have received the blessing. Inquire how many are seeking it in this way; and you have a sufficient answer," p. 402.[1]

There is no more cheering sign of the times than the widespread longing among Christians after a higher life of holiness. The testimony is no longer confined to Methodist circles. It is clearly seen that for the final as for the initial stages of salvation, we are wholly dependent on God. We are sanctified as we are justified by God, 1 Pet. 1^2. Every further step is as much in his strength as the first step. We are not indeed wholly passive; the seeking of desire and aspiration, the hunger and thirst, are ours, although even these are of grace. But the conserving, sanctifying energy is God's. "Who by the power of God are guarded through faith unto salvation," 1 Pet. 1^5. "Apart from me ye can do nothing," John 15^5. The sap is constantly flowing from the vine-stock into the branch.

The mode of the higher life is union with God in Christ, the condition faith. Faith not only unites us with Christ, but keeps us in that union. Our new life is lived "in Christ." Christ seems to take the place of our personality, Gal. 2^{20}, John 15^5. Paul's habitual phrase for the Christian life is "in

[1] See also Fletcher's "Last Check to Antinomianism," *Works*, v. 413.

Christ," Rom. 8^{1}, 2 Cor. 5^{17}, etc. Sometimes he puts the other side, "Christ in you," as Christ does in John, Rom. 8^{10}, etc. The Christian's life is one of faith, Gal. 2^{20}. Faith is continuous, a life rather than an act.

According to Rom. 8, Christians "are" in their nature "after the spirit," and therefore "walk after the spirit." They "mind" — affect, pursue, strive after — "the things of the spirit." They "are in the spirit," ver. 9; the Spirit "dwells" in them, ver. 11. They are "led by the Spirit," ver. 14. Their body is "a temple of the Holy Ghost," 1 Cor. 6^{19}, John 14^{17}, Eph. 2^{22}. "Raised together with Christ," they "seek the things that are above," set their mind on them; their life is hid with Christ in God, Col. $3^{1\,ff.}$. Being "begotten of God," they do not sin and cannot sin, 1 John 3^{9}. They "walk in the light, as he is in the light," 1 John 1^{7}, and draw near with boldness to the throne of grace, Heb. 4^{16}. They sit with Christ "in the heavenlies," Eph. 2^{6}, and "rejoice in hope of the glory of God," Rom. 5^{2}.

While it is quite possible that the entrance upon the higher Christian life should mark a crisis, it is certain that every advance is merely a difference of degree. No change from one degree of grace to another can mean as much as a change from sin to grace. The highest stage is only a perfecting of what already exists. It is a change "from glory to glory."

In Dr. Pope's *Compendium* (iii. 61–99) will be found an original and complete history of the doctrine of holiness in the Church, doing full justice to all efforts and movements in the right direction. The account given of Methodist doctrine is succinct, yet full, pp. 88–99. Augustine admitted the possibility of Christian perfection: "And so we cannot deny the possibility of such perfection even in the present life, because all things are possible to God, whether those things which he does by his own will alone, or those the doing of which he has made dependent on the co-operation of his creature." "They cannot, indeed, find any such perfect man; yet it must not be said that God lacks the power so to assist human will that

righteousness may be perfected (*perficiatur*) in every respect in man, not merely the righteousness which is of faith, but also that which will qualify us to live in his presence for ever. For, if he should will that even now in some one corruption should put on incorruption, and a man should live immortal amid the mortal, so that, all old things being at an end, the law in his members shall not contradict the law of his mind, and he shall discern God's presence everywhere as the saints will do afterwards, who will dare to affirm that he could not? But men ask why he does not do this; and they who ask forget that they are men." He thus questions the fact of such perfection having been realised. One reason he gives is curious. A state of imperfection is best for man; anything else would be unsafe (Pope, p. 73). Dr. Mozley greatly prefers Augustine's doctrine to Wesley's.[1] One ground of the preference is "that Augustine regards the perfect state in this life, should it ever be realised, as a miracle, and contrary to all the ordinary laws of God's working; Wesley regards it as only in keeping with, and consistently carrying out, the natural growth of Christian grace." But in what sense is perfect holiness miraculous or supernatural in which all holiness is not so? What other difference than of degree is there between the lowest and the highest state? The increase of spiritual life is only miraculous in the same sense in which its beginning is so.

The Ascetic and Mystical schools, with whatever defects, have rendered great service in asserting the claims of the spirit and keeping the thought of a perfect life before the mind of the Church. Writers like à Kempis and Fénélon may be read with profit, if it is remembered that they only represent one side of Christian life.

After referring to the Antinomian danger lurking in Calvinist teaching, Dr. Pope says: "It is in its noblest representatives a most mighty stimulant to the pursuit of personal perfection. Union with the Lord is the soul of their doctrine, of their ethics, and of their hopes; and, where the aspiration after

[1] *Lectures*, p. 174.

fellowship with Christ has its full unhindered influence, it excites an unbounded horror of sin and thirst for holiness." The idea of imputation applies also here.

It is shown that in the Roman teaching on this subject truth and error are subtly and inextricably interwoven. The possibility of keeping God's law perfectly, and the non-sinful character of "venial" transgressions, are maintained. Nay, the first truth is exaggerated into the possibility of works of supererogation, as if the highest degree of excellence were not required by the divine law interpreted by a spiritual mind. "Counsels of perfection," so called, represent a higher degree of obedience to law, but they are still obedience. The doctrine of Purgatory is the provision made for perfecting the work of holiness in the great majority of the good. According to Roman doctrine, although "concupiscence," the evil principle, remains, it is not regarded as sinful. Nothing is said about its being extinguished or destroyed.

Methodism has always made the destruction of inbred sin part, and the chief part, of perfect holiness. At the same time this is kept in the closest connection with the atonement as the power, and faith as the condition; and who will set limits to either the one or the other? We believe that Methodism has not gone beyond the highest aspiration of the best Christians in all ages, either in its account of the blessing or in the prominence given to it. On this subject the saints of all Churches are in advance of theologians, and better represent the mind of Scripture. Methodism simply puts their faith and experience into formal statement, and gives it due prominence. To do this is part of its mission.[1]

Sec. 3.—The Assurance of Personal Salvation

Scripture expressly asserts, and all Churches hold, the fact of a witness of the Holy Spirit to the spirit of the believer, Rom.

[1] T. Goodwin, *Gospel Holiness in Heart and Life*, *Works*, vii. 131; Swinnock, *Christian Man's Calling*, *Works*, vols. i.–iii.

8^{16}, Gal. 4^{6}. The only point of dispute is whether the witness is direct as well as indirect.

Methodism teaches that there is a *Direct* Witness of the Spirit, in addition to the Indirect. Such teaching is at least justified by the passages referred to, and Methodists think it the only teaching which satisfies the terms used by the apostle. If the first passage is rendered "bears witness to," instead of "bears witness with," the statement is even stronger. That our interpretation is not putting a strain on the passage, is shown by Eph. $1^{13.14}$, 4^{30}, etc., where the Holy Spirit is spoken of as a seal. The very purpose of a seal is to certify or give evidence. If, then, I have the Holy Spirit, as all true Christians have, I have a seal or evidence of my salvation. Joying and glorying in God (Rom. $5^{3.11}$) implies certainty as its ground. Otherwise it is unjustifiable. See also 1 John 3^{24}, 4^{13}. The indirect witness, or that of our own spirit, being our own judgment on a comparison of our experience and life with God's law, is of slow growth, and may not always give undoubting certainty. It may indeed be said that God's will may not be to give us such certainty. Yet the apostles and the Christians to whom they wrote had it. If it was not hurtful for them, how can it be so for us? If they needed it in order to the highest form of joyous obedience, do we not need it for the same reason? Besides, as has often been said, our adoption being an act of God towards us,[1] not an act of God in us, needs to be notified to us by outward testimony. Certain knowledge of God's love to us is the spring of our love to him. Mr. Wesley defines this testimony as "an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit that I am a child of God; that Jesus Christ hath loved me and given himself for me; and that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God." "That this testimony must needs in the very nature of things be antecedent to the testimony of our own spirit, may appear from this single consideration: We must be holy of heart and holy in life before

[1] It is so even on Dr. Pope's view of its place, see *ante*, p. 207.

we can be conscious that we are so, before we can have the testimony of our spirit that we are inwardly and outwardly holy. But we must love God before we can be holy at all; this being the root of all holiness. Now we cannot love God till we know he loves us. And we cannot know his pardoning love to us till his Spirit witnesses it to our spirit. Since, therefore, the testimony of his Spirit must precede the love of God and all holiness, of consequence it must precede our consciousness thereof, or the testimony of our spirit concerning them."[1] Not that Mr. Wesley or Methodists would make such a direct testimony necessary to salvation or an ever-present mark of Christian experience.[2] There are Christians without it. It is a privilege open to all. Of course those who think that a state of suspense and fear is the best for a Christian, and that a profession of certainty involves presumption and danger, denounce such a doctrine as the offspring of enthusiasm. As if it would be dangerous for a child to be certain of a parent's love, and therefore a parent ought to keep his children at a distance, in doubt and terror! "Ye have received, not the spirit of bondage, but the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father." It will be observed that in the above quotation Wesley makes our love to God, which is the effect of our knowledge of God's love to us, the principle of all holiness. It is at once obvious how powerful a motive it is to growth in holiness.

Any danger of fanaticism is guarded against by the Indirect Witness, which is the evidence of our own consciousness and life. It is practically identical with "the testimony of our conscience," 2 Cor. 1^{12}. Mr. Wesley describes it as "a con-

[1] Sermons x. and xi.: "The Witness of the Spirit."

[2] "When I say every believer may be assured of his salvation, I don't say that every believer is assured of it. Every one is to labour for it, but every one has not yet obtained it. Assurance is not of the essence of a Christian. A man may be a true child of God, and certainly saved, though he have not assurance. 'Tis required to the *bene esse*, not to the *esse* of a believer," N. Culverwel, *Discourses*, 1654.

sciousness that we are inwardly conformed, by the Spirit of God, to the image of his Son, and that we walk before him in justice, mercy, and truth, doing the things which are pleasing in his sight." It may be thought that the first witness, giving direct certainty, makes the second unnecessary. But the first is only for him who experiences it, it is no evidence to others. The second is both for the individual and others. One is instantaneous, the other gradual.

The result of the twofold testimony is full Assurance, πληροφορία, "plenitudo, abundantia, copia, plenissima persuasio, certissima fiducia,"[1] of faith, hope, and understanding (Heb. 10^{22}, 6^{11}, Col. 2^{2}), *i.e.* faith, hope, and understanding at their highest point, 1 Thess. 1^{5}, and Boldness of Speech, both before man and God (παρρησία, Heb. 4^{16}).

Sec. 4.—Conditional Perseverance

The point in debate between Arminianism and Calvinism is, whether the perseverance of believers is conditional or unconditional, or whether it is possible for believers finally to fall away. The Calvinist view, like the idea of a limited redemption, is scarcely derived in the first instance from Scripture, but is part of a general theory. The teaching of passages like John $15^{4.6}$, 1 Cor. 9^{27}, Heb. 3^{14}, 4^{11}, 6^{4}, $10^{26.35.39}$, Jude ^{24}, 2 Pet. 1^{10}, 2^{20}, as well as the case of Judas, is distinctly in favour of the Arminian interpretation. David and Peter fell into sin, though they were afterwards restored. Rom. $8^{29.30}$ describes the successive steps or stages in the process of salvation in the case of the actually saved. Foreknew, "as them that love God." "The apostle's statements in this passage are limited to the class of persons already doubly defined—(1) as those who love God, and (2) as those who are called according to his purpose. His whole subject is their predestination to glory: no opposite view concerning the ungodly, no doctrine of an eternal reprobation, is even sug-

[1] Grimm, *New Testament Lexicon.*

gested."[1] The conditions stated in other passages are here assumed.

At the same time it is unwise to dwell unduly on the perils of the Christian life. The means of security, the power and glory of Christ as a Saviour, the greatness and certainty of the divine promises, the unfailing efficacy of prayer, should be as earnestly set forth. No Christian need or ought to be overcome, Matt. 7^{7}, Phil. $2^{12.13}$, Col. 1^{11}, Eph. 3^{20}, 1 Pet. 1^{5}, 5^{8-10}, Jude ^{24}. Cases of real apostasy are perhaps less numerous than is often supposed.

[1] Dr. Gifford in *Speaker's Comm. on Romans.*

CHAPTER IV

THE CHURCH

The whole body of the saved, whose experience has been just described, constitutes the Church. Article xix. of the English Church defines the Church as "a congregation of faithful men, in which the pure Word of God is preached and the sacraments are duly administered according to Christ's ordinance," a definition more suited to the Congregational than the Episcopal system. The Westminster Confession makes the Church consist of "all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children," ch. xxv. 2. Both these definitions apply to "the visible Church."

The term Church [1] (ἐκκλησία) in the New Testament seems to denote—(1) the whole body of Christians in one city, Acts 11^{22}, 13^{1}, Col. 4^{16}, etc.; (2) the whole body of believers on earth, Eph. 5^{23}. Subordinately the name is given to a congregation, 1 Cor. $14^{19.\,35}$, in a house, Rom. 16^{5}, 1 Cor. 16^{19}, Col. 4^{15}, Philem. ^{2}. In the latter cases the congregation may be the whole Church in a city or only a part of it, according to the size of the Church. We only read of one Church in a city, which again may be due to considerations of size. We always read of the "Churches" of a province, Acts 15^{41}, 1 Cor. $16^{1.\,19}$, 2 Cor. 8^{1}, Gal. 1^{22}, Rev. 1^{4}, etc. The only general unity apparent is that formed by the authority of the apostles. The Church proper was founded at Pentecost. It is remarkable

[1] "Church" comes to us through the Teutonic races (Kirche, Kirk) from the Greek term κυριακός, 1 Cor. 11^{20}, Rev. 1^{10}. Another set of terms (ecclesiastic, etc.) comes from the New Testament ἐκκλησία.

that all the elements of Church life are found in Acts 2—common worship, preaching, the sacraments, fellowship, conversion, edification.

Christ himself only uses the word Church twice, Matt. 16^{18}, 18^{17}. But the first instance is of decisive importance. It leaves no room to doubt that Christ's intention was to found a Church which was to continue his work. His term in the Gospels is the kingdom of heaven or kingdom of God. There has been much effort to find opposition between the two terms. The Gospel term has been described as more comprehensive and spiritual than the other. Really it is more indefinite. While it bears several meanings, there can be no doubt that sometimes it means, as Church does, the society or community of saved believers in Christ. But if the two terms did not substantially mean the same, we should have this difficulty, that the Gospel term almost disappears in the Epistles, while in the Epistles another term is common which scarcely occurs at all before. The explanation of the change no doubt is that the Jewish phrase "kingdom of God" is used as long as the Gospel remains on Jewish ground, but that when it goes forth to the larger Gentile world, a Greek name is substituted. The Jewish phrase would scarcely be understood by the Gentiles. A similar change took place in the use of presbyter and bishop. The Church is the developed kingdom, the kingdom the undeveloped Church.[1] No one who reads the Epistle to the Ephesians can think that Church has less spiritual associations. If the term has been lowered in meaning, it has been the work of human error and sin. In that wonderful Epistle we see the ideal Church of Paul's vision, originating in God's eternal counsel, founded by Christ's divine ministry, endowed with the highest spiritual privileges. That Church is the Church of God's eternal, unfailing purpose.[2]

In the course of time three types of Church polity have arisen. (1) Episcopalianism, far the oldest, yet not as old in anything

[1] Denney, *Lectures in Theology*, Lect. viii.

[2] Art. "Church" in Hastings' *Bib. Dict.* vol. i.

like its present form as its advocates often claim. Its distinctive mark is the division of the ministry into three orders,—bishop, priest or presbyter, and deacon,—the powers of ordination and confirmation being reserved for the bishop exclusively.[1] (2) Presbyterianism holds tenaciously by one order of ministers, possessing equal rights and prerogatives. Its institution of ruling elders or presbyters is peculiar. In its series of ecclesiastical courts, the representative principle is very thoroughly carried out.[2] (3) Congregationalism or Independency. In it each congregation forms a complete, self-governed Church, owning no human authority outside itself. The Churches form so many independent republics, without any attempt at confederation or connection in a formal way. The system is the perfection of simplicity, but it sacrifices the great power of organisation and combined action in Church life and work.[3] The second and third systems arose in the sixteenth century, Presbyterianism being due to the genius of Calvin.

The argument for or against these several systems may be based either on the ground of New Testament authority and the example of New Testament Churches, or on the ground of advantage and expediency; regard, of course, being had to the spirit and purpose of New Testament teaching. Formerly all three systems alike were advocated on the high ground of New Testament authority. The early Presbyterians and Independents, just as much as Episcopalians, maintained that they, and they only, conformed to New Testament teaching and precedent. In the present day all Presbyterians and Independents, as well as reasonable Episcopalians, take the other ground. The Roman Church and High Church writers, indeed, claim divine sanction and authority for their polity as much as for their doctrine, but the authority can only be indirectly derived from Scripture. On the ground of Scripture, perhaps there is most to be said for the third system, and least for the

[1] Hooker, vii. 2, 3, 6; Rigg, *Comparative View of Church Organisations*
[2] Macpherson, *Presbyterianism* (Clark).
[3] Dale, *Manual of Congregational Principles.*

first. The elaborate arrangements of Episcopalianism are far removed from the simple details of Church-life disclosed in the New Testament, and are manifestly the growth of a later age. The entire absence of organisation, marking the third system, is much nearer the simplicity of the beginnings of Christian Church-life. But this very fact is proof enough that the simple arrangements, which met the wants of a young community, could never have been intended to be a law to the Church in altogether different conditions. Accordingly, the advocacy of Congregationalism, as well as of Presbyterianism, has moved to other and better ground. As for the claim of divine authority made for Episcopalianism, it is put briefly thus: "It is quite true that episcopal jurisdiction and ordination, ecclesiastical laws and regulations, such as we know, are not found in the New Testament. But Christ established the Church, put over it certain officers, and gave it full authority to make such laws and regulations as changing times and circumstances might require. And our system has come in unbroken descent from Christ and the apostles, just as the British constitution has come by development from Norman and Saxon days." This, of course, is the theory of Apostolical Succession, which we shall consider presently. Meantime, those who take this ground can never get over the fact that Christ and the apostles make little in their teaching of questions, of which, if this theory is true, they ought to have made much. Where in the New Testament is the order and polity of the Church, which in the Roman and High Church system is at least co-ordinate with doctrine, put on the same footing as doctrine? Where do the apostles speak like our modern "priests"? Where is there any indication of an intention on Christ's part to attach the vital importance which this theory attaches to a definite Church-order? No one has ever yet shown any teaching in the New Testament, which bears the same relation to the constitution of the Church on the so-called Catholic theory, as the teaching of the New Testament on spiritual truth bears to the later dogmatic statements of that truth. We ask no more than this. We do not

ask for all the orders of an episcopal hierarchy in the New Testament. We only ask for its outlines, or for the authority to establish it and impose it on others. To whom was the authority given? To Peter or Paul? Show us where it is even hinted that they were to transmit to somebody else power to make laws and regulations which they themselves did not make.[1] This is taken for granted, because otherwise it would follow that they had made no provision for the permanence of their work! Taken for granted! Suppose, on the other hand, that we say it is taken for granted that if they had meant to transmit such tremendous power to other hands,—power equal to their own,—they would have said so. There is surely much to be said for such a supposition. The fact is, the whole Roman and High Church theory of the Church is a series of taken-for-granteds. That Christ and the apostles had any such intention, that they expressed and carried out the intention, that the Roman Church is the legal heir of the apostles, are all taken for granted. It is assumed that Christ must have had certain intentions, that certain forms and institutions were essential to the well-being of Christians, *e.g.* that without a standing, living interpreter of revelation, the truth would be lost in a wilderness of error; and then the whole theory is worked out with admirable completeness. These speculations remind us of the speculations of other theorists, as to how the world might have

[1] "If St. Peter's seat or chair had been as the pole-star, whereto our belief, as the mariner's needle, should be directed, lest we float we know not whither in the ocean of opinions; were the bosom of the visible Church the safest harbour our souls in all storms of temptation could thrust into: this apostle (St. Peter) was either an unskilful pilot or an uncharitable man, that would not before his death instruct them in this course for the safety of their souls, whose bodily lives he might have commanded to have saved his own. Had perpetual succession in his see, or Apostolical tradition never interrupted, been such an Ariadne's thread, as now it is thought, to guide us through the labyrinth of errors, such was St. Peter's love to truth, that he would have so fastened it to all faithful hearts, as none should ever have failed to follow it, in following which he could not err," Dean Jackson, Bk. iii. ch. xxiii. 1. It will be seen that great Anglicans like Jackson and Hooker do not hold Apostolical Succession.

been constituted differently from what it is, speculations which the sober sense of Butler rebukes so justly. There is just as much or as little reason for the assumptions of the free-thinking Deists of Butler's days, as for the Roman and Anglican theory of the Church of our days.

What we see clearly in the New Testament is that Christ and the apostles had a great spiritual end in view, the establishing and perfecting of God's kingdom on earth. For this end they set on foot certain means and agencies—the preaching of the gospel, the gathering of believers into Christian fellowship, their edification in character and life. Only two simple outward rites, setting forth spiritual truth, and channels of spiritual grace, are enjoyed. The particular form which these means took, was determined by local circumstances. There is no intimation that this form is binding for all time.[1] As matter of fact, there is no religious community that does not vary the incidental features of these means to a greater or less extent. Even supposing that the Episcopal or Congregational system conformed most nearly to the usages of the New Testament Churches, this would be no argument in its favour.[2] The excellence of outward forms and regulations must be measured by their suitableness in particular circumstances to promote the spiritual ends for which Christianity exists, and by nothing else. The wisdom of the Church is to take and allow a large latitude in such matters in different countries and ages. Why should it be assumed that Church-order and Church-life must be of the same unvarying type in America, Europe, Africa, Asia, where the conditions are

[1] Dale, *Man. of Congr. Principles*, p. 4; Gregory, *Holy Cath. Church*, p. 31.

[2] "The Lord founded no order of priests, and just as little did he found a system of Church government. Everything lying in this sphere he left to be shaped by the needs and circumstances of the time. Even the institutions established by the apostles for the guidance of particular Churches are merely finger-posts and examples, not a binding law; all that is binding on Christendom is the method of salvation, which again is not a legal one, but a method of grace," Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk* Part 3, ii. p. 411.

so different? Is not every presumption the other way? What new Christian communities need is not so much rigid law and control, as wise guidance. Otherwise the new wine will burst the old skins.[1]

We have no difficulty in deciding that a system of Church-government in which those who form the overwhelming majority of the Church have no voice, is contrary to the spirit and aim of Christianity, as if the self-government which is good everywhere else were bad here, as if the final and perfect religion only trained men to the one duty of submission to human authority, as if the clergy were the Church, and the Christian laity had no rights and no independence. The account of the memorable council in Jerusalem in Acts 15 indicates a different course. It is true that in ver. 6 we read that "the apostles and elders came together for to consider of this matter." And yet from the phrase used in ver. 12, "all the multitude," it is clear that the people were not excluded, unless we can suppose that the number of "the apostles and elders" could be called a "multitude." The words used in ver. 22, however, settle the matter: "Then pleased it the apostles and elders, *with the whole Church*, to send chosen men." The written message which they bring begins, "The apostles and elders and *brethren*, greeting."[2]

[1] Bk. iii. of Hooker's *Eccl. Pol.* is an argument in favour of freedom in matters of polity as distinct from matters of doctrine, chs. ii. 1, iii. 4, vi. 1, x. 1, 7. Granting even that Hooker is only arguing for the power of the Church, supposing it established by Christ, to make and vary laws, the principles of his argument have a much wider application, like much of his language. "He which affirmeth speech to be necessary among all men throughout the world, doth not thereby import that all men must necessarily speak one kind of language. Even so the necessity of polity and regiment in all Churches may be held without holding any one certain form to be necessary in them all." This language is broad enough to cover all our position. "To make new articles of faith and doctrine, no man thinketh it lawful; new laws of government, what commonwealth or Church is there which maketh not, either at one time or another?"

[2] D. D. Bannerman, *Script. Doctr. of Church*, Cunningham Lecture; Dorner, *Syst. Christian Doctr.* iv. 333; Jacob, *Eccl. Polity of N. T.*

Sec. 1.—Notes of the Church

Putting together the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, we have four such notes—Unity, Holiness, Catholicity, Apostolicity. Even if these terms and the meanings attached to them had been taken directly from Scripture, greater importance could not have been attached to them by High Church writers. As matter of fact, while there is a certain amount of scriptural truth at the basis of some of them, the phrases themselves and their application are ecclesiastical rather than scriptural, like the creeds of which they are part. The Roman and Protestant theories of the Church understand these notes in different senses.[1]

According to the first, the Unity is outward and visible, as in the case of a municipal corporation or a nation. The Church consists of a definite number of persons, bound by a common badge or profession, subject to the same outward authority and laws, forming, in short, one community. The term "unity," let it be noticed, is ambiguous. It may mean the internal harmony existing between the several parts of a whole, or a numerical unity excluding plurality. In the first sense we speak of the unity of a state, in the second of the unity of God. The first is the kind of Church unity spoken of in our Lord's great prayer in John 17, and, for anything we can see, may exist apart from the second. The same kind of unity is meant in the Epistles. The unity of the Roman theory is of the second kind, *i.e.* a unity consisting of a certain number of persons, who constitute the sole existing Church. Where is a unity of this kind predicated of the Church in the New Testament? All the unity spoken of there is perfectly consistent with the existence of separate communities. Such separate communities, called Churches in a certain sense, may, when viewed in the aggregate, form the Church in the widest and highest sense. The Anglican is the

[1] Luthardt, *Comp.* p. 275; Jackson, *Works*, Bk. xii. chs. iii.–vi., and all that follows on the visible Church and just causes of separation. Pope, *Comp.* iii. 266.

same as the Roman theory. Only, the reality does not correspond to the theory. Anglicans are obliged to admit that the outward and visible unity, which they make one of the predicates of the Church, does not exist. According to them, the Anglican, Roman, and Greek Churches (or branches of the Church) together form the one Church, so that outward division, after all, is not fatal to Church-life. They are as much separated outwardly as other religious communities. Where, then, is the visible unity, which they declare essential to the very existence of the Church?[1]

Holiness, again, is understood as inherent in some sense in the visible community apart from the individuals comprising it. There is a corporate as well as an individual sanctity. But it is difficult to conceive a holiness that is independent of individual character. If, as Bishop Pearson contends, a holy calling and obligation confers sanctity, wicked persons are holy in some sense, but a very unreal one.

Catholicity is explained as the universal extension of a particular visible society, and Apostolicity as consisting in personal, lineal succession from the apostles.

Let us now turn to the Protestant interpretation. Church Unity consists of the oneness of faith and feeling and aim for which the Saviour prayed, and to which the apostles so often exhort. Such unity is perfectly compatible, as experience shows, with existence in separate communities. In many cases, are not common moral aims, such as temperance and thrift, better advanced by separate action? Is not competition, within reasonable limits, a necessary check and healthy stimulus? It is a fact, which cannot be gainsaid, that the ages of the Church which were distinguished by outward unity, were ages when

[1] "I believe in the holy catholic Church." Does not "believe" show that the reference is to the invisible Church, *i.e.* the whole body of real Christians in the world? "I believe in the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, the life everlasting,"—all unseen. Barrow, *Unity of the Church* (1818 ed.), p. 495; Gregory, *Holy Cath. Church*, p. 140, etc.

the worst abuses and corruptions grew apace. The fact of such corruptions were lamented by many who did not adhere to the Reformation. And unless outward unity is plainly commanded, outward division is no sin. The best way to secure real unity would be the universal acknowledgment that the holding of vital truth, along with holiness of life, is the note of the Christian Church, and that all other matters should be relegated to a secondary place. On this basis all Christians in the world might meet and work together.

The Holiness of the Church is the aggregate of the holiness of its members. All other holiness is merely nominal. When members of the Church are addressed as "saints," it is implied that their lives bear out the profession. The Parables of the Tares and the Net are often quoted in support of the laxer view, which makes Church-membership partially independent of personal character; but with little reason. The Tares are to be tolerated either when they cannot be distinguished or cannot be removed without injury to the wheat. And the Protestant theory of the Church has never said anything to the contrary. It simply says that when the tares are discernible and can be removed, nay, when they cannot be tolerated without grave scandal, they should be removed. The parable applies to those cases in which human tests and judgment are at fault, not to others. The opposite doctrine would logically require the toleration of any and all evil, and abolish the distinction between the Church and the world.

The note of Catholicity is fulfilled by the universal extension of the Church in its widest sense, *i.e.* in any of its several branches. Apostolicity may be conceived of as likeness to the apostles in doctrine, instead of lineal succession. But of this, more presently.

The view taken of the Unity of the Church determines the meaning of Schism and Heresy.[1] Indeed, the modern meaning of these terms, separation from the Church and false doctrine, grew out of the view of the Unity first mentioned. The terms

[1] Pope, *Comp.* iii. 270; Gregory, *Handbook of Scriptural Church Principles*, Pt. i. p. 110.

are used in a different sense in Scripture, and the modern one has been grafted on to that sense. Schism occurs six times in an ethical application (John 7^{43}, 9^{16}, 10^{19}, 1 Cor. 1^{10}, 11^{18}, 12^{25}; see Matt. 9^{16}), where it means dissension, division, party, or school within a body, which, of course, may issue in separation. Heresy is used in 1 Cor. 11^{19} almost synonymously with schism. Generally, it means "sect" (used of Pharisees, Sadducees, Nazarenes, or the early Church, Acts 5^{17}, 15^{5}, $24^{5.14}$, 26^{5}, 28^{22}). In this sense it has not the opprobrious tinge now belonging to it. The derivation of the word suggests that what is condemned is a wilful, obstinate temper, "a self-chosen view," something very different from wrong teaching or difference of view, except in so far as the latter springs from a wrong spirit. See also Gal. 5^{20}, Tit. 3^{10}, 2 Pet. 2^{1}. Accordingly, we regard the present divisions of the Church as divisions within, rather than separations from the Church, and hold that the blame, so far as matter of blame exists, rests with those whose narrowness, exclusiveness, or erroneous teaching makes such divisions necessary. "The term 'divisions' signifies not *schisms*, as in the marginal rendering, but *dissensions;* not separations from the Church, but dissensions within the Church."[1] Of course, if the apostle condemns the one, he would still more condemn the other; then the above remarks apply. "The Greek *schismata* may be literally rendered by our word *splits* in the modern sense, as 'splits in the cabinet' marked dissensions threatening disruptions. It should be remembered that this Epistle says nothing of separation into sects, but speaks of partition into schools, as Pauline, Apolloite, Petrine, Christine; it describes an arrogant party spirit, tending, indeed, to a breach of outward unity, but not yet sundering the bond."[2] "Not *heresies* in the sense of 'false doctrines,' nor *sects* as in the margin of the A.V. The word in Greek means 'self-chosen view,' differing from received opinions," *ibid.*

[1] Canon Evans in *Speaker's Comm.* on 1 Cor. 1^{10}.
[2] Canon Evans in *Speaker's Comm.* on 1 Cor. 11^{18}.

The Protestant confessions recognise a distinction between the Visible and Invisible Church, which Roman teaching repudiates. The Invisible Church consists of all the really saved on earth, known only to God, and is not necessarily coincident with the Visible Church. All attempts, and many have been made, to make the two coincident, must fail; but this is no reason why the visible should not be the closest approximation possible to the invisible. In other words, the wisest and most faithful application of the best tests will never secure an absolutely pure Church, but that is no argument against the use of tests. Rather it is an argument in their favour. If strictness often fails, laxity must be still worse. Unless purity is the aim, the reason of the Church's existence falls to the ground. In the heavenly state the visible and invisible Church are one, every one is what he seems.

Sec. 2.—Theory of Apostolical Succession

Two points are vital in this theory, (1) That only ordination by bishops makes a real minister of Christ, giving authority to absolve from sin and administer sacraments; and (2) That the only bishops are those who are appointed in direct, unbroken succession through the bishops of Rome, from the days of the apostles. All others are pretenders. Apostolical succession is the real mark of the true Church, far more vital than the notes before mentioned. This is the doctrine held in common by the Roman Church and the High Anglican school, for the two stand on the same ground up to the Reformation. It is through the Bishops or Popes of Rome that Anglicans derive their authority. The theory is worked out most completely in the Roman Church. The Anglican Church is burdened, not merely with the difficulties of the Roman case, but with the break at the Reformation. The break, indeed, is denied by the Anglican, though asserted by the Roman. Still, the former has to show that the authority was validly transmitted through the changes of the Reformation time.

(1) "Only ordination by bishops makes a true minister of Christ, with power to absolve from guilt and administer sacraments." There is not a trace in the New Testament of bishops as a separate order, with exclusive right to ordain. This is now so generally acknowledged, that there is little need to illustrate it. In the New Testament, bishop and presbyter or priest are one, the first being a title taken from Greek life, the second from the Jewish synagogue, cf. Acts $20^{17.28}$. Unless they are one, the presbyters are passed by in the salutation in Phil. 1^{1}. Cf. also Tit. $1^{5.7}$, 1 Tim. $3^{1.8}$. In the last passage, also, St. Paul mentions bishops and deacons only. The New Testament bishops or elders rule the Church (Acts 21^{28}, 1 Tim. 3^{5}, 1 Pet. 5^{2}), but do not rule ministers. In the Jerusalem council we read of "apostles and elders" ($15^{6.22}$), not bishops and elders. Timothy was ordained by presbyters, "with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery," 1 Tim. 4^{14}. St. Peter exhorts "the elders" only, calling himself a "fellow-elder," 1 Pet. 5^{1}. It is somewhat singular that the apostles knew nothing of the distinction of orders that is a vital element of "apostolical" succession.[1]

The distinction between bishops and presbyters grew up afterwards, how soon or how long after is of no concern to our argument. It is not apostolic or scriptural. Whatever may be supposed or probable as to the first germs of episcopacy, in the modern sense, being in accordance with the apostolic mind or spirit, that is a long way short of proof; and the amount of probability will vary to different minds.

(2) "The only bishops are those regularly appointed in succession from the apostles." According to the complete theory, it was the divine purpose that Christ should have a successor, and that successor is, and always has been, the Bishop of Rome; and also that the apostles should have successors, and the bishops of the two Churches named are the successors. We

[1] *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* knows only of bishops and deacons. It says, "*Elect for yourselves* bishops and deacons," ch. 15, translation by Rev. H. de Romestin.

want proofs of the divine purpose, and of its actual fulfilment. Surely it is reasonable to expect that the scriptural authority for so tremendous a position shall be as clear and full as that for the doctrines of the Trinity and Atonement. Where is it? In Matt. 16^{18}? Granting that the reference is to Peter personally, we see an ample fulfilment when Peter in Christ's name founds the Church at Pentecost, and admits Jews and Gentiles into it, Acts 2^{41}, $10^{44\text{-}48}$, 15^{7}. Bengel well asks, What has this to do with Rome? To make these words mean that Peter took Christ's place, that he was invested with supreme authority over the other apostles and the Church, that he was intended to transmit it to others, and did transmit it, is not interpretation, but arbitrary assertion. Where did he ever claim such authority? When was it acknowledged by others? The binding and loosing power given to Peter in ver. 19 is at least given equally to all the apostles in ch. 18^{18}. The words in John 20^{23}, about the power of remitting and retaining sins, however they are to be interpreted, were spoken to "the disciples," ver. 19, which phrase, according to the parallel account in Luke 24^{33}, includes "the eleven and them that were with them," *i.e.* the disciples generally, the Church, not the apostles merely. Moreover, if the bishops were the designed successors of the apostles, why was the name changed? Why was the ancient and scriptural term "apostles" discarded for "bishops"?[1]

It is here that the weakness of the whole theory is found. If it could be shown that it was ever the divine purpose that the Church should be constituted in this way, and in no other, we might be willing to assume a great deal as to the fulfilment, and to explain the deficiency of evidence by the scantiness of

[1] Hooker, Bk. vii. 4, argues that bishops are the successors of the apostles. The proof given is slender enough. He jumps from Scripture to Cyprian and the opinions of the later Fathers. However, Bks. vi. vii. and viii. of Hooker are suspected of interpolation, like some of the witnesses for episcopacy. On the whole subject see Barrow's *Treatise on the Pope's Supremacy*.

early records, as we do on other questions. But it is not so. There is no doctrine of the Church in Scripture, standing in the same relation to the Roman and Anglican dogma, as the doctrine of the Trinity bears to the dogma of the Trinity, or as the teaching about the Lord's Day and Baptism in Scripture bears to the belief and practice of the Church on these questions.

This being so, we have a right further to point out the difficulties in the historical evidence. The presence of Peter at Rome as bishop, and the transmission of his office to successors, are quite unproved, and indeed uncertain at the best.[1] It is needless to refer to later links in the chain, to the great schisms, when there were several Popes at once, to the heresy of Popes Liberius and Honorius, which was condemned by the Council of Constantinople in 680, and to the infamies of Popes like John IX., XIII., XXII., XXXIII., and Alexander VI. The heresy of the two Popes will be denied. Archbishop Trench, a High Churchman, had no doubt about it. These cases, he says, are "sufficient to defeat the claim to infallibility."[2] He says also, "For fifty years and more (904–962), the election to the throne of St. Peter lay in the hands of three infamous women, a mother and her two daughters. The moral outrages which this time beheld are not to be told, nor shall I attempt to tell them."[3] And yet Dr. Trench's own orders came through this channel. Granting that the foulness of the channel need not affect the official authority transmitted through it, it is a hard necessity for good men to be forced by a theory into association

[1] "The attempt to decipher the early history of episcopacy in Rome seems almost hopeless, where the evidence is at once scanty and conflicting," Lightfoot, *Christian Ministry*, p. 215. Clement of Rome, writing "probably in the last decade of the first century, though he has occasion to speak of the ministry as an institution of the apostles, mentions only two orders, and is silent about the episcopal office." "He still uses the word 'bishop' as a synonym for presbyter." Barrow, *Pope's Supremacy* (ed. 1818), p. 137.

[2] *Mediæval Church History*, p. 154.

[3] P. 114. On Liberius, see Jackson, Bk. xii. ch. xvii. 6; Honorius, ii. 14, 5. Also Salmon, *Infallibility of Church*, pp. 420, 433.

with such characters. The validity of the Anglican ordinations depends on the question whether Archbishop Parker's ordination was valid. The debate lies between Roman and Anglican, and we need not interfere in it. We will only remark, that on the theory of Apostolical Succession the Roman Church is in the best position. If the theory is true, if there is no true Church without this mark, the Roman Church is best off. The Anglican may be right, the Roman must be right.[1]

With the episcopal system, when it is advocated on the ground of human authority, of expediency and utility, we have no quarrel. We recognise its advantages as well as its defects. The growth of such an organisation was perhaps inevitable and of immense advantage in the early centuries. Dr. Lightfoot,[2] while giving up the ground of Scripture authority for the distinction of order between bishops and presbyters, is naturally anxious to push the rise of the diocesan episcopate as far back as possible. "History seems to show decisively that before the middle of the second century each Church or organised Christian community had its three orders of ministers—its bishops, its presbyters, and its deacons. On this point there cannot reasonably be two opinions." This does not take us back to apostolic days, and the history of the interval is very obscure. Starting with the identity of bishop and presbyter in the New Testament, we have the greatest difficulty in tracing the course of development. We are taught the need of caution by what is said of James and Simeon in Jerusalem. "As early as the middle of the second century all parties concur in representing him (James) as a bishop in the strict sense of the term" (p. 206). That this is a reading of later ideas into earlier days is conclusively proved by the fact that in the Book of the Acts James does not appear "as a bishop in the strict sense of the term." There he has "a certain official

[1] See also *An Essay on Apostolical Succession*, by Thomas Powell, Wesleyan minister, 2nd ed., 1840, an able and racy essay; Moberly, *The Great Forty Days*, pp. 151–191, on the Papal Supremacy.

[2] "The Christian Ministry," *Epistle to Philippians*.

prominence," but nothing more. The narrative suggests great personal influence, not office. The "parties" who "concur" are Hegesippus, quoted in Eusebius, and the Clementine writings, which are described by Lightfoot as a "theological romance."[1] The "episcopal office" certainly belonged to James "in a rudimentary form only" (p. 196). In a similar way "it is the conception of a later age which represents Timothy as Bishop of Ephesus and Titus as Bishop of Crete" (p. 197).

Asia Minor is the first country mentioned as possessing many bishops in the second century. Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian connect the fact with St. John's labours at Ephesus. Polycrates, Bishop of Ephesus in the last decade of the century, speaks of "crowds" of bishops whom he summoned to a conference on the Paschal question. We read of similar crowds in Cyprian's days (middle of third century). These numbers show us that the bishops were not the diocesan bishops of later times. Every town and village had its bishop.

If the development was rapid in Asia Minor and North Africa, it was slow and unequal elsewhere. Clement in the last decade of the first century knows only presbyters and deacons at Corinth, to which he is writing. Nor does he call himself Bishop of Rome, and in mentioning the ministry as instituted by apostles he is silent about the episcopal office. Polycarp in his epistle to Philippi does not refer to any bishop there. At Alexandria the situation is even stranger. Clement at the close of the second century speaks sometimes of two, sometimes of three, orders of the ministry. It would also seem that the twelve presbyters elected and ordained a bishop from among themselves (p. 229). Hilary the commentator, Jerome, Chrysostom, Theodoret, acknowledge the original identity of the two offices (p. 97). Yet Ignatius, writing "during the earliest years of the second century," writes very definitely about the three orders of the ministry, and the necessity of obedience to "the bishop"; and even remembering the unequal

[1] The same work represents Peter as appointing bishops in every city in Palestine which he visits.

pace of development in different churches, the advance on Clement, who wrote not long before, is remarkable.[1] It would seem that church organisation grew more rapidly in the East. All the circumstances point to gradual development. Each Christian Church, following the precedent of the synagogue (Jas. 2^2), had several presbyters. One of these would preside and lead, as representing the whole, *primus inter pares*. Then Jewish opposition and the Gnostic controversies would necessitate compact organisation and unity. It was probably such a situation as this which led to the increase of authority in the hands of the chief officer and to the growth of the third order. Lightfoot says: "If bishop was at first used as a synonym for presbyter, and afterwards came to designate the higher officer under whom the presbyters served, the episcopate, properly so called, would seem to have developed from the subordinate office. In other words, the episcopate was formed not out of the apostolic order by localisation, but out of the presbyterial by elevation; and the title, which originally was common to all, came at length to be appropriated to the chief among them" (p. 194). He speaks of Clement as "rather the chief of the presbyters than the chief over the presbyters."[2]

[1] "Ignatius certainly uses the most emphatic language in urging obedience to the bishop; but the greater his emphasis the more significant is the absence of any appeal to any institution of an *order* of bishops by the apostles. The absence of an argument which would have rendered all the rest superfluous seems nothing less than an admission that he knew of no such institution," Gwatkin, "Church Government," *Bib. Dict.* vol. i.

[2] Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*, and Moberly, *The Ministerial Priesthood*, criticise Bishop Lightfoot's position, but do not refute it. They follow the theoretical, Lightfoot the historical, method. "Catholic Church" is found first in Ignatius and the Martyrdom of Polycarp. See art. "Church Government," Hastings' *Bib. Dict.* vol. i.; Hort, *The Christian Ecclesia;* also Brown, *Apostolical Succession in the light of History and Fact.*

Sec. 3.—Church Offices

In the references to these offices in the Epistles (Rom. $12^{6,7}$, 1 Cor. 12^{28}, Eph. 4^{11}), there is no attempt at exact and complete statement. Presbyters and deacons are not mentioned by name. "Teachers," "pastors and teachers," most probably stand for the first, indicating their functions. "Helps" and "ministration" may denote the second. Apostles, prophets, and evangelists were evidently not meant for permanence; else why did they not continue? If the office of apostles was meant for permanence, how is it that we do not read of the apostles having taken steps to appoint their successors? The only two offices which continued, and so proved that they were meant to do so, were those of the presbyter and deacon.

(*a*) *Presbyters.*—It is not a little remarkable that there is no account of the institution of the office. Its first mention is incidental, Acts 11^{30}. Both the office and term were evidently taken from the arrangements of the Jewish synagogue. The Jewish presbyter or elder had two functions, those of teaching and ruling. Each elder would, of course, exercise the one for which he was best fitted. Some would possess both orders of gifts. This explains 1 Tim. 5^{17}: "Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honour, especially they who labour in the word and doctrine." Dr. Binnie in his exposition of the Presbyterian office of ruling elders,[1] says the passage "is most naturally understood as implying that, while all the elders ruled, some of them did not teach." This may be so, but it by no means follows that the ruling eldership was erected into a distinct office as in Presbyterianism. The terms are quite explained by supposing that each elder did the work for which his peculiar gifts best fitted him. Dr. Binnie is right enough in pointing out that in New Testament days each local church had a plurality of elders, following the example of the synagogue. "The apostolic plan of assigning a plurality of rulers to every church, and the prelatic plan of assigning a plurality of

[1] *The Church*, p. 129, Clark's Handbooks.

churches to every ruler, are as contrary as can be imagined." Such deviations, found in all communities, are covered by the principle laid down by Dr. Binnie: "The Church, being a divinely instituted society, possesses the rights common to all societies, and, among the rest, the right of electing appropriate officers, with authority to work in its behalf," p. 126.

The two presbyterial functions are referred to in Scripture—"teachers," 1 Cor. 12^{28}; "pastors and teachers," Eph. 4^{11}. So, again, Heb. $13^{7.\ 17}$, Rom. 12^{8}, "they that have the rule, he that ruleth." In the Pastoral Epistles, where Church organisation is more prominent, the office is presented in the same light, 1 Tim. 3^{1-7}, Tit. 1^{5-9}. All elders are equal. Distinctions of office and function among them are quite consistent with this equality. High Church writers constantly write of Timothy and Titus as Bishops of Ephesus and Crete. But there is not a word or hint in Scripture to show that they possessed or exercised any authority but that of ordinary elders. Timothy had received "the gift" that was in him "by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery," not by episcopal ordination in the modern sense. His presbyterial ordination gave him authority to take oversight of the Church at Ephesus. To Titus the apostle says: "For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldst set in order the things that were wanting, and appoint elders in every city, as I gave thee charge," 1^{5}. Titus is to complete the work begun by the apostle. How can a modern bishop be made out of this? After Titus has discharged his temporary mission in Crete, he is to meet the apostle at Nicopolis in Epirus, 3^{12}. Strange to direct a "bishop" to leave his diocese so soon! Titus went into Dalmatia, which is north of Nicopolis, 2 Tim. 4^{10}. To say that they were bishops without the name, is to say that they were not bishops.

Of all the transformations that history has witnessed, none is more complete or startling than that of the New Testament presbyter, with the simple function of religious instruction, into the priest in the sacerdotal sense. The process of transforma-

tion is carefully traced by Bishop Lightfoot in his essay on "The Christian Ministry," appended to the *Comm. on Philippians*, pp. 242–266. The term for the sacrificing priest in the Old Testament is the Hebrew *cohen* and Greek ἱερεύς, which is quite distinct from presbyter, and is never connected with it in the New Testament. Yet by degrees the sense of the former has been bodily transferred to the latter, for our word "priest" is simply "presbyter" writ small.[1] If sacrifice had been among the functions of the presbyter, how is it that it is ignored in St. Paul's account of the office in the Pastoral Epistles? According to the modern theory, this is not a secondary, but the essential work of the office, and yet it is passed by in silence. How is it that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where the Old Testament priesthood and sacrifices and their New Testament analogues are expounded, no mention is made of a Christian taking the place of the Jewish priesthood? Christ is the only priest spoken of.[2] It is incorrect to say that this is an argument from silence; for the officers of the Christian Church are frequently mentioned, and sacrificing priests are not among them. It is remarkable that there is no sacerdotalism in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, though the topics treated of would naturally require reference to it, if it had existed. The same is true of Justin Martyr, and Irenæus, and

[1] "Whether we call it a Priesthood, a Presbytership, or a Ministry, it skilleth not: although in truth the word *Presbyter* doth seem more fit, and in propriety of speech more agreeable than *Priest* with the drift of the whole gospel of Jesus Christ. . . . The Holy Ghost, throughout the body of the New Testament making so much mention of them, doth not anywhere call them Priests," Hooker, v. 78, 4.

[2] "This apostolic writer teaches that all sacrifices had been consummated in the one Sacrifice, all priesthoods absorbed in the one Priest. The offering had been made once for all; and as there were no more victims, there could be no more priests. . . . The Epistle deals mainly with the office of Christ as the antitype of the *High Priest* offering the *annual* sacrifice of atonement; and it has been urged that there is still room for a sacrificial priesthood under the High Priest. The whole argument, however, is equally applicable to the inferior priesthood; and in one passage at least is directly so applied ($10^{11.\,12}$)," Lightfoot, p. 263.

Clement of Alexandria. "Irenæus, if he held the sacerdotal view, had every motive for urging it, since the importance and authority of the episcopate occupy a large space in his teaching. Nevertheless he not only withholds this title as a special designation of the Christian ministry, but advances an entirely different view of the priestly office. He recognises only the priesthood of moral holiness, of apostolic self-denial," p. 251. Tertullian and Origen are the first to use sacerdotal terms of the Christian ministry, and this of course implies that they were not alone in such use. Still the idea cannot have gone very far in their days, for the former strongly affirms the universal priesthood of believers, and the latter gives the terms the same general meaning and application. Cyprian (†258) is the first to transfer the sacerdotalism of the Old Testament broadly and boldly to the Christian Church, and from his days the idea grew apace. The most probable view is that it was imported from heathenism, not from Judaism, the Jewish priesthood being afterwards used to support it. If Judaism had been the source of Christian sacerdotalism, it would have appeared in the earliest days, and in the East; for it was then and there that the Jewish element in the Church was strongest. As matter of fact, it was in the West, where the influx of heathens into the Church was greatest, that the sacerdotal view spread most widely. It is evident that the heathen converts were unable to shake off the sacrificial notions in which they had previously moved, and brought them into the Church. Two circumstances accelerated the growth of the theory: first, the early attachment of the idea of sacrifice in a special sense to the Eucharist; and, secondly, the parallel between the three orders of the Christian ministry and the Jewish high priest, priests, and Levites. "So entirely had the primitive conception of the Christian Church been supplanted by the sacerdotal view of the ministry before the northern races were converted to the gospel, and the dialects derived from the Latin took the place of the ancient tongue, that the languages of modern Europe very generally supply only one word to represent alike the priests of

the Jewish or heathen ceremonial and the presbyter of the Christian ministry," p. 244. There is nothing objectionable in the representative view of the Christian ministry, the minister representing man to God and God to man. But this is not priestism or sacerdotalism in the sense of the Roman or Anglican theory. The latter has been described as "vicarial," in distinction from representative.[1]

(*b*) *Deacons.*—Though the term "deacon" does not occur in the account of the appointment of the Seven (Acts 6^{1-6}), the ancient and general view is that the Seven were the first Deacons. The duties in both cases are the same. The qualifications for the office are described at length, 1 Tim. 3^{8-13}. This office soon underwent great modifications in the early Church. At the present time it would be hard to find any office in the Church exactly corresponding to the New Testament diaconate. Perhaps the nearest is the deacon of the Congregational polity. The Anglican Deacon is simply a presbyter on probation. The episcopal system has no permanent order of deacons. Singularly enough, "minister," which is equivalent to "deacon," has come into use instead of presbyter.

It is doubtful whether there was any order of Deaconesses in the New Testament Church. Rom. 16^{1} may be meant in a general sense. The other passages sometimes quoted in this connection are certainly to be understood differently (1 Tim. 3^{11}, 5^{9}, Tit. 2^{3}). Woman's work in the Church is not organised as it might be and ought to be, at least within Protestant Christendom, and thus much power is lost.

Free scope is left in Scripture for the adoption of new and the adaptation of old agencies of Christian work. Comparing the later with the earlier Epistles, we see that the new life of the Church at once created for itself new forms of activity, some conservative, some aggressive. Their spontaneousness, their variety, the changes they underwent, are the charter of the

[1] Falconer, *From Apostle to Priest* (Clark); C. Anderson Scott, *Evangelical Doctrine—Bible Truth;* Mellor, *Priesthood in the light of the N.T.*

Church's liberties. The test of institutions and organisations is their power to conserve the purity of Christian life and extend the dominion of Christian truth. In early Church history, again, we see the same freedom exercised in the use of Church forms and agencies. The early Church was the most flexible of institutions in its outward forms. Not only bishops, presbyters, and deacons, but grave-diggers, janitors, readers, sub-deacons, are spoken of as separate orders. Cyprian ordained readers and sub-deacons. We claim simply the same liberty in things constitutional and ceremonial that was exercised by the early Church. We fail to discover that the early Christians any more set themselves up as legislators to the Church for all time than we do.

No one can read such passages as Rom. 12^{4-8}, 1 Cor. 12^{4-11}, 14, without seeing that the fixed offices of the early Church were far from representing the whole of its activity. Each Christian had a gift of some kind, which he was expected to use in God's service. The Epistles rebuke excess and abuse in the exercise of these spiritual gifts, but no more. They would no doubt have just as earnestly condemned their suppression. Apollos is a busy, active figure in the Church, but there is no intimation that he held any office. We have supposed it probable that Titus was a presbyter, but there is no evidence on the point. In later days Justin Martyr's is a similar case. He did the work of a missionary evangelist both by word and pen; yet there is no record of his having held office in the Church.

A chief feature of Methodist Church-economy is the fuller provision it makes for Church-fellowship. "The communion of saints" is an article of the Apostles' Creed [1] which has found little practical expression. It has no doubt entered more or less into Christian life, and is incidentally present in common worship. Still its importance is such as to demand more formal recognition. It has quite as good scriptural warrant as the

[1] Introduced into the creed, with the term "catholic," in the sixth century. See Lumby's *History of the Creeds*.

"notes" of the Church mentioned above. The first Christians "continued steadfastly in the apostles' fellowship." The apostle thanks God for the fellowship of the Philippians in the gospel. Christians are often exhorted to edify one another, teach and admonish one another, speak to one another in psalms and hymns, confess their faults one to another, and pray one for another. Such precepts are not met by public instruction merely. They require something more formal and intimate; besides, they imply mutual action. It is quite true that they are, or may be, kept in the daily intercourse of Christians. Still there must be great advantage in making provision for the recognised, systematic exercise of fellowship. Mutual edification seems the needful supplement of public. The necessity and the benefit of religious fellowship are perhaps still more strikingly set forth in the apostle's favourite comparison of the Christian community to a body, Rom. $12^{4.5}$, 1 Cor. 12^{12}, Eph. $4^{15.16}$. The love-feast is a revival of a primitive custom, which soon fell into disuse in early days.[1]

Sec. 4.—Worship—The Lord's Day

The Lord's Day (Rev. 1^{10}) is the Jewish Sabbath in Christian form, filled with Christian contents. To the idea of rest is added that of worship. The sacredness is not lessened but increased, increased in proportion as the facts commemorated and the truths declared are higher and more spiritual than those of the earlier dispensation.

A point in dispute is whether the Jewish Sabbath was instituted at Creation or at Sinai. There is certainly nothing in Gen. 2^{1-3} to intimate that the reference is anticipatory. If so many ages intervened between the fact commemorated and the commemorative institution, if the Sabbath was Judaic, not patriarchal, we might reasonably expect some indication of this in Genesis. It is true there is no mention of the observance of the Sabbath afterwards in Genesis. But we must remember

[1] Gregory, Fern. Lect. on *Holy Catholic Church*, p. 75.

the great brevity of the narrative, as well as the unlikelihood of regularly occurring observances being spoken of. There is no mention of the Sabbath in Judges, Joshua, 1st and 2nd Samuel, 1st Kings, after the Sinaitic legislation. Is the gathering of the double supply of manna in Ex. 16 also anticipatory? The need for a fresh announcement of the ancient law may have arisen during the Egyptian captivity, when religious observances must have fallen into neglect. The fact of creation commemorated and the need of rest are not specially Judaic, but of universal application. The Sabbath idea is found in other Semitic races, such as the ancient Babylonians.

But even if this point were conceded, the insertion of a positive law like that of the Sabbath in the Decalogue has great significance. Though it does not convert a positive into a moral precept, it raises the positive command, so treated, far above the crowd of specially Judaic laws.

The presumption, then, is all against the Sabbath being abolished by Christianity. Christ does not destroy, he fulfils, *i.e.* he gives something better. He meets universal needs more fully and effectually. He never by word or act violated the Mosaic law of the Sabbath, but only disregarded the Rabbinical misinterpretations of that law, condemning Pharisaic applications of the Sabbath law, but not the law itself, Luke 6^{1-11}. The real Sabbatarianism is the spirit that would place the positive above the moral; mint, anise, and cummin above justice, mercy, and faith, Matt. 27^{6}, John 18^{28}.

It may be said that when the Sabbath was transferred to Christian ground, the observance on the seventh day should have been transferred with it, and that we have no formal announcement of any change in this respect. But any candid person will admit that the particular day cannot be of the essence of the law. There is indeed no formal notice of the change of day. But there are plain indications of the change in practice, Acts 20^{7}, 1 Cor. 16^{2}, Rev. 1^{10}. The simple fact of the absence of any definite beginning of the new practice proves that it goes back to the earliest days of the Church. If

the change had been made afterwards, either by authority or general agreement, we should find some mention of it, but there is none. The observance of the first day and the reason of it are as old as Christianity, or as old as the Church. The weekly observance of the day of the Lord's Resurrection is in perfect keeping with the position which the Resurrection holds in New Testament teaching. When we are told that we receive the Lord's Day on the authority of the Church, we ask when and where the Church made any law on the subject? Outside Scripture, the historical tradition of the observance from the days of the Apostolic Fathers[1] is undoubted and unbroken.

If the proof of the divine authority of the Lord's Day is not as direct as in the case of the Jewish Sabbath, the indirect proof is very strong. This proof is supported by the argument from necessity and utility in relation to the highest interests of the individual and the race, and especially in relation to spiritual life and religious worship. Every blow struck at the Lord's Day is a blow struck at these. The allusions in Gal. $4^{9\,f.}$, Rom. $14^{5.\,6}$, Col. 2^{16}, are to Jewish distinctions, "meat or drink, feast-day, new moon, sabbaths." The Judaizing party, whom the apostle is opposing, wished, of course, to import the Seventh-Day Sabbath, along with circumcision and other Jewish rites, into the Christian Church, where the Lord's Day had become the law. The apostle did not object to the voluntary observance of any of these rites; he only opposed their imposition by authority on others.

Sec. 5.—The Two Sacraments

I. SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE

It is remarkable that two rites so simple as Christian Baptism and the Lord's Supper were at first, have grown into the

[1] *The Lord's Day*, by Rev. J. W. Thomas, pp. 103-113 (C. H. Kelly); Smith's *Bible Dict.* "Lord's Day," "Sabbath"; Hastings' *Bible Dict.* vol. iii.

most complicated questions of Christian theology; that rites intended to be bonds of union have given rise to fiercer controversies and wider divisions than any other subject.

The term sacrament itself (a sacred thing, an oath consecrated by religious rites) is not taken from Scripture. *Sacramentum* is used in the Vulgate, as equivalent to μυστήριον in Eph. 1^{9}, 3^{9}, 5^{32}, 1 Tim. 3^{16}, Rev. 1^{20}, 17^{7}. The association of the two words reminds us of the early application of the term "mysteries" to the Lord's Supper, an application which undoubtedly did much to foster the notion of mysterious virtues attaching to the rite.

The Jewish rites of Circumcision and the Passover are the starting-point of any discussion of the Christian ordinances. There is no reason why they should not be called sacraments. They were outward and visible signs of religious privilege and spiritual grace. They were essentially signs and seals of a covenant between God on the one side and the Jewish nation and individual on the other, Gen. $17^{9\,ff.}$. In the Jewish case the covenant had a national political meaning as well as a religious one; but we must not overlook the latter. The two meanings were separable. There was an outer and an inner Israel, Rom. $2^{28\,f.}$, 9^{6}, just as there is an outer and inner Christendom. Christian believers are the true Israel, Rom. 4^{16}, 1 Pet. 2^{9}. In Rom. 4^{11} circumcision is spoken of as a sign and seal of spiritual blessing. Nothing is more certain than that in the Old Testament the political and spiritual benefits were distinguished from each other; the outward rite was not regarded as insuring salvation. This came to be believed by some among the Jews, but it is always contradicted in Scripture. The moral conditions were as strongly emphasised as in the New Testament. The sign without the substance was worthless, Deut. 10^{16}, 30^{6}, Jer. 4^{4}, Ps. 51^{17}, Isa. $1^{11\text{-}17}$, 55^{6}, Mic. 6^{8}. Circumcision taught man's need and God's provision of cleansing and purity, just as baptism does. The Passover not merely commemorated deliverance. The eating and drinking that formed part of it were signs and means of communion with God. In Col. $2^{11\,f.}$ baptism is regarded as the Christian cir-

cumcision. It is the right of initiation. The time and circumstances of the institution of the Supper all mark it out as taking the place of the Passover, Matt. 26^{17}. It renews and perpetuates the covenant. The Jewish ordinances were divinely instituted; they were of permanent and universal obligation; they were signs of essential religious truth. The same applies to the Christian rites. The new sacraments of the Roman Church lack one or other of these elements. The difference between the Jewish and the Christian rites is that which obtains between the two economies generally; the Christian rites are more intensely spiritual as well as universal. The fact that the Passover was annual is a point of mere detail.

The first, fundamental distinction is that between the sign and the thing signified. For our knowledge of the latter we are entirely dependent on Scripture. The truths and blessings signified, sealed, and conveyed ("exhibited," as is often said), are found there. Thus the sacraments can never be severed from the Word and from the Spirit, who alone makes them effectual. As a sign, a sacrament is in Augustine's phrase a "visible word." It is a sermon or parable in action. It pictures truth to the eye. But clearly it would be unintelligible without Scripture to interpret. As a seal, it confirms, ratifies to sense the promises and blessings spoken of in the Word. Further, wherever the moral conditions are present, it is a means of blessing. Prayer, preaching, the reading of God's Word, are means of grace. But these two rites, as specially ordained, must be so in a special sense. Protestant teaching has always maintained the connection between the sacraments on the one hand and spiritual conditions on the other, thus avoiding all appearance of mechanical, magical action.[1]

A. BAPTISM

The formal institution is found in Matt. 28^{19}, although Christ and his disciples baptized before, John 3^{22}, 4^{2}. How the

[1] Candlish, *The Sacraments*, pp. 22, 33.

apostles interpreted Christ's words is best seen in their teaching and action—Peter at Pentecost, Acts $2^{38.41}$; the Samaritans, $8^{12.16}$; the Ethiopian, 8^{38}; Cornelius and his friends, $10^{47.48}$; Saul of Tarsus, 9^{18}; Lydia and her household, 16^{15}; Philippian jailer and his household, 16^{33}; the Corinthians, 18^{8}; John's disciples at Ephesus, 19^{5}.

Here we have to do with adult converts to Christ from Judaism and heathenism. The Church is in its first missionary stage, and the circumstances are those of every missionary Church still. Christian Judaizers would have imposed circumcision on Gentile converts, Acts 15^{1}, but the Church required nothing more than baptism. The case of Pentecost represents the normal state of things. St. Peter unites the moral condition with the outward rite, "Repent and be baptized for the remission of sins," Acts 2^{38}. Every one who was baptized repented and believed, or was assumed to do so; on his repenting he was baptized. His submission to the rite was a sign of penitence on his part, as in the Baptist's case, Matt. 3^{6}. The Samaritans believed and were baptized, Acts 8^{12}. Cornelius and his friends received the Holy Spirit and were then baptized, 10^{47}, reversing the order in Acts 2^{38}, "and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." The Corinthian converts "believed and were baptized," 18^{8}. In these typical cases baptism was on man's side a profession of personal faith in Christ, and on God's side a sealing of the blessings consequent on faith, just as in the case of circumcision of adult proselytes. The same state of things is constantly reproduced at present in all missionary churches. In Abraham's case the rite was "a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had while he was in uncircumcision," Rom. 4^{11}. In the Acts, then, we see the normal order of baptism in the early Christian Church. All the other references to the subject are in harmony with what has been said. John 3^{5} has been referred to baptism from the earliest days, a fact which cannot be disregarded. Still, the rite was not then instituted, although it was practised, John 4^{2}, and it is not mentioned by name. It is quite open to consideration whether the passage

should not be interpreted as Matt. 3^{11}, the operation of the Spirit being likened in one case to fire and in the other to water.[1] But even granting the reference to baptism, the two baptisms are not necessarily connected; it does not follow that birth of the water and birth of the Spirit always go together, or that the one is the cause of the other.[2] The two are simply declared necessary; but the nature of the one and the other must be learnt elsewhere. In any case the birth of water is insufficient alone; it is the sign without the thing signified. The same interpretation applies to Tit. 3^5. Baptism is not named. Even admitting that "laver" or "bath" refers to baptism, this is not necessarily connected with the "renewing of the Holy Ghost." In Rom. 6^3, Gal. 3^{27}, we are said to be baptized into Christ, and to be "buried with him through baptism into death." Baptism unites us with Christ, puts us into him; all which is true of baptism in the conditions described in the Acts and implied in the Epistles.

Thus the Holy Spirit is declared to be the agent in regeneration and all other spiritual blessings, faith the condition. Here all is spiritual and conceivable. The introduction of water as an instrument is incongruous—not to say inconceivable. Far from us be the wish to depreciate the effect of a rite which Christ has ordained, but we must just as little exaggerate. We cannot but be struck with the fewness of the references to the subject in

[1] "Many have held that the 'birth of water and spirit' can only refer to Christian baptism; others have denied that Christian baptism is alluded to at all. There is error in both extremes. There is no *direct* reference here to Christian baptism; but the reference to the truths which that baptism expresses is distinct and clear." Schaff's *Comm.* on John 3^5. The same view is taken of the relation of John 6 to the Lord's Supper. "In neither case is the sacrament *as such* brought before us; in both we must certainly recognise the presence of its fundamental idea," p. 86.

[2] "As the new birth is not the same thing with baptism, so it does not always accompany baptism; they do not constantly go together. A man may possibly be 'born of water' and yet not be 'born of the Spirit,'" Wesley, Serm. 45.

the New Testament, and the lack of prominence given to it. If its place and function had been that which advanced doctrine ascribes to it, how can we understand its secondary place in the practice of the New Testament Church, John 4^2, 1 Cor. 1^{14}? Must not Christ and the apostles have put the ordinance in the forefront of their work? Must it not have taken precedence of preaching, whereas the reverse is the case? The apostles often give thanks for the faith and love of Christians, never for their baptism. It is indeed a high function of baptism that it is a sign and seal of God's grace in Christ; but it is only a sign and seal, the power is elsewhere. The coronation of a sovereign and the ordination of a minister do not seem to be unfit analogies. Questions about the sufficiency of the grace without the seal are best left unanswered.

Baptism is to be in the Triune name, Matt. 28^{19}. When baptism in the name of Christ is spoken of, a part is put for the whole, Acts 2^{38}, 8^{16}.

As a sign, baptism preaches to the eye as Scripture does to the ear man's defilement through sin, the need of means of cleansing, and the provision of such means in Christ. As a seal, it confirms the offer and the bestowment of the cleansing on the conditions set forth. It is at once a sign and seal of the covenant, embodying these truths between God and man. On the one hand God says, If you believe, I give you forgiveness and the Holy Spirit; on the other, man says, I fulfil the condition and seek the blessing. In coming to baptism an adult believer says, I acknowledge my defilement by sin and need of cleansing, and look to God in Christ for the blessing; and God replies, "Thy iniquity is taken away and thy sin purged."

Infant Baptism

The case for Infant Baptism, against the Baptist restriction to adults, rests first of all on circumcision. Whatever objections are urged against one apply to the other. Yet we know

that the rite was administered to infants. The greater spirituality of the Christian covenant is no sufficient reply, for circumcision was no unspiritual act; it signified and sealed spiritual blessings. Whether the households in Acts $16^{15.33}$, 1 Cor. 1^{16} included children, we do not know. But there can be no doubt that a Jewish Christian, unless taught the contrary, would make the range of baptism as wide as in the other case, and no limitation is hinted in the New Testament. The Christ who blessed little children nowhere says that they are excluded from the grace of the new covenant or from its sign. It is quite true that the baptisms in the Acts are of adults, for the reason already given; but this no more precludes the baptism of children than the circumcision of adult proselytes in Judaism precluded the circumcision of children. The old law surely continues in force until it is repealed. It is quite true that many Old Testament rites, as sacrifice, have been repealed without express reference. The law of sacrifice was fulfilled and so abolished in Christ's sacrifice; no other sacrifice takes the vacant place. But here another outward rite is expressly ordained without any intimation of a more limited range. Instead of restricting, Christianity extends old privileges. It is in the highest degree unlikely that Christ intended to put children under disability. In the days of Origen and Tertullian infant baptism was an old practice, and was appealed to as evidence of doctrine. Roman Catholics say that we receive it on the authority of the Church. In reply, we ask to be shown any Church decree or definition establishing the practice, but there is none. It was simply received and handed down from the beginning. As in the case of the Lord's Day, there was no formal enactment, and none was necessary.

Of course the grace signified and sealed (some would say, conveyed) is different from what it is in the case of adults. The conditions of repentance and faith are out of the question. How far the faith of others can be a substitute for personal faith, we do not know; but while it may avail to secure much good, we have no reason to think that it can be a perfect sub-

stitute. Yet we do not doubt that through Christ's atonement grace is given to all without exception. This prevenient grace most probably begins its work from the earliest days of life; if evil is at work and shows itself, why not good? That good will be greatly helped or hindered by surrounding conditions. Undoubtedly this grace, long working in secret, must be affirmed by the individual will in order to be finally effectual; but it prepares the way, and salvation, where faith follows, is the result of the prevenient workings of God's gracious Spirit. We can understand the rejection of infant baptism by those who deny original sin and prevenient grace, but not otherwise. We cannot believe that sin is left to work without counteraction. We believe that children dying in infancy and childhood are saved; but they are saved not because they are good by nature, not because they have never actually sinned, but because, though they are sinful by nature, their sin is covered by Christ's atonement. Living or dying, they need and receive God's grace, and of this grace baptism is the pledge and confirming seal. All this is not merely matter of promise, but of covenant, and here are the outward and visible signs of the covenant. Such confirming pledges and tokens are full of comfort to us. That children should be capable of the grace, as few would doubt, and incapable of the sign, would be strange.

Baptismal Regeneration

According to this doctrine, baptism is the means of regeneration; the spiritual grace is linked to the outward rite. The doctrine is held by the Roman Church in its fullest sense. It is held also by High Churchmen and by Lutherans, perhaps less strictly. The English Catechism says that the two sacraments are "generally necessary to salvation," a statement which expresses also the Lutheran doctrine. In the baptismal form of the Prayer-Book the minister says, "Seeing now that this child is regenerate," and again, "We give thee hearty thanks that it hath pleased thee to regenerate this infant with thy

Holy Spirit," words which exclude the lower sense sometimes given to the term as simple reception to outward Church privileges. Scripture recognises no such lower meaning. If this had been the meaning in John 3^3, Nicodemus need not have wondered. The alleged Scripture evidence in the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles has been already considered (p. 256). In Acts 10 the Holy Spirit is received before baptism, in Acts 8 after it. In Acts 2 repentance is the moral condition.

According to this doctrine, every one baptized is spiritually a child of God, converted, sanctified. Everything affirmed of God's children is true of him. He is a "new creature," has the Spirit of Christ and is led by that Spirit. The baptized need no conversion. The fruit of the Spirit must needs be seen in them, Gal. 5^{22}. We ask whether this is the character of the baptized generally. Do they answer to the character of God's children as given in Scripture? Are they as different from the unbaptized as God's children are from others? Should we at once recognise that they had undergone a great moral change? We know what the answer of fact and experience is. Baptism alone marks no moral excellence, secures no moral privilege. The result of baptism depends entirely on the use made of the grace there received. If the grace were independent of all conditions, would the result be of the very mixed kind it is? "By their fruits ye shall know them." Baptism notwithstanding, conversion is in most cases still necessary to a Christian life. It is quite conceivable that life might continue Christian from the time of baptism, the days as they go on being bound to each other "by natural piety"; but where it is so, the result is due to moral conditions. Our interpretation of Scripture is thus borne out by experience.

Mode of Baptism

Baptists hold that immersion is the only legitimate mode, a position which implies that the form of a rite is of its essence.

All other Churches hold that the mode—whether immersion, pouring, or sprinkling—is indifferent, while the last mode is more in keeping with Western customs; they do not condemn immersion as Baptists condemn sprinkling and pouring. The Baptist argument appeals chiefly to the meaning of the word "baptize" and to the general Eastern custom. Both proofs are far from conclusive. It is certain that "baptize" is often used in and out of Scripture in a general sense. In classical writers, we read of a bladder floating on the sea being baptized, of the shore being baptized by the tide, of wine being baptized with water, where sprinkling or pouring must be meant. The word is used in the Septuagint of Naaman's washing in the Jordan, of Nebuchadnezzar's being wet with dew, Dan. 4^{33}. It is applied in 1 Cor. 10^{2} to the Israelites passing through the Red Sea. We read of baptisms of cups, pots, and brazen vessels, where dipping is not the only possible mode, Mark 7^{4}. "They were all baptized in the Jordan" (Matt. 3^{6}, Mark 1^{5}) would suit either immersion or pouring. Christ "was baptized by John into the Jordan" (Mark 1^{9}) seems to indicate immersion, and we do not need to question it. "Except they wash (baptize) themselves, they eat not," Mark 7^{4}. The Revised Version says, "some ancient authorities read sprinkle themselves," *ῥαντίσωνται* instead of *βαπτίσωνται*. The phrase "in water" may apply to more than one mode, but "in the Spirit" (Matt. 3^{11}) alludes to pouring or sprinkling, for the Spirit is said to fall or be poured on men, Acts $2^{17\,f.}$. Naturally immersion is a common mode of ablution in the East, although pouring is also used.

We may concede that baptism by immersion was common in the Church in early days and continued to be practised for centuries. But then it gradually passed out of use. What we cannot concede is that there is anything important or vital in the question of mode. If the meaning of the word and the custom of the East were more certain and unvaried than they are, we do not believe that the Church is bound for ever to such a point of ritual. It is certain that no Church observes the Lord's Supper in every detail of form as it was observed by

the Lord himself in the act of institution. Convenience and custom have their claims on such points.[1]

B. THE LORD'S SUPPER

The phrase is found in 1 Cor. 11^{20}, and "the Lord's Table" in 10^{21}. "Altar" is never used in any passage treating of this subject; and yet, if the Supper is a sacrifice, the table is an altar and should have been so called. We have four separate accounts of the institution of the ordinance, substantially identical while differing in detail: Matt. $26^{27\,f.}$, Mark $14^{22\text{-}24}$, Luke $22^{19\,f.}$, 1 Cor. $11^{23\text{-}26}$. St. John's Gospel has no account of the institution; but Paul supplies the place, becoming for the occasion an evangelist. He says that he received the account "from the Lord," *i.e.* the Lord Jesus.[2] The term "covenant" is used in all four accounts, marking the resemblance to the Passover-sacrifice. "Shedding of blood" is found in all the three Gospels. "All drink," "blood of covenant," "for many" are peculiar to Matthew and Mark, "new" to Luke and Paul.

That the ordinance was intended to be permanent is implied in the Gospels by the relation in which it is placed to the Passover. In St. Paul's account there is no allusion to the Passover, but the permanent element is expressed more plainly. The bread is to be eaten and the wine drunk "in remembrance" of Christ. "As often as ye eat this bread, and drink the cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till he come," vers. 23–26.

The annual Passover was the commemoration of a great redemptive sacrifice. If it was also a repetition of the sacrifice,

[1] *Paraleipomena* (Dickinson), chs. viii.–x., contains much useful matter.

[2] It has been disputed whether he received the account *directly* from Christ, because of his use of ἀπό, not παρά. But the "I" is emphatic. παρά is contained in the verb (παρέλαβον), and ἀπό is used elsewhere of direct communication, Col. 1^{7}, 3^{24}, 1 John 1^{5}, 2^{27}. Paul certainly received direct communications from Christ, Acts 9^{5}. We know how jealous Paul was of his apostolic independence, $22^{17\text{-}21}$, 23^{11}.

the sacrificial aspect ceased when the one real sacrifice was offered, and only the commemorative aspect remained. Its covenant character must be borne in mind. It was the sign and seal of the covenant in which every believing Israelite stood with God. We cannot doubt that the temporal redemption wrought out for Israel in Egypt symbolised to Jewish faith the greater spiritual redemption of forgiveness and inwrought holiness. As a sign, it preached the fact of sin and guilt, the necessity of atonement, and the divine provision of atonement. As a seal, it confirmed the promise of forgiveness to sincere and earnest faith. In a word, it was the seal of a covenant of grace which bound God and man together.

The Supper is the Christian Passover, the old ordinance filled with higher meaning and conveying richer blessing. The Epistle to the Hebrews shows us that the old reappears in the new in perfect form. Christ's death is a greater sacrifice, still it is a sacrifice; the Gospel is a better covenant, still it is a covenant. The symbols used, although simple in the extreme, are exactly adapted to set forth the spiritual truth intended, the bread representing the body broken, the wine the blood shed. The eating and drinking point to Christ as the food on which our souls live, the bread and wine of eternal life. On our first entering into covenant with God, we receive Christ into our hearts, eat his flesh and drink his blood; and every observance of the Supper represents the perpetuation and renewing of the covenant. The word covenant expresses a great Old Testament idea, which is taken over into the New and filled with higher truth. It expresses the divine condescension in a wonderful way, implying that God and the believer are equal as parties to the compact, whereas we know that everything we receive is a "free gift" of God, Rom. 6^{23}. This was as true in the old economy as in the new.

As a sign, then, the Supper preaches pictorially to the eye the sin which made sacrifice necessary and the sacrifice which God's love provided. As a seal, it confirms to us the benefits which our believing acceptance of the sacrifice assures to us.

Our eating and drinking is our receiving Christ by faith—faith of a very special kind, faith which appropriates all the power and all the benefits of the atoning sacrifice, appropriates it as our propitiation, our redemption, our reconciliation, Rom. 5^{11}. It is often said that such unusual phrases as "eating my flesh and drinking my blood" cannot mean mere believing,[1] and we agree. They cannot mean ordinary believing, but believing of a peculiarly intense kind and for peculiarly high objects; they can express nothing less than the faith that brings personal salvation and makes us one with Christ. Partaking in the Supper is on my side both a confession of sin and helpless need and a depending on Christ for present salvation. On God's side it is the response to my faith and prayer. Nothing could be a more expressive symbol of the union with Christ which is our life. The fellowship is of the closest kind, and it becomes closer with every new act of faith. Just as earthly food passes into the body and sustains the natural life, so Christ himself becomes the nourishment of the spiritual life. Yet with all this rich symbolism in the ordinance, it is obvious how essential it is to look through the symbols to the divine reality.

John 6 is a commentary by Christ himself upon his death. The Supper was not then instituted; but we can scarcely doubt that the chapter was meant by anticipation to teach the truth expressed in the rite. Christ is set forth as the bread of life, and he is this by dying. "I am the bread of life. The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood dwelleth in me, and I in him. It is the Spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing." The sixth chapter thus combines the teaching of the tenth and

[1] Even Bishop Westcott seems to approve an ancient notion that the body and blood are to be to us the seed of a future resurrection-body, *Rev. of Father*, p. 40.

fifteenth chapters, the Good Shepherd and the Vine. If John does not narrate the institution of the rite, he expands its meaning as no other apostle does, supplementing the three synoptic accounts. In Milligan's *Comm.* on John 1^{29} we read: "As the institution of the Passover preceded the general Mosaic legislation, its laws and arrangements lie without the circle of the ordinary ritual of sacrifices, and combine ideas which were otherwise kept distinct. The paschal-supper resembles the peace-offerings, the characteristic of which was the sacred feast that succeeded the presentation of the victim—an emblem of the fellowship between the accepted worshipper and his God. But the sin-offering also is included, as a reference to the original institution of the Passover will at once show. The careful sprinkling of the blood upon the door-posts was intended to be more than a sign to the destroying angel whom to spare. The lamb was slain and the blood sprinkled that atonement might be made for sin; when Israel is consecrated anew to God, the sin and the deserved punishment removed, the sacred feast is celebrated."[1]

The institution of the Supper as the memorial rite of Christianity agrees with and confirms the central importance given in Scripture to Christ's death (p. 162). There is no other instance of such significance being assigned to the death of a teacher as is assigned in the Four Gospels and the doctrine of the Epistles to Christ's death. Certainly the death does not save apart from the life (Rom. 5^{10}); still unique significance is ascribed to it. The explanation is found in its sacrificial character.

In this service, then, our thoughts are set entirely on the spiritual realities signified—the sin condemned and pardoned, the atoning Saviour, the open throne of grace, the holiness and love manifested. The visible symbols are only useful as they point to these truths. We believe in a *real presence* of Christ, but it is a spiritual one, the presence of a spiritual Christ. Real is not synonymous with material or corporeal. We do not

[1] See Candlish, *The Sacraments*, p. 93.

worship an absent Saviour, as we are accused of doing. But we do not believe in a bodily presence in bread and wine. Christ himself tells us that "the flesh profiteth nothing," John 6^{63}. In Roman doctrine real presence means corporeal presence; but even in Christ's person the spiritual is the real, Rom. 1^{4}, 1 Tim. 3^{16}, Heb. 9^{14}. If we are asked in what sense Christ is present in the Supper in which he is not always present, we reply that the visible emblems make the spiritual presence more vivid. We do not see what a material reception of Christ could add to us.

In the same way the eating and drinking give greater keenness to the sense of union between us and Christ. We consciously and joyously receive Christ afresh in our souls. And he afresh comes in and sups with us, Rev. 3^{20}.

The Reformed doctrine is often disparaged as a mere memorial view. Certainly it is the memorial of a sacrifice, not the sacrifice or a repetition of the sacrifice. But a memorial of what? Of the greatest of all the divine acts, of the act which is the supreme expression of God's majesty and mercy, the act which opens to every soul the way to God and life. The memorial is glorified by its end. It must be the highest of all means of grace. It is the meeting-place of divine love and human love in their purest form.

Communion and Eucharist are names of later growth, though gathered from Scripture. The joyous, thankful spirit of the Communion Service in the Book of Common Prayer is quite true to the four Scripture accounts of the Supper.

II. DOGMA OF THE SACRAMENTS

1. *Nature of a Sacrament*

There are three types of doctrine on this subject—the Roman, the Lutheran, and the Reformed.

According to Roman doctrine, a sacrament produces its effect *ex opere operato*, necessarily, by the mere performance of the

act.[1] The grace is inherent in, a property of, the consecrated elements. It would not indeed be true to say that the action of the sacrament is unconditional. Intention in the priest and faith in the recipient are necessary; but the faith is reduced to a minimum. As stated before under the head of Justification, the faith required is general faith in Christianity as a whole, rather than specific faith in Christ. The necessity of intention on the part of the priest introduces uncertainty into all the sacramental acts of the Roman Church.[2] If it is essential that the priest shall always intend to produce the effect of the sacrament he is administering, what certainty can we have that he does this? The condition required of the recipient is more negative than positive. He must simply not interpose the obstacle of mortal sin. On this condition the sacrament necessarily takes effect. "If any one shall say that grace is not conferred by the sacraments of the new law *ex opere operato*, but that faith alone in the divine promise suffices to obtain grace, let him be anathema," Conc. Trid. vii. sacr. 8.[3] The Roman Catechism thus defines a sacrament: "A thing under the cognisance of the senses, having the power by divine appointment both to signify and to produce holiness and righteousness."[4]

The Lutheran Church, while happily rejecting the *ex opere operato*, holds to the inherence of grace in the elements, but makes the experience of grace dependent on living, earnest

[1] Dr. Fisher in his *Hist. Christian Doctrine*, p. 256, explains the phrase as meaning that the grace of the sacrament is independent of the personal character of the officiating minister. It also means that the grace is largely independent of the character of the receiver, as, indeed, Dr. Fisher presently points out.

[2] See this well argued in Jackson, Bk. xi. ch. xxxix.

[3] Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novæ legis sacramenta ex opere operato non conferri gratiam, sed solam fidem divinæ promissionis ad gratiam consequendam sufficere, anathema sit, Winer, p. 244.

[4] Ut explicatius quid sacramentum sit declaretur, docendum erit, rem esse sensibus subjectum, quæ ex dei institutione sanctitatis et justitiæ tum significandæ tum efficiendæ vim habet, Cat. Rom. $2^{1.11}$; Winer, p. 234.

faith in the recipient. The grace is communicated to the elements, as in the Roman doctrine, by the consecrating words. It is the insistence on real faith that has saved Lutheranism from serious evil. "Through the Word and the Sacraments, as through instruments, the Holy Spirit is given, and he works faith, where and when God pleases, in those who hear the gospel," A. C.[1] "They therefore condemn those who teach that the sacraments justify *ex opere operato*, and do not teach that faith, which believes sin to be forgiven, is necessary in using the sacraments."[2] Lutheranism puts the necessity of the sacraments high.

The Reformed type of doctrine presents many shades and degrees, though substantially identical. The lowest point, where sacraments are merely badges of profession or commemorative, is only reached in Socinianism. Zwingli is sometimes said to have held the same view, but wrongly. The Reformed confessions generally reject the inherence of grace in the elements, and put the efficacy in the co-operating Spirit. The definition given in the *Remonstrant Confession* is very fine: "By the sacraments we mean those outward ceremonies of the Church, or those sacred and solemn rites, by which, as by visible, federal signs and seals, God not only represents and adumbrates to us his gracious benefits, promised especially in the evangelical covenant, but also in a regular manner offers and seals them to us, and we in turn openly and publicly declare and testify that we embrace all the divine promises with a true, firm, and obedient faith, and desire ever to celebrate his benefits with constant and grateful memory."[3] Article xxv. of the Anglican

[1] Per verbum et sacramenta, tanquam per instrumenta, donatur Spiritus Sanctus, qui fidem efficit, ubi et quando visum est Deo, in iis qui audiunt evangelium, *ibid.* p. 234.

[2] Damnant igitur illos, qui docent, quod sacramenta ex opere operato justificent, nec docent, fidem requiri in usu sacramentorum, quæ credat remitti peccata, *Conf. Aug.* Winer, p. 246.

[3] Sacramenta cum dicimus, externas ecclesiæ cærimonias seu ritos illos sacros ac solennes intelligimus, quibus veluti fœderalibus signis ac sigillis visibilibus Deus gratiosa beneficia sua in fœdere præsertim evangelico

Church goes no further: "Sacraments ordained of Christ be not only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession, but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace, and God's goodwill towards us, by the which he doth work invisibly in us, and doth not only quicken, but also strengthen and confirm our faith in him." Westminster Confession: "Sacraments are holy signs and seals of the covenant of grace." *Ibid.*: "The grace which is exhibited in or by the sacraments, rightly used, is not conferred by any power in them; neither doth the efficacy of a sacrament depend upon the piety or intention of him that doth administer it, but upon the work of the Spirit and the word of institution; which contains, together with a precept authorising the use thereof, a promise of benefit to worthy receivers." Shorter Catechism: "An holy ordinance instituted by Christ; wherein, by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers." Wesleyan Catechism: "An outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given unto us, ordained by Christ himself, as a means whereby we receive the same, and a pledge to assure us thereof. They are signs and seals of the covenant of grace established in Christ; which is a covenant with promise on the part of God, and with conditions on the part of man."[1]

2. *Baptism*

The Roman doctrine is Baptismal Regeneration in its strictest form. Baptism entirely does away original sin, leaving only

promissa non modo nobis repræsentat et adumbrat, sed et certo modo exhibet atque obsignat, nosque vicissim palam publiceque declaramus ac testamur, nos promissiones omnes divina verâ, firmâ atque obsequiosâ fide amplecti et beneficia ipsius jugi, et gratâ semper memoriâ celebrare velle, Winer, p. 238.

[1] "Roman Catholics may be said in substance to hold that the sacraments represent grace, because they apply it; Protestants, that they apply grace, because they represent it," Candlish, *The Sacraments*, p. 17; Blunt's *Dict. Theol.* arts. "Sacraments," "Baptism," "Eucharist."

concupiscence, which is not sinful, though the cause or material of sin. Sin after baptism must be removed by the satisfaction of penance. Conc. Trid. xiv. cap. ii.: "We who put on Christ by baptism are made quite a new creature in him, obtaining full and complete remission of all sins." Cat. Rom. 2. 5: "Rightly and aptly defined, baptism is the sacrament of regeneration through water in the Word."[1] Baptism being the means of the reception of salvation, its necessity is placed at the highest point. Even unbaptized infants perish. On account of this stringent necessity the sacrament may, in certain circumstances, be administered by any one.

The Lutheran Church teaches a general necessity, baptism being the ordinary means of regeneration. To save its doctrine of the necessity of faith, it holds that faith is present in some sense, even in infants. Luther's Cat. Min. says: "Baptism works remission of sins, delivers from death and Satan, and bestows eternal blessedness on each and all, who believe what the Word and the divine promises pledge." Aug. Conf.: "As to baptism, they teach that it is necessary to salvation."[2]

The Reformed doctrine has been indicated already. The work of the Holy Spirit is put first. The Conf. Helv. ii.,[3] after referring to the gifts of salvation, says: "By Baptism all these things are sealed: for inwardly we are regenerated, cleansed, and renewed by God through the Holy Spirit, while outwardly

[1] Per Baptismum Christum induentes nova prorsus in illo efficimur creatura, plenam et integram peccatorum omnium remissionem consequentes. . . . Recte et apposite definitur, baptismum esse sacramentum regenerationis per aquam in verbo, Winer, p. 253; Cramp, as before, pp. 109, 136, 213.

[2] Baptismus operatur remissionem peccatorum, liberat a morte et a diabolo et donat æternum beatitudinem omnibus et singulis, qui credunt hoc quod verba et promissiones divinæ pollicentur. De baptismo docent, quod sit necessarius ad salutem.

[3] Obsignantur hæc omnia baptismo; nam intus regeneramur, purificamur et renovamur a Deo per Spiritum Sanctum, foris autem accipimus obsignationem maximorum donorum in aquâ, qua etiam maxima illa beneficia repræsentantur et veluti oculis nostris conspicienda proponuntur, Winer, pp. 254, 256.

we receive the ratification of the greatest gifts in the water, by which also those great benefits are represented, and set forth, as it were, as objects of sight." Article xxvii.: "Baptism is not only a sign of profession, and mark of difference, whereby Christian men are discerned from others that be not christened; but it is also a sign of regeneration or new birth, whereby, as by an instrument, they that receive baptism rightly are grafted into the Church; the promises of forgiveness of sin, and of our adoption to be the sons of God by the Holy Ghost, are visibly signed and sealed; faith is confirmed and grace increased by virtue of prayer unto God." All this is thoroughly in the spirit of Reformed teaching. In the office of Baptism, however, in the Prayer-Book, we have the Roman or Lutheran type of doctrine: "Seeing that this child is by Baptism regenerate." "We yield thee thanks, that it hath pleased thee to regenerate this infant with thy Holy Spirit, to receive him for thine own child by adoption, and to incorporate him into thy holy Church." It is scarcely open to any one, in the light of these words, to explain the regeneration spoken of here as investment with outward privileges. West. Conf.: "Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament, ordained by Jesus Christ, not only for the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible Church, but also to be unto him a sign and seal of the covenant of grace, of his ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remission of sins, and of his growing up unto God through Jesus Christ to walk in newness of life."[1] Dr. Pope says: "The true doctrine makes baptism the initiatory sign of a covenant the blessings of which it most aptly symbolises: the sprinkled blood and the Spirit poured out. It makes it also the seal of a covenant which pledges these blessings to all who believe and dedicate their children to Christ; a seal, therefore, of an impartation which is quite distinct from the seal, though it may accompany it, as it may have preceded it, and may also, as in part it must do to unconscious infancy, follow the seal," *Comp.* iii. 324.

[1] Winer, p. 254.

3. *The Lord's Supper*

The basis of the Roman doctrine is the idea of Transubstantiation, the conversion of the substance of the bread and wine by the words of consecration into the substance of the body and blood of Christ. Conc. Trid. xiii. cap. 4: "Since our Redeemer, Christ, affirmed that to be truly his body which he offered under the species of bread, it has always been so held in the Church of God, and this the holy Synod now at last declares, that by the consecration of the bread and wine a conversion takes place of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of Christ's body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood; which conversion is aptly and rightly called by the Holy Catholic Church *transsubstantiatio.*" "If any one shall say, that in the holy sacrament of the eucharist the substance of bread and wine remains, along with the body and blood of Jesus Christ, and shall deny that wonderful and unique conversion of the whole substance of bread into the body and of the whole substance of wine into the blood, the species of bread and wine merely remaining, which conversion the Catholic Church most aptly calls transubstantiation, let him be anathema."[1]

Let it be noted that it is only the *substance* of the elements that is affected, the *accidents* (*i.e.* properties) remain, so that

[1] Quoniam Christus Redemtor noster corpus suum id, quod sub specie panis offerebat, vere esse dixit, ideo persuasum semper in ecclesiâ Dei fuit, idque nunc denuo Sancta hæc Synodus declarat, per consecrationem panis et vini conversionem fieri totius substantiæ panis in substantiam corporis Christi, et totius substantiæ vini in substantiam sanguinis ejus: quæ conversio convenienter et proprie a Sanctâ Catholicâ Ecclesiâ *transsubstantiatio* est appellata.

Si quis dixerit, in sacrosancto eucharistiæ sacramento remanere substantiam panis et vini, una cum corpore et sanguine Jesu Christi, negaveritque mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem totius substantiæ panis in corpus et totius substantiæ vini in sanguinem, manentibus duntaxat speciebus panis et vini, quam quidem conversionem Catholica Ecclesia aptissime *transsubstantiationem* appellant, anathema sit, Winer, p. 280.

in this stupendous miracle the substance of bread and wine is absent, though the properties of bread and wine remain; and the substance of body and blood is present, though the properties of body and blood are absent. We must believe that one substance is present, though not one of its qualities is present, and we must believe that another substance is absent, though all its qualities are present. This is faith, not merely without but against the evidence of the senses. Faith and sense are in direct contradiction. It is useless to refer us to the Gospel miracles. There faith and sense were one. The ground of the faith that water was changed into wine was that the senses perceived the properties of wine to be present. The proof that the blind and deaf and sick were cured was the testimony of the senses. Christ did not require men to believe that a miraculous change had taken place while their senses testified the contrary. In transubstantiation it is not a miracle that we are asked to believe, but a contradiction. And if our senses play us false in one case, why not in others? If our senses deceive us, why may not our reason? We know, of course, that both sense and reason may be mistaken. But our whole system of thought and life rests on the assumption that after we have taken all possible care, and tested the information of the senses and the inferences of reason in every possible way, they are to be taken as true. If not, nothing can ever be known to be true; if not, universal scepticism is the only consistent course; and this is what the dogma leads to. The Trinity, the Incarnation, the Divine Attributes, present us with many mysteries, mysteries which follow from the combination of the spiritual with the material, the infinite with the finite; but they present no contradiction for our faith. Here is no question of the spiritual and infinite, but simply a combination of material elements. It is a combination of one substance with the properties of another substance, a substance without its properties and properties without their substance! The Roman Catechism openly avows the strange consequences which follow: "Since it has been proved that the body and blood of the Lord

are truly in the sacrament, so that the substance of bread and wine no longer exists, and seeing that those accidents cannot inhere in Christ's body and blood, it follows that, beyond all order of nature (supra omnem naturæ ordinem), they support themselves with nothing else to rest on."[1] "Supra omnem naturæ ordinem" is a very mild statement of the position. A miracle is above the fixed order of nature. But this wonder contradicts every law of knowledge and faith which God has given us to guide our lives by.[2]

The philosophical question involved here, which Roman writers know how to turn to use, should be noted here. The change affects the *substance* only; and substance is the unknown something or substratum which is supposed to underlie properties. We say, is supposed, because whether substance exists apart from properties, or what it is in itself, is a moot question. The Roman doctrine supposes that it does exist. Even supposing this, it is obvious that we may assert anything about changes in an inaccessible world. The Roman advocate, of course, rests his faith on the saying of Christ, literally understood, which saying he interprets by his philosophy.

The sole scriptural authority for the dogma is the saying of Christ, "This is my body," Matt. 26[26]. We respect the feeling which thinks itself bound to accept the literal words of Christ, whatever consequences follow. But we venture to think that the consequences in this case are so tremendous, that nothing but the most absolute necessity should lead us to acquiesce in the literal meaning. Is there any such necessity? Is no other sense possible? In what circumstances were the words spoken? Christ held the bread in his hand, and said of it, "This is my body." Putting ourselves in the position of the disciples, is it conceivable that, with Christ's living body before our eyes, we could think that he held it in his hand, and gave it to us to eat? We think not. If the disciples had understood Christ as the Roman Church does, it is incom-

[1] Winer, p. 281.

[2] Cramp, *Text-book of Popery*, p. 249; Workman, *Dawn of Reformation*, i. 179.

prehensible that the disciples expressed no surprise. Christ had often used figurative language about himself, speaking of himself as Bread, a Vine, a Door, a Shepherd. They were accustomed to such modes of speech, and perfectly understood them. But now he makes a similar statement in a literal sense, and they say nothing! Besides, the meaning, "This signifies or represents my body," was quite in the order of Paschal speech. "Eat the passover," in this very chapter; "kill the passover" (Ex. 12^{21}); "This cup is the new covenant in my blood" (Luke 22^{20}, 1 Cor. 11^{25}); "Drink the cup" (1 Cor. 11^{26}). The Apostle Paul says, "As often as ye eat this bread; Whosoever shall eat the bread; So let him eat of the bread" (1 Cor. 11^{26}, etc.); so that the bread remains after the consecrating words are spoken. What the recipients eat is bread. How could Paul have said this, if he had held transubstantiation? Does he give any hint that only the accidents of bread remain, not the substance? Accidents without substance are not bread. We fear that St. Paul would come under the anathema of Trent just quoted.

The dogma destroys all analogy with the other sacrament. There is no such transformation of the water in baptism. It signifies certain spiritual things. On the Protestant view the bread and wine signify the body and blood of Christ, and the spiritual work accomplished by the death. But what do the body and blood themselves signify? Here we have not a sign, but the things signified. Ang. Article xxviii. well says that the dogma "overthroweth the nature of a sacrament."

No doubt, language tending in the direction of a literal presence of Christ's body and blood may be found in the Christian Fathers.[1] How much of this is to be understood literally, and

[1] "In a word, it appeareth not that of all the ancient Fathers of the Church any one did ever conceive or imagine other than only a mystical participation of Christ's both body and blood in the sacrament, neither are their speeches concerning the change of the elements themselves into the body and blood of Christ such that a man can thereby in conscience assure himself it was their meaning to persuade the world either of a

how much is exaggerated metaphor, it is not always easy to say. Probably, as on other subjects, language used at first metaphorically was afterwards taken literally. Active controversy began in the ninth century, Paschasius Radbertus advocating the dogma. Two centuries later, Ratramnus and Berengarius opposed it. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) adopted it.

The next step was to withdraw the Cup from the laity. This was done at the Council of Constance, 1415 A.D. Conc. Trid. xxi. cap. 1: "The Holy Synod, taught by the Holy Spirit, and following the judgment and custom of the Church itself, declares and teaches that laymen and non-celebrant clerics are bound by no divine precept to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist under both species, and that it cannot be doubted, without detriment to faith, that communion in either species suffices for them to salvation." Conc. Trid. xiii. euchar. 3: "If any one shall deny that in the venerable sacrament of the Eucharist the whole is contained under either species and under the several parts of such species in case of separation, let him be anathema."[1]

Other consequences which follow from transubstantiation are the Adoration of the Host, its reservation in the monstrance or sanctuary, elevation and carrying in procession for this purpose. The Roman Church also uses unleavened bread, and wine mixed with water. Conc. Trid. xiii. 6: "If any one shall say that in

corporal consubstantiation of Christ with those sanctified and blessed elements before we receive them, or of the like transubstantiation of them into the body and blood of Christ," Hooker, v. 67, 11. *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* speaks copiously of Baptism and the Supper. It knows nothing of extra-scriptural additions, see chaps. vii. ix. x.

[1] Sancta Synodus, a Spiritu Sancto . . . edocta atque ipsius ecclesiæ judicium et consuetudinem secuta, declarat ac docet, nullo divino præcepti laicos et clericos non conficientes obligari ad eucharistiæ sacramentum sub utrâque specie sumendum, neque ullo pacto salvâ fide dubitari posse, quin illis alterius speciei communio ad salutem sufficiat.—Si quis negaverit, in venerabili sacramento eucharistiæ sub unaquaque specie et sub singulis cujusque speciei partibus separatione factâ totum Christum contineri, anath. sit, Winer, p. 288; Cramp, as before, pp. 136, 213.

the sacrament of the Eucharist Christ is not to be adored with the outward worship of latria, and so is not to be venerated with special festive honour, and carried about solemnly in processions, or is not to be presented to the people to be worshipped, and that his worshippers are idolaters, let him be anathema."[1]

A still more distinctive and influential doctrine of the Roman Church is, that the body and blood of Christ veritably present in the Eucharist are a proper Sacrifice for sin. "If any one shall say that in the Mass a true and proper sacrifice is not offered to God, or that 'to be offered' is nothing else than that Christ is given to us to be eaten, let him be anathema." "Since in this divine sacrifice, which is performed in the Mass, the same Christ is contained and slain without blood, who once offered himself with blood on the altar of the cross, the Synod teaches that this sacrifice is truly propitiatory, and through it it comes to pass that, if with true heart and right faith we come contritely and penitently to God, with fear and reverence, we shall obtain mercy," etc.[2] "If any one shall say that the sacrifice of the Mass is merely one of giving of thanks and praise, or a bare commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the cross, but not propitiatory, or that it benefits only the recipient, and ought not to be offered for the living and the dead, for sins, punishments, satisfactions and other afflictions, let him be," etc.[3] Thus, according to Roman doctrine, the Eucharist is two

[1] Winer, p. 285.

[2] Si quis dixerit, in missâ non offerri Deo verum et proprium sacrificium, aut quod offerri non sit aliud, quam nobis Christum ad manducandum dari, an. sit.—Quoniam in divino hoc sacrificio, quod in missâ peragitur, idem ille Christus continetur et incruente immolatur, qui in arâ crucis semel se ipsum cruente obtulit, docet synodus, sacrificium istud vere propitiatorium esse per ipsumque fieri, ut, si cum vero corde et rectâ fide, cum metu et reverentiâ, contriti ac pœnitentes ad deum accedamus, misericordiam, etc., Winer, p. 293.

[3] Si quis dixerit, missæ sacrificium tantum esse laudis et gratiarum actionis, aut nudam commemorationem sacrificii in cruce peracti, non autem propitiatorium, vel soli prodesse sumenti, neque pro vivis et defunctis, pro peccatis pœnis satisfactionibus, et aliis necessitatibus offerri debere, an. sit, Winer, p. 294.

things at once—a Sacrament and a Sacrifice. A Sacrament is primarily something given by God to men as a sign and seal, a Sacrifice something given by or for man to God. Considered in the latter aspect, the Eucharist differs in some respects from the sacrifice of the cross. It is through it that the sacrifice of the cross is applied to men. As it is constantly repeated, its value is only finite. According to Bellarmin, it is only meritorious and propitiatory in the second degree, deriving its virtue from the original sacrifice, which was "meritorious, satisfactory, and impetratory, truly and properly." This sacrifice of the Mass is only impetratory, *i.e.* it supplicates blessing. "When it is called propitiatory or satisfactory, this is to be understood in reference to the thing supplicated. For it is called propitiatory because it supplicates remission of guilt; satisfactory, because it supplicates remission of penalty; meritorious, because it supplicates grace to do good and acquire merit."[1]

No part of Roman doctrine aroused greater or juster hostility at the Reformation, as infringing, however it may be disclaimed, on the sufficiency of the Sacrifice of the Cross, than this. The Protestant confessions are filled with condemnations of the doctrine. Private masses and masses for the dead follow by direct consequence. If Christ's sacrifice needs to be continued and repeated, we have Jewish incompleteness back again. "Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high priest entered into the holy place every year with blood of others," Heb. $9^{25.\,26}$, $10^{11\text{-}14}$. If it was God's purpose that the sacrifice of the cross should be carried into effect in this way, it is inexplicable that there is no hint of the kind in Scripture.

This doctrine is the complement of the Roman theory of the Priesthood. The priest offers the sacrifice of the Mass for the living and the dead, or Christ offers himself through the priest. In early days the term sacrifice was applied to the Eucharist, obviously in a spiritual sense; but this gave way to the literal sense, as the sacerdotal view of the ministry developed (p. 216). Each dogma helped the other.

[1] Winer, p. 294.

The Lutheran Church, while strenuously condemning the other distinctively Roman doctrines of the Eucharist, retains the corporeal presence of Christ on the same grounds as the Roman Church. Conf. Aug.: "Concerning the Lord's Supper, they teach that Christ's body and blood are truly present, and are distributed to those partaking, and reject those teaching otherwise." "We confess that we think, that in the Lord's Supper the body and blood of Christ are truly and substantially present, and are truly offered, with those things which are seen, the bread and wine, to those who receive the sacrament."[1] At the same time, Lutheranism rejects transubstantiation, the sacrificial idea, and the fleshly eating. "We utterly reject and condemn the Capernaite eating of Christ's body." Lutheranism thinks itself bound by the literal meaning of Christ's words, and yet cannot receive transubstantiation, because of the difficulties it involves. The body and blood are present, and the bread and wine are present. How are these propositions to be combined? It is said that the body and blood are present in, with, or under the bread and wine.[2] The union between the body and the bread and between the blood and the wine is a sacramental one. The union is also not permanent, but only in the partaking (*in usu*). Thus adoration and reservation are cut off. The peculiar Lutheran doctrine of the Incarnation, the *communicatio idiomatum*, is here practically applied to explain the Ubiquity of Christ's body. It was on the present subject that Luther showed himself so obstinate in controversy with the Swiss Reformers, and his views were adopted by the Lutheran Church. Consubstantiation is the name given to the doctrine. It is a compromise, which separates Lutheranism both from

[1] De cœna Domini docent, quid corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in cœna Domini, et improbant secus docentes. — Confitemur nos sentire, quod in cœnâ Domini vere et substantialiter adsint corpus et sanguis Christi et vere exhibeantur cum illis rebus, quæ videntur, pane et vino, his qui sacramentum accipiunt, Winer, p. 283.

[2] For consubstantiation in the Middle Ages, see Banks, *Devel. of Doctr.* ii. 110, 151.

Rome and from the rest of the Reformation. According to it, two substances are present with their properties, and are equally received. Real body and blood are eaten and drunk, but in a spiritual or sacramental way![1]

The Reformed doctrine, while unanimously rejecting the special Roman and Lutheran tenets, presents some shades of difference in itself, as in the case of the other sacrament. Zwingli is generally thought to have held the bare commemorative sense. But Dr. Pope says that, while tending towards that view, "his doctrine went beyond it: Christ to the contemplation of faith is not only subjectively but objectively present; and that spiritual eating of his heavenly body, which is the appropriation of his atoning grace, is a sacramental eating or receiving of the signs and seals of a present Saviour."[2] He preferred the phrase "with the bread and wine" to "in the bread and wine." The quotations given by Winer (p. 269) scarcely go beyond the idea of commemoration and pictorial teaching. Thus: "When the bread and wine, consecrated by the words of the Lord, are distributed to the brethren, is not the whole Christ, as it were sensibly (to say more, if words are necessary, than is common), presented to the senses? But how? Is the natural body itself to be handled and tasted? By no means; it is offered to mental contemplation, while the sensible sacrament of it is offered to sense. . . . We never denied that Christ's body is sacramentally and mysteriously present in the Supper, both because of the contemplation of faith and because of the entire action of the symbol."

Calvin holds a real, though spiritual, feeding on the body and blood of Christ. "The communicant is lifted up by faith to heaven, and his soul is as surely invigorated by the spiritual body of Christ as his body by the emblems" (Pope). Calvin says: "The chief point is that our souls are nourished by the flesh and blood of Christ, just as bread and wine preserve and support bodily life. For the analogy of the sign would not

[1] On the Lutheran doctrine, see Jackson, *Works*, Bk. xi. ch. iii.

[2] *Comp. of Theol.* iii. 332; Banks, *Devel. of Doctr.* ii. 164.

hold good unless our souls found their food in Christ, which cannot be, unless Christ really unite with us and refresh us by the eating of his flesh and the drinking of his blood. And although it seems impossible, considering the distance of space, for the flesh of Christ to reach to us, so as to be our food, let us remember how far above all our senses the secret power of the Holy Spirit shines, and how foolish it is to measure his vastness by our limits. What, then, our mind comprehends not, let faith conceive, that the Spirit really unites things disjoined in space."[1] "If with our eyes and minds we are carried up to heaven to seek Christ there in the glory of his kingdom, even as the symbols invite us to him in his integrity, so let us under the symbol of bread feed on his body, and under

[1] Winer, p. 270. Dean Jackson says: "This present efficacy of Christ's body and blood upon our souls, or real communication of both, I find as a truth unquestionable amongst the ancient Fathers and as a Catholic confession. The modern Lutheran and the modern Romanist have fallen into their several errors concerning Christ's presence in the Sacrament from a common ignorance; neither of them conceive, nor are they willing to conceive, how Christ's body and blood should have any real operation upon our souls, unless they were so locally present as they might *agere per contactum*, as physical medicines do our bodies (which is the pretended use of transubstantiation), or so quicken our souls, as sweet odours do the animal spirits, which were the most probable use of the Lutheran consubstantiation. Both the Lutherans and Papists avouch the authority of the ancient Church for their opinions, but most injuriously. For more than we have said, or more than Calvin doth stiffly maintain against Zwinglius and other Sacramentaries, cannot be inferred from any speeches of the truly orthodox or ancient Fathers; they all agree that we are immediately cleansed and purified from our sins by the blood of Christ, that his human nature, by the inhabitation of the Deity, is made to us the inexhaustible fountain of life. But about the particular manner how life is derived to us from his human nature, or whether it sends its sweet influence upon our souls only from the heavenly sanctuary, wherein it dwells as in its sphere; or whether his blood which was shed for us may have more immediate local presence with us, they no way disagree, because they in this kind abhorred curiosity of dispute. As for ubiquity and transubstantiation, they are the two monsters of modern times, brought forth by ignorance and maintained only by faction," Bk. x. ch. lv. 12; Hooker, Bk. v. 55, 67 8–11; Banks, *Devel. of Doctr.* ii. 212.

the symbol of wine drink separately of his blood, that at length we may enjoy him perfectly." Calvin objects to the corporeal presence, because it binds the divine to earthly and corruptible elements, and infringes on the integrity of Christ's human nature. The Remonstrant Confession is again worth quoting: "The holy Supper is the second sacred rite of the New Testament, instituted by Jesus Christ on the night in which he was betrayed, to celebrate the eucharistic and solemn commemoration of his death, in which the faithful, after duly examining and testing themselves as to their true faith, eat the sacred bread publicly broken, and also drink the wine publicly poured out; and this to declare with solemn thanksgiving the bloody death of the Lord undergone for us (by which, as our bodies are sustained by food and drink, or by bread and wine, so our hearts are fed and nourished to the hope of eternal life), and in turn to testify publicly before God and the Church their vivifying and spiritual fellowship with Christ's crucified body and shed blood (or with Jesus Christ himself crucified and dead for us), and so with all the benefits obtained and acquired by the death of Jesus Christ, and at the same time their mutual charity among themselves."[1] The Helv. Conf. ii. distinguishes two kinds of eating, the physical eating and spiritual eating. Of the former it says: "By this kind of eating the Capernaites once understood that the flesh of the Lord was to be given to them to eat, but they are refuted by John 6." Ang. Art. xxviii.: "The body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten in the Supper, only after a heavenly and spiritual manner; and the mean whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is faith."

Additional Sacraments

The Roman Church adds five Sacraments to the two of Scripture—Orders, Confirmation, Penance, Matrimony, Extreme Unction. During the earlier Middle Ages the number was

[1] Winer, p. 265.

variously stated at five, ten, and even thirty, the term being used in a wide sense. At last the number was fixed at seven. Orders and Matrimony are not binding on all, and so would seem to lack one essential of a sacramental act. Where the scriptural authority for the five additional sacraments is, it is hard to say. Penance, as the means by which all sin after baptism is removed, is of high import. It covers the whole of Christian life. On the penitent's contrition, confession, and satisfaction, the priest pronounces the absolution which sets free from sin's guilt and power. The satisfaction consists of temporal penalties imposed by the priest, which may be commuted for fasting, prayer, and almsgiving. Indulgences mitigate these penalties. It is strange that while marriage is made sacramental, celibacy is extolled as a condition of the highest saintly life. An important part of the definition of a sacrament is the distinction between form and matter. Thus, in the eucharist the form is the formula of consecration, the matter the elements. But what the distinction is in other sacraments, as matrimony, is not always clear. Christianity according to this doctrine is a great sacramental system. All grace comes from God to man through this channel.[1]

[S. C. Malan, *The Two Holy Sacraments;* Candlish, *The Sacraments;* Fisher, *Hist. Christian Doctrine, passim;* Gregory, *Handbook of Scriptural Church Principles,* part i. pp. 32–78; Dale, *Manual of Congregational Principles,* pp. 121–164.]

[1] Pope, *Comp.* iii. 307; H. B. Swete, *England v. Rome.*

CHAPTER V

THE LAST THINGS

Sec. 1.—The Intermediate State

The Hebrew Sheol and the Greek Hades (the invisible, the world of spirits) represent the same idea. It is only in accordance with the law of development running through revelation, that the doctrine of a future state should be taught less distinctly in the earlier than in the later Scriptures. Accordingly we find that Sheol is, so to speak, undifferentiated. It is spoken of as the common home of the righteous and the wicked; whereas in the New Testament Hades divides into Paradise and Gehenna.[1] "Paradise" occurs in Luke 23^{43}, 2 Cor. 12^{4}, Rev. 2^{7} (Abraham's bosom, Luke 16^{22}). Hades, then, sometimes means the unseen state generally, sometimes one of its two divisions, Luke 16^{23}, Acts 2^{31}. Though the two divisions are not mentioned in the Old Testament, they are implied there in the differing character and destiny of the righteous and the wicked.

Man's existence after death is one of the presuppositions of religion. No people have been found without religion, and no religion without a doctrine of immortality in some form. There is no difference in this respect between civilised and barbarian. In the great religions of ancient Egypt, Babylon, Persia, India, Greece, immortality played a large part; in Egypt the doctrine

[1] Hades occurs twelve times in the New Testament (Matt. 11^{23}, 16^{18}, Luke 10^{15}, 16^{23}, Acts $2^{27.\ 31}$, 1 Cor. 15^{55}, Rev. 1^{18}, 3^{7}, 6^{8}, $20^{13.\ 14}$); so Gehenna (Matt. $5^{22.\ 29.\ 30}$, 10^{28}, 18^{9}, $23^{13.\ 15}$, Mark $9^{43.\ 45.\ 47}$, Luke 12^{5}, Jas. 3^{6}). Other phrases also are used for Gehenna.

overshadowed every other one. Religion is as inconceivable without it as without God. "Immortality is the corollary of religion. If there be religion, that is, if God be, there is immortality, not of the soul, but of the whole personal being of man, Ps. 16[9-11]." [1] On the supposition that the Old Testament contained no such doctrine, Kant refused to call its faith a religion.[2] Dr. Tylor says: "Looking at the religion of the lower races as a whole, we shall at least not be ill-advised in taking as one of its general and principal elements the doctrine of the soul's future life." [3]

The opinion that the doctrine of immortality is not found in the Old Testament is a very strange one. Certainly it is not found in the form which it takes among us. There is no abstract idea of an immaterial soul. The antithesis is not that of body and soul, but of flesh and spirit.[4] What the Hebrew looked for as the ultimate state of man, was not a disembodied existence, but the existence of "the whole personal being of man," *i.e.* flesh and spirit in one, or, as we say, body and soul. The idea of resurrection, instead of being a late importation into the Old Testament, pervades the whole book, although it only appears definitely towards the close. In Heb. 11[17-19], faith in a resurrection is ascribed to Abraham. In Matt. 22[23] Christ says that the familiar title "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" involved the thought of resurrection, because the Hebrew expected the restoration of the whole man." "Gathered to his fathers" or "people" is a familiar phrase for death, implying that the fathers are living, Gen. 25[8 f.], 35[29], 49[29. 33], Deut. 32[50], Num. 20[24], 1 Kings 2[10]; the phrase for burial is different, Gen. 35[29]. The translations of Enoch (Gen. 5[24]) and Elijah (2 Kings 2[11]) confirm the faith. In Job 14[13-15] and

[1] Davidson, *Comm. on Job*, p. 296. The description refers to the Old Testament doctrine.

[2] Salmond, *Christian Doctr. of Immortality*, p. 228. Schopenhauer says the same, p. 230.

[3] Salmond, p. 579.

[4] See Orr, *Christian View of God and World*, p. 162.

19[25-27] faith in a future state and probably in a resurrection is strongly avowed.[1] In the latter passage "in my flesh" and "away from my flesh" are both possible translations. "The Hebrew faith of Immortality—never a belief in the mere existence of the soul after death, for the lowest popular superstition assumed this—was a faith that the dark and mysterious event of death should not interrupt the life of the person with God enjoyed in this world" (Davidson, p. 294). Raisings of the dead by Elijah, 1 Kings 17[21], and Elisha, 2 Kings 4[34], illustrate the doctrine. Eccles. 12[7] draws a sharp distinction between the fate of the spirit and that of the body. It seems to us impossible to explain away the references to the doctrine in Ps. 16[8-11], 17[15], 49[14 f.], 73[24]. Passages like Hos. 6[2], 13[14], Isa. 26[19], Ezek. 37[1-10], show that the idea of resurrection, even if only in reference to the nation, was a familiar one. In Dan. 12[2] the resurrection of individuals, both righteous and wicked, is affirmed.

It will not be denied that existence after death both of the good and evil is taught far more plainly in the New Testament. There is nothing to suggest that it was a new doctrine. It is still more closely bound up with the doctrine of the resurrection. The New Testament simply "illuminates" the old truth, 1 Tim. 1[10].

That the doctrine of a future state and resurrection, including the blessedness of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked, formed part of the Jewish faith at the time of Christ, is certain. The doctrine of retribution in the apocryphal and apocalyptic books of the second and first centuries B.C. and the first century A.D. was a very harsh one, contrasting greatly in its lurid, detailed character with the reticence of the New Testament. While the fundamental ideas are the same, the contrast in spirit is very great.[2]

In Dr. Beet's essays on the subject[3] all this is of course

[1] Orr, *Christian View of God and World*, p. 234.

[2] See Salmond, p. 358 ff.; Charles, *Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish, and Christian*, chs. v.–viii.

[3] *Expositor*, 1901.

maintained—the survival after death of good and bad, the resurrection, the two states. The one point of divergence is whether the soul is essentially immortal, (in other words) whether immortality is endless by necessity of nature. That Scripture teaches this is denied. The practical point of interest is whether the wicked are immortal in the same sense as the righteous, or whether the final destiny of the wicked is left uncertain. Further reference will be made to the subject. But here we may observe that we should be greatly surprised if Scripture pronounced dogmatically on such a subject. As on other subjects, the mind of Scripture must be learnt by implication. Man exists, he continues to exist after death, after the resurrection and the judgment; this holds true of both the righteous and the wicked. It is for the objector to prove any difference between the two classes. According to the law of continuance, which Bishop Butler says is our only reason for believing that anything will continue to exist longer, what exists will continue to do so unless some reason to the contrary is shown.[1] Dr. Beet does not argue that Scripture teaches the contrary, but only that the matter is left in doubt. We hope to show afterwards that this is not so. Dr. Beet suggests further that the idea of the endless existence of the soul by nature came into Christian thought from Plato's teaching. We venture to think that nothing that is adduced proves this contention. In the extracts given from early Christian writers, only one, Tertullian, refers to Plato by name, and that incidentally. The proof that other writers, like Justin and Augustine, derived the idea from Plato, is drawn merely from the supposition that they must have been acquainted with Plato's teaching. No doubt they were familiar with thoughts that were matters of common knowledge then. No educated man in those days would be ignorant of Plato's teaching. But their reference to Plato and their use of his arguments are no more a proof that they drew the doctrine itself from him, than my reference to a writer proves a similar indebtedness on my part. If this idea were derived

[1] *Analogy*, pt. 1, ch. i.

from Plato, we should expect other peculiar Platonic ideas to be borrowed, such as the pre-existence of souls, "their number, the work of the Demiurgus in their formation, the place of each in its own peculiar star, the relation of the soul to the world-soul, its single or tripartite nature, its distribution in the body, its visible, spectral form, its retributive attraction to the bodies of beasts, birds, and insects,"[1] but they are not. Strange that one point should be selected and the rest omitted. In a similar way Augustine constantly used the Platonist arguments for the existence of God; but he did not borrow the idea from Plato or his school.

No subject occupied thoughtful men in pre-Christian antiquity more than immortality. But it cannot be said that the best result of reflection and reasoning amounts to more than hope, and that for the most part dim and faint. Socrates speaks with two voices, the note of confidence is absent. Aristotle is silent on the subject. Cicero, who avowedly copies Plato, alternates between hope and doubt. The Roman world—Lucretius, Horace, Pliny, Cato, the Stoics generally — was negative. Plato's reasoning from the nature of the soul and the desert of virtue is the best of the kind that the ancient world supplies. It touches one to feel that he wishes to believe and would welcome any clear warrant for doing so. But his arguments are of a very mixed kind, and at least leave us in suspense.[2] Our arguments from reason and experience would take a different shape. We should reason from the greatness of man's rational and moral nature, as that nature is better understood now; from the disproportion between man's capacity and the brevity of life, from the growth in excellence to the end of life, from the soul's independence of and rule over the body, from the absolute worth of moral character, from the moral inequalities of life.[3] But neither these arguments nor any others give us certainty; they can only serve to confirm

[1] Salmond, p. 149.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 141.
[3] Orr, *Christian View*, p. 177.

the truth otherwise ascertained.[1] Revelation alone gives certainty. This it does, we hold, even in the ancient Scriptures, although to a less degree than in the New. Christ's teaching and resurrection raise the hope of immortality to certitude.

Purgatory

The Roman Church adds a third division to Hades. According to it, the good, with rare exceptions, before entering Paradise, must be perfected by the suffering of Purgatory. This state is only for the good, *i.e.* those who die in a state of salvation. There is no evidence in Scripture for the idea, but much against it. The fire of 1 Cor. $3^{12\text{-}15}$ is different in nature and purpose. It is not for all Christians, but for Christian builders, to test and judge the quality of their work; it is the fire of the Judgment, while Purgatory precedes Judgment; in short, it is evidently a figure of speech for the final Judgment.[2] Scripture speaks of the immediate happiness of the dead in Christ, Luke 16^{22}, 23^{43}, 2 Cor. $5^{6.\,8}$. Surely ordinary Christians, after a long life of growth in grace, are as fit for heaven as the penitent thief, or as Lazarus in the parable. Besides, unlimited efficacy is ascribed in Scripture to the blood of Christ, Eph. 1^{7}, Heb. 10^{14}, 1 John 1^{7}. If, indeed, the existence of such a middle state were taught in Scripture, we might say that its cleansing power is derived from the atonement, as we say of the means used in the present state; but when no such doctrine is taught, we can only regard the state as a work of supererogation. It undertakes to do what there is already ample provision for.

Prayers for dead believers are intelligible on the supposition of belief in purgatory, but not otherwise. Prayers for the dead generally are intelligible only on the supposition of belief in

[1] "For my part I believe in the immortality of the soul, not in the sense in which I accept the demonstrable truths of science, but as a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God's work," Fiske in Salmond, p. 186.

[2] H. B. Swete, *England* v. *Rome*, p. 80 (Rivingtons).

probation after death. If neither of these suppositions is scriptural, the ground for them falls away. The case of Onesiphorus in 2 Tim. 1^{18} is insufficient as evidence; the wish is expressed in the most general terms. Prayer for the dead was undoubtedly practised in early times, as is seen in Augustine's Confessions in Monica's dying request for her son's prayers; but there is no reference to the practice in earlier days. Many members of the Anglican Church contend for it as permissible.

A passage in the Apocrypha (2 Macc. $12^{42\text{-}45}$) intimates a belief of the Jews in forgiveness after death. Dr. Swete says: "This proves, indeed, that the Jews of the Maccabean period believed in remission of sins after death, but not that their tradition was a true one." This is one of a multitude of Jewish notions which the New Testament entirely ignores. Clement of Alexandria speaks of a spiritual fire in the present life. Origen transferred it to the next life; but he uses the idea to support, not a Roman purgatory, but universalism. Augustine is indefinite on the subject. Gregory the Great, in the sixth century, was the first to teach purgatory in the full sense. And from his day the doctrine grew in definiteness and influence. In the Middle Ages no doctrine exerted greater power over Christian thought and life. The frightful abuses of Indulgences grew up in connection with it. Other means of alleviating and shortening the cleansing process, are charity, prayer, and especially Masses for the dead. The fire is generally regarded as corporeal, as well as penal and purifying. From the nature of the doctrine, it must assume a chief place wherever it is received. It was adopted first at the Council of Florence, at which both the Greek and Latin Churches were represented, in 1443, and finally at Trent. To-day, however, the Greek Church rejects the doctrine, while retaining the practice of prayers for the dead. Some Lutheran divines adopt the notion of a semi-purgatory, extending it even to a probation for the wicked (Martensen, Kahnis, Dorner).[1]

[1] Blunt's *Dict. Theol.* art. "Purgatory."

Sec. 2.—Christ's Second Coming

The second coming is mentioned in the three creeds. It is often referred to in Scripture, and clearly formed, as preliminary to the Judgment, a more frequent subject of apostolic than it does of modern preaching. It is described as the *παρουσία*, *ἐπιφανεία* (2 Thess. 2^{8}), *ἀποκάλυψις* (2 Thess. 1^{7}, 1 Cor. 1^{7}). The time is, "that day" (Matt. 7^{22}), "the great day" (Jude ^{6}), "last day" (John 6^{39}), "day of the Lord" (1 Cor. 1^{8}, 5^{5}), recalling an Old Testament phrase. See also Acts 1^{11}, $3^{20.\,21}$, Rev. 1^{7}. The time is secret (Acts 1^{7}, Mark 13^{32}); the manner sudden (Matt. $24^{27.\,39.\,44}$). The destruction of Jerusalem is treated as a preliminary coming ($24^{34.\,35}$).

There are several events, spoken of as preceding the Second Advent, which it is not easy to adjust together. St. Paul seems to foretell a general conversion of the Jews, leading to a general conversion of the Gentiles (Rom. $11^{15.\,25}$). And Scripture in many places seems to justify the Christian presentiment which anticipates the conversion of mankind. Yet the same apostle foretells a great apostasy as coming before the Advent, 2 Thess. 1^{8}, $2^{3.\,4}$. His Man of Sin and Lawless One is evidently St. John's Antichrist (1 John $2^{18.\,22}$, 4^{3}). Here we have a critical example of the difficulty of expounding prophecy before the time of fulfilment.

Some have thought that the apostles expected the Second Advent to take place soon, using the supposed mistake as an argument against the doctrine of inspiration. Even some orthodox writers think the evidence too strong to be gainsaid. The evidence is really far from strong. The language of passages like Phil. 4^{5}, 1 Pet. 4^{7}, 1 John 2^{18}, might be used at any time. 2 Thess. 2^{2} expressly warns against the notion "that the day of Christ is at hand." This passage shows that the notion existed among the Thessalonians, as is evident also from 1 Thess. $4^{15\text{-}17}$. But the apostle, so far from sharing, disclaims the view. In the phrase, "we which are alive," the apostle, in his usual vivid style, identifies himself with those who shall

be found alive at the Second Coming, and speaks in their name.

Pre-Millenarianism

Millenarianism or Chiliasm is a certain scheme of the Second Advent. At Christ's coming the just only are raised from the dead; they reign with Christ on earth a thousand years (the binding of Satan): then the wicked are raised, Satan is unloosed, and the Last Judgment takes place. The chief points are the two resurrections and the thousand years' visible reign on earth. The whole theory is taken from Rev. 20^{1-10}, and is established if that passage is meant to be taken literally. But is it? All probability is against the notion. The account is part of a description which overflows with highly-wrought symbol and imagery. No one dreams of taking the rest of the description literally; and yet it would be as reasonable to do so as to take this literally. An even stronger objection is, that it is impossible to fit the two chief points of the theory—the interval between the two resurrections and the visible earthly reign—into the other descriptions of the same events, descriptions which are free from figure and symbol. The references to the subject elsewhere are frequent and full,—John $5^{28.\,29}$, 6^{40}, Matt. 25, 1 Cor. 15, 2 Cor. 5^{9-11}, Acts 17^{31}, Rom. 2^{16}, 2 Pet. 3^{8-13}, 1 Thess. 4^{13-18},—yet they give no suggestion or hint of these important features. St. Paul, indeed, says, "The dead in Christ shall rise first" (1 Thess. 4^{16}), but the meaning of the "first" is, before the living are changed.

The theory is of a material cast, and is indeed a recurrence to the temporal views of the Jews and the first disciples. It supposes that spiritual means have failed or only partially succeeded; Christ has at last to rely on an overwhelming manifestation of power and to overcome all opposition by sheer force. We may well ask, "Having begun in the Spirit, are ye now made perfect in the flesh?" If such means are to be used at all, why not at first? Why allow the long triumph of evil, if it is to be put

down at last by sheer power? If the theory has not its root in despair at the slow progress of truth and the slow success of spiritual means, it finds its chief support in such a feeling.

Indeed, historically, it is not improbable that the theory had a Jewish origin. Among its first teachers are writers like Hermas, Barnabas, Papias, who betray strong Jewish leanings. It is found also in Justin, Irenæus, Methodius, Lactantius. It disappeared when Christianity finally triumphed over heathenism. Generally speaking, it flourishes most in days of religious conflict and depression. There was very little of it during the Middle Ages. It revived at the Reformation in Anabaptism and the Fifth-Monarchy men. Since then, Millenarianism has been advocated in a purer form and on more intelligent grounds by very good men. It characterises the Evangelical School of the Anglican Church. Bengel, Irving, and many other German and English divines have held or favoured it.[1]

Some good remarks on the subject will be found in a special note by Dr. Milligan in Schaff's *Popular Commentary*, p. 488.[2] The points he puts are as follows:—"If we interpret the thousand years literally, it will be a solitary example of a literal use of numbers in the Apocalypse, and this objection alone is fatal." How also will the glorified body of believers fit in with a non-glorified earth? "The great difficulty, however, presented by this view of the millennium, arises from the teaching of Scripture elsewhere upon the points involved in it. We are not entitled to separate between believers and unbelievers, for it cannot be denied that the New Testament always brings the *Parousia* and the general judgment into the closest possible connection. When Christ comes again, it is to perfect the happiness of all his saints, and to make all his enemies his footstool. The idea of masses of the nations continuing to be Christ's enemies for years or ages after he has come, is not only entirely novel, but is at variance with everything we are taught

[1] *Christ's Second Coming: will it be Pre-Millennial?* Dr. D. Brown (Clark).

[2] See also his Baird Lecture, *The Revelation of St. John* (Macmillan).

by the other sacred writers upon the point." The "first resurrection" of Rev. 20 is a state, not an act. The word "this" (ver. 5) refers to the whole of the previous description. "The writer is not thinking of any first act of rising in contrast with a second act of the same kind. He is describing the condition of certain persons in comparison with others, after an act of rising, predicable of them both, has taken place." "The thousand years are not a period of time at all. They represent that victory of the Lord over Satan which is shared by his people in him, and they complete the picture of that glorious condition in which believers have all along really been, but which only now reaches its highest point, and is revealed as well as possessed. The saints 'died' when they believed, and entered into a divine life, but are 'hid with Christ in God.' At the manifestation of Christ at his Second Coming, they also are manifested with him in glory."

Sec. 3.—The General Resurrection

The doctrine is contained in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. There are plain intimations of it in the Old Testament, Isa. 26^{19}, Dan. 12^{2}, Job 19^{25}. It is frequently and emphatically taught by Christ and the apostles, Luke $20^{35\text{-}37}$, John $5^{28\,f.}$, 6^{39}, 11, Acts 17^{18}, 1 Cor. 6^{14}, 15. It is in exact keeping with the uniform view of man's nature in Old and New Testaments, for Scripture does not divide man into heterogeneous parts, but contemplates him as a unity, in which the body has an integral, permanent place. As the instrument of good and evil, the body is to share in the final awards, 2 Cor. 5^{10}. The New Testament always does high honour to the body, making it the temple of the Holy Ghost, Rom. 6^{19}, 12^{1}, 1 Cor. $6^{15.\,19.\,20}$, 9^{27}. This is in contrast with the Greek contempt for the body as a clog and prison of the soul.[1] The resurrection of "the body," or "the flesh" (as the earliest forms of the Apostles' Creed have the phrase) is not a Scripture expression. Scripture speaks of

[1] Salmond, *ibid.* 574 f.

the resurrection of "the dead," Rom. 1^4, 1 Cor. 15^{13}, etc.; but many passages show that bodily resurrection, like Christ's, is included. The resurrection of the wicked is affirmed by Paul, Acts 24^{15}.

There have always been two tendencies of thought in the Church as to the nature of the resurrection body and its relation to the present body, one making the identity more literal than the other. The Eastern Church, represented by Origen, held a freer, more spiritual view. The Western Church generally held a more literal view (Tertullian, Lactantius, Jerome, Augustine). Scripture, while teaching the identity, indicates that the change will be great, passing our comprehension. All the statements and hints in 1 Cor. 15 point in this direction. The comparison of the seed and grain, the reference to the different kinds of body, the contrasts of weakness and power, corruption and incorruption, dishonour and glory, the natural (psychical) and spiritual, point to a great transformation, a glorifying, transfiguring of the material. Modern science has given wonderful revelations respecting the latent capacities of matter. "If there is a natural (psychical) body, there is also a spiritual," 1 Cor. 15^{44}. Our Lord's is the pattern of the glorified body of the saints, Phil. 3^{21}. There is a connection between the resurrection and the spirit dwelling in believers, Rom. 8^{11}.[1] Christ's risen body had evidently undergone great changes, and yet it was recognised as the same, John 20, 21. The changes in our body during life, show that its identity does not depend on the sameness of the constituent parts.[2]

Lutheran divines lay great stress on the glorification of the body, as a pledge and earnest of the glorification of all nature, which they find in Rom. $8^{19\text{-}23}$. The natural interpretation of the words is certainly in their favour, and there are other hints of a great physical transformation, 2 Pet. $3^{11\text{-}13}$, Rev. 21^{1}.[3]

[1] Salmond, *ibid.* p. 552.
[2] Orr, *Christian View*, p. 381.
[3] Jackson, *Works*, Bk. xi. chs. xiii.–xvi.

Sec. 4.—The Last Judgment

The doctrine is found in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, and is exceedingly prominent in the New Testament. In all the descriptions given of the Judgment, it is represented as universal, Matt. 25^{32}, Heb. 9^{27}, and yet individual, Rom. 2^{6}, 2 Cor. 5^{10}. The person of the Judge, fitted for his office by divine and human attributes, is specially noted, John $5^{22.\ 27}$, Acts 17^{31}, Rom. 2^{16}. The divine character is the supreme guarantee for the rectitude of the judgment, Gen. 18^{25}. It will be according to men's deserts, Rom. 2^{6}, 2 Cor. 5^{10}. Rom. $2^{12\text{-}14}$ gives a significant glimpse into the rules of the final Judgment. Men's knowledge and opportunity will be strictly regarded. "As many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law." They who sin perish, and the nature of the sin measures the punishment. There are "many stripes" and "few stripes," Luke $12^{47.\ 48}$. These Scripture principles afford far more effectual relief in all questionings respecting the future of our fellow-creatures than arbitrary theories of our own.

Sec. 5.—Eternal Life and Death

(*a*) *Blessedness of the Righteous*

Happily on this subject there is no controversy. With one mind believers "rejoice in hope of the glory of God." God's word of power is the ground of their security; see Ps. $16^{8\text{-}11}$, 73^{24}, John $10^{28\ f.}$, $11^{25\ f.}$, $14^{3.\ 19}$, 17^{24}, Rom. 8^{35}, 1 Pet. 1^{5}, 1 John 3^{2}, Jude ^{24}, etc. The life which they receive is much more than immortal existence. It is the perfected life of likeness to and fellowship with God. It is eternal in its own nature.

The chief point to be remembered in respect to the nature of this blessedness, is the continuity of the present with the future life. The present is to the future as the sowing to the reaping,

Gal. $6^{7.8}$. As the service is moral, so the reward is moral, Matt. 25^{21}, Rom. 2^{7}, 2 Tim. $4^{7.8}$, Rev. 2^{10}. The future reward is often spoken of comprehensively as life, eternal life; and yet it is certain that this life is already enjoyed, John 3^{36}, 1 John $5^{11.12}$. It can only be, then, a higher degree of all that constitutes religious character and happiness at present. This view is confirmed by another favourite phrase for the heavenly state, "glory" (Heb. 2^{10}, Col. 3^{4}, John 17^{24}, Rom. 5^{2}, 8^{18}, 2 Cor. 4^{17}), which can only mean the sum of moral and spiritual perfection, the perfect development of every capacity, the perfect satisfaction of every desire. The gorgeous imagery of Rev. 21 needs a spiritual interpretation, which only vision can perfectly give. It is significant that material creation is ransacked for images of beauty and splendour. Yet some of the simple statements of Scripture say even more to the devout heart, for in speaking of spiritual gifts and joys they speak of what is matter of present experience, Ps. 17^{15}, John $14^{2.3}$, 17^{24}, 1 Cor. 13^{12}, Eph. 4^{27}, Phil. 1^{23}, 3^{14}, 1 John 3^{2}.

> My knowledge of that life is small,
> The eye of faith is dim;
> But 'tis enough that Christ knows all,
> And I shall be with him.

The perfection is individual, including the bodily (Phil. 3^{21}, 1 Cor. 15) and mental powers (1 Cor. 13^{12}), and social. That is the perfected kingdom of God, the scene of perfect service and perfect rest (Rev. 7^{14-17}). Cicero's beautiful anticipation, one of the noblest utterances of the heathen world on the subject, will be more than realised: "O glorious day, when I shall depart to that divine assembly and gathering of souls, and when I shall quit this scene of disorder and corruption! For I shall depart not only to those men of whom I have spoken before, but also to my Cato, than whom no better man was ever born, none more eminent in goodness; whose body was burnt by me—while mine rather should have been burnt by him—but his soul not forsaking me, but with back-

ward glance departed verily whither he saw that I myself must come: which calamity I seemed to bear bravely, not that I bore it with calm soul, but I comforted myself with the thought that no great interval of time would separate us. But if I err in believing that the souls of men are immortal, I err willingly, nor would I have this error, in which I delight, torn from me while I live; if, however, when dead I perceive nothing, as some minute philosophers[1] suppose, I am not afraid lest dead philosophers should deride me," *De Senect.* xxiii.

(*b*) *Eternal Punishment*

No one who knows the spirit of the New Testament will be surprised to find that much less is said about the future destiny of the wicked than of the righteous; much is left obscure. The reserve may even seem excessive. Both the amount and nature of what is said are regulated by practical ends, by regard for religion in the present life. At the same time, enough is said to give certainty respecting the main issues.

In Matt. $25^{31\text{-}46}$ Christ is treating expressly and formally on the subject, and says: "These shall go away into eternal[2] punishment; but the righteous into eternal life." "Eternal punishment" is evidently equivalent to "eternal fire," ver. 41. It is difficult to see how the equality of duration between the two issues can be evaded. To say that the permanence of life is insured by the character of the righteous and their fellowship with God, thus making "eternal" superfluous, is true but irrelevant here. If the adjective had not been used, the permanence of the lot of the righteous would only have been our inference. It might then have been said that we could not conclude from one case to the other. To give the word two different meanings in the same passage is unwarranted. If Christ had used the word in two different senses, he would

[1] The Epicureans. Bp. Berkeley's *Minute Philosopher*.

[2] See Note at the end.

surely have given some intimation of the change. "To say that the adjective has one sense in the first half of the sentence and another in the second, is the counsel of despair" (Salmond). To deny to the noun κόλασις the sense of "punishment" is the same.[1] Worse still is the suggestion that the passage is not Christ's, but was added by the evangelist. This is pure conjecture without warrant of any sort. The same method might be used to get rid of any passage in the New Testament which a reader objects to. Meyer says on Matt. 25[46]: "The idea of eternal punishment (κόλασις as in 2 Macc. 4[38], Wis. 16[24]) is not to be got rid of either by a popular minimising of the sense of *aiōnios* (Paulus) or by appealing (de Wette, Schleierm.) to the biblical expression fire and to the incompatibility of the idea of the eternal with the idea of evil and its punishment, or to the monitory aim of the statement, but is here confirmed exegetically (cf. 3[12], 18[8]) by the contrasted 'eternal life' (cf. Dan. 12[2]), by which endless life in Messiah's kingdom is meant." Prebendary Row conjectures that "punishment" may by mistake or accident have taken the place of "fire," *Fut. Retrib.* p. 268. So also Mr. White (Salmond, p. 621). The passage is supported by other sayings of Christ.

Luke 16[26]: "Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed, that they which would pass from hence to you may not be able, and that none may cross over from them to us." The possibility of conversion after death is excluded. It is true that the description is parabolical. Still the main features must be true to fact. The picture of Judgment in Matt. 25 also has parabolical features, and yet it describes facts.

Mark 9[43. 45. 47], Matt. 5[29 f.], 18[8 f.], are parallel passages. "Hell (*gehenna*), hell fire, eternal fire, the undying worm, and unquenchable fire," are equivalent and explain one another. They must also be equivalent to and explain "eternal punishment" in Matt. 25. The "worm and fire" are figurative, but they must point to dreadful realities. It is remarkable that

[1] Salmond, p. 385. See 1 John 4[18]. Another strange course is to make "eternal punishment" cover annihilation.

these sayings are Christ's, and are found in the synoptic Gospels, one of them in the Sermon on the Mount. The plainest, sternest words on the subject came from Christ's lips, and are part of the synoptic teaching. Matt. 10^{28} compared with Luke 12^{5} shows that "cast into hell" (*gehenna*) is equivalent to "destroy both soul and body in hell" (*gehenna*), indicating also what "destroy" means and does not mean. In Jude ^{6,7} ἀΐδιος and αἰώνιος are treated as equivalent.

In Mark 3^{29} he who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit, *i.e.* who deliberately rejects the only means of salvation, is declared to be "guilty of an eternal sin," a remarkable phrase. This phrase is explained in the parallel passage, Matt. 12^{32}, in these terms: "It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in that which is to come." To make this passage teach indirectly that other sins may be forgiven hereafter, is to put force on the language. The words are a well-known Jewish way of stating the impossibility of forgiveness. "This world and that which is to come" meant to the Jew all time, present and future. See also Matt. 7^{23}, 18^{6}, 26^{24}, John 7^{34}.

The general strain of Christ's teaching in such parables as the Tares, the Net, the Marriage Feast, the Wise and Foolish Virgins, the Talents and Pounds, conveys the same idea of finality in the issues of the present life (Matt. $13^{24\text{-}30.\ 37\text{-}43}$). The general strain of the entire New Testament is to the same effect. All is made to turn on the present life and its decisions. The urgency of immediate repentance, the absolute evil of sin, the absolute value of redemption, are everywhere suggested. The force of these ideas is never weakened by any reference to probation and conversion after death.

St. Paul speaks of "punishment, eternal destruction" (2 Thess. 1^{9}), the second phrase explaining the first. If destruction means extinction, what need to add "eternal"? The different phrases used to describe the doom of the wicked—"death" (Rom. 6^{21}), "perdition" (ἀπώλεια, Phil. 3^{19}), "destruction" (ὄλεθρος, 2 Thess. 1^{9}), "the wrath to come" (1 Thess. 1^{10}), "wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish" (Rom. 2^{8})—

must be used synonymously. If there is no consciousness of the wrath, how is it punishment?

Nothing is said in Scripture respecting the nature of future punishment. The worm and the fire are figures of speech, Mark 8^{48}.

The law of causation, as active in the moral as in the natural world, throws much light on the subject, Gal. 6^{8}. By the action of habit, character becomes finally fixed. The hardening, corrupting tendencies of sin work with fearful rapidity. In this life the effects of evil-doing are final. Moral ruin, perdition, death is complete. Whether all punishment of sin follows by sequence of cause and effect, we do not know, but much does. Probation is a law of the present life. Character and destiny are largely decided in early life. Scripture teaches that as childhood and youth are a probation for after years, so the whole of this life is for the future life. As men in early life may waste opportunities and sow the seed of ruin, so they may act in regard to the future state. Time is the sowing, eternity the harvest. There are preliminary judgments in this world, John 3^{19}.

If the eternal existence of evil is a mystery, its existence at all is scarcely a less mystery. But there is a great difference between sin apparently often triumphant and sin adequately punished and finally vanquished, between the imperfect and the perfect vindication of divine righteousness. Then man's faith in God and righteousness will be fully justified.

It is often alleged that the ordinary doctrine implies that the majority of mankind will be lost, but it is not so. Christ put aside a question as to the number of the saved, Luke 13^{23}. Scripture everywhere teaches that responsibility will be measured by knowledge, Rom. $1^{18\text{-}23}$, $2^{12\text{-}15}$. Heathen and Christian will not be judged by the same rule in this respect, Matt. 11^{21}. Condemnation is greatest where the light is fullest. The descriptions of judgment in the full sense in the New Testament apply only to those possessed of the full light of revelation. The degrees of responsibility and guilt must be very great, and such as divine knowledge alone can discriminate.

Our interpretation is borne out on the whole by what we know of Jewish belief in Christ's day. There are expressions in Jewish writers which, if they stood alone, might be understood as pointing to annihilation, but they are explained by far more explicit passages which exclude it. The same might be said of Scripture language. Certain expressions and passages, if they stood alone, might be interpreted in the sense of annihilation; but they are explained by passages of another tenor and by the general drift of Scripture teaching.[1] Restorationism finds no countenance in ancient Jewish thought.

Other Theories

Annihilationism or *Conditional Immortality.* According to this theory man is naturally mortal; immortality is a gift of redemption and belongs only to the believer in Christ. Amid many differences of opinion, the school generally holds that the soul survives death, lives in the intermediate state, and only perishes at a longer or shorter period after the Final Judgment.

Attempts are made to prove that this was the general belief of the earliest Christian days, and that it was displaced later through the influence of philosophy; but the attempts fail. Arnobius (4th cent.) is the only writer who can be proved to hold the view in question. Other early Christian writers may sometimes write ambiguously or inconsistently; they often use simply the Scripture expressions *perish, die,* without further explanation; but other passages show plainly that they held the opposite view. Justin Martyr writes more uncertainly in some places, but even his position is not doubtful.[2] The doctrine has been revived in modern days. The names of E. White, Heard, Petavel, Rothe, Constable, Row are identified with it.

The strongest argument for the doctrine on Scripture ground

[1] Salmond, *ibid.* p. 359 ff.

[2] Donaldson says: "Justin believed in the eternity of the punishment of the wicked," in Salmond, p. 596.

is the insistence on the literal meaning of life and death, destruction, perdition, and similar words. But nothing can be more certain than the fact that Scripture constantly uses these terms in the moral sense, and nothing can be more natural. Inevitably these terms soon acquire such higher meanings, and they are constantly so used. Life is more than existence; but annihilationism would take us back to the bald literal sense. The lost son was *dead*, *perished*, Luke 15^{24}. Christ came "to seek and to save that which was *lost*," Luke 19^{10}. "You did he quicken when ye were *dead* through your trespasses and sins" (Eph. 2^{1}), not dying, or doomed to death, or on the way to death. Here, as in the lost son, death was consistent with abundant consciousness and activity. "She that giveth herself to pleasure is *dead* while she liveth," 1 Tim. 5^{6}; see Hosea 4^{6}, 12^{9}. Eternal life is defined in John 17^{3} as knowledge of the true God and Jesus Christ. A believer passes "out of death into life," John 5^{24}. "I came that they may have life" (John 10^{10}), although they have existence already. This life is a present possession, John 3^{36}, 1 John 5^{12}, indicating that it consists in spiritual blessings. The contrast with the wrath of God, John 3^{36}, proves the same;[1] so in Dan. 12^{2} it is set in contrast to "shame and everlasting contempt." The same meaning is evident in St. Paul's ideas of dead to the law, dead to sin, alive to God and righteousness. Life is "the good of existence, and death is the opposite of this; not extinction of being, but existence apart from God and his favour, removal from the fellowship of God, as well as from the fellowship of the living on earth" (Salmond, p. 614). While St. John uses the terms "life" and "eternal life" to denote the sum of the blessings received by the believer, Paul uses both these terms and salvation, Rom. 6^{23}, 1^{16}. We know what salvation, as the opposite of ruin and destruction, is; it is forgiveness, peace with God, hope and joy; and ruin, destruction, must be the opposite. Thus, life and salvation on the one side, ruin, death, perdition on the other, are present experiences. The difference

[1] Rom. $2^{6\,ff.}$, "eternal life—wrath and indignation."

between the present and the future is the fixity of state hereafter. Spiritually men live and are saved now, are dead and lost and ruined now.[1] The future simply continues present salvation and ruin with the new element of finality.

This doctrine makes man by nature survive the shock of death, and apparently the Final Judgment. The worst is then over. If death does not destroy, what else is there to fear? "The notion of a soul immortal enough to live through death, but not immortal enough to live on for ever, is too childish to be entertained beyond the little school of literalists who delight in it. The world outside will be content to believe that that which proves its powers to live through death, claims its immortality."[2] If the soul is naturally mortal, we should expect it to die with the body. If it continues afterwards, it must be by special divine provision. Even supposing that the wicked live after death in order that in the subsequent probation, which is generally held by this school, they may have another chance of immortality, they are raised at the Judgment and continued in existence only in order to punishment.

The doctrine also makes a change in the constitution of man's nature follow as the effect of redemption. All the other gifts of redemption are spiritual qualities and graces. Indeed, some Conditionalists deprive the natural man of spirit altogether, or at least make spirit in him utterly dormant, and only bestowed or quickened through faith.

To say no more, the doctrine cannot be preached. Even those who hold it as matter of private theory, apparently as a means of comfort, abstain from preaching it. Instinct teaches us the danger of the belief.

[1] "I submit as the result of this induction—1, that there is absolutely no ground for identifying the words 'destroy, perish,' and their cognate forms, as used by the New Testament writers, with the cessation of conscious existence; 2, that as used by them they speak—(1) of a state of failure, ruin, frustration, not necessarily irremediable; and (2) of physical death."—Essay on Conditional Immortality in Plumptre's *Spirits in Prison*, p. 327, also p. 16.

[2] Baldwin Brown in Salmond, p. 610.

Universalism finds more acceptance in our day. Origen (3rd cent.) and Gregory of Nyssa (4th cent.) held universalism, and other writers of the Eastern Church are said to have leaned to it. It did not appear in the West till the Middle Ages, and then in connection with pantheism (Erigena). In modern days it has found widespread favour, being advocated by S. Cox and A. Jukes. Others like Maurice, Thomas Erskine, and Dean Farrar, favour the doctrine without formally adopting it. Martensen sees in Scripture the "antinomy" of universalism and eternal punishment.

Some of the passages quoted in support of the doctrine refer simply to God's universal purpose of grace, John 12^{32}, 1 Tim. 2^{4}, 4^{10}, Tit. 2^{10}. The realising of the purpose depends on conditions in man, which are referred to elsewhere. Rom. $5^{12\text{-}21}$, taken alone, teaches universalism; the conditions are left out of sight for the moment, but they appear in other passages. 1 Cor. 15^{22} is limited by the context to the righteous, or, if it refers to all men, affirms simply a bodily resurrection. The "regeneration" of Matt. 19^{28} means the renewal of the world in righteousness, the complete restoration of the world to its original state. The "restitution," Acts 3^{21}, refers to the same events. Phil. $2^{10\,f.}$, Eph. 1^{10}, Col. 1^{20}, are also adduced in support. These passages refer to the universal acknowledgment of Christ's supremacy and the restoration of the world to unity and harmony. But it is clear that these results can be brought about in other ways than by the conversion and salvation of all. The complete subjugation and disarming of the powers of evil, reducing them to impotence, will answer the same end in harmony with man's freedom. Meyer says that Paul's alleged universalism leaves "the constant teaching of the New Testament concerning everlasting perdition entirely untouched." B. Weiss writes: "A bringing back of the world of spirits hostile to God . . . is as far away from the biblical view as is also a need of redemption on the part of the angel-world, and therefore the author felt no need to guard his expressions against either of these thoughts. . . . Enough that they by

their subjection to Christ are stripped of any power which can injure the absolute dominion of Christ."[1] It is significant that the greatest exegetes feel themselves shut up to this position. In 1 Cor. $15^{24\text{-}28}$ Paul looks forward to the end of Christ's mediatorial kingdom, when the opposition of evil shall be utterly vanquished and the triumph of righteousness assured. When it is said that infinite truth and love must finally prevail, this can only mean that they ought to prevail, which is true of this life and yet is not realised. If men are to be saved in the next life, it must be freely; the possibility of refusal must still remain.

Dr. Salmond reminds us that the doctrine has against it the whole force of the term "eternal" as applied to the future of the impenitent.[2] Nothing can ever empty the term of the meaning of duration and of permanent duration. It is put in direct contrast to temporal, 2 Cor. 4^{18}, in relation to the highest subjects. It is applied to God, to his kingdom, his life, his rights. The fire, the punishment, the destruction, the sin are all called "eternal." Its use to express vast but limited duration in reference to things which in their nature are transitory, does not affect its predominant sense in reference to divine and spiritual things. Dr. Salmond agrees with Maurice that in St. John's phrase "eternal life" the adjective is qualitative, not temporal, expressing a certain kind of being. But this is an adapted, not the original sense. "It is the quantitative sense that is the primary sense. The idea of duration is the original idea. It is also the proper idea, and will be found to underlie most of the passages in which the ethical sense appears;" see John $6^{54.\,58}$, 10^{28}. "It is impossible, indeed, to carry the qualitative sense through the New Testament. There are many passages which it will not fit (2 Cor 5^{1}, 14^{17}, etc.). It is only when we take the quantitative sense as the fundamental sense that the different uses of the term explain themselves naturally. . . When the future life is in view, the idea of its nature associates

[1] Salmond, p. 643.

[2] His whole discussion should be consulted, p. 649.

itself with that of its measure, and the term comes to express the good as well as the permanence of the existence. What Maurice forgot was that in such cases the adjective takes its heightened sense from the object to which it is attached. It is the 'life' that gives its profound ethical sense to the 'eternal'; it is not the adjective that raises the life to that power" (p. 652).

Probation after death for the heathen, and for those in Christian lands who have had no adequate means of knowledge in this life, is held by Lutheran divines and by many in this country and America. Deans Plumptre and Farrar advocate it. The Scripture evidence for it is very slight. Elaborate arguments are founded on the obscure passages in 1 Pet. 3^{18-20}, 4^{6}. But until the interpretation is clearer, it is impossible to use these passages in proof of any doctrine.[1] The idea of a second probation is one way of meeting certain difficulties, but it may not be the only way. The New Testament undoubtedly lays all the stress of decision on the present life. Like the other two views, a second probation cannot be preached.

It is right to seek relief from our perplexities in every way consistent with Scripture and the facts of life. Relief may be found in the thought of the infinite degrees of guilt and penalty, in the natural sequence of sin and suffering, so that the sinner reaps only what he sows, in the moral and spiritual nature of sin's penalties, in the universal action of divine grace. We may freely rejoice that the doctrine of eternal retribution is preached without the harsh additions which were once general. On the other hand, we may not sacrifice the claims of the divine righteousness, the interests of the highest justice, and the prerogatives of human freedom, to our own views of the requirements of mercy and love. Some who would like to believe in universalism have been held back by a wholesome regard for freedom in man. If man cannot be forced into goodness in this life, the same applies to the future. Men can and do incur final ruin in this world; and they may do so hereafter, as long as their nature remains what it is.

[1] See Salmond, pp. 456, 475.

[Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality;* Fyfe, *The Hereafter;* Randles, *For Ever;* Plumptre, *The Spirits in Prison;* Dahle, *Life after Death.*]

NOTE ON "ETERNAL"

The adjective *αἰώνιος* is often represented as of utterly indefinite, ambiguous meaning. It is even questioned whether it means duration at all. If it does, it is alleged, it means merely indefinite duration, not necessarily or usually unlimited duration. Certainly it does not mean this or anything, necessarily. Meanings of words are governed much more by usage than derivation. How the temporal sense should be questioned is strange, seeing that the basis of the meaning of *αἰών* is duration.

On the second point, whether the usual meaning is indefinite or unlimited duration, it might be enough to ask, If this is not the New Testament word for eternal, what is? Is it *ἀΐδιος*? This only occurs in two passages, Rom. 1^{20} and Jude ^{6}. Will it be pretended that these are the only New Testament passages in which the idea occurs?

We are quite at a loss to discover the grounds for the charge of ambiguity brought against the word. If any one will examine the New Testament usage for himself, instead of trusting to general assertions, he will be in the same perplexity. The term occurs in the New Testament seventy-one times. Of these, in forty-four cases it qualifies "life," where it certainly means "eternal."[1] Or, if it does not, life is never so called. In relation to the present subject, it qualifies "fire" thrice (Matt. 18^{8}, 25^{41}, Jude ^{7}), punishment (Matt. 25^{46}), judgment (Mark 3^{29}, Heb. 6^{2}), destruction (2 Thess. 1^{9}). In other cases it describes "tabernacles" in future state (Luke 16^{9}),

[1] See *ante*, p. 307. It is possible that in St. John the term denotes the higher nature or order of life. But we understand Dr. Salmond to contend that the permanence follows as a necessary consequence of this higher nature.

redemption (Heb. 9^{12}), Spirit (Heb. 9^{14}), inheritance (Heb. 9^{15}), covenant (Heb. 13^{20}), salvation (Heb. 5^{9}), kingdom (2 Pet. 1^{11}), gospel (Rev. 14^{6}), God (Rom. 16^{26}, cf. Septuagint, Gen. 21^{33}), times (Rom. 16^{25}, 1 Tim. 1^{9}, Tit. 1^{2}), glory (2 Cor. 4^{17}, 2 Tim. 2^{10}, 1 Pet. 5^{10}), unseen things (2 Cor. 4^{18}), house in heaven (2 Cor. 5^{1}), consolation (2 Thess. 2^{16}), power (1 Tim. 6^{16}), the restoration of Onesimus to his master (Philem. ^{15}). These are all the cases in the New Testament. Let any one go over them and see what ground there is for the alleged uncertainty in the meaning of the word. What is gained by not translating the word, *i.e.* by using sounds without sense? "Aionian" God, salvation, Spirit, Gospel, glory, kingdom! What does this mean? The passage in Philemon may seem doubtful. But was not Onesimus restored to Philemon for ever? The implicit reference evidently is to the conversion of Onesimus, "whom I have begotten in my bonds," ver. 10. This has established a union that will never cease.

But this is not all the case. In addition to the adjective αἰώνιος, the noun αἰών is used in combination with prepositions sixty-seven times in the New Testament to express the same idea of unlimited duration. The use in doxologies to God is surely conclusive, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας (Rom. 1^{25}), εἰς πάσας τὰς γενεὰς τοῦ αἰῶνος τῶν αἰώνων (Eph. 3^{21}), εἰς πάντας τοὺς αἰῶνας (Jude ^{25}). These sixty-seven instances are all. In all, if eternal duration is not meant, what is? There is no exception. In all questions of meanings of words, the meanings of other forms of the same word are important evidence. If the use of the noun in these phrases confirmed the vague, uncertain meaning alleged, the fact would be felt to be of no mean weight.

We turn to the Old Testament. The adjective is used in the Septuagint eighty-two times, thrice of God (Gen. 21^{33}, Isa. 40^{28}, 26^{4}). It is used of the divine covenant seventeen times, of divine ordinances twenty-one times. If all the cases were given here, as in the New Testament above, it would be found hard to give a reason for assigning a limited duration in most

cases. The term is applied to mountains, hills, and "the bars of the earth" (Jonah 2^6), three times in all. As to the phrase "everlasting hills," it ought not to be made a difficulty. The poetical use of words does not disprove their ordinary use. No one can be under mistake as to what is meant. But, even granting that as used of "covenant, ordinance," and similar things, eternity in the strict sense cannot be meant, what is the explanation? Plainly, in any case the duration is vast, no end is thought of; or, to put it in another way, the duration is determined by the nature of the subject. We are content with this statement. On the doctrine that the soul is naturally immortal, eternal can only have one meaning in reference to it.

But the far more common method of describing eternity in the Septuagint is the second one mentioned, by *αἰών* and prepositions. In this phraseology the Septuagint copies the Hebrew, which is poor in adjectives. All the great references to eternity are put in this way. The phrase occurs scores and scores of times. It may be worth while to quote a few examples. "From everlasting to everlasting thou art," *ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἕως τοῦ αἰῶνος σὺ εἶ*, Ps. 90^2. "And live for ever," *καὶ ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, Gen. 3^{22}. "I live for ever," *Ζῶ ἐγὼ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, Deut. 32^{40}. "That inhabiteth eternity," *κατοικῶν τὸν αἰῶνα*, Isa. 57^{15}. *Αἰών* exactly corresponds to the Hebrew *Olam*.

Dr. Salmond says of the Hebrew *Olam:* "That it denotes *duration* admits of no question. . . . It is often used, indeed, as is the way with other terms, in a modified sense where the duration in view may be said to be indefinite rather than perpetual. But there is a large number of occurrences in which there can be no question that it has the proper sense of the *changeless* or *everlasting*. It is a solemn designation of God, his life, his dominion, his prerogative. It is the note of a doom that is fixed and irreversible as in the '*everlasting* contempt' of which Daniel speaks. In many passages the idea of the *endless* or *changeless* is made still more certain by the addition of amplify-

ing and explanatory clauses. The New Testament terms are the lineal descendants of these Old Testament expressions. The former came from the latter through the medium of the Septuagint. The 'eternal' of the New Testament inherits the whole fulness of meaning belonging to the 'eternal' of the Old Testament, and adds to it." "It is sometimes said that some less ambiguous word than αἰώνιος would have been used had it been intended to express the idea of the perpetuity of future retribution. But in point of fact there is no word, whether in English or in Greek, neither ἀΐδιος, ἀπέραντος, nor any other, that is not subject to the same variations or ambiguities, and liable to be dealt with as αἰώνιος is dealt with," pp. 650, 654.

The use of αἰώνιος in 2 Cor. 4[18] is significant: "The things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal." If αἰώνιος here has no definite temporal meaning, and if the meaning is not eternal, the antithesis is destroyed.

See Dr. Plumptre's essay on "The word Eternal" in *The Spirits in Prison*. His conclusions are—"(1) It is not proved that our Lord excluded duration from the idea of æonian life. (2) In every book of the New Testament, except the writings of St. John, I find this connotation as the obvious and natural meaning of the word æonian. (3) In St. John I find, with Mr. Maurice and Dr. Westcott, the effort to make men realise the thought that the eternal life, being eternal, exists in the present, has existed always in the past. (4) Æonian *death* is not found in Scripture. (5) I find it impossible to conceive of life, either human or divine, apart from the idea of duration."

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